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This study presents an exploration of the socio-legal foundations and traditions that govern 
alternative child care in a society bound by plural legal orders. It traces the problem of 
children without parental care in Mainland Tanzania to depict its magnitude and causes. 
Recognising the alleged weakening of the customary-law-regulated traditional child care 
system, the study looks at the formal alternative child care solutions under state law. The 
research presented is centred on child adoption as the most long-standing statutory measure 
offering a permanent family-based solution to the problem. Further, considering the prevalent 
socio-cultural and economic situation in Tanzania that defines the leading type of adopters, 
the study is designed to concentrate on adoptions by non-resident Tanzanians and resident 
non-Tanzanians. These two types of adoptions are categorised in this study as child adoptions 
with an international element.  
The examination of the law and practice of child adoption generally, and of adoptions with an 
international element in particular, is guided by the question ‘What is in the best interests of 
the child?’. The best interests of the child principle serves as a yardstick against which the 
capacity of the legal, policy, and institutional framework to manage child adoptions is 
measured in the study. Together with this framework, an evaluation of the child adoption 
practice, specifically regarding adherence to the law and protection of children in adoption, is 
made. Recognising the central role that ‘street-level bureaucrats’ play in the adoption process, 
the study also considers the effects on the process of their workplace dilemmas and coping 
mechanisms. Lastly, based on statistics of registered adoptions, the potential of child adoption 
as a solution to the problem of children without parental care and protection in Tanzania is 
reflected on. 
To conclude the study, answers are given to the main research questions based on the research 
findings. Hoping for a better way forward, ways to improve child adoption law and practice in 









Chapter 1:  Introduction 
“…the child occupies a unique and privileged position in the 
African society and that for the full and harmonious 
development of his personality, the child should grow up in a 
family environment in an atmosphere of happiness, love and 
understanding”1  
1.1 Subject of the Study 
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 19892 and the African Charter on 
the Rights and Welfare of the Child, 19903, which are fundamental international and African 
regional legal instruments on the rights of the child, agree that the family provides the best 
environment for a child to grow up in. However, both these instruments do not end with the 
family environment requirement but emphasise an atmosphere of happiness, love and 
understanding. Tanzania, the locale of this study, has ratified4 and domesticated these two 
instruments under the Law of the Child Act, 2009.5 Tanzania, therefore, is bound to ensure 
that children within its territory grow up in a family environment that offers happiness, love 
and understanding. To fully comprehend this duty, it is imperative to understand what a 
family is. 
‘Family’ is a term that is becoming increasingly difficult to define. This is because of its 
constant evolution and different views in different parts of the world concerning who belongs 
to the family. Time, place, and culture are, therefore, significant variables in defining the 
word family. In 1994, a group of family law experts authored an article that attempted to 
deconstruct the concept of family, specific to the ‘contemporary’ Eastern and Southern 
African region.6 They used the metaphor of ‘parting the long grass’, which translates the need 
to dive deep into African society to understand what constitutes the African family. The 
authors wielded family function as a tool with which to part the long grass and 
 
1 Preamble statement (No.4) to the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child: ACRWC (11 July 
1990); A similar preamble statement (No.6) is found in the Convention on the Rights of the Child: UNCRC 
(Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 44/25 of 20 
November 1989); and preamble statement (No. 1) in the Hague Convention on Protection of Children and 
Cooperation in respect of Intercountry Adoption (29 May 1993). 
2 United Nations, Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989. 
3 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, 1990. 
4 Tanzania ratified the UNCRC on 10th June 1991 according to the UN depositary information available at 
https://treaties.un.org/ and the ACRWC on 16th March 2003 according to the ratification table available at 
https://www.acerwc.africa/ratifications-table/. 
5 Law of the Child Act, 2009 Act No. 21 of 2009, [CAP. 13 R.E. 2019]. 
6 Bart Rwezaura, Alice Armstrong, Welshman Ncube, Julie Stewart, Puleng Letuka, Priscilla Musanya, Isabel 
Casimiro, Mothokoa Mamashela, “Parting the Long Grass: Revealing and Reconceptualising the African 




reconceptualise the ever-transforming African family.7 They looked at the specific cultural 
and historical contexts as well as the internal and external definitions of the family. In doing 
so, they acknowledged that the family remains the smallest unit of society in many cultures.8 
However, divergent formations, structures, sizes and functions of the family create various 
family forms that differ considerably from both Western conventional and African traditional 
concepts.9 These variations influence how family membership is defined. Further, depending 
on the purpose and context of the definition, family membership also varies.10  
In most African cultures, family refers to a relationship based on blood ties formed from 
common descent.11 This definition, the authors found, relies heavily on the pre-capitalist and 
subsistence agricultural economy era, and excludes modern conceptualisations of the family. 
They established that, in the contemporary world, definitions of the family should not be 
limited by kinship ties but also consider residence links.12 Today, various other factors such as 
marital, artificial, and legal links that are diverse and evolving come into play. Along with the 
numerous considerations, law, without a doubt, stands as a significant component in the 
conceptualisation of family. Perceptions of the family can differ considerably, depending on 
the constitutive, regulatory, and enforceable roles of law and the influence of lawmakers, 
interpreters, and implementers.13 This applies not only to formal state law, but also to 
informal traditional and religious laws in the African context.14 Family, therefore, in the legal 
context of African societies is characterised by conceptual pluralities. This is because plural 
systems of law define relationships, links, rights, and obligations that constitute a family and 
its membership.  
However, the authors of the above-mentioned article found that, in the African legal 
pluralistic setting, despite acknowledging the role of informal laws in creating and regulating 
the family, formal law may have the upper hand in influencing how people define the 
family.15 In Tanzania, family is a legal field whose legal regulation is among the most 
 
7 The authors used family function as a framework for conceptualising the family, ibid., at p. 29. 
8 Ibid., at p. 26. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid., at p. 28. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid., at p. 29. 
13 Ibid., at pp. 29-30. 
14 See the discussion on the interplay between formal and informal law in the definition of the family, ibid., at 
pp. 30-31. 
15 The authors arrive at this conclusion through considering the central role of state law in providing a wider 




pluralistic.16 For the purpose of setting the scene for this study, this part concentrates on state 
law which, apart from providing the framework for the operation of other systems of law, is 
the primary focus in relation to the subject of the study, child adoption with an international 
element. Several legislations, in one way or another, govern the family in Tanzania. In this 
study, the Law of the Child Act, 2009, takes centre stage. Section 3 of the Act defines the 
term family inclusively as meaning the “parental father, mother and children, adopted or 
blood-related and other close relatives including grandfather, grandmother, uncles, aunts, 
cousins, nephews and nieces who live in a household”. This definition combines both the 
kinship and residence links approach to the conceptualisation of a family. Also, it adds a legal 
link to family formation, which is child adoption. In adoption, family membership is a purely 
legal creation that does not depend on biological ties. Section 2 of the Adoption of Children 
Regulations, 2012 defines child adoption as a measure that provides permanent family care 
for a child deprived of his or her family environment. Thus, it is a type of family formation 
that opens up membership of a family to a child in need of family care and protection.  
A group of family law scholars has maintained that a child is a family member, irrespective of 
how that family is defined.17 Therefore, the question arises as to when a child is deprived of 
the environment which family membership guarantees. To address this question, family 
environment is construed here as the surroundings in which the family cares for and protects 
its children.18 In the ordinary course of life, children born into a family may be forced to live 
outside that family environment for diverse reasons. These may include loss of parents due to 
war or diseases such as HIV/AIDS, parents’ physical or mental disability, breakdown of the 
family, a decline in the family economy, abuse, neglect, abandonment, or exposure to 
significant harm within the family.19 Articles 20 and 25 of the UNCRC and ACRWC 
respectively require states to ensure the provision of an alternative family environment for 
children who for any reason are permanently or temporarily deprived of their family 
 
16 A reference to legal pluralism in family regulation can be found in the provisions of the Judicature and 
Application of Laws Act (JALA) [Cap. 358 R.E. 2019] and Law of Marriage Act, 1971. 
17 Explained in detail through the contributions in the book that defines an African child, childhood, and child 
rights in the context of law, culture and tradition in Eastern and Southern Africa. Welshman Ncube (ed.), Law, 
culture, tradition and children's rights in Eastern and Southern Africa (Dartmouth: Ashgate, 1998). 
18 The meaning of a 'family environment' is considered in chapter 2 on the conceptualisation of care and child 
adoption. It is also discussed by Ulrike Wanitzek in “Child Adoption and Foster Care in the Context of Legal 
Pluralism: Case Studies from Ghana”, in E. Alber, J. Martin, C. Notermans (eds.), Child fostering in West 
Africa: New perspectives on theory and practices (Boston: Brill, 2013), at p. 226. 
19 Wanitzek provides a list of grounds on which children may be without parental care in her article; Ulrike 
Wanitzek, “Legal pluralism under the influence of globalisation: a case study of child adoption in Tanzania”, in 
A. Peters; L. Koechlin; T. Förster; G.F. Zinkernagel (eds.), Non-state actors as standard setters (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009), at p. 468; Section 16 of the Law of the Child Act, 2009 defines a child in 
need of care and protection and provides a comprehensive list of ways in which children may be deprived of 




environment or in their own best interests cannot remain in it. Among the listed alternatives is 
child adoption, a measure that provides a family to a child who is permanently deprived of his 
or her family environment or can never return to it.20  
The global community devised child adoption to ensure that a child without the care of his or 
her birth parents can grow up in a stable family-based environment.21 The Tanzanian society, 
for instance, through traditional care arrangements, has practised child adoption since time 
immemorial.22 In the past, depending on the reasons why a child was deprived of his or her 
family environment, members of the extended family or community usually adopted him or 
her through child care arrangements based on customary law.23 These arrangements prevailed 
until formal regulation of child adoption was introduced in Tanganyika (now Tanzania 
mainland) by the British in 1942.24 The English Adoption of Children Act of 1926, which 
introduced statutory child adoption in England, formed the basis for formal adoption law in 
Tanganyika.25 The adoption law in Tanganyika continued to reflect developments in the 
English law of adoption, which led to the Adoption Ordinance of 1953.26 Since then, and for a 
long time, the same adoption law applied in Tanzania, save only for minor amendments.27 
However, the Law of the Child Act, enacted in 2009, marked the end of the long service of 
the English-based law of adoption. Section 160(1) of the Act repealed the Adoption of 
Children Act, 1953. 
This study examines child adoption as provided for under the Law of the Child Act, 2009, 
particularly in cases with an international element. These include adoptions by non-resident 
 
20 The ACRWC does not list child adoption under Article 25 but instead provides for it separately under Article 
24.  
21 See the historical background to child adoption and its laws as explicated in United Nations Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, Child Adoption: Trends and Policies (New York: United 
Nations, 2009), at pp. 5-31. 
22 See Barthazar A. Rwezaura, Ulrike Wanitzek, “The Law and Practice Relating to the Adoption of Children in 
Tanzania”, Journal of African Law 32(2) (1988), at pp. 124–63. 
23 Wanitzek, “Legal pluralism under the influence of globalisation: a case study of child adoption in Tanzania”, 
above footnote 19, at pp. 466-468. 
24 Adoption of Infants Ordinance, 1942 (Ordinance No. 5 of 1942); applied together with Adoption of Infants 
Rules, 1942 (GN 321 of 1942); as explained in Rwezaura, Wanitzek, “The Law and Practice Relating to the 
Adoption of Children in Tanzania”, above footnote 22, at pp. 124 and 126. 
25 Lowe, Nigel V. and Douglas, Gillian, Bromley's Family Law (Oxford: Univ. Press, 2007), at p. 818; and in 
Rwezaura, Wanitzek, “The Law and Practice Relating to the Adoption of Children in Tanzania”, above footnote 
22, at p. 126. 
26 Adoption Ordinance, 1953, Ordinance No. 42 of 1953 [R.L. CAP. 335] which according to section 5 of the 
Second Schedule to the Ordinance must be read together with Adoption of Infants Rules, 1942 as explained in 
Rwezaura, Wanitzek, “The Law and Practice Relating to the Adoption of Children in Tanzania”, above footnote 
22, at p. 126. 
27 For instance, some amendments were effected in 1962 and 1968 by GN No. 478 of 1962 and Act No. 4 of 
1968, as explained in fn. 3 in Rwezaura, Wanitzek, “The Law and Practice Relating to the Adoption of Children 
in Tanzania”, above footnote 22, at p. 124; also see Wanitzek, “Legal pluralism under the influence of 
globalisation: a case study of child adoption in Tanzania”, above footnote 19, at p. 474. In 2002 the Ordinance 




Tanzanians and resident non-Tanzanians as specified in sections 62 and 74 of the Act. The 
study uses a socio-legal approach to investigate the capacity of the current legal, policy, and 
institutional framework to regulate child adoption by these two groups of adopters. While 
taking stock of the existing legal pluralistic setting and child protection issues, the study uses 
the best interests of the child principle as a yardstick against which the effectiveness of the 
framework is measured. 
1.2 Background to the Study 
First and foremost, as already stated, Tanzania (then Tanganyika) is one of the countries 
which had a modern child adoption law quite early during or after the Second World War 
(WWII).28 Subject to amendments from time to time, the English-based adoption legislation 
operated in Tanzania from 1942-2009. Despite this long period, there was remarkably low use 
of the law. The UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs reported Tanzania to be 
among the countries with the lowest child adoption rates in the world.29 In answering the 
question ‘how common is adoption’, the Department used three different indicators to 
measure the outcomes. All three indicators showed formal adoption to be relatively 
uncommon in Tanzania.30 First, in adoptions of children below 18 years, Tanzania had the 
rate of one adoption for every million persons under 18. Second, in adoptions of children 
under five years of age, the country had the rate of less than two children for every million 
children within the age group. Lastly, calculating the adoption ratio to get the number of 
adoptions in every 100,000 live births, the Department found Tanzania to have a ratio of 
about one adoption per 100,000 live births. Considering these research findings and other 
comparisons drawn with countries such as China, Russia and the USA, the report concluded 
that generally, the number of children adopted was lower than those in foster care or 
institutions.31 This report motivated the decision to study child adoption in Tanzania from a 
socio-legal perspective, to find out, among others, why the formal law of child adoption is not 
utilised. 
In the late 1980s, Rwezaura and Wanitzek researched the law and practice of child adoption 
in Tanzania.32 The study examined the formal law of child adoption based on the Adoption of 
Children Act, 1953 and critically analysed its practice. The resultant article provided not only 
 
28 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA), Population Division, Child Adoption: 
Trends and Policies (New York: United Nations, 2009), at p. 15. 
29 Ibid., at pp. 66-68. 
30 See ibid., at p. 68. 
31 Ibid., at p. 66. 





a legal but also a social perspective regarding child adoption practice. It discussed, among 
others, the social classification of Tanzanian society and how socialisation of the given 
classes influenced preferences for formal child adoption. The article also portrayed existing 
legal pluralism (including customary and religious laws), which determined how different 
clusters of society members arranged for the care of their children. These aspects sparked the 
present author’s interest in this subject. Specifically, Rwezaura and Wanitzek unveiled 
motivations for child adoption among people of different descent or belonging to different 
ethnic groups in Tanzanian society, inspiring further research.33 This study is focused on two 
groups, resident non-Tanzanians and non-resident Tanzanians, whose child adoption practices 
depicted in the article raised questions that justified further research.34 Also, in their 
concluding remarks in the article, the authors called for a comprehensive law of the child. The 
Parliament of Tanzania enacted the said law in 2009. 
The Law of the Child Act, 2009 provides comprehensive coverage of the law and rights of the 
Tanzanian child. The Act and its framework of Regulations provide for child adoption law 
and procedure. The enactment of a child adoption law that reflects Tanzanian socio-cultural 
values rather than colonial ones further spurred the present author’s interest in socio-legal 
research on child adoption. A study on how the new law addresses some of the issues raised 
in Rwezaura and Wanitzek’s work on the previous Act seemed crucial. This study, therefore, 
examines the law, policy, procedure, institutions, and practice relating to child adoption based 
on the legal framework established under the Law of the Child Act, 2009. The study makes 
specific reference to adoptions by resident non-Tanzanians and non-resident Tanzanians, for 
whom the new law has provisions that are articulated more comprehensively than under the 
Adoption of Children Act, 1953. 
Lastly, the present author elected to focus on child adoption by resident non-Tanzanians and 
non-resident Tanzanians because they have at least three advantages over resident 
Tanzanians. First, these two groups of people are not affected by the socio-economic situation 
prevalent in the country in the same way as resident Tanzanians. Second, because of their 
exposure to foreign culture, specifically Western culture, they are more disposed to use the 
formal law of child adoption for providing care and protection for children in need. Third, a 
more significant percentage of resident non-Tanzanians are not subjects of customary law. An 
exception is those married to Tanzanian spouses who are subjects of customary law. The 
 
33 See ibid., at pp. 134-142. 
34 See the discussion on how immigration and welfare laws of other countries have affected child adoption 
practices. Also, on how the judges in Tanzania have determined child adoption in the best interest of the child in 




Tanzanian spouses may, to some extent, expose their non-Tanzanian spouses to the law’s 
influence. Also, while a considerable number of non-resident Tanzanians may still be subjects 
of customary law due to their continuing relations with their family back home, they are only 
so to different extents and in different ways compared to resident Tanzanians. Hence, these 
two groups of adopters are not affected by the interpretative and practical complications 
arising from legal pluralism in child adoption in the same way as resident Tanzanians. 
However, they are subject to international law, the laws of their countries of origin or 
domicile, and to the regulations of the foreign national and international institutions involved 
in the adoption process. Thus, the multiplicity of legal systems complied with in the adoption 
procedure may still challenge the promotion and protection of the child’s best interests. 
Hence, the decision to carry out this study. The above factors pushed and pulled the study 
towards the subject of child adoption law and practice, with a special focus on adoptions by 
resident non-Tanzanians and non-resident Tanzanians. 
1.3 The Research Problem 
The Law of the Child Act, 2009, is the first comprehensive law of the child in Tanzania. 
However, despite its recent and extensive enactment, some legal and practical issues remain a 
challenge regarding the provision of a family environment for children deprived of their own. 
This study mainly considers the challenges posed in child adoption. In this part, the researcher 
describes the main issues that prompted the study and lists the questions the study sought to 
answer.  
1.3.1 Statement of the Problem 
All countries in the world, irrespective of their economic affluence, have their share of 
children deprived of their family environment. For Tanzania, a third-world country in sub-
Saharan Africa, the number of such children is on a steady increase. For the longest time, 
kinship and community-based care were the solution to the plight of these children. 
Unfortunately, due to the prevailing socio-economic conditions in the country, the informal 
care net is now threadbare. As part of the solution, the state has devised formal measures of 
alternative child care, including care by relatives, fit persons, foster parents, and residential 
child care facilities. In addition, for children who cannot remain in or return to their birth 
families, the state provides formal child adoption as an option that offers a permanent solution 
to their situation. However, even with the available range of formal care options, Tanzania 




Law of the Child Act, 2009, provides for and regulates alternative child care in the country. 
Child adoption is among the formal care measures provided under the Act, for which it 
attempts comprehensive provision. It adds legal options in respect of child adoption that did 
not exist in the previous law. These additions include child adoption by non-resident 
Tanzanians under section 62 of the Act.35 Also, for adoptions by resident non-Tanzanians, 
which existed in the previous law, the Act offers more explicit cover under section 74.  
This study provides a limited situational analysis of formal alternative child care measures in 
Tanzania’s law and practice. The specific focus of the research is on regulation of the two 
child adoption categories provided under sections 62 and 74 of the Act. The legal, policy and 
institutional frameworks established to regulate the two types of child adoption are critically 
examined in the study. At the same time, primarily due to the international element in the 
selected child adoptions, the study considers the effects of legal pluralism and examines the 
resulting child protection issues. Considering the role the best interest of the child principle is 
required to play under the provisions of the Law of the Child Act, 2009 and the Adoption of 
Children Regulations, 2012, the law and practice of child adoption are measured against the 
principle’s dictates.  
1.3.2 Research Questions 
The study seeks to answer the following questions: 
1. whether the existing legal, policy, and institutional framework has the capacity to 
adequately manage child adoptions with an international element; 
2. whether the legal process for child adoptions by non-resident Tanzanians and resident 
non-Tanzanians is in the best interest of the child;  
3. whether the law and practice in respect of child adoption guarantee sufficient 
protection to the child in the adoption process; and 
4. whether child adoption, especially by non-resident Tanzanians and resident non-
Tanzanians, can help to alleviate the problem of children deprived of parental care in 
Tanzania. 
1.4 Purpose of the Study 
This study aims to critically analyse the legal, policy, and institutional framework in respect 
of child adoption in Tanzania in order to determine its capacity to handle child adoption in 
conformity with the principle of the child’s best interests. It intends to generate knowledge 
 





which could motivate changes in implementing the best interests of the child principle in 
terms of its interpretation, determination, and application. In doing so, the author hopes that 
concerned institutions would be better informed and placed to ensure robust child protection 
in the child adoption process. Lastly, the study seeks to lay a foundation for an enhanced 
formulation of law and policy on child adoption in Tanzania to improve child adoption 
practices in the country. As an outcome of the study, the law in respect of formal child 
adoption could be used suitably to address the problem of children deprived of their family 
environment in Tanzania. 
1.5 Scope of the Study 
The study investigates the legal, policy and institutional framework on child adoption in 
Tanzania Mainland, with a focus on child adoption by non-resident Tanzanians and resident 
non-Tanzanians. While it examines the entire formal child adoption law and procedure, it 
focuses on adoptions by the two groups of persons mentioned. The primary law under study is 
the Law of the Child Act, 2009 and the Regulations made under it. In connection with the 
law, and to a limited extent, the study explores national policies and other instruments, such 
as guidelines, strategies and plans relating to child welfare in so far as they impact child 
adoption. The study also investigates the factors, circumstances, and processes involved in 
child adoption in Tanzania. The study considers these aspects through the lens of enacted 
child protection laws and procedures. In doing so, it also deals to some extent with the 
prevailing situation regarding alternative child care, in order to lay a foundation for 
understanding child adoption practices in the country. The focus of the study is on formal 
(statutory) rather than informal (traditional) alternative child care arrangements.  
The study examines compliance with the best interests of the child principle in child adoption 
practices. It does so by considering international, regional, and national legal provisions on 
the principle and their interpretation and application in child adoption practice. It investigates 
conformity with the principle as far as it relates to administrative and judicial decisions in 
child adoption.  
This study is based in Tanzania Mainland. Any references to Tanzania Zanzibar and its laws 
are mainly for comparison or clarification, or for drawing lessons. The author conducted 
qualitative field and desk research using interviews and documentary analysis on child 
adoption law and practice, and was less concerned with gathering quantitative data relating to 
child adoptions in Tanzania. Therefore, as far as the study refers to statistical data on child 
adoption, it does so only for the purpose of understanding child adoption trends and practices 




emphasis was not on the number of research participants but on their roles and characteristics, 
which were essential for answering the research questions. Hence, the data collected and 
analysed is not statistically representative of the phenomena discussed in this study; rather, it 
is descriptive and explanatory. 
Psychosocial and emotional aspects of child adoption experienced pre- or post-adoption are 
not within the scope of the subject covered by this study. Any references to these aspects are 
limited to understanding the social life and culture of members of the adoption triad, research 
participants, and Tanzanians at large. Also, a full exploration of Tanzanian culture and 
traditions relating to child welfare was not within the purview of the study due to time, 
finance, and human resource constraints. Therefore, the study only makes general references 
to these facets without any specific focus on ethnic groups in Tanzania. Mainly, it uses the 
theories of legal pluralism and street-level bureaucracy to draw inferences regarding cultural 
practices and effects. 
1.6 Research Methodology 
This section describes how the study was designed to obtain valid and reliable answers to the 
research questions and attain the research objectives. It attempts to provide a comprehensive 
description of the research procedure by answering the how and why of the adopted research 
strategy and technique. In a nutshell, this part seeks to ensure that the reader understands how 
the researcher obtained the research findings, and interpreted, analysed, presented and 
discussed them in this study.  
1.6.1 Area of Research 
The research for this study took place in Mainland Tanzania. The researcher selected three 
cities as the central research locations: Dar es Salaam, Dodoma, and Arusha. These cities 
were selected, first, because they host the headquarters of most of the governmental, 
intergovernmental, and non-governmental institutions or organisations operating in the 
subject area of the study. Dar es Salaam has been for a long time the centre of government 
business. This has only recently changed when Dodoma officially became the capital city and 
the government’s centre.36 As a result, the government ministries key to this study were 
moved to Dodoma. These include the Ministry of Health, Community Development, Gender, 
Elderly and Children, the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Ministry of Constitutional and 
Legal Affairs.  On this ground, Dodoma was identified as one of the research sites. However, 
Dar es Salaam still hosts the principal offices of most public and private authorities related to 
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this study. Arusha, nick-named ‘Geneva of Africa’, on the other hand, headquarters many 
international organisations. This was one of the reasons for selecting Arusha as a research site 
because it has a higher number of foreign residents than other regions. The presence of non-
Tanzanians in a place may affect the number of adoptions by ‘foreigners’.37 Whether this is 
reflected in the field will be reported in the following chapters. High Court Registries in both 
Dar es Salaam and Arusha favoured them as research areas for this study. 
Second, Dar es Salaam is the most thriving commercial city in Tanzania. It hosts many 
businesses, from the biggest to the smallest. This makes it the largest city in Tanzania in terms 
of population, which is extremely diverse. Most investors, foreign and local, settle in Dar es 
Salaam. Due to its status as the former centre of government business, the city also hosts most 
of the political elite. In addition, the state established Tanzania’s first university in Dar es 
Salaam, which means that the academic elite is concentrated in the city as well. In short, Dar 
es Salaam assembles high profile people in Tanzania who are the most likely to take part in 
child adoption with an international element.38 This population has the highest probability of 
containing non-Tanzanians working or living in Tanzania. 
Third, the touristic nature of Dar es Salaam and Arusha also played a part in deciding to 
choose these cities. Touristic arrivals in Tanzania are most likely to pass through the Julius 
Nyerere International Airport in Dar es Salaam or the Kilimanjaro International Airport, 
which is very close to Arusha. This makes the two cities default destinations for many 
tourists. Dar es Salaam acts as a point of transit to other touristic places, such as Bagamoyo 
and Zanzibar, while Arusha is the centre for a considerable percentage of touristic attractions 
in Tanzania. It is thus ‘a must go to’ for most tourists. Tourism was a factor in selecting sites 
for field research because of its potential to influence the transit or settlement of a large 
number of non-Tanzanians. Residence is a prerequisite for child adoption by non-Tanzanians. 
Touristic visits may expose them to a level of socio-economic interaction that, for different 
reasons, may lead them to adopt children in Tanzania.39 
The field research for this study did not cover the entire regions of Dar es Salaam, Arusha and 
Dodoma, but only selected districts. These included Kinondoni, Ilala and Temeke districts for 
Dar es Salaam, and Arusha Town for Arusha. These are the earliest formed districts in these 
regions with local government structures that have operated for a long time; hence, they have 
 
37 Section 74 of the Law of the Child Act, 2009 [Cap. 13 R.E. 2019] uses this terminology when referring to non-
Tanzanians. 
38 Rwezaura, Wanitzek, in “The Law and Practice Relating to the Adoption of Children in Tanzania”, above 
footnote 22, found that the elite among people of African descent and non-Africans were the most likely to use 
the formal law of child adoption during the periods investigated by them. 




more experience than districts that were formed later. For Dar es Salaam, this was the main 
reason for selecting these three districts rather than Ubungo and Kigamboni, which are 
relatively new. Arusha Town was selected since it is the centre of the region and likely to 
have had more experience of child adoption than the other districts.  
1.6.2 Research Design 
‘Design’ here refers to the framework of research methods and techniques which provides a 
coherent plan that the researcher utilised to address the research questions through data 
collection, interpretation, analysis, and discussion. This is a socio-legal study that uses a 
qualitative research design with a descriptive approach. The research methods and approaches 
were selected after considering how best they could tackle the research questions and remain 
realistic in terms of the available time and financial resources.40 The researcher also 
considered the list of research design aspects that Lewis considers key. These include research 
questions, research settings and populations (sampling), data collection time frames, data 
collection methods, and negotiation of research relationships (access and ethics).41 In the 
course of the study, these aspects were not fixed at any time before and during the actual 
research but remained flexible and changing consonant with experiences in the field.42  
Since this is a qualitative study, it uses “people’s own written or spoken words and observable 
behaviour” to investigate the law, policies, institutional setup and practice in respect of child 
adoption with an international element in Tanzania.43 However, being socio-legal in nature, it 
is also based on a considerable degree of documentary analysis, largely of relevant legal 
instruments. The study, therefore, combines the examination and analysis of legal and other 
documents with knowledge of practice gathered through field research. It unveils the general 
strengths and weaknesses of the law on child adoption and its implementation, while 
specifically measuring it against the dictates of the best interests of the child principle. In 
addition, the study considers compliance with ratified and domesticated international and 
regional legal instruments on the law and rights of the child. On the institutional front, it 
focuses mainly on the functioning of social welfare institutions and courts and their legal and 
 
40 Advice on good methodological practice provided by Jane Lewis, “Design Issues”, in Ritchie, Jane and Lewis, 
Jane (eds.), Qualitative research practice: A guide for social science students and researchers (Los Angeles, 
California: SAGE, 2003), at p. 47; Also available in an updated edition, Jane Ritchie, Jane Lewis (eds.), 
Qualitative research practice: A guide for social science students and researchers (London: SAGE, 2014). In 
this study, reference is made to the earlier edition of 2003. 
41 Lewis, “Design Issues”, above footnote 40, at pp. 47-48 and explained in detail in the chapter. 
42 Flexibility is a fundamental characteristic of qualitative research as stated in Steven J. Taylor, Robert Bogdan, 
Marjorie DeVault, Introduction to qualitative research methods: A guidebook and resource (Hoboken, New 
Jersey: Wiley, 2016), at p. 29; and also by Lewis, “Design Issues”, above footnote 40, at p. 47. 
43 For a description of what qualitative methodology entails, see Taylor, Bogdan, DeVault, Introduction to 




technical challenges in matters of child adoption practice. The study also considers the need 
for the child to be sufficiently protected pre and post child adoption. In all this, the study takes 
into account legal pluralism and street-level bureaucracy in a way that allows an exploration 
of how these affect child adoption law and practice in Tanzania. In this way, the research 
design caters to the research questions. 
1.6.3 Research Approaches, Methods and Instruments 
This part elaborates further on the research design aspects mentioned above. It provides 
detailed information regarding research approaches, methods and instruments employed in 
this study. 
1.6.3.1 Research Approaches 
This study is mainly qualitative. It describes the law and procedure through which child 
adoption is carried out in Tanzania in order to be able to answer the research questions. Data 
collection that reliably and validly produced the required information necessitated desk 
research typical for legal researchers, coupled with field research standard in most social 
science fields. The researcher, therefore, gathered information through exploration of 
documentary sources at the desk and in the field, combined with live interaction with selected 
respondents in the field.  
A small portion of this study is quantitative. It uses an “alongside statistical enquiry” to 
accompany the qualitative research.44 The researcher has thus collected, analysed, presented 
and discussed a small amount of statistical data relating to, among others, the number of 
registered adoptions, adoption petitions and orders, and the difference in numbers of non-
Tanzanian as compared to Tanzanian adopters. For this data set, a quantitative documentary 
survey was conducted, and the data are presented in several figures in chapter six. 
Explanations of the data collection methods that were utilised are given in part 1.6.3.2. 
1.6.3.1.1 Field Research  
Field research gathers primary data through direct interaction between the researcher and the 
subjects of research in the environment in which they naturally exist, live, work or play. In 
this study, field research did not consist only of the actual collection of data but entailed an 
extensive procedure. It  included preparing the plans for field research and their actual 
execution; the whole process of travelling to and in the field; identifying data sources; 
organising access to the research settings and respondents by dealing with permits, ethical 
 
44 Jane Ritchie, “The Applications of Qualitative Methods to Social Research”, in Ritchie, Jane and Lewis, Jane 
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issues and gatekeepers; choosing the most suitable methods of data collection and adjusting 
them when the need arose; recording of data in the field through taking field notes, document 
scans and photocopies, and audio recording; and later, interpreting and analysing the data. In 
the parts below on fieldwork and data collection, the entire processes involved are described.   
The field research for this study was carried out in three phases. The first phase was from 
December 2017 to March 2018; the second phase from December 2018 to March 2019; and 
the third and last phase in January 2020. In all three phases, the targeted research participants 
remained the same. In the third phase, which was purely follow-up research, the researcher 
communicated with only a few intended participants. The second research phase was more 
productive than the first, which mainly served as ‘setting the scene’ for research. The section 
below on methodological challenges explains the reasons.  
1.6.3.1.2 Desk Research 
Desk research in this study refers to exploring library and internet resources that were not 
field sources of data. At the desk, legal instruments, court judgements and orders, scholarly 
works, and various reports relating to the subject of the study were reviewed. Their themes 
included, but were not limited to, child care and protection, child adoption, the best interests 
of the child principle, legal pluralism, street-level bureaucracy, globalisation, and other topics 
pertinent to the study. The researcher accessed materials from physical and virtual libraries, as 
well as other internet resources. Various national and international, governmental and non-
governmental, academic and non-academic, legal and non-legal websites were accessed to 
obtain information needed for the study. 
Physical libraries that were accessible to the researcher without being in field research settings 
include the University of Bayreuth libraries, especially the central, law, business and 
economics, and Chair of African Legal Studies (former Law in Africa) libraries; the 
University of Dar es Salaam main and law libraries; the TGCL libraries in Dar es Salaam and 
Bayreuth, and the private library of Professor Ulrike Wanitzek.  
1.6.3.2 Research Methods 
The main research methods employed in this study were semi-structured interviews and 
documentary analysis. Interviews were held with personnel at the respective institutions and 
identified key informants (see Table 1-1 Data Sources below). As well, documents pertaining 
to child adoption were examined and analysed at the institutions visited. The researcher also 
undertook a partial quantitative survey of statistical data from the Adopted Children Register 




In a few research settings and with specific respondents, it became imperative for the 
researcher to use other data collection methods, such as written interviews, observation, and 
impromptu focused group discussions. The scenarios that called for this kind of flexibility in 
the field are explained briefly below under ‘other methods’. 
1.6.3.2.1 Semi-structured Interviews 
Maintaining a reasonable degree of structure and avoiding rigidity in obtaining information 
from identified respondents led the researcher to settle for semi-structured interviews. This 
made it possible to introduce themes for discussion by using open-ended questions and then 
leaving the respondents to share their experience and knowledge. This type of interview also 
allowed for spontaneity because it was possible to follow up on relevant information the 
respondents mentioned during the interviews. The interviews allowed for almost free 
interaction between the researcher and respondents. The researcher only used minimal subtle 
probes and prompts to mine information from the interviewees.45 This way, the interviewees 
were encouraged to provide their opinions and suggest solutions related to the research 
problem.  
The language used in most of the interviews was Kiswahili, the national language of 
Tanzania. Code-mixing Kiswahili and English was ubiquitous when interviewing persons 
whose professions involved regular use of the English language, which is the official 
language or one of the official languages (such as academics, judges, magistrates, and 
lawyers). Research settings where the interview was conducted entirely in English involved 
participants who were non-Tanzanian.  
Although taping of interviews would have been the best way of obtaining an utterly reliable 
recording of the interview proceedings, this was not a possibility in this study in most cases. 
The confidential nature of adoption and the political environment that prevailed at the time of 
field research impeded audio recording of public officers and persons responding in their 
professional capacity. Only two respondents gave their consent to an audio recording – a 
professor of law and a resident non-Tanzanian adopter. Therefore, the interview data collected 
and analysed in this study stems mainly from field notes. The researcher took notes as 
comprehensively as possible during the interviews, and later on the same day read and 
supplemented them with remembered bits and pieces left out in the notes taken during the 
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Interviews”, in Ritchie, Jane and Lewis, Jane (ed.), Qualitative research practice: A guide for social science 




interview. As much as possible, the interviews were recorded in the interviewee’s language 
and the interviewee’s original words.  
The researcher held interviews with assigned personnel from the public offices accessed by 
the study. In the case of individual key informants, the researcher approached those who fit 
the criteria of the sampling method used in this study. Key informants interviewed included 
law practitioners such as judges, court officials and advocates; experts on child adoption such 
as academics and social workers; and adopters. Ordinary citizens also participated by 
answering a few questions meant to gauge their awareness of child adoption law and practice 
(random selection at church, on the street and in WhatsApp groups in which the researcher 
was or still is a participant). 
1.6.3.2.2 Documentary Analysis  
The analysis of documents was another empirical research method used for this study. 
Reliable information regarding the nature of adoption in practice, adoption petition 
proceedings, and orders were retrievable from relevant documentary sources. The Adopted 
Children Register and child adoption court records, rulings and orders were the most 
frequently used sources. The researcher accessed these documents at the Registration, 
Insolvency and Trusteeship Agency (RITA) offices in Dar es Salaam, Resident Magistrates 
and High Courts’ libraries, and court case files and registers in Dar es Salaam and Arusha. 
Children’s statistical data was obtained from the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS); 
information on child care and protection from the Department of Social Welfare of the 
Ministry of Health, Community Development, Gender, Elderly and Children; legislative 
history and official versions of legal instruments relating to child adoption from the library of 
the Parliament of Tanzania (Hansards) and Office of the Attorney General law collection in 
Dodoma; and data on various topics from children’s organisations and homes operating in 
Tanzania.  
The researcher visited institutions hosting the documents mentioned above during field 
research (see part 1.6.4.4 on sampling and data sources below). However, some of the needed 
information that was not accessible during field research was later found online on the 
institutions’ websites. Thus, for this study, documentary analysis was a data collection method 
that involved both field and desk research. 
1.6.3.2.3 Quantitative Survey 
As mentioned above, quantitative methods were applied to a smaller extent in order to 
complement the qualitative research on child adoption by collecting data about the same 




alongside qualitative research among respondents who kept statistical records relating to child 
adoption. These included the Adopted Children Register at RITA offices, court registers of 
adoption petitions, social welfare department registers of foster care and child adoption 
applicants, National Bureau of Statistics publications, and records found in children’s homes 
and other organisations. The quantitative survey was undertaken to collect data required to 
establish specific child adoption statistics. Ancillary to that was the need to check data 
recording and keeping capacities in these institutions. The statistical enquiry was directly 
connected with documentary analysis as most of the statistical data was extracted from 
documents.  
1.6.3.2.4 Other Research Methods 
During field research, circumstances necessitated employing other research methods that the 
field research plans did not envision. Since qualitative research should be flexible, this did not 
pose a problem but rather enriched the data collection process. Two methods that the 
researcher had to resort to are group discussions and observation. It was research settings 
involving social welfare officers that called for the use of these methods.  
The researcher held impromptu group discussions with four to five social welfare officers in 
two instances. The first time was at the Department of Social Welfare offices in Dar es 
Salaam in March 2018, and the second was at the Kinondoni Municipal Council social 
welfare department offices in Dar es Salaam, in January-February 2019. The discussions 
occurred in the work settings of the social welfare officers when the researcher visited their 
offices for interviews. They took place pre and post the scheduled interview with the 
designated respondent.  The topic of discussion was child adoption in Tanzania generally, and 
especially how the officers and other Tanzanians perceive it.  
The research setting in the social welfare department offices in the Kinondoni Municipal 
Council in Dar es Salaam warranted the use of observation to collect data. The researcher 
visited these offices for two weeks, in which, among others, she conducted interviews, 
perused record files on child care and protection, and discussed child adoption issues with the 
officers. During this entire time, the social welfare officers carried on with their duties as 
usual. Even the interviews were interrupted at times with questions from fellow officers or 
clients. In the bustle of their work, the researcher sometimes had to sit unattended and was 
able to observe the goings-on. This gave her a first-rate ticket to observe street-level 
bureaucrats in action. The researcher took notes on the observed activities and behaviour of 




1.6.3.3 Research Instruments 
To efficiently use the selected research methods to collect, measure and analyse data, it was 
necessary to identify and develop suitable research tools. Apart from the research methods 
that directly determine the tools to be used, other criteria were considered before selecting the 
research tools. These included available time, financial budget, human resources for research, 
and the capacity of the tools to collect valid and reliable data. 
1.6.3.3.1 Interview Guides 
Semi-structured interviews usually use pre-mapped interview guides to lead the researcher in 
the questions to be asked. The researcher, therefore, opted to develop interview guides for the 
study that slightly differed from one interviewee to another. The guides did not contain 
questions but rather themes in relation to which open-ended questions could be formulated 
and asked during the interviews. This way, the guides could provide a flexible structure in the 
interviews as required. The researcher included at the end of the guides a few questions 
intended to collect demographic data of the interviewees. These questions could be asked only 
after obtaining the interviewees’ separate and specific consent. The relevance of such data 
was, for example, to establish the nationality or average age of adopters and adoptees. 
1.6.3.3.2 Written Data Capture Forms 
The researcher decided to use written data capture forms for data retrieved through 
documentary analysis and statistical enquiry. The drawn up standard forms included columns 
that showed the data source, retrieval date, theme or title and the recorded information. The 
targeted information, for instance from court records, included records of the occurrence of a 
particular type of adoption petition, trends in the adoption rulings such as regarding cases with 
obvious legal pluralism issues, profiles of litigants in terms of nationality, occupation, age, 
etc., as well as the procedure and criteria used to determine the best interests of the child. The 
forms, which showed unique or interesting features, or issues from the analysed records, 
assisted in their quick identification later in data analysis and thesis writing. 
The written data capture forms were seldom used directly in the research setting. Instead, in 
most cases, the researcher obtained permission to scan or photocopy the accessed documents 
and filled the information in on the forms later at home. The main reason for this arrangement 
was the lack of sufficient time to go through the documents, analyse them and record the 




1.6.4 Fieldwork and Data Collection 
Field research was a process that included complicated activities. As mentioned above, it did 
not by any means involve only typical field activities. A brief description of the procedure for 
field research and data collection is given below. Since this was a doctoral research project, 
fieldwork and data collection activities were, in large part, executed by the researcher. 
Research assistants were used only to a limited extent. This was because of the nature of the 
research topic, as well as limited financial resources.  
1.6.4.1 Fieldworker Training 
The field research process commenced with training in how to conduct field research for a 
socio-legal study. Of course, the researcher already had training and skills in legal research 
through her postgraduate studies in law. Nevertheless, to incorporate the social in the legal, 
the researcher obtained training in field research from the perspectives of legal and social 
anthropologists. The training took the form of a research colloquium series held before, 
sometimes during, and after each field research phase. For the most part, the colloquia were 
held in Bayreuth, Germany, and one colloquium was held in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. They 
took different forms, depending on the central theme for each, but were all committed to 
equipping the researcher for fieldwork and its pre and post activities. Six expert researchers 
and lecturers in family law, children’s rights and other socio-legal topics led the discussions in 
these colloquia. These were Professors Ulrike Wanitzek (who organised and hosted the 
series), Bernd Kannowski, Chuma Himonga, Bart Rwezaura and Keebet von Benda-
Beckmann, and Dr. Habil. Jeannett Martin. The colloquium series consisted of six sessions 
which are summarised as follows: 
Colloquium I: Professors Ulrike Wanitzek and Chuma Himonga led the colloquium at the 
University of Bayreuth on 07-08 November 2017 before the researcher travelled to Tanzania 
for the first phase of field research. Professor Himonga presented and discussed ‘The 
Conceptualisation of Customary Law and Its Implications for Research in Africa’  based on 
her article titled “The Future of Living Customary Law in African Legal Systems in the 
Twenty-First Century and Beyond, with Special Reference to South Africa”.46 Also, she 
shared her experience on researching customary law in Africa based on a research project she 
headed, reported in a book titled “Reform of Customary Marriage, Divorce and Succession in 
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South Africa”.47 Then, in line with the colloquium’s theme of preparation for field research, 
the researcher presented her research proposal and field research plan on child adoption in 
Tanzania. The ensuing discussion mainly revolved around methodological approaches to 
doing research in a pluralistic legal setting and formulating a theoretical and conceptual 
framework upon which to base the study. 
Colloquium II: Professor Bart Rwezaura presided over the second session in Dar es Salaam, 
Tanzania, on 26-27 March 2018. The discussion revolved around his two texts: “Competing 
‘Images’ of Childhood in the Social and Legal Systems of Contemporary Sub-Saharan 
Africa”48 and “The Value of a Child: Marginal Children and the Law in Contemporary 
Tanzania”49. His presentation centred on the interaction of customary and religious laws with 
state law and how people perceive their rights as coloured by these laws. It provoked a debate 
on the interrelation between the image of childhood and the concept of child care in the 
Tanzanian community compared to the global (Western) concepts of childhood and child 
care. The researcher presented her field research experience and a draft chapter on the child's 
best interests as the guiding principle in child adoption. The colloquium underlined the 
importance of doing further research into the concept of care and different levels of legal 
pluralism in child adoption in Tanzania. Also, it insisted on the effectiveness of a well-drafted 
conceptual framework, which as a strong stem, holds and nourishes all branches of argument 
in a doctoral thesis.  
Colloquium III: Professors Ulrike Wanitzek and Keebet von Benda-Beckmann headed 
research colloquium number three held at the University of Bayreuth on 23-24 April 2018 
after the researcher’s return from the first phase of field research. Professor von Benda-
Beckmann discussed two topics: ‘Theoretical Perspectives on Legal Pluralism’ as based on 
her article on “Legal Pluralism, Social Theory, and the State”50; and ‘The Practice of Care’ as 
based on her article “The Practice of Care: Social Security in Muslim Ambonese Society”.51 
Being a legal anthropologist, Professor von Benda-Beckmann’s experience in doing research 
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from the perspectives of both law and the social sciences, and her expertise in legal pluralism 
enabled her to give good advice on socio-legal research in legally pluralistic Tanzania. The 
colloquium included a discussion on the field research experience of the researcher, and, 
based on Professor von Benda-Beckmann’s previous research work, on legal pluralism as a 
concept and theory. Suitable research methods for this type of study were identified.  
Colloquium IV: Together with Professor Ulrike Wanitzek, Dr. Habil. Jeannett Martin, a social 
anthropologist and seasoned researcher at the University of Bayreuth, led a bi-monthly text-
reading colloquium series from May to July 2018. Although they were like a mini-series of 
their own, the reading meetings formed a subset of the main colloquium series. Each meeting 
lasted for a minimum of two hours, with discussion of a pre-read selected text with academic 
relevance to this doctoral research.52 The discussion was predominantly on theory and 
methodology. An exploration of alternative research perspectives, methods, and tools was one 
of the main themes of the meetings. Dr. Martin shared her research experience on participant 
observation as a research method and discussed possible ways of using the method in this 
doctoral research. The primary purpose of these meetings was to prepare the researcher for the 
second phase of field research. 
Colloquium V: Professors Ulrike Wanitzek and Bernd Kannowski, together with Dr. Habil. 
Jeannett Martin organised and moderated a research colloquium from 24-26 June 2019. The 
colloquium was held at the University of Bayreuth, Germany. This colloquium was different 
from the previous colloquia in the series as it combined several topics in family law regarding 
marriage and child care. The pluralistic nature of law in Africa was a thread that ran through 
all the topics and drew them together. The researcher presented her field research experience 
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(second phase) and preliminary research findings, which formed the basis for discussing how 
to analyse, present and discuss collected data.  
Colloquium VI: Professors Ulrike Wanitzek, Bernd Kannowski, and Keebet von Benda-
Beckmann led the final colloquium in the series held at the University of Bayreuth on 17 
February 2020. The researcher briefly presented her experience during the third phase of field 
research in Tanzania. Also, she received feedback from the three professors on a draft thesis 
chapter that she had previously shared. The dominant theme of discussion in this colloquium 
was data presentation, discussion and writing styles that best suit doctoral research reporting.  
The colloquia served their purpose of assisting a constant evolving of capacities for the 
researcher. Research methodology was the main area of doctoral research that benefited from 
the colloquia. The researcher obtained extensive training on selecting a study type, research 
perspective, methods, and tools. A realistic field research plan was also an outcome of the 
colloquia after discussing in detail the research setting, especially after the first phase of field 
research.  
The researcher obtained other forms of training in the course of the doctoral project, for 
instance, from workshops, summer schools and conferences. However, such training did not 
have as great an impact on research methodology as the colloquia did. 
1.6.4.2 Field Research Plan 
The researcher developed a field research plan for each phase of research. The plans acted as 
road maps that directed the researcher through the research processes. The plan included a 
clear statement of the research problem and questions and research methodology – 
constituting area of study, research approaches, selected methods and instruments, pilot study 
arrangements, timeline, budget, and logistics. The researcher always developed the plans and 
reviewed them during the research colloquia before going to the field.  
1.6.4.3 Pilot Study 
Here, the term pilot study does not refer to the traditional preliminary small-scale study 
conducted to determine the feasibility of the main study. Rather, it represents only a subset of 
it. It denotes the preliminary testing of research instruments in a small group of people to pre-
determine their effectiveness before use in the field. 
The researcher pre-tested research instruments to obtain a picture of the type of data they may 
generate. Also, to determine the average time required to collect data per instrument. Time 
determination was significant for the interview guides as it helped estimate the time needed 
for an interview. Additionally, the pilot study provided room for re-designing or adjusting the 




The pilot study was two-fold. First, in critical reviews in the first and third colloquia, the 
experts reviewed the research instruments to assess their potential to collect valid and reliable 
data. The reviews took place before the first and second phases of field research. Second, the 
instruments were tested on a randomly selected group of people consisting of law academics, 
practitioners, and university students in Tanzania. The testing was done only once between 
mid-December 2017 and early January 2018 before visiting the selected respondents in the 
first phase of field research. 
The pilot study led to minor adjustments to the research instruments and the researcher’s way 
of posing questions and using probes and prompts.  
1.6.4.4 Sampling  
This study being mainly qualitative and small-scale, a non-probability sampling strategy was 
used to select the data sources.53 The sample selected was not statistically representative but 
was picked because its characteristics or roles were related to the research questions. The 
selection of the research participants, institutions, settings, and locations was purposive, based 
on criteria such as official mandates or roles, specific experiences, and socio-demographic 
characteristics. Significant to note is that the subject of the study acted as a sampling criterion. 
This is because data sources are, in a way, legally pre-defined actors in the field of child care 
and protection, and specifically in child adoption practice. ‘In a way’, because the study is 
socio-legal. Therefore, the researcher selected other sources based on their characteristics 
rather than the law. For instance, selected family law experts were mainly academics or law 
practitioners with knowledge or experience of child adoption law. The researcher also used a 
convenience sampling approach in rare instances depending on the ease of accessibility of the 
research participant.54 For example, the researcher included a specific faith-based Non-
Governmental Organisation as a research participant after discovering in the field its 
contribution to the child protection system and finding a relatively uncomplicated research 
connection to it.  
Following the sampling strategy and approaches mentioned above, the researcher prepared a 
list of authorities, institutions and organisations, and individual persons that she deemed 
significant to the study. In the case of institutions, respondents were either specific personnel 
or occupiers of the targeted offices. As regards individuals, the researcher had to identify 
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specific persons who fit the sampling criteria in the field. Knowledge of persons with 
experience in the subject of the study assisted their identification. The table below provides a 
list of research participants or units that were the respondents to this study:  
Table 1-1: Data Sources 
SN Institution/Person Responsible Office 
1 The Ministry of Constitutional and Legal Affairs 
• Registration, Insolvency and Trusteeship 
Agency (RITA) 
Registration Manager 
• Registration of Births, Deaths, Marriages, 
Divorces and Adoptions 
2 Judiciary of Tanzania 
The High Court of Tanzania 
Court Registry and Records: 
• Dar es Salaam Registry 
• Arusha Registry 
Resident Magistrate’s Courts at Kisutu, Dar es 
Salaam and Sekei, Arusha 
Office of Chief Court Administrator 
The Registrar of the High Court 
• Adopted Children Register  
• Adoption cases and records 
The Registrar, RM Court Kisutu and Sekei  
• Adopted Children Register 
• Adoption cases and records 
3 Ministry of Health, Community Development, 
Gender, Elderly and Children (MoHCDGEC) 
• Department of Social Welfare  
• Child Development Department 
• Legal Services Unit 
Ministry Headquarters in Dodoma and offices in 
Dar es Salaam and Arusha 
Permanent Secretary MoHCDGEC 
• Commissioner for Social Welfare  
• Director of Child Development Department 
• Director of Legal Services Unit 
4 President’s Office – Regional Administration and 
Local Government (PO – RALG) 
• Local Government Authorities in Dar es 
Salaam and Arusha 
• Social welfare departments at the local 
government level in Dar es Salaam and 
Arusha 
Permanent Secretary PO-RALG 
• Regional Administrative Secretary: Dar es 
Salaam and Arusha 
• Municipal Council Directors: Kinondoni, 
Ilala, Temeke and Arusha Town 
• Social welfare officers at the district and 
ward levels 
5 The Ministry of Home Affairs 
The Tanzania Immigration Services Department 
The Commissioner General 
Passport and Travel Documents Department 
6 Parliament of Tanzania 
• Parliament library in Dodoma 
 
Office of the Clerk of the National Assembly 
• Chief librarian, Parliament Library in 
Dodoma 
7 Office of the Attorney General 
• Headquarter offices in Dodoma 
Assistant Chief Parliamentary Draftsman 
• Legislative Drafting Division 
Principal Law Secretary 
• Legal Registry Unit 
8 National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) 
• NBS offices in Dodoma and Dar es 
Salaam 
 
Office of the Director General  
• Legal Office 
• Directorate of Population Census and 
Social Statistics 
9 A selection of children’s agencies, orphanages, 
residential homes and centres in Dar es Salaam 
and Arusha 
Executive Directors 
• UNICEF Tanzania 
• Save the Children Tanzania 
• SOS Children’s Village in Dar es Salaam 
• PASADA - Pastoral Activities and Services 





SN Institution/Person Responsible Office 
• Msimbazi Centre Children’s Home 
• Mburahati Children’s Centre 
• UMRA Orphanage Centre 
• Kijiji cha Furaha 
• Kurasini National Children’s Home 
10 Key informants 
 
• Adoption law experts and practitioners 
- Family law experts 
- Judges, Registrars, and court officials 
- Advocates dealing with child adoption 
- Social welfare officials  
• Adoptive parents/applicants 
 
1.6.4.5 Access to the Field 
The success of a study hinges critically on how the researcher establishes access to the 
research setting. Since this study involved research in institutional/organisational and private 
individual contexts, access was obtained through two distinct procedures. First, the study 
sought access through obtaining research clearance to engage in field research activities with 
the above-listed respondents. This was an absolute requirement for research in the 
institutional setting, especially where the government was involved. Second, the study 
obtained access through negotiations that establish research relationships. While obtaining 
research clearance is significant, specifically for research ethics compliance, it is the process 
of negotiating access that determines whether a researcher can collect data or not. These two 
aspects are further elaborated below. 
1.6.4.5.1 Research Clearance 
The Vice-Chancellor of the University of Dar es Salaam is empowered to review and grant 
applications for research clearance for the University’s staff and students on behalf of the 
government and the Tanzania Commission for Science and Technology (COSTECH). Being a 
University staff member, the researcher applied to the Vice-Chancellor for research clearance 
for each phase of field research. The Vice-Chancellor granted the clearance, which signified 
that the research project was approved. The clearance, among others, introduced the 
researcher to the respondents and, on her behalf, requested permission to research. Since it 
came in the form of a letter to the respondents, it represented the University’s endorsement of 
the researcher. 
1.6.4.5.2 Research Permit 
In the field, the researcher found that research clearance does not on its own guarantee access 
to the targeted research participants, both in the governmental and non-governmental 




researcher had to understand each institution’s organisational structure in order to identify the 
respective gatekeepers to whom the applications should be addressed. The application 
procedure differed significantly from one institution to another. In some, especially non-
governmental, it was relatively quick and straightforward. In most governmental institutions, 
however, the procedure was cumbersome. For instance, obtaining research permits from local 
government authorities in all four selected districts in Dar es Salaam and Arusha involved 
complex, confusing and time-consuming procedures. The procedures involved double or 
triple levels of assessment before the permits were issued. In the applications for permits, the 
researcher had to deal with two central and local government systems operating concurrently 
from the regional level down to district and ward levels. The researcher had to write another 
letter or fill another form at each level as if it was an entirely new application. 
The processes involved in obtaining permits are too extensive to be reported in this part. It 
suffices to say that ultimately research permits were obtained from each respondent 
institution.  
1.6.4.5.3 Negotiating Access and Developing Relationships 
Being equipped with a research clearance and permit, much as this provided an umbrella and 
specific permission to access the field, was not all that it took. Entrance into each research 
setting required yet another kind of authorisation. This involved the sensitive task of 
establishing contact and developing relationships with the respondents, in order to obtain an 
uninhibited flow of information. Making initial contact comprised introductions, setting the 
time, location, and duration of interviews, mainly through emailing and telephoning or 
messaging. The researcher found this process tasking as it required great patience. For 
example, some respondents never replied to digital communication and had to be approached 
physically. Others postponed the set interview after the researcher had arrived at the setting. 
Ultimately, when the appointment was set, what remained was creating a proper atmosphere 
for data collection. It began with obtaining respondents’ informed consent to participate in the 
research. The researcher explained the purpose of the study, how the collected data would be 
used, and that participation was voluntary. Further, she assured the respondents that their 
answers would remain anonymous and confidential. 
In creating a research relationship, the researcher had to develop appropriate language skills 
that corresponded to the characteristics of each research setting and participant. The language 
used was crucial in establishing a good rapport with the respondent. Additionally, the 
researcher had to consider the respondents’ social life and value system. This is due to the 




To address this, the researcher had to develop interviewing strategies that suited each group of 
respondents. For instance, the researcher found that while interviewing judges, social welfare 
officers and non-Tanzanian adopters, the interviews took a completely different approach 
from the other respondents. The differences lay in the level of legal proficiency as well as in 
people’s understanding of child adoption. 
Research needs reciprocity.55 It is an exchange of raw data with the promise of accessibility to 
the resultant processed information (research report). Understanding this, the researcher 
explained how she would make the study’s outcome accessible to the respondents. It also 
involved discussing how that outcome would assist in addressing the problems identified by 
the respondents (conclusions and recommendations). Finally, considering the need for 
reciprocity, the researcher provided tokens of appreciation which were, for the most part, a 
simple lunch after the interview. Several respondents proposed a considerable amount of cash, 
which the researcher could not provide due to the ethical dilemmas this would have given rise 
to, and her limited budget. 
1.6.4.6 Ethical Procedures 
The first step towards compliance with research ethics is obtaining approval of the research 
proposal and plan. The authority and procedure for approval differ from one jurisdiction to 
another. In the case of this study, the researcher was eligible to seek approval and obtain 
research clearance from the University of Dar es Salaam, as explained above. The Vice-
Chancellor granted the clearance after internal deliberations that involved the University’s 
Directorate of Research. 
The second step is to obtain informed consent from the research participants. The research 
permits from institutions were a form of informed consent, but the researcher still sought 
informed consent from each interviewee, whether affiliated to the institutions or private 
individuals.  
The researcher also promised anonymity and confidentiality to the respondents. Hence, she 
conceals the identity of the interviewees and their responses in the presentation and discussion 
of collected data. Although some specific comments are reproduced, the researcher cites them 
in a way that leaves the respondent anonymous. The presentation and discussion of data 
present the reality but do not expose the participants to any harm. 
 




1.6.4.7 Time and Financial Budget 
Field research was carried out in three phases. The first two phases shared a similar duration, 
unlike the last phase, which was much shorter. Phase I commenced in mid-December 2017 
and ended in the first week of April 2018, while phase II began in mid-December 2018 and 
concluded at the end of March 2019. They each consisted of three months of active field 
research from January to March 2018 and 2019. In each case, the researcher used the few 
days in December of the previous year for preliminary activities in the field. These activities 
mainly related to negotiating access. In the three months, the researcher collected data in the 
field. The other fieldwork and data collection activities included in the research plan were 
done pre or post the months of field research. Phase III, which was purely follow-up research, 
was in January 2020. In total, this study is based on about eight months of field research. This 
was a limited amount of time considering the nature of the data sources and data to be 
accessed and collected.  
Funds for the three phases of field research came from three different sources. The Bayreuth 
International Graduate School of African Studies (BIGSAS) financed phase I of the study, the 
University of Dar es Salaam financed phase II, and the DAAD, through the office of the 
academic supervisor, financed phase III. Each institution had a limit to the funds that could be 
granted for research. In addition, each had its own regulations for application, use, and 
accounting that the researcher had to comply with. The researcher conformed with all the 
conditions of the granted funds. 
1.6.4.8 Personnel and Logistics 
In each of the first two phases of field research, the researcher was to a small extent supported 
by two research assistants. Their role was limited to delivering letters requesting research 
permits and following up on promised documents, especially in courts of law, while all tasks 
concerning interviewing were carried out by the researcher. Also, access to sensitive 
documents, such as the Adopted Children Register, was possible only for the researcher 
herself. Furthermore, the assistants’ support ended at the data collection stage; they did not 
assist in data interpretation, analysis, presentation, and discussion.  
The organisation and implementation of the field research plan in each phase fell squarely 
upon the researcher. Management of logistical issues was, therefore, the researcher’s 
responsibility. This included setting up appointments, travel logistics in the field such as 




1.6.5 Data Analysis 
Although there are no hard and fast rules and procedures for qualitative data analysis,56 for 
data analysis to be effective and efficient, the researcher had to identify suitable approaches 
and procedures. Factors that guided this decision were the nature of the data and the main aim 
and focus of the analysis. The researcher had to consider the analysis of laws as well as the 
social phenomena emerging from the data, since this is a socio-legal study. Furthermore, since 
the study generated a voluminous mass of data in spoken form (recorded in extensive 
fieldnotes) and in written form (documents from field and desk research), the researcher 
needed to consider how to analyse these data. The researcher, therefore, adopted a mixture of 
analytical approaches. This included content analysis, law or policy analysis, and descriptive 
and interpretative analysis.  
A three-step process of data analysis was developed which involved data management, 
presentation, and discussion. These analytical processes can best be understood from the 
borrowed concept of analytic hierarchy explained by Spencer, Ritchie and O’Connor.57 The 
authors describe the hierarchy as an analytic structure “made up of a series of ‘viewing’ 
platforms, each of which involves different analytical tasks, enabling the researcher to gain an 
overview and make sense of the data”.58 The hierarchy involves three stages of analysis which 
begin with data management, followed by making descriptive and explanatory accounts from 
the data.59 Data management in this study comprised sorting through and reducing the data by 
using themes and concepts to assign labels to identified data categories. The researcher 
executed this process manually without the facilitation of any computer-assisted qualitative 
data analysis software.60 However, some manual data analysis tools such as mapping methods 
(creating thematic links in the data) and document summary forms (primarily for court cases) 
aided the process. Once the researcher had sufficiently organised the data, she moved to 
present it in descriptive accounts. Here, she relays the study’s findings using actual and 
paraphrased words of respondents or written accounts, charts, tables, and other forms of data 
presentation to ensure a full report of the research content. Lastly, the researcher discusses the 
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findings by providing explanatory accounts of the different legal and social phenomena and 
patterns which have emerged.  
The process of data analysis included the transcription of interviews. There were only two sets 
of interviews that were recorded in audio form and required transcription. The interviews 
were both conducted in English and hence required no translation. However, a considerable 
percentage of data from interviews was in Kiswahili. Therefore, the researcher had to deal 
with language translation in data management to fit the labels, which had to be in English, the 
reporting language. Since the data is also primarily presented and discussed in English, 
translation from Kiswahili was imperative.  
The researcher guarantees that all the field data presented and discussed in this thesis is 
authentic. In case of any question, the data can be checked in the author's field notes, with the 
respondents, and in formal records of the researcher’s visits at the respondent institutions. 
1.6.6 Methodological Challenges 
In the course of the research, the researcher experienced several challenges that shaped the 
study in one way or another. Below, the challenges related to research methodology are 
explained. 
Research clearance/permit: In the first phase of field research, the researcher experienced 
challenges in applying for and obtaining research clearance and permits. Application for 
research clearance from COSTECH through the University of Dar es Salaam while still in 
Germany in November 2017 was not fruitful due to changes in application procedures. After 
extensive follow-up in December 2017, the researcher had to re-apply in January 2018. The 
re-application was, unfortunately, met with cumbersome bureaucratic delays. The University 
issued research clearance towards the end of February 2018. The delay significantly affected 
the field research schedule. Regrettably, there was still a need to apply for research permits 
from the respective government ministries and institutions and some of the non-governmental 
organisations before obtaining access. As explained above, some complications further 
delayed the issuance of permits, delaying access to the research settings and participants even 
longer. As a result, the researcher accomplished only a small number of visits with 
unsatisfying research findings. 
The second phase of field research drew lessons from the first. Research clearance was 
applied for early in September 2018 before the planned field research in January 2019. 
Although it helped, the researcher still had to make follow-ups physically at the University of 




was obtained. While that was an improvement, request for research permits and appointments 
with respondents, unfortunately, remained cumbersome—bureaucratic hurdles in permit 
processing in public and private institutions still held up the field research schedule. The 
problems mainly stemmed from gatekeepers’ reluctance to do their job efficiently, several 
officials’ unavailability in the office and disregard for appointments.  
Negotiating access: In negotiating access and establishing research relationships, the 
researcher experienced some largely communication-related challenges. These challenges 
took the form of non-response to e-mail communication, unanswered and unreturned phone 
calls, non-response to letters until physical follow-up (mostly experienced in government 
institutions), indefinite unavailability of research participants due to their engagement in 
training or travel (especially in the contacted NGOs), and postponement of appointments, 
sometimes indefinitely. In addition, some institutions misunderstood the research subject and 
withheld research permits entirely. Others denied access due to the confidential nature of 
child adoption (this happened with some children’s homes).  
Ethical issues: Some individuals approached withheld their consent to participate in the 
study. Some, mostly public officers, cited the political atmosphere at the time of research as 
the ground for their denial. Others did so because of required confidentiality in child adoption 
practice. Even when they consented, respondents speaking in their official capacities rejected 
digital recording of interviews, anticipating harm. The researcher’s promise of anonymity and 
confidentiality did not help matters. The confidential nature of child adoption also 
complicated access to information that would have been otherwise readily available. 
Documents that are usually accessible to the public, such as copies of court decisions, were 
not accessible because they contained information on child adoption. For the same reason, 
complex procedures were involved in gaining access to adoption registers, both at RITA and 
in courts of law.  
Also, particulars of adoptive parents or prospective adoptive parents needed in order to 
establish contact for interview purposes were hardly accessible. Confidentiality issues also 
complicated the reporting of research findings. For instance, the researcher came upon some 
information that became difficult to substantiate or follow up due to its being confidential. For 
example, one particular story related to adoptive parents who adopted a child fraudulently 
entirely without the involvement of the Department of Social Welfare. Finally, the 
Department figured it out when the parents wanted to adopt a second child. However, the 
source refused to open up channels for following up on this story, citing confidentiality of 




Institutional logistics: There were substantial institutional practical and logistical 
complications that challenged research in government institutions. For instance, one challenge 
concerned internal institutional coordination. The researcher had to separately request for 
research permits in two inter-related departments of the Ministry of Health, Community 
Development, Gender, Elderly and Children (MoHCDGEC). Research in Social Welfare and 
Community Development departments of the Ministry required separate applications for 
permits at the ministerial level and again at the departmental levels. Since the departments are 
under the same Ministry (MoHCDGEC), one ministerial permit should have sufficed. 
The researcher faced a similar challenge with procuring a research permit from the judiciary 
of Tanzania. The department dealing with research and training in the judiciary is under the 
Court of Appeal. Therefore, a researcher must apply to the Court of Appeal for a permit to 
research in Tanzanian courts. Challenges were met here in the application process due to 
misinformation and delays in issuing the permit. For example, when the researcher sought 
guidance from the High Court of Tanzania Registrar’s office, she was directed to apply for a 
research permit there, only to be later redirected to the Court of Appeal. This misdirection 
cost time as the researcher had to submit the permit from the Court of Appeal to each 
respondent court to obtain a direct research permit from them. 
Another institutional challenge experienced related to the merging and restructuring of 
government ministries. For instance, the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare merged with 
the Ministry of Community Development, Gender and Children in 2015 to form the Ministry 
of Health, Community Development, Gender, Elderly and Children. The merger, together 
with the transfer of the resultant Ministry to Dodoma in 2017, adversely affected the 
functionability of the ministerial departments and officers. For instance, in the first and 
second phases of field research, only a part of the Department of Social Welfare’s staff was 
transferred to Dodoma, with the remainder in Dar es Salaam without defined functions. The 
Department was also not yet settled-in in Dodoma (everything still packed in boxes). Also, 
the Ministry's organisational structure was confused due to the merger, which meant its 
institutional co-ordination was at its nethermost. 
There were also complexities in the institutional framework responsible for child welfare 
issues in Tanzania that posed a challenge during field research. For instance, social welfare 
officers who do the same work, only at different levels, work under the mandate of two 
different ministries: the Ministry of Health, Community Development, Gender, Elderly and 




result, figuring out their chain of command and how they operate posed considerable 
challenges, especially regarding application for research permits. 
1.7 Literature Review 
Traditional literature review sections in scholarly works provide an overview of the existing 
body of knowledge on the topic at hand. In a fixed, so-labelled section, they critically analyse 
and evaluate the state of knowledge on the subject by identifying theories, methods, and gaps 
in previous research. The researcher chose to use a different approach for this study. Rather 
than providing a comprehensive critical discussion on the literature only in this part, it adopts 
the approach of presenting it under the framework of concepts and theories and throughout 
the chapters where necessary. This part, therefore, serves to introduce key literature upon 
which the subsequent research is built. The works presented were selected because of the role 
they play in setting the foundation for the study. The main themes of the study set the 
framework under which the selected literature is explained.  
The family and child care in Africa is a subject that scholars have extensively explored 
from numerous angles. This study focuses mainly on the conceptualisation of the African 
family and child care from a legal perspective and in terms of alternative child care. As seen 
above, a group of scholars in the mid-1990s found that they must part the long grass to reveal 
and reconceptualise the African family in its several dimensions, including historical, cultural, 
and legal.61 These scholars utilised the framework of family function in various historical, 
cultural, and legally pluralistic contexts to describe what constitutes families in Eastern and 
Southern Africa. Their work depicts how the family is expected to care for its vulnerable 
members, such as children. It shows that there is a lack of child care facilities due to this 
expectation, even when socio-economic challenges have compromised the family’s ability to 
care for its children.62 In conclusion, the authors look closely at the relations between the 
family and the state, and find that state intervention in the affairs of the family is sometimes a 
necessity. They say,  
“We advocate a system by which the state can provide mechanisms for the 
support and review of the family where and when necessary, respecting the 
autonomy of the family, yet having the capacity to intervene as and when 
necessary.”63 
The processes of formal alternative child care provision necessitate state intervention in 
matters of the family. This is because, in many cases, child protection procedures involve 
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agents of the state, such as the social welfare office and police department. Thus, apart from 
providing a deep insight into the African family, this article reveals the significance of state 
intervention in family matters through mechanisms that cut across the lawmaker, implementer 
and adjudicator.64 It proposes state intervention where necessary, despite the concept of 
family democracy, which the authors discuss in detail.65 However, the authors express 
reservations concerning state intervention, due to recorded adverse effects in Africa.66 Also, 
although their work provides a useful background for understanding the African family, it 
does not take current developments into account and does not consider alternative child care 
in the discussion.  
A similar group of scholars authored a book on the law, culture, tradition, and children’s 
rights within Eastern and Southern Africa.67 The book shows how international and regional 
instruments on the rights of the child, particularly the UNCRC, 1989 and the ACWRC, 1990, 
are localised and applied within the legal frameworks of a select number of countries within 
the region. To do so, the scholars use an approach that cements the universality of norms 
concerning the rights of the child, while trying to reconcile them with the prevailing African 
cultural relativism and legal pluralism contexts.68 In the volume, the authors provide a 
conceptualisation of the child in two contexts; the African cultural context and the context of 
the children’s and human rights. Then, in the light of these two contexts and the theoretical 
framework of legal pluralism, the authors consider diverse topics in respect of children’s 
rights in the region.  
The contributions in the book discuss who the African child is and what place he or she 
occupies in different contexts. Some of the contributors consider the law and practice in 
connection with the principle of the child’s best interests69 and child adoption70, topics that are 
pertinent to this study. Thus, the book provided a concrete foundation for this study. This is 
because the contributions set the background for alternative care with regard to the African 
child. However, since the contributions refer to different countries in Eastern and Southern 
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Africa, except for one contribution that covers Tanzania specifically71, it was more of a source 
for comparative knowledge. Also, since the authors published the book towards the end of the 
1990s, it does not provide a current discussion on this study’s crucial topics.   
Child adoption, the study’s main subject, is one of the areas of family law and children’s 
rights that have attracted profound scholarly interest. Such interest has translated into a 
massive volume of literature on the topic. However, current literature that is specific to child 
adoption law and practice in Tanzania is scarce. Rwezaura and Wanitzek published a crucial 
article on the subject in 1988.72 The article was based on their research on child adoption law 
and practice in the mid-1980s. Although their work was an investigation of the past formal 
law of adoption under the Adoption of Children Act, 1953, repealed and replaced by the Law 
of the Child Act, 2009, it plays a central role as the groundwork upon which the researcher 
builds this study. The article addressed three main points that generated research interest for 
the study. These include the authors’ analysis of the sections of Tanzanian society that used 
the formal law of child adoption, their motivations for doing so, and how child adoption law 
reflected state policy on the care of children.73 In addition, they considered the influence of 
culture and religion on how people of different ethnic descent in Tanzania arranged care for 
their children. They found that legal pluralism was a factor to be reckoned with when 
considering alternative child care in the country. The issues discussed in the article prompted 
the present author to consider the new provisions concerning child adoption in the Law of the 
Child Act, 2009, and specifically two groups of adopters that represent those issues, non-
resident Tanzanians and resident non-Tanzanians.  
To pursue this research, it was necessary to gain a global understanding of child adoption. 
O’Halloran provides a critical perspective of the politics of adoption in a wide range of 
countries in different parts of the world.74 This book uses an analytical approach that traces 
the historical evolution of child adoption law, policy, and practice across numerous societies, 
and identifies how and what caused its metamorphosis into the current modern adoption law. 
In doing so, the book considers the social values of indigenous peoples and how they have 
influenced child adoption custom and practice. It looks at the content of adoption laws in 
countries with different legal and cultural traditions and discusses their core constitutive 
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elements, which enables a comparative analysis of their law, policy, and practice on child 
adoption. The book also evaluates how international jurisprudence influences national child 
adoption law, policy, and practice, especially how national law is subject to relevant 
international principles. Among many other issues discussed in the book, these aspects 
informed this study on significant points of law, relevant concepts, and applicable principles 
in child adoption. However, the book does not provide a perspective on child adoption law, 
policy, and practice in African countries. Although its discussion on countries with a 
common-law tradition like Tanzania is informative, it is not close to home regarding cultural 
specificity, a significant variable in the book. 
This study focuses on child adoption with an international element in Tanzania. Bromley’s 
Family Law by Lowe and Douglas includes a section on child adoption with a foreign element 
in the UK.75 Although it deals with a country other than Tanzania, the book provides clarity 
concerning what constitutes adoptions with a foreign element. The authors refer to such 
adoptions as intercountry adoptions. They define them as adoption of children usually resident 
abroad by adopters usually resident in the UK, or adoption of children resident in the UK by 
adopters resident abroad.76 They proceed to categorise them into three types of intercountry 
adoption. These are Convention adoptions, overseas adoptions that are non-Convention, and 
domestic adoptions of foreign children.  
The authors explain that the UK became a party to the Hague Convention on Intercountry 
Adoption in June 2003.77 Reviewing practice under the Convention, they opine that it has 
become highly successful in the Contracting States due to the child protection mechanism it 
guarantees.78 The authors emphasise that in intercountry adoption a child can be better 
protected if the states involved (sending and receiving) are party to the Convention. To 
demonstrate the Convention’s success, the authors devise an important test based on the 
ability of the sending states to properly carry out the adoption process and safeguard the 
interests of both the child and the birth family.79 However, Tanzania is not a party to the 
Convention; hence Convention adoptions and their protective guarantees do not apply. 
Instead, the category of overseas non-Convention adoptions fits the features of adoptions by 
non-resident Tanzanians covered in this study. For instance, if a Tanzanian resident in the UK 
comes to Tanzania and adopts a child resident in Tanzania, it is considered an overseas non-
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Convention adoption. However, adoption of a Tanzanian child by a resident non-Tanzanian, 
who is a UK citizen, is different. It would be recognised in the UK according to common law 
principles established by Re Valentine’s Settlement.80 In this case it was decided that in such 
adoptions, the domicile of the adopters and the adopted child in an overseas country during 
the adoption is the key criterion for its recognition. Oppong clarifies that this is because child 
adoption occasions fundamental changes in the status of the adopters and the adopted child, 
and that at common law, questions regarding the status of a person are governed by the law of 
the domicile of that person.81 Thus, there should be some degree of permanence in the 
residence of the adopters in the overseas country for the adoption to be recognised in the UK 
according to common law principles. Although Lowe and Douglas do not conceptualise this 
type of adoption as a Convention adoption or an overseas adoption, they still consider it an 
intercountry adoption while in Tanzania, based on residence requirements, both types of 
adoption, by resident non-Tanzanians and non-resident Tanzanians, are considered domestic 
adoptions. 
Lowe and Douglas, in the section of their book on adoption with a foreign element referred to 
above, provide information pivotal to this study. Their discussion on the protections afforded 
under Convention adoptions exemplifies what Tanzanian children in adoptions with an 
international element lack in terms of protection. It lays a base for the discussion in this study 
on children’s protection in the adoption process. 
The best interests of the child principle is a key principle in international jurisprudence on 
children’s rights. It has obtained an elevated status among the other cardinal principles laid 
down in children’s rights conventions, in this case, the UNCRC and ACRWC. This status is 
also maintained in national child laws. This study uses the principle as a benchmark to 
measure the law, policy, and practice of child adoption in Tanzania. Scholarly works on the 
principle have been consulted and it is quite clear that the crucial position that the principle 
occupies in decision making on matters that affect children is not debatable. However, what 
scholars do not always agree on is what constitutes the child’s best interests. Alston’s works 
that explore how to interpret, determine, and apply the principle of the child’s best interests in 
a way that takes into account the cultural values of different societies were especially 
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insightful for this study.82 The contributions in the book trace the historical advancement of 
the principle up to its enshrinement in the UNCRC.83 They provide an interpretation of the 
principle based on its formulation in the UNCRC and ACRWC and discuss criteria for its 
determination.84 Further, the authors show how cultural differences influence how the 
principle is perceived and applied in different jurisdictions.85 Ultimately, they conclude that, 
while the flexibility allowed by leaving the definition of the child’s best interests open is 
justified, it renders the principle subjective and at risk of arbitrariness.86 However, the authors 
also suggest ways of overcoming the indeterminacy of the principle to ensure its proper 
application.87  
Rwezaura, in his contribution, gives a specific account of how social and economic conditions 
in sub-Saharan Africa affect the meaning assigned to the best interests of the child concept.88 
In his discussion, he shows how compliance with the principle has been reduced to 
satisfaction of the child’s material needs and nothing more. This study critically analyses this 
finding in the discussion on compliance with the principle in child adoption practice. These 
authors’ contributions helped to shape the research perspectives and discussions in this study, 
although they do not cover Tanzania specifically or reflect the current law and practice in 
Tanzania, especially with regard to application of the best interest of the child principle in 
child adoption. 
Safeguarding the child’s best interests in adoptions with an international element is 
extensively discussed in Cantwell’s publication of 2014.89 In this work, the author uses 
several studies of the principle to provide guidance on how the principle of the child’s best 
interests may be interpreted, determined, and applied in intercountry adoption. While being 
quite informative, his discussion does not take into account the uniqueness of the child 
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adoptions covered in this study. This is because Cantwell, in large part, considers adoptions 
under the 1993 Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption. The dilemma in the question he 
discusses in his article of whether the best interests principle is a pillar or a stumbling block 
for implementing children’s rights also plays a significant role in examining adherence to the 
principle in child adoption practices in Tanzania.90 The question directs attention to the 
authorities charged with the mandate of applying the principle in their decisions on matters 
concerning children, an angle that this study aims to explore. Although the discussion in the 
article does not reflect the conditions existing in Tanzania, particularly concerning child 
adoption, it enabled the researcher to consider the question more critically, especially as far as 
child protection in adoption is concerned. 
Protection of children in adoption is an issue at the heart of this study. This is because the 
international element in the adoptions considered here raises this question in practice. While 
considering this topic, the researcher looked at the publications of the African Child Policy 
Forum (ACPF) regarding intercountry child adoption. The Forum has published two reports 
that give an essential account of intercountry adoption in Africa.91 The first report analyses 
the international standards on intercountry adoption laid down in the UNCRC, the ACRWC 
and the 1993 Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption.92 It emphasises the thrust of 
international standards on intercountry adoption as protection of the child rather than 
promotion of the practice. The analysis depicts how ill-equipped policy-, law-, and practice-
wise Africa is at safeguarding its children when adopted internationally.93 Nonetheless the 
abridged second report discusses the rationale for intercountry adoption.94 It argues that 
intercountry adoption provides a child with “permanency” in a loving family environment in a 
legalised and formal way that informal coping mechanisms such as community care cannot 
provide.95 Since the practice can complement child care in Africa, the reports recommend 
measures to improve the situation of intercountry adoption in Africa. Among others, a 
measure of great significance for this study is the suggested comprehensive law reform to 
ensure protection of the child’s best interests. One way to achieve this, the reports propose, is 
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domestication of the international standards formulated not only in the UNCRC and ACRWC, 
but also in the 1993 Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption. The reports also advocate 
for legislative and procedural reform, establishing safeguards to protect the child, and 
searching for bilateral and multilateral assistance to minimise the need for adoption.96 
The ACPF, as shown by the reports, frowns upon countries that are not party to the Hague 
Convention on Intercountry Adoption, and yet encourages intercountry adoption, which 
compromises the protection of the adopted children.97 Tanzania is not party to the 1993 Hague 
Convention on Intercountry Adoption. Although adoptions with an international element are 
practised in the country, which would be deemed intercountry adoption by these and other 
authors, they are considered domestic adoptions in Tanzania. Since Tanzania is not among the 
countries discussed in the reports, they do not shed light on this question.98 This study fills 
this gap and answers the protection question by considering how the child’s best interests in 
adoptions with an international element are safeguarded pre- and post-adoption. 
Mezmur also considers the issue of child protection in adoptions with an international 
element. He has written a crucial article on intercountry adoption in Africa.99 He shows the 
vulnerabilities and gaps in African intercountry adoption systems by reviewing three cases: 
the Angelina case in Ethiopia, the Madonna case in Malawi, and the Zoe’s Ark case in Chad. 
This article’s primary focus is on drawing lessons from the three cases to address intercountry 
adoption irregularities in Africa.100 The author discusses the international legal framework on 
intercountry adoption founded on the UNCRC, ACRWC and the 1993 Hague Convention on 
Intercountry Adoption.101 
 This article does not explicitly consider the situation in Tanzania. However, the author offers 
an opinion very relevant to this study, namely that it is not a foregone conclusion that 
intercountry adoption must be a secondary measure of alternative care to be considered after 
all other measures have failed, but that the child’s best interests must be the paramount 
consideration.102 His assertion is pertinent because the subsidiarity principle is one of the 
safeguards enacted under section 74 of the Law of the Child Act, 2009 for adoptions by 
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resident non-Tanzanians. In his discussion, the author emphasises further that the Hague 
Convention, if ratified and implemented, can solve a significant portion of the problems 
created by illegal adoptions in Africa.103 This study does look at Tanzania’s attitude towards 
the 1993 Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption. However, it focuses more on 
investigating how Tanzanian children in adoptions with an international element are protected 
under the existing legal, policy and institutional framework governing child adoption in 
Tanzania. 
Legal pluralism is a fact to reckon with in child adoptions with an international element in 
Tanzania. This study looks at how legal pluralism impacts the practice of these types of child 
adoption. In doing so, it refers to the work of the Commission on Legal Pluralism, whose 
members have constantly strived to conceptualise and reconceptualise legal pluralism since 
1981.104 Griffiths’ pioneering article on legal pluralism helps to set the stage for 
understanding what legal pluralism means.105 His use of Moore’s concept of the semi-
autonomous social field to define what law is in a context of legal pluralism inspired the 
researcher to consider the multiple legal constellations that exist in Tanzanian society and 
their influence on child adoption practices.106 However, other scholars have been critical of 
Griffiths’ views. Some, such as Merry107, Woodman108 and Tamanaha109, refute his stance on 
what law is in contexts of legal pluralism. The question of what law is for purposes of 
defining what legal pluralism entails appears to be a permanent question. This is because 
Griffiths shows that law has an extraordinarily mobile and contingent nature that constantly 
reproduces the multiple faceted domains of legal pluralism.110 Nevertheless, von Benda-
Beckmann and Turner have offered a sufficiently broad definition of law to encompass its 
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multiple dimensions and prompt an understanding of legal pluralism.111 They call law any 
normative order that its participants consider as law.112  
These discussions raise numerous issues that shape and reshape legal pluralism as a 
theoretical and conceptual analytical tool. However, it is not applied in the critical analysis of 
practical social phenomena such as alternative child care. This study attempts to explain the 
influence of plural legal systems in child adoption practice in Tanzania. Wanitzek’s use of 
legal pluralism serves as an analytical framework for the discussions.113 In her work, she 
considers legal pluralisation processes in child adoption caused by the increasing international 
mobility of people. She shows how international migration and immigration laws of foreign 
countries have influenced child adoption practice. In consideration of the laws at play in such 
adoption arrangements, she depicts their interplay and resultant contradictory effects. 
Wanitzek’s work reflects the key issues in respect of legal pluralism in child adoptions with 
an international element, and can thus be compared to this study. The main distinction is the 
governing law on child adoption, in her case still the former Adoption of Children Act, 1953 
as revised in 2002, and in this study, the Law of the Child Act, 2009. Also, the timelines for 
the two studies are different. The current study, therefore, endeavours to build on the 
foundation laid by Wanitzek’s earlier study. 
Street-level bureaucracy, a theory developed by Lipsky, was found helpful for evaluating 
the implementation of child adoption law by the mandated authorities in Tanzania.114 Lipsky 
uses the term street-level bureaucrats to refer to those public servants who directly contact 
people as they perform their work. They are service providers who, in each encounter, present 
the government to the people and deliver public policy. Lipsky’s theory says that, in the face 
of systematic and practical dilemmas in the workplace, the bureaucrats invent coping 
mechanisms to assist them in the discretionary discharge of their duties.115 In essence, the 
policy enacted by higher administrative or legislative bodies is shaped by them in the process 
of executing their work. He further argues that though statutes, rules, regulations, 
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administrative directives, occupational and community norms and practices should direct their 
work and limit their discretion, the normative body is immense and constantly evolving; 
hence they adhere only to the most fundamental rules.116 Although Lipsky’s discussion is not 
directly related to the subject of this study, he advances a theory that is relevant to all street-
level bureaucracies.117 He lists police departments, social welfare departments, lower courts, 
and legal service offices, all of which are relevant to this study.118 The researcher thus 
considers how street-level bureaucrats involved in child adoption processes in the existing 
context of legal pluralism interpret and implement child adoption law as they navigate the 
dilemmas characteristic of their jobs.  
1.8 Thesis Outline 
This thesis reports on all the research activities that constituted the author’s doctoral research 
project. It is divided into seven chapters reflecting the varied but connected themes of the 
study. Each chapter consists of an introductory part that briefly explains what it covers. The 
chapters also have concluding remarks that provide a summary of the main points of 
discussion and their implications. This part, therefore, outlines only breifly what each chapter 
entails. The rationale is to draw a map of the thesis for ease of reference and to arouse the 
interest of the reader. 
Chapter one, this chapter, introduces the study. It clarifies the subject under study, and sets the 
foundation for understanding the research problem. Next, it defines questions stemming from 
the research problem that the study seeks to answer and explains the purpose of the 
investigation. Further, it explains the limits of the study which ensure the validity and 
reliability of the research outcomes. Then, it details the methodology employed to arrive at 
such outcomes. Lastly, in an attempt to root the study, it discusses a select body of existing 
literature relevant to it. Chapter two, in extension of chapter one, reviews the literature from a 
broader perspective. It defines the theoretical and conceptual framework on which the study is 
built. This chapter also constructs a framework of institutions that operate and have a direct 
legal bearing on the subject of the study. 
Chapter three, in relation to chapter one, provides the background to the study. First, it 
explains the socio-economic, political, legal, and cultural circumstances that lead to the 
existence of children in need of care in Tanzania. Next, it analyses the legal and policy 
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provisions and procedures for the protection of these children. After that, based on the 
applicable law and practice, the chapter briefly looks at the provisions and procedures for 
placing children in available formal alternative care arrangements. Finally, the chapter 
outlines child adoption as a measure of alternative child care and portrays the rationale for 
research on child adoption law and practice in Tanzania. 
The legal and policy framework on child adoption is examined in chapter four of the thesis. 
To begin with, the structure of national, regional, and international legal instruments 
regulating child adoption in Tanzania is presented. This chapter shows that legal pluralism is a 
reality in child law in Tanzania. Then, it goes on to critically discuss the legal process and 
requirements of child adoption. In the discussion, the roles of participants in child adoption 
and relevant institutions as described in chapter two are explained and evaluated. The chapter 
mounts the critique upon the dictates of the best interests of the child principle. Chapter five is 
pivotal to the whole discussion on the capacity of the legal, policy and institutional framework 
to oversee child adoption in Tanzania. This is because the chapter examines the best interests 
principle in Tanzania’s child law and justifies its use as a yardstick against which the law and 
practice of child adoption are measured in this study. In doing so, chapter five attempts to 
show how the relevant authorities interpret, determine, and apply the principle in practice. 
Chapter six presents the main research findings, although these are presented and discussed 
wherever relevant throughout the different chapters of the thesis. This chapter commences 
with statistical information on the basis of which the researcher explains the nature and trends 
of child adoption in Tanzania. This is followed by a discussion of motives for child adoption, 
to explicate the push and pull to adopt as experienced by different categories of adopters. 
After that, the legal and institutional management of child adoption is presented and 
discussed. The chapter looks at the adherence to and sufficiency of child adoption procedures 
and requirements in practice, while observing the performance of the mandated authorities in 
overseeing these procedures and requirements. In one way or another, the entire discussion is 
based on the analytical foundation of the theories of legal pluralism and street-level 
bureaucracy. In the end, the chapter considers the extent to which child adoption could help 
alleviate the problem of children without parental care in Tanzania. Finally, in conclusion, the 
chapter summarises how the findings answer the research questions.  
Chapter seven is the conclusion of the study. It begins with a recapitulation of the research 
questions and objectives and then discusses them in relation to the research outcomes. Next, 










Chapter 2:  Theoretical, Conceptual, and Institutional Framework 
“Returning to our analogy of how writing a dissertation is 
similar to building a house, we believe that the theoretical 
framework and its associated tenants and principles would entail 
the elevation blueprints for a house, whereas the conceptual 
framework would involve the floor plan blueprint of how 
information flows throughout the dissertation.”119 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter lays the theoretical and conceptual foundation for the study. It considers existing 
relevant literature that establishes and develops theories and concepts underlying the study. 
The chapter’s main aim is to explain the legal and social phenomena relating to the study in 
order to show their specific meaning and application in this study. Therefore, it discusses 
alternative meanings and applications from other scholars’ perspectives to sharpen a 
distinctive perception valid for the study.  
The chapter further provides the institutional framework constituting the child protection 
system in Tanzania by describing the mandated authorities in child welfare practice. Specific 
to the study’s subject, the composition, governance, and functions of the authorities engaged 
in implementing child adoption law are discussed. The framework should be read in 
conjunction with chapter four to fully understand the authorities’ roles in executing child 
adoption law. 
2.2 Theoretical Framework  
There is a vast amount of literature that attempts to define what a theoretical framework 
signifies. This study appreciates the graphic description based on construction engineering 
that Grant and Osanloo provide in their article.120  The authors find that a theoretical 
framework for a thesis is analogous to a house blueprint that can serve the same purpose for 
the whole inquiry.121 According to the authors, a theoretical framework is a structure that 
defines the study’s philosophical, epistemological, methodological, and analytical approach. It 
guides a researcher on how to build and support their study. Usually, the framework is derived 
from existing theories that have been tested and validated by other researchers and are 
considered generally acceptable in scholarly literature.122 A researcher may also use a theory 
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that he or she develops in the course of the study.123 Either way, one must use the theories that 
best align with the study’s problem, purpose, and significance.  
This study uses the theories of legal pluralism and of street-level bureaucracy as lenses 
through which the research problem is critically analysed.  
2.2.1 Legal Pluralism 
The advancement of legal pluralism as a theoretical and analytical tool demanded a clear 
conception of law and legal pluralism, the development of which commenced some decades 
ago124 and is still ongoing. The researcher does not claim to trace the concept’s historical 
development fully here, nor to discuss it exhaustively in all its breadth.125 Nonetheless, she 
acknowledges the pioneering work of various scholars from legal studies and the social 
sciences, which laid the basis for the progress the concept boasts of today.126 The strengths 
and weaknesses, success and failure of the concept of legal pluralism, and how far it has 
come, are not discussed here.127 In this thesis the concept is used as a theoretical and 
analytical tool to the extent that the established knowledge of co-existing interacting plural 
legal orders within a defined locus and their effects on social life guides the study in 
answering the research questions. This part explicates the concept’s gist and its relation to the 
study. Work done by the then Commission on Folk Law and Legal Pluralism, today’s 
Commission on Legal Pluralism, and its members, published mainly in the Journal of Legal 
Pluralism, lays the basis for discussing the concept in this part.  
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What is legal pluralism?128 Griffiths asks and confirms that it is not legal centralism.129 In his 
attempt to construct a conception of legal pluralism suitable for a descriptive theory of law, 
Griffiths defines legal pluralism as the existence of more than one legal order in a given social 
field.130 Here, it is significant to note the use of and distinction between legal rules, 
mechanisms, orders and systems.131 Distinguishing legal pluralism from legal centralism, 
Griffiths describes the latter as the perception that law is and should be the state’s law that 
applies uniformly to all people in the state, is exclusive of all other law, and has only one set 
of state institutions to oversee its administration.132 Legal centralists, he asserts, perceive other 
existing normative systematisations, such as the family, church, social associations, or 
economic organisations, as subordinate to state laws and institutions. Griffiths holds that legal 
centralism is to blame for hindering the advancement of general theory and accurate 
observation of legal reality.133 He says this viewpoint has prevented lawyers and social 
scientists from perceiving the legal reality of a modern state as “an unsystematic collage of 
inconsistent and overlapping parts” which submits to no straightforward legal interpretation, 
and which in the view of a liberal idealist can be morally and aesthetically offensive, and to 
the empirical student nearly unintelligible in its complexity.134    
After considering the said legal reality, Griffiths concludes that a society’s legal organisation 
is congruous to its social organisation.135 This means that social pluralism breeds legal 
pluralism. Merry states that almost every society, whether with a colonial past or not, is 
legally plural.136 Although research on the concept of legal pluralism emanated from studying 
colonial or post-colonial societies in which imperialist nations superimposed parts of their 
own legal systems on pre-existing, mostly non-formalised indigenous legal systems, the 
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concept exists beyond that category.137 Merry classifies legal pluralism as classic or new, 
where the former relates to the colonial convergence of indigenous and European law, and the 
latter to the law of non-colonised Western countries. However, she declares that indigenous 
societies were legally and culturally plural due to conquests and migration, even before their 
encounter with colonisation.138 Agreeing with Merry, Tamanaha argues the existence of legal 
pluralism in non-Western societies during medieval times.139 Thus, the legal systems of both 
the coloniser and the colonised were plural, even before they met. 
Indeed, instances of plurality are not found exclusively in these two groupings. With the 
increasing volume of interaction between societies, and burgeoning globalisation processes, 
other forms of legal pluralism have emerged. Tamanaha, and von Benda-Beckman and Turner 
use the umbrella term of “global legal pluralism” to express legal multiplicity in the context of 
international, regional and transnational laws, trans-governmental networks, global 
immigration, and human rights laws.140 Further, setting aside its classifications and scope of 
loci, legal pluralism has become a widely studied concept across numerous academic fields, 
such as legal anthropology and sociology, socio-legal studies, comparative law, international 
law, and political science.141 Thus, it seems that legal pluralism is always there and 
everywhere.142 
“Legal pluralism is everywhere. There is, in every social arena one 
examines, a seeming multiplicity of legal orders, from the lowest local level 
to the most expansive global level. There are village, town, or municipal 
laws of various types; there are state, district or regional laws of various 
types; there are national, transnational and international laws of various 
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types. In addition to these familiar bodies of law, in many societies there are 
more exotic forms of law, like customary law, indigenous law, religious 
law, or law connected to distinct ethnic or cultural groups within a society. 
There is also an evident increase in quasi-legal activities, from private 
policing and judging, to privately run prisons, to the ongoing creation of the 
new lex mercatoria, a body of transnational commercial law that is almost 
entirely the product of private law-making activities.”143 
Where, then, does legal pluralism start and end? In his attempt to set parameters of legal 
pluralism, Griffiths’ critical analysis of other authors’ work played a significant role in 
spearheading the debate on the concept. Griffiths chose to distinguish between legal pluralism 
and legal plurality as a clarification tool for the concept. The former refers to the situation 
where people in the same state can choose from two or more co-existing bodies of rules,144 
while the latter denotes a situation whereby multiple systems of law co-exist in one state but 
cater to different groups of people who are not at liberty to choose which should apply to 
them.145 Woodman, however, concludes that both situations constitute legal pluralism.146 
In line with the discussion on legal pluralism and plurality of law, Griffiths identified two 
conceptions of legal pluralism. The first one comprises the weak, state, classic, relative, 
legally-constructed, lawyers’ or juristic version of legal pluralism (legal-political concept of 
legal pluralism or normative legal pluralism).147 It takes the position that the state and its law 
are central in a plural legal constellation and that law is that which the state recognises. From 
this viewpoint, the state legal system in whose framework plural legal components may be 
incorporated defines the existence of non-state law.148 However, conceptions in this version of 
legal pluralism may vary depending on how much power and sovereignty the state is assigned 
and the level of interaction between state law and the other normative orders occurring in the 
plural legal configuration.149 Essentially, this boils down to one legal system (that of the state) 
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recognising and providing for the application of other legal systems. It is a conception that 
recognises the plurality of laws and a broad range of complex legal problems relating to 
conflict and choice of laws.150  
The second conception is the strong, deep, real, factual, or social-science version of legal 
pluralism.151 In this version, the state legal system is stripped of its superiority. What is law, 
in this category, is recognised not by the state but rather by the people.152 Its proponents 
consider state law and other normative orders, including but not limited to customary and 
religious orders, to co-exist on an approximately equal footing, each with its own legitimacy 
and validity within a plural legal arrangement.153 Thus, in this version, legal pluralism 
constitutes the co-existence of legal orders of different types and forms characterised by 
diverse, competing, and overlapping authority.154           
From these conceptions arises a question that seems to be at the core of the concept. What is 
law for purposes of legal pluralism?155 In view of the vast body of varying normative orders 
in a plural legal setting, Merry, for instance, cautions against describing ordinary social life as 
law.156 Von Benda-Beckmann finds that there should be criteria to qualify social phenomena 
as legal and distinguish legal phenomena from non-legal.157 However, who legislates and 
sanctions appears to be a fundamental point of departure that centres references on the 
relationship between the state and law in law conceptions.158 Escaping such confinement, 
Griffiths, in the quest to identify law, borrows from Moore’s concept of the semi-autonomous 
social field, which propounds that social groups generate rules and can coerce or induce 
compliance with them.159 Though self-regulating, self-enforcing, and self-propelling, the 
social groups are still semi-autonomous because they are acting in a larger legal, political, 
economic, and social world whose rules can affect them.160  Griffiths defines law as “the self-
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regulation of a semi-autonomous social field”,161 a definition that scholars have vehemently 
criticised in the light of Moore’s clarification that her concept refers to non-legal rather than 
legal obligatory orderings.162 Later, according to Tamanaha, Griffiths revised his stance on 
what constitutes law for purposes of legal pluralism and limited his previous 
conceptualisation to normative pluralism.163 
Identifying and delimiting law is essential for understanding the concept of legal pluralism 
and its application as a theory of law. Tamanaha is insistent on being able to differentiate 
legal from non-legal forms of social ordering or regulation.164 This is because the inability to 
distinguish law from other forms of normative or regulatory orders results in a plurality of 
legal pluralisms.165 Merry finds that it helps, for starters, to identify and define state law and 
non-state law.166 She argues that it is relatively uncomplicated to identify state law, but quite 
challenging to define non-state forms of social orderings, especially when they exist in a 
setting of legal pluralism.167 Von Benda-Beckmann, however, cautions that law should not be 
defined in relation to the state.168 To assist the cause, Tamanaha provides a framework 
equipped with six systems of normative orderings that can guide the identification of law for 
legal pluralism purposes.169 As it is impossible to rehash the complete discussion on what 
constitutes law here, it is best to conclude that law is not only that of the state, although state 
law inescapably shapes and provides for the practice of other normative orders operating 
within its boundaries.170 Law may therefore be any normative order that its social actors or 
participants identify as law.171 
Legal pluralism is a fact in Tanzania. First, the country is characterised by social and cultural 
pluralism, which reproduces diverse sources of social orderings. Tanzanians are 
predominantly of African descent mixed with a minority of Asiatic (primarily Indian and 
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Arabic) and European descent.172 Indigenous peoples comprise more than 120 ethnic groups, 
complete with their customs, traditions, religions, and languages. Their societal relations are 
governed mainly by customary law, which differs considerably from one community to 
another. The body of customary law referred to may be either static and codified or dynamic 
and living.173 Religious laws also play a significant role in regulating social life in Tanzania. 
Since Tanzanians profess various faiths such as Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, and 
traditionalism, such laws are multiple and diverse.174 According to the Judicature and 
Application of Laws Act (JALA), state law recognises these legal orders (customary and 
religious) as sources of law in Tanzania applicable in specific situations and subject to 
repugnancy clauses.175 Within Tanzanian society, child care is a matter that is primarily 
regulated by customary and religious laws, unless there is a need for state interference. These 
laws regulate the most widely practised form of child care in Tanzania: kinship- and 
community-based care.176 Their influence is far-reaching as perceptions of, for instance, 
traditional or religious-based foster care (kafala)177 and adoption tint people’s understanding 
of their statutorily regulated counterparts. The Law of the Child Act recognises the role 
played by customary law in organising care for orphaned children.178 Also, in recognition of 
customary law as a coexisting legal order, section 68 of the Act subjects an adopted child to 
customary law in cases where the adoptive parent is also subject to it.  
Second, Tanzania (then Tanganyika) was colonised by Germany, and later became a 
protectorate under British rule after WWI.179 While German rule did not leave a significant 
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mark on Tanganyika’s legal system, the British imposed their legal system on the country. 
Although legislated mainly by the parliament today, state law in Tanzania is, for the most 
part, traceable back to the British colonial period.180 British colonial legislation and 
institutionalisation received during the colonial period continued to be of relevance after 
independence. British laws are still applicable in Tanzania to some extent, some in the 
original version with amendments and some with significant changes that reflect the current 
society. State law recognises received law as a source of law in Tanzania. Received law 
constitutes Acts from the United Kingdom and India applicable in Tanzania from the 
reception date (22 July 1920) to date.181 Tanzania also adopted the English common law 
tradition, in which, among others, judges can make law and are bound to it according to the 
doctrine of stare decisis. A fact pertinent to this study is that the Adoption of Infants 
Ordinance of 1942, based on the British Adoption of Children Act of 1926, introduced 
Tanzania’s statutory child adoption law.182 English-based adoption legislation underwent 
several changes but remained in operation in Tanzania up to 2009.183 The Tanzanian 
Parliament enacted the Law of the Child Act in 2009, which replaced the English-based law 
but essentially adopted most of its provisions.184 
Third, Tanzania forms part of today’s global village and hence is affected by global legal 
pluralism. Tanzania is a State Party to the international community under the framework of 
the United Nations. It is also a Partner State to some regional organisations and blocs, such as 
the African Union (AU), the East African Community (EAC), and the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC). Such international and regional involvement commits the 
country to international and regional legal instruments on diverse subjects. As a result, 
international and regional law are sources of law in the country. For instance, concerning 
child rights, Tanzania has ratified and domesticated the UNCRC and the ACRWC. Being a 
player in the international arena, Tanzania also has to deal with the growing body of 
transnational law. For instance, the law regulating international agencies operating in the 
country, such as UNICEF, and transnationally, such as the International Social Service, must 
be reckoned with as it affects child adoption law and practice. 
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Inspired by what von Benda-Beckmann says, this study pays attention to the numerous 
variations in constellations of legal pluralism found in practice, and how they influence the 
conditions and lives of people involved in child adoption in Tanzania.185 It considers the 
levels of legal pluralism within state law and its institutionalisation and beyond. In doing so, it 
acknowledges the existence of strong and weak legal pluralism in Tanzania’s legal field. 
Thus, the study observes the interplay between the existing normative systems as they 
compete, clash, and overlap.  
Further discussion on the identified layers of legal pluralism in Tanzania’s legal system 
ensues in the following chapters, especially those discussing the legal framework, best interest 
of the child principle, and child adoption practice. 
2.2.2 Street-Level Bureaucracy 
Michael Lipsky’s sociological theory of street-level bureaucracy is predominantly used as an 
analytical tool in public administration and political science.186 However, it has also proved 
useful in this socio-legal study for analysing the work and behaviour of public service 
workers involved in child adoption processes. It has also been used to explore the differences 
between policy and laws as written and as implemented in practice, and between best practice 
found in guidelines and actual practice on the ground. Although Lipsky started developing the 
theory in 1969, his book of 1980 explains it comprehensively and has attracted much 
scholarly interest.187 Numerous authors have written on the theory pre- and post-Lipsky, but 
this thesis uses the theory in so far as articulated by Lipsky and subsequently discussed by 
others basing on his ideas.  
Street-level bureaucrats are public service workers who directly interact with clients in their 
work while exercising substantial discretion in the performance of their jobs.188 These are 
bureaucrats whose work has a considerable impact on their clients’ lives.189 They are the ones 
who bring the government to the people, and each encounter constitutes public policy 
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delivery.190 Their employers, street-level bureaucracies, are public service agencies that 
engage numerous bureaucrats in their workforce. Lipsky gives an illustrative list of 
bureaucracies, including schools, police, social welfare departments, lower courts, and legal 
service offices.  These employ, among others, teachers, law enforcement officers such as 
police officers, social workers, health workers, judges, public lawyers, other court personnel, 
and diverse public workers involved in delivering services in government programmes.191  
Street-level bureaucracy theory describes the practices and beliefs of street-level bureaucrats 
faced by systematic and practical dilemmas in the workplace, and how, in their routine work, 
they enact public policy.192 The main elements of the theory, which Lipsky summarises in the 
preface of his book, relate to existing stressful work settings, developing coping mechanisms, 
exercising discretion, and enacting policy.193 Public service workers commit themelves to 
working in their fields based on ideal conceptions of their jobs, given the social usefulness 
potential they hold. They start with a commitment to service. However, their aspirations are 
defeated by the nature of their work, which is characterised by inadequate resources, uncertain 
methods, and unpredictable clients. 
In his article on “Street-Level Bureaucracy and the Analysis of Urban Reform”, Lipsky 
expands on the three types of stress that street-level bureaucrats face in their work. These 
include inadequate organisational resources (human, fiscal, infrastructural, information and 
time)194, contradictory or ambiguous job expectations which create uncertainties in job 
performance, and threats and challenges to their authority perceived in their inability to 
control the work-related encounter.195 These stresses necessitate coping mechanisms to aid the 
bureaucrats to discharge their responsibilities despite their workplace conditions. Lipsky finds 
that the coping mechanisms develop as psychological or behavioural reactions to the 
stresses.196  
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Lipsky mentions three coping mechanisms that teachers develop to manage their stressful 
working conditions.197  First, simplifications such as mass processing – teachers responding to 
children’s educative needs as a class rather than individuals. Second, defences such as 
population segmentation or redefining during profiling or categorising clients – teachers 
labelling students as uneducable. Third, rationalisations such as creating validity for their 
actions and attitudes – teachers abandoning their duty to educate based on the belief that 
children are dull or unmotivated. In Lipsky’s view, the coping mechanisms in the best-case 
scenario may lead to effective and efficient service provision, but at worst may lead to 
discrimination, stereotyping, and routinising, which may serve both private and agency 
purposes.198 Here a question may arise; are the bureaucrats agents of the state or citizens?199 
The stresses and coping mechanisms affect decision-making standards that street-level 
bureaucrats adhere to while executing their duties. In their interaction with clients, the 
bureaucrats exercise broad discretion in arriving at decisions. They determine the nature, 
amount, and quality of benefits or sanctions that their clients receive.200 Professionals, Lipsky 
observes, are expected to exercise discretionary judgement in their fields relatively free from 
supervision or clients’ scrutiny.201 However, he finds that public service workers, who claim 
no professional status, may, in street-level bureaucracies, still exercise this discretionary 
judgement. Their discretion may be defined or limited by statute, rules, regulations, 
administrative directives, occupational and community norms, and practices. However, this 
normative body may be voluminous and ever-changing, potentially resulting in adherence 
only to the most fundamental rules.202 Further, he finds that although exercising discretion is 
the root cause of numerous problems in public service, one has no option because the 
complex nature of the tasks impedes the use of programmed formats.203  
Rowe asks, is discretion a good or bad thing?204 The answer lies in the street-level work 
characterised by complicated situations requiring responses to their human dimensions which 
necessitate sensitive observation and judgement.205 Also, in the bureaucrats’ reflection, 
discretion boosts their self-regard and gives legitimacy to their decisions, something which 
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makes clients perceive them as crucial holders of their well-being.206 Finally, Lipsky declares 
that exercise of discretion needs to strike a proper balance between compassion and flexibility 
in dealing with the unique circumstances of each case and expected impartiality and rigid 
rule-application in service provision.207 
Weatherley and Lipsky argue that the meaning of policy can only be understood once the 
bureaucrats have worked it out in practice at the street level.208 From this perspective, they 
propose a dual way of studying policy formulation and implementation. First, by looking at 
policy from its traditional authoritative articulation by legislatures and high-ranking 
administrators, through different administrative modifications, to how it affects decision 
making at the end of the chain in street-level decision making.209 And second, by looking at 
the street-level bureaucrats in their discretionary decision making in the context of their work 
as they encounter their clients.210 Here one can observe policy as it shapes the behaviour of 
the bureaucrats and what is ultimately delivered to the citizens as the bureaucrats navigate 
their work situations.211 In such a study, street-level bureaucrats become policy-makers and 
the high-ranking administrators restrictors of the lower level policy-making.212 In this sense, 
policy should be understood both as the written version in government statements and 
legislation, and as the version delivered to the public as street-level bureaucrats use and 
interpret the written rules and deal with their work environment constraints.213 Lipsky 
explains this as follows: “decisions of street-level bureaucrats, the routines they establish, and 
the devices they invent to cope with uncertainties and work pressures, effectively become the 
public policies they carry out.”214 
Smith and Donovan’s use of street-level bureaucracy’s theoretical framework in their study of 
child welfare caseworkers’ descriptions of their everyday work has substantially inspired its 
use in this study.215 In their study, the authors use Lipsky’s theoretical framework to explore 
the discrepancy between best and actual practice in the everyday workings of frontline foster 
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care caseworkers.216 They discuss the effects of organisational pressures and constraints 
facing the caseworkers, and challenges associated with their interaction with the judiciary, on 
their performance, measured against best practice guidelines and timelines set in the law (US 
Adoption and Safe Families Act).217 Together with the work of Weatherly and Lipsky on the 
implementation of special-education law, their discussion pointed this study towards 
discussing the implementation of Tanzania’s child adoption law from the street-level 
bureaucrats’ viewpoint. The Law of the Child Act, 2009 is studied in this thesis from the 
perspective of a statute bringing new child adoption rules to the field, after the previous law 
had operated for more than half a century since 1953. This study considers how street-level 
bureaucrats in Tanzania cope with implementing the new law and policy, and how their 
decision-making is modified by it, while there are no substantial changes in their work 
environment, but instead in their work requirements.218 Their work conditions and the stresses 
produced by them are analysed, and the coping mechanisms the bureaucrats have invented 
and their effects on child adoption practice are observed. The application of this theory is 
essential in discussions on the implementation of child adoption law by street-level 
bureaucrats throughout the thesis. In view of Tanzanian society’s legal and social pluralistic 
settings, the influence of religion, local custom, traditions, education, and personal experience 
on the bureaucrats’ interpretation and application of the rules is taken into account. 
2.3 Conceptual Framework 
A conceptual framework is a system of concepts, assumptions, and beliefs that lays out the 
study’s key factors, constructs, and variables and explains their relationship.219 The 
framework is based on the researcher’s understanding of how best to explore the research 
problem and depict the specific direction of the study.220 The researcher presents in the 
framework not a mere string of concepts but a structure of connected concepts relating to the 
research problem that provides a clear picture of how ideas relate to one another in the 
study.221  
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This part explores select concepts key to the complete comprehension of child adoption law 
and practice in Tanzania as analysed in this study. The presented conceptual perceptions are 
from legal, anthropological, or other sociological standpoints uttered in numerous scholars’ 
voices and discussed in line with the researcher’s perception. 
2.3.1 Child, Childhood and Child Welfare 
The concept of child and childhood has been, for a long time, a contentious topic of debate in 
different fields of study. Ariès traced the concept of childhood from the Middle Ages, which 
led him to state that childhood, as we understand it today, is a European conception 
originating from the 18th century.222 He contends that before this there was no distinction 
between the life of children and adults, to the extent that they were treated in the same way 
and enjoyed the same rights. His contentions have been the subject of extensive discussion 
and criticism. “‘Childhood’ in ‘Crisis’?” is among the works criticising and building on Ariès’ 
study. It provides a wide view of the historical, theoretical, and social construction and 
reconstruction of childhood.223 However, it is not possible to delve into these debates here, 
nor to attempt to find a fitting concept of childhood. Instead, following Ncube, it suffices to 
say that previous authors have shown that the conception of childhood changes with time and 
in different social and cultural contexts.224 While it is clear that the term child may refer both 
to a minor and to a person’s daughter or son irrespective of age, this study centres on the 
former. 
Norozi and Moen contend that the idea that childhood is the earliest phase of human life is an 
uncontested truth across all societies and cultures.225 However, the conceptualisation of a 
child and childhood still varies between different societies and cultures. For instance, the term 
child may refer to bodily or mental incapacity or immaturity, natural dependency, friendship 
or flattery (an adult referred to as a child), or identity reference, e.g. calling a mother by her 
child’s name as is common in African societies.226 It may also hinge on set 
conceptualisations, such as being and becoming a child, referring to children as social actors 
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in their own right, or as adults in the making.227 It also differs depending on the specific field 
in which the concept is defined: legal, political, social, cultural, or economic. Although across 
various societies, cultures, or fields, the attainment of a particular age is the primary 
determinant, many also consider capacity and purpose in child and childhood 
conceptualisations.228 For example, in the legal field, statutory laws emphasise age as a 
defining factor for both a child and the duration of childhood, in contrast to capacity and 
purpose in customary and religious laws and other fields. 
Black’s law dictionary defines a child as a person below the age of majority.229 The UNCRC 
and the ACRWC define a child as every human being under 18 years of age.230 In the 
framework of the two instruments, the age of majority is 18 years. However, the UNCRC 
allows for an earlier age of majority applicable under the law relating to children in individual 
State Parties. Even so, the cap remains 18 years of age and not later. In Tanzania, the Law of 
the Child Act, 2009, domesticating the UNCRC and ACRWC, defines a child in section 4(1) 
as any person below 18 years. Since this is the principal statute relating to children, it 
provides the country’s overarching legal meaning of a child.  
The English suffix -hood affixed to the term child refers to a state or condition of being. 
Childhood is thus the state or duration of being a child. According to the above legal 
definition of a child, childhood generally spans a period of 18 years. However, this varies in 
some countries, as recognised by the UNCRC, for various purposes and in various 
circumstances.  
In Tanzania, in different statutes, the age limit of childhood differs depending on the required 
purpose or capacity. Thus, age remains a defining factor, but the emphasis shifts to purpose or 
capacity. For instance, under sections 13 and 17 of the Law of Marriage Act, 1971, the 
minimum age at which a female may marry is fifteen years. Thus, for marriage purposes, a 
fifteen-year-old girl has capacity although she has not attained the age of majority set at 18 
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years by section 2 of the same Act.231 The Government of Tanzania justifies this exception to 
the general rule by arguing that the early biological maturity of girls calls for the social 
protection marriage affords if they engage in sexual relations below 18 years of age.232 Also, 
the Employment and Labour Relations Act, 2004, which domesticates fundamental ILO 
conventions, defines a child as a person below 14 years, and for employment purposes in 
hazardous sectors, below 18 years. Section 5 of the said law, which criminalises child labour, 
details the type of employment children under 14 years and 18 years can pursue. Thus, in this 
law, the legal meaning of a child has changed for purposes of employment and in general 
consideration of a child’s capacity at age 14.  
Emphasis on ability and purpose rather than age is typical of traditional African definitions of 
childhood. For instance, Letuka, in her discussion on child labour in Lesotho, explains how 
the Basotho society defines a child and childhood for labour purposes, based on physical 
ability or development rather than age.233 She adds the attainment of married status as another 
qualifying factor. Thus, childhood stops once married is crossed in one’s marital checkbox; in 
the described instance, this applies to a girl aged 13. Rwezaura, who explains traditional 
African perceptions of childhood, asserts that the duration of childhood is relatively short in 
African societies compared to modern Western societies.234 Based on competing images of 
childhood as a concept, his discussion shows how different African societies or cultures 
conceptualise a child and childhood. Using the concept of ‘wealth-in-people’, he describes 
how children in African societies end up in child labour because they are perceived as family 
assets or resources that guarantee the family’s economic survival. Although the 1990s saw a 
revolution in the children’s rights movement, these two studies show that the situation in 
traditional African societies had not changed significantly by the end of the decade. However, 
since then, there may have been some transformations in the perceived image of childhood.  
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‘Image’ of childhood is a crucial component in understanding a child’s meaning, value, and 
needs. Since childhood is a social construction235, the image of childhood that a particular 
society holds explains its conceptualisation of a child and childhood. The changing, evolving, 
competing, or conflicting images of childhood are perceived as such depending on the time, 
place, and developing socio-cultural, economic, and legal systems. In her article, Sorin paints 
ten different images of a child: innocent, noble/saviour, evil, snowballing, out of control, 
miniature adult, adult-in-training, commodity, victim, and agentic.236 The images and what 
they imply give children varying meanings and values, which affects assessment of their 
needs and their ultimate treatment. The ever-changing images of childhood laid the 
foundation for the conception of the child as a subject of rights rather than an object of care—
which considerably transformed children’s rights and child welfare practice.237  
Welfare is a term that may have several interpretations depending on the context. Generally, 
welfare means the state of being or doing well in all respects.238 Within the family, child 
welfare in O’Halloran’s view translates to a secure and contented home environment 
established and maintained by parents or carers and sustained by a harmonious parental 
relationship.239 However, welfare in the society may refer to coordinated procedures or 
services, legal, social, economic, or otherwise, intended to promote the physical or 
psychological well-being of persons in need. Thus, child welfare can be described as a 
continuum of services designed to ensure children’s safety and well-being within and outside 
of their families.240 It spells child care and protection in various domains of children’s lives. 
The child welfare system, which encompasses actors, services, and practices, evolves with 
time and need in both the domestic and international arenas.241 It depends on a vast body of 
laws that may be national, regional, international or otherwise, and statutory, customary, 
religious or otherwise; on public or private agencies; on child- or family-centred, community-
based or other services; and on evidence-based or other practices. These factors make clear 
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the diverse and varying nature of child welfare which makes it difficult to conceptualise.242 
However, no attempt will be made here to deconstruct the entire concept, but it will be 
focused on only as far as legal and social perceptions of child welfare relate to alternative 
child care, with specific attention to child adoption.  
2.3.2 Concept of Care  
Care is a multidimensional phenomenon. Whether used to name or describe an activity, care 
has various meanings. According to Morse et al., care may refer to an action as in the phrase 
‘to take care of’ or to concern displayed as in ‘caring about’.243 It requires the existence of a 
caregiver and a care-receiver. Conceptualisations of care depend on the context of its use. 
This could be, for instance, in the health sciences (nursing), legal discourse, or social welfare. 
For example, phrases such as reasonable care, duty, standard, or degree of care are common in 
the legal field, especially in the law of negligence. Black’s law dictionary defines care in that 
context as the way a person must act in a given situation: with serious attention while 
considering all possible risks and how to avoid them.244 However, in social welfare, a field 
central to this study, care may refer to providing what is necessary for someone’s health, 
welfare, maintenance, and protection.245  
Defining a concept is one step towards successful conceptual analysis. Stroehlein finds that 
describing the concept’s attributes, backgrounds, outcomes, and perceptions helps its 
understanding.246 While developing a definition of caring, another author, Engster, uses care 
aims and virtues.247 Engster believes that the resultant definition is wide enough to embrace 
care as practised across numerous fields, such as parenting, teaching, nursing, elder care, and 
psychology, and narrow enough to exclude acts which are done in a caring manner but are not 
caring per se.248 He defines care as “everything we do directly to help others to meet their 
basic needs, develop or sustain their basic capabilities, and alleviate or avoid pain or 
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suffering, in an attentive, responsive and respectful manner.”249 Common to several authors 
who attempt to conceptualise care, such as Daly and Lewis250, Engster, Morse et al., and 
Stroehlein, is their study of existing literature regarding the concept. The literature review 
provides a historical development of the concept and prompts its broader understanding.  
Daly and Lewis show that initially, and for a long time, care was in the purview of informal 
unpaid domestic and personal workers, and was provided in the sphere of relations defined by 
marriage and kinship.251 At that time, care was considered a women-specific concept.252 
Providing care was the responsibility of a wife, mother, aunt, sister, or daughter. These 
relations underscore personal ties that influence trust, commitment, loyalty, and obligation, 
forming a foundation for the provision of care in the family. Hence, care in the family is 
understood as a moral practice or social relationship grounded on love, thoughtfulness, and a 
sense of duty.253 However, further studies on the concept have shown that the provision of 
care may be personal or institutional. It may occur at the level of the state, community, 
family, or market. At such levels, care may be formal or informal, contractual or non-
contractual, paid or unpaid, public or private, received in cash or services, and could be a 
form of dependence or independence.254  
Over time, the concept of care evolved beyond the family. The introduction of care 
arrangements in the impersonal realms of the state, community and marketplace led to 
broader conceptualisations of care. Due to its diversity of use, care became an obscure and 
contested concept. The increased debate developed the concept and heightened academic 
interest in it.255 This study utilises the empirical category of analysis termed ‘social care’ 
adopted in Daly and Lewis’ work.256 The authors describe care in three dimensions: as labour, 
as an obligation and responsibility within a social and state normative framework, and as an 
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activity with financial and emotional costs extending across public and private boundaries. 
They define social care as, 
 “…the activities and relations involved in meeting the physical and 
emotional requirements of dependent adults and children, and the 
normative, economic, and social frameworks within which these are 
assigned and carried out.”257 [emphasis added]  
Child care, as discussed in this study, falls within the above definition of social care. Instead 
of describing the activities that constitute child care, this study focuses more on the 
frameworks within which care is defined and practised, and more on the normative and social 
rather than the economic frameworks. The normative framework spans the international, 
regional, and national levels, while the social framework considers care within the family and 
community in Tanzania. In these frameworks, what actions constitute care, and the ensuing 
relations depend on legal and societal definitions and care requirements.  
In most African traditional communities, including Tanzania’s, prevailing customs and 
traditions determine what child care encompasses. Customary rules and traditions on child 
care vary significantly from one traditional group to another and from time to time.258 What 
one community considers as child care may not be considered as such by the next community. 
Nevertheless, a well-known common feature in African child care is that it is not limited to 
the nuclear family unit but is shared communally. Members of the extended family, distant 
relatives and neighbours may participate in child care. The care provided may vary from 
childminding for a few hours to fully-fledged child care permanently. When it operated 
without a glitch, children without parental care were rarely heard of in this setting. Informal 
kinship care was the answer for orphans or children deprived of parental care for any other 
reason. However, the African traditional safety net for children in need of care is no longer 
strong enough.259 Its weakening has compelled states, including Tanzania, to design and 
implement alternative child care arrangements to fill the gap.  
The UNCRC and the ACRWC are the leading legal instruments in respect of child care on the 
international and regional front. They do not define what child care means. However, they 
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state that children need special care because of their physical and mental immaturity.260 For 
children in Africa, the need for special care is also due to socio-economic, cultural, traditional 
and political circumstances unique to their environment.261 Special care for children starts at 
the family level. These instruments affirm that the family is the fundamental social group 
offering a natural environment for its members’ growth and well-being.262 Articles 7, UNCRC 
and 19, ACRWC, establish the right for every child to be cared for by their parents. This right 
gives to parents and legal guardians the primary responsibility for children’s upbringing and 
development as stipulated under Articles 18(1), UNCRC, and 20(1), ACRWC. Recognising 
that this responsibility may not always be achievable, the instruments require suitable 
alternative care arrangements for children who are separated from their parents or who are 
deprived of their family environment temporarily or permanently for whatever reason.263 
Child care in these two instruments is, thus, parental or alternative.264  
In Tanzania, the Law of the Child Act, 2009, which domesticates the UNCRC and ACRWC, 
mirrors the above provisions. Although it does not directly define child care, section 16 of the 
Act provides a list of circumstances in which a child needs care. Lack of nurturing and 
protection by a child’s natural parents, relatives, legal guardians, or any other person with 
primary care of the child, qualifies him or her as a child in need of care. It follows that such a 
child should receive appropriate substitute care in line with section 7(3) of the Act. When 
needed, alternative child care, according to section 9(3) and (4) of the Act, must be as 
prescribed by statutory or customary law. The Act stipulates a range of alternative care 
arrangements according to sections 18 and 24.  
Since this study focuses on children without parental care265, understanding alternative child 
care becomes imperative. According to the UN Guidelines on Alternative Care of Children 
2010, alternative care can be formal or informal.266 The critical difference between the two is 
the ordering authority; in contrast to informal care, for formal care a competent 
administrative, judicial, or other duly accredited body regulating formal care must be used. 
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Different types of alternative care are kinship care, foster care, other family-based care (such 
as care by fit persons in Tanzania), residential care, and supervised individual living for 
children.267 Child adoption is another form of alternative family care under the UNCRC, the 
ACRWC, and the Law of the Child Act, 2009.268 However, the UN Guidelines apply to child 
adoption as an alternative care arrangement only as far as the pre-adoption process is 
concerned, and considers it a form of parental care after placement.269 This study focuses on 
child adoption as an alternative child care measure within Tanzania’s legal framework. 
2.3.3 Concept of Parenthood  
Parenthood is a relation and an activity. Its conception considers how one becomes a parent 
and acquires parental rights and responsibilities.270 ‘Parent’ as an English noun means a 
person’s mother or father. It denotes the presence of a parent-child relationship. The way this 
relationship comes into existence determines interpretations of the term. Biological, social, 
artificial, judicial, or de facto processes can establish parenthood.271 Considering the 
numerous ways through which one can become a parent, especially in the context of the 
emergent contemporary complex patterns of family life, conceptualising parenthood is a 
rather tricky task. Technological advancements that diversify ways of reproducing do not help 
matters. Further, a number of variables influence conceptions of parenthood, such as the 
formality of relationships, biology, attachment, rights and responsibilities of adults and 
children, and gender difference and equality in adult relationships. As a result, parenthood is 
currently a highly contentious topic in academic discourses on the family.  
This study does not include a debate on conceptions of parenthood. Instead, it uses existing 
conceptualisations to understand parenthood in the Tanzanian context. While several other 
authors272 have written on the concept too, the book “What is Parenthood?: Contemporary 
Debates about the Family”, which covers topics pertinent to understanding the term 
parenthood, is a key used in this study to unlock the concept.273 The authors use two 
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competing models of parenthood to analyse the concept and organise the discussion on it: 
integrative and diversity parenthood. These two parenthood models attempt to avoid the 
simplistic contrasts made in the debate, such as for versus against, traditional versus modern, 
and conservative versus liberal.274 Instead, they explain perceptions of parenthood in the 
context of each model and answer each question from both perspectives. This study borrows 
their approach and considers the two models to assist comprehension of what parenthood 
signifies in Tanzania. 
The integrative model275, also known as the conjugal model, derives its convictions about 
parenthood mainly from religion. However, some of its proponents derive their ideas from 
kinship studies, evolutionary psychology, and biological anthropology. The model 
conceptualises parenthood as a natural adult-child relationship arising from biological 
procreation by a man and woman within wedlock. It is integrative because it regards marriage 
between opposite-sex couples as the centre for integrating adult intimate bonds and parent-
child bonds. Emphasis is on sex difference between the parents, biological connection with 
the children, and children’s right to two biological parents for optimal development. The 
model also recognises parenthood resulting from child adoption within the ambits of opposite-
sex marriage. However, it does not recognise other methods or family forms through which a 
person becomes a parent. For instance, it does not support assisted reproduction technology 
(ART) because of the trenches it digs between biology and parenthood as well as marriage 
and parenthood. Also, it generally opposes the legalisation of marriage between same-sex 
couples because this weakens the model’s pillar, namely that every child has a right to a father 
and a mother. However, some proponents of the model recognise and support same-sex 
marriage to strengthen the marital institution, foster marital parenthood, and rethink ART. 
They also support second-parent adoption in same-sex marriages, favouring formal relations 
that promote the child’s well-being over informal ones.  
The diversity model276, unlike the integrative model, focuses not on family form but on 
function. It conceptualises parenthood as the quality of the relationship between an adult and a 
child, measured by the psychological concept of attachment. It recognises any person who 
functions as a parent irrespective of biological or formal connection to the child. Thus, it 
emphasises adults’ authority and responsibility, and children’s fundamental right to healthy 
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attachments and good parenting, rather than the biology and formality of relationships 
proposed by the integrative model. Like those of the integrative model, some proponents of 
the diversity model recognise marriage as a valuable integrative tool between adult intimate 
relationships and parent-child relationships. However, unlike the integrative model’s 
proponents, this recognition is their reasoning for supporting same-sex marriage. Considering 
the integration between adult intimate relationships and parent-child relationships, some 
proponents of the diversity model urge that family law and society should recognise the array 
of adult intimate relationships. By contrast, others propose moving the focus to parenthood 
and children’s needs. 
Considering Tanzanian society, one model alone cannot fully capture the existing conception 
of parenthood. The Law of the Child Act under section 3 defines a parent as “a biological 
father or mother, the adoptive father or mother and any other person under whose care a child 
has been committed.”277 This is an expansive definition of a parent. One may find that it fits 
the big tent of the diversity model. However, same-sex relationships are neither legal nor 
socially recognised in the country.278 Thus, that part of the model does not apply in Tanzania. 
Nonetheless, the end part of the definition aligns with the diversity model in the sense of 
parental function. Sections 6 to 10 of the Law of the Child Act describe the care functions of 
the parent in terms of parental rights and responsibilities towards the child.279 Regulation 2 of 
the Child Protection Regulations defines parental duty and responsibility as “all the rights, 
duties and responsibilities which, under both statutory and customary law, a parent has for his 
child including those prescribed in section 9(3) of the Act.” The said subsection assigns child 
care duty to parents and requires them to ensure care by a competent person in their 
temporary absence. In its proviso, section 9(3) of the Act relieves parents from child care duty 
when they have surrendered their rights and responsibilities per statutory, traditional, or 
customary law arrangements. Section 9(4) of the Act provides that a court order or traditional 
arrangement can confer the parental responsibilities of deceased biological parents on a 
relative of either parent or a custodian. These provisions show that statutory or customary law 
can bestow and withdraw parenthood status in Tanzania. Therefore, a parent in Tanzania is 
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anyone, besides biological parents, who holds that status according to statutory or customary 
law arrangements. 
However, returning to the Act’s definition of a parent, the phrase ‘has been committed’ 
suggests an authority assigning the child’s care to a person or even an institution. Sections 6-
10 of the Act which set out parental rights and responsibilities show that persons other than 
parents can have such rights and responsibilities. These include guardians and relatives. 
Section 3 of the Act and regulation 2 of the Child Protection Regulations define both 
guardians and relatives. They define a guardian as “a person who has a charge or control over 
a child or a person appointed by deed, will or order of the court vested with the duty of taking 
care and managing the property and rights of the child.” A relative is defined as “a 
grandparent, brother, sister, uncle, auntie or any other member of extended family.”280 
Numerous provisions of the Act contain the phrase ‘parent, guardian, or relative’, referring to 
persons who have parental rights and responsibilities over the child.281 Regulations made 
under the Act, whenever providing specifically for the numerous instances regarding which 
the Act refers to ‘parent, guardian or relative’, also use the same phrase. The Child Protection 
Regulations, in some provisions, add the term carer to the phrase, or replaces ‘relative’ with it 
instead.282 Its regulation 2 defines a carer as a person who has lived with and provided care to 
the child for at least three months in the last six months. Considering the definitions of parent, 
guardian, relative, and carer under the Act and Regulations, and the way they refer to 
parenthood, a child lacks parental care only when all these persons are unavailable to care for 
him or her.  
‘Has been committed’ implies formality in terms of care ordered by judicial or administrative 
organs and informality in traditional care arrangements, which brings both integrative and 
diversity models into play.283 The determinant role of statutory and customary law child care 
arrangements in defining parenthood also underscores the existence of either formality or 
informality. However, the first part of the definition reflects the integrative rather than the 
diversity model. This is because it requires a biological or formal connection for a parent-
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child relationship. It, nonetheless, does not expressly demand a marital bond for a couple to 
be parents.  However, only married couples can adopt a child in Tanzania, except for a 
Tanzanian single woman or a single man under exceptional circumstances.284  
Since Tanzania’s society is highly religious, the general public may relate to the integrative 
more than to the diversity model. However, being a pluralistic legal society governed, among 
others, by both statutory and customary laws, there are diverse conceptualisations of a parent 
and parenthood. As a result, a wide range of persons with varying primary formal and 
informal relationships to the child can become their parents. Therefore, the conceptualisation 
of parenthood in Tanzania draws from parts of both the integrative and diversity models.  
This study focuses on statutory child adoption. For adoption purposes, it is vital to define 
what constitutes a child without parental care. Thus, understanding what parenthood entails in 
Tanzania helps to establish the meaning of parental care and to define what is a child deprived 
of parental care. This assists the categorisation of children without parental care, which is 
necessary for the identification of alternative care arrangements suitable for each child. In 
turn, it sets apart parenthood in child adoption against parenthood in other arrangements, such 
as foster care and institutional care. In the course of this thesis, this distinction under the law 
and in society will become apparent.   
2.3.4 Child Adoption 
There exist multiple perceptions of child adoption, depending on the lens through which one 
views the concept. Understanding of this concept varies within a society and from one society 
to another. It is also dynamic, depending on the context, time, and field of study. This part 
considers conceptualisations of child adoption in legal and anthropological studies, while 
focusing on Tanzanian society in recent times. The plurality of legal orders governing life in 
Tanzania has led to diverse perceptions of child adoption. Adoption under state law 
(formal/statutory adoption) is quite different from adoption practices under customary and 
religious laws (informal/traditional law, kinship adoption).285 Fundamental elements and 
procedures that constitute child adoption differ from one legal order to the other. As well, 
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there are very diverse motives for adoption.286 Thus, society members living according to the 
various laws understand and practice child adoption differently.  
Tanzania’s formal adoption law, particularly regulation 2 of the Adoption of Children 
Regulations, defines adoption as a measure that provides permanent family care to a child 
deprived of their family environment.287 The Regulations do not define ‘family environment’, 
nor does the Law of the Child Act under which the Regulations are made. However, section 3 
of the Act defines a family as a father, mother, and children, blood-related or adopted, and 
other typical members of an extended family living in a household. Therefore, it means 
children may be regarded as deprived of their family environment only when found without 
the care of their parents or members of the extended family.288 However, the UN Guidelines 
emphasise the deprivation of parental care rather than the family environment.289 In the 
context of the Guidelines, the term parents refers to the father and mother of the child. In 
Tanzania, as discussed above, the definition of a parent in the Law of the Child Act is 
extensive. Thus, children are considered as being deprived of their family environment or 
parental care in Tanzania only when they are without the care of their parents, members of the 
extended family, or any other person to whose care they are committed. The term ‘deprived 
of’ is also open to broad interpretations. It may cover a wide range of scenarios, including 
children who are parentless, relinquished, sold, trafficked, neglected, abused, maltreated, or 
even runaways.290 The remaining question is how adoption as an alternative measure of child 
care can be understood. 
Wanitzek finds that almost always adoption refers to the voluntary assumption of parental 
rights and obligations over a child by a non-biological parent.291 It is a process that creates full 
or partial kinship ties by agreement or law instead of blood. O’Halloran gives numerous 
interpretations of the concept as she attempts a comprehensive conceptualisation of child 
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adoption in various jurisprudences.292 She terms statutory adoption as the most radical family 
law order empowered to permanently change the legal status and impact the legal interests of 
members of the adoption triad with far-reaching implications for their entire families, social 
circles, and future generations.293 She argues that statutory adoption creates an artificial 
parent-child relationship between a child and a non-biological parent that is tantamount to the 
preexisting biological relationship. It severs the original family relationship by transferring 
parental rights and responsibilities to the adopter and gives the child a new identity, address, 
kin, and property. The adopter voluntarily takes on the duty to nurture and protect the child of 
another, hoping that their mutual bonding will create sufficient attachment for them both to 
sustain their need for a family.  
Section 64(1) (a) and (b) of Tanzania’s Law of the Child Act, which names the effects of 
child adoption, confirms the picture O’Halloran paints. It reads, 
“When an adoption order is made– (a) the rights, duties, obligations and 
liabilities including those under customary law of the parents of the child or 
of any other person connected with the child of any nature whatsoever shall 
cease; and (b) the adoptive parent of the child shall assume the parental 
rights, duties, obligations and liabilities of the child with respect of custody, 
maintenance and education as if the child was born to the adoptive parent in 
a lawful wedlock and was not the child of any other person.” 
Howell, from a different angle, conceptualises child adoption from the standpoint of 
anthropological kinship studies.294 She establishes that child adoption is a process involving 
the kinning of strangers. It is an expression of a kin idiom that entails bringing a foetus, 
newborn, or any previously unconnected person into a significant and permanent relationship 
with a group of people.295 She points out that numerous societies and scholars consider 
biological connectedness as the universal identifier of kin relatedness.296 Such thinking is 
based on biocentrism, which perceives social relatedness as being weaker than biogenetic 
relatedness. The perception leads to the characterisation of adoption as a fictive, pseudo or 
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artificial kin relationship. Howell vehemently rejects such labelling and asks, fictive to 
whom?297 She says in no way do adoptive parents or children visualise their relationship as 
fictive.298 Instead, Howell suggests the classification of self-conscious kinship.299 She 
describes adoption as being akin to the natural process of childbirth, comparing the approval 
of a couple for adoption with the beginning of pregnancy, and child allocation with the 
beginning of childbirth.300 She explains the process of ‘kinning’ and imparting to adopted 
children the sense of belonging to the new family as transubstantiation. In her words, she 
says, 
“On their arrival in Norway, adopted children are treated as tabulae rasae. 
Indeed, they undergo something akin to a rebirth. The main actors in this 
process are the parents, the bureaucracy, and the judiciary, all of whom are 
concerned with the transubstantiation of the child. Each child is given a new 
name, new citizenship, new birth certificate, new kin and home, new social 
and cultural expectations, and new relationships beyond the family. This is 
a time characterized by an extreme effort to de-biologize origins and 
transubstantiate the child’s essence. The ultimate aim is to kin the adopted 
child into his or her parents’ network.”301 
In contrast to Howell’s conceptualisation of adoption as a kinning process, Fonseca explains it 
as a de-kinning of birth mothers.302 She describes plenary adoption as a form of bureaucratic 
violence designed to write out birthparents from their children’s lives.303 In her view, de-
kinning is achieved through the characteristic clean-break principle, no-contact rule, and 
shrouding the adoption process in secrecy304. This is meant to completely supplant the child’s 
preexisting family relations by the adoptive ones. These aspects of child adoption also 
prohibit or restrict direct contact between the two sides involved. She opines that poor birth 
parents accustomed to traditional child circulation practices fail to comprehend the severance 
of family ties when consenting to formal child adoption. Fonseca attempts to rationalise the 
clean-break principle in the Euro-American kinship system as being based on antipathy to 
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shared parenthood, but finds that this does not apply to modern family formations, such as 
blended families. Instead, she comments on the characteristic plasticity of kinship across all 
systems, as it can “bend, relocate and adjust to new situations.” However, she argues that such 
plasticity can be prejudicial, especially where society admires an adoptive mother for creating 
kinship relations where there were none, but shuns and excludes a birth mother for giving 
away her child, which means that she is de-kinned.305 She accuses adoption legislation of the 
crime of endorsing erasure of parental status, which renders the birth mother non-existent, 
based merely on the justification of given consent to a set of contractual conditions. 
Concluding her analysis from the perspective of violence and subjectivity, legal anthropology, 
and kinship studies, she terms a birth mother’s act of giving away her child for adoption as 
social suffering.  
The modern statutory form of adoption as conceptualised by O’Halloran, Howell and 
Fonseca, and broadly practised today, was not always, and still is not, practised across all 
societies. One UN publication on adoption trends and policies provides detailed accounts of 
the evolution of child adoption and its laws across numerous societies globally.306 It lists 
Tanzania among the first countries to enact a modern adoption law during or after WWII, 
which it did in 1942 based on the English 1926 Adoption of Children Act.307 O’Halloran, in 
her book, argues that the basic model of formal adoption has not changed much in the UK 
since being introduced by the first statute in 1926. There has only been a re-balancing of 
public and private interests, necessitated by the principle of the welfare interests of the 
child.308 She argues that adoption is a social construct that modern Western societies gave a 
specific, consistent meaning to, in order to address similar social problems in their diverse 
cultural traditions. But its definition can vary according to the norms and values of other 
cultures, including religious (Islam) and customary (indigenous communities). Since 
Tanzania’s formal adoption law originates from the UK, it reflects the Western modern social 
construct. However, since it is implemented in a different cultural tradition, it is important to 
consider the co-existing forms of child adoption under customary and religious law. 
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Since ancient times, African traditional legal systems have included arrangements for varying 
forms of child adoption.309 Wanitzek shows that the forms of adoption governed by African 
customary laws of given communities do not fit the Western conceptions of adoption that 
involve complete severance and replacement of familial relations.310 Rwezaura and Wanitzek 
argue that only certain rights and responsibilities over a child may be transferred in African 
traditional law adoption.311 Procedures, objectives, elements and effects of traditional law 
adoption in Africa considerably differ from the Western statutory model, and from one 
community to another within the continent and individual countries. Customary law differs 
from one ethnic group to another, and because it is a living law it also changes with time. 
Okumu-Wengi found that the definition of customary law adoptions is unclear even among 
members of a particular community.312 Tanzania attempted customary law codification, which 
resulted in the 1963 Local Customary Law (Declaration) Order. Still, the Order guarantees no 
cast-iron certainty regarding applicable customary laws, and it does not explicitly provide for 
adoption. Therefore, customary law adoption practices remain largely variant in Tanzania, 
from child adoption in the Kuria system of daughter-in-law marriages (mokamona) to 
adopting a son for an heir among the Haya (okuzala), as described by Rwezaura and 
Wanitzek313, and further beyond these. The Law of the Child Act under section 9(3) (c) and 
(4) recognises traditional and customary child care arrangements, which may include 
customary law adoptions, although these are not provided for in detail.314 
Tanzania is a legal and culturally pluralistic society, where religious laws also play a role in 
regulating family relations. Rwezaura and Wanitzek show that, although religious laws cannot 
create recognised parent-child relationships in adoption in Tanzania, they can influence child 
adoption practice under state law.315 For instance, both traditional and modern codified Hindu 
laws recognise and provide for child adoption. However, the section of the Tanzanian 
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population to which Hindu law applies can only use it for informal adoptions.316 This form of 
adoption is meant to secure a male heir for a sonless adopter in order to further his lineage, 
provide for him in old age and perform his death rites. Islamic law, on the other hand, does 
not permit child adoption. It only provides for some arrangements that are analogous to 
certain forms of child adoption.317 Kafala318 is a widely recognised Islamic practice that 
comes close to weak child adoption or strong foster care practice. O’Halloran attempts a 
conceptual analysis and comprehensive description of adoption processes in the Islamic 
context.319 She explains that kafala is, 
 “…an Arabic legal term for a formal pledge to support and care for a 
specific orphaned or abandoned child until he or she reaches majority. A 
form of unilateral contract, it is used in various Islamic nations to assure 
protection for such minors, as these nations generally do not legally 
recognize the concept of adoption. But unlike adoption, kafala neither 
confers inheritance rights nor any right to use the grantor’s family name.”320 
The UNCRC recognises kafala under Article 20(3). Although the Law of the Child Act, 2009 
domesticates the Convention, it does not provide for kafala, unlike its counterpart, the 
Zanzibari Children’s Act, 2011, under section 75. Section 2 of the Zanzibari Children’s Act 
defines kafala as a voluntary commitment to care for a child’s maintenance, protection and 
education, as the child’s biological parents would. Section 75(2) and (3), which list the effects 
of kafala for the guardian and the child, clarify that the effects of adoption, including 
severance and transfer of familial ties, identity, and inheritance rights, do not apply in 
kafala.321 Although the Children’s Act provides for statutory child adoption under section 76, 
it prohibits people professing Islamic faith from engaging in such an undertaking. However, 
in Tanzania Mainland, where kafala is not recognised, Muslims are not forbidden to 
undertake state law adoption.   
Conceptions of child adoption include a myriad of other factors. For instance, once, it was 
considered mainly a humanitarian act, while today, it is mostly a child protection measure 
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taken when a child can no longer be cared for within the family of origin.322 Thus, there has 
emerged a debate on whether adoption is an alternative child care measure. This debate 
stemmed from UNCRC’s listing of adoption as an alternative care measure under Article 
20(3). Also, there is a discrepancy between the UNCRC and the ACRWC, because the latter 
does not list adoption as an alternative care measure under Article 25(2) (a). Further, the UN 
Guidelines 2010 in section 30(b) explain specifically that the guidelines do not apply to 
adopted children after the final adoption order because it considers those children already 
under parental care. However, the present researcher opines that adoption falls into the 
alternative care category, since the guidelines apply to all pre-adoption processes. Cantwell, 
rejecting the alternative care label for adoption, calls it an outcome rather than a component of 
alternative care.323 
Differences in conceptions of child adoption may also lie in its numerous forms arising from 
varying practices across different legal systems and societies. Below are a few contrasting 
categories described in brief with direct relation to Tanzania’s law and society.  
2.3.4.1 Full/Partial Adoption 
Full adoption, also referred to as strong adoption, plenary adoption, or adoptio plena, denotes 
the type of adoption in which preexisting kinship ties with the birth family are entirely 
severed and replaced by new full kinship ties in the adoptive family.324 It differs from partial 
adoption, which is also known as weak adoption, simple adoption, or adoptio minus plena, in 
which the preexisting familial relations are not supplanted in their entirety by the new 
adoptive relations.325 Thus, some elements, such as inheritance rights vested in the birth 
family, may be retained in partial adoptions.   
Tanzanian statutory adoption takes the form of full adoption only326, although other global 
jurisdictions retain both forms. O’Halloran provides examples of countries that recognise only 
full adoption under state law, like Tanzania, including the UK, USA, Australia, and the 
Scandinavian countries, while France, Japan, Romania, and several South American and 
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African countries recognise partial adoption as well.327 However, customary and religious law 
in Tanzania do not recognise full but only partial adoptions. 
2.3.4.2 Child/Adult Adoption  
Child adoption is the practice that has been discussed in detail above. Adult adoption, on the 
other hand, is its counterpart. Adult adoption is a form of adoption descended from Roman 
law referred to as arrogatio, in which originally only sons above the age of puberty (18 years) 
were adopted.328 Influenced by Roman law, adult adoption became a standard practice among 
European nations in the Middle Ages and early Modern Era.329 It allowed childless couples to 
have descendants. It is not a practice currently recognised in all legal systems. In those 
jurisdictions that do, adult adoption has acquired varying patterns. Japan is a country that has 
adult adoption as the primary form, while child adoption remains the minority practice.330 
How and why the Japanese practise adult adoption is not necessarily the same as in other 
countries that practise it, such as the USA (except New Jersey), Germany, some Australian 
states, and Canada.331 Like Tanzania, some other common law countries, such as UK, South 
Africa, and New Zealand, do not recognise adult adoption in their adoption law.332 However, 
a recent High Court ruling in Tanzania granted an adoption order in favour of an adult person 
with a mental disability.333 Since there is no legislation providing for adult adoption in 
Tanzania, the judge in the said case relied mainly on international and national laws for 
people living with disabilities to ground his argument for granting the adoption.334 
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Adult adoption refers to the practice of adopting persons who have attained the age of 
majority in accordance with the laws of the country where the adoption takes place.335 Unlike 
the welfare motive in child adoption, the motives for adult adoption are based on emotion and 
practicality.336 Adult adoption is used to give a person a sense of identity and belonging, as 
well as security (which includes inheritance rights). As Blore explains, this cannot be 
achieved by simply changing a name and writing a will.337 Examples of emotion-based 
motives are searching for identity and belonging, which is seen frequently in step-parent 
adoptions, while on the practical side are searching for an heir, or an extra pair of hands, or a 
way to simplify emigration.338 For instance, in the recent Tanzanian adoption ruling, foreign 
countries’ immigration rules were central in granting the adoption petition.339 The effects of 
adult adoption orders also vary, depending on the form of adoption allowed for adults in a 
specific country. For example, in Germany, adult adoptions are mainly partial, with full 
adoption being allowed in specific circumstances as stipulated under the German Civil Code, 
sections 1767-1772.340 In the cited Tanzanian case, the judge granted a full adoption order. 
In customary law adoptions, which vary across communities, it is possible to adopt adults, for 
instance as shown in the adoption of an heir among the Haya in Tanzania.341 Okumu-Wengi 
describes other forms of adult adoption among the Bakiga and Jopadhola of Uganda. These 
include the adoption of war captives (abazaana), adoption for marriage when one has no 
bridewealth (akutendera), and self-obligation (okwehonga) adoption where a man renounces 
his clan and begs to be adopted into another to avoid punishment for crimes (death) 
committed in his clan.342 As in traditional law child adoptions, these forms of adult adoption 
lack consistency in their motives, elements, procedures, and effects. 
2.3.4.3 Adoption by Decree/Contract 
It is no news that adoption laws have evolved continuously. In some jurisdictions, adoption 
was by way of a private contract between the parties concerned. A contract is an agreement 
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between two or more parties that creates rights and obligations either enforceable or 
recognised by law.343 Thus the adoption agreement would include all the terms and conditions 
that bind parties to the adoption. The form, contents, and effects of such agreements have 
varied from one legal system to another. For instance, in ancient Greece adoption included a 
voluntary contractual relationship inter vivos or a testamentary or posthumous arrangement 
that needed court confirmation.344 From the ancient Roman adoption laws up to the 
Napoleonic code, adoption was mainly of adults by agreement.345 Countries whose adoption 
laws originated from Roman laws, such as Germany, mainly practised adult adoption as a 
private contract between adopters and adoptees. Adoption under the German Civil code of 
1900 stipulated this.346 When introduced in Germany, the adoption of children remained by 
way of a private contract (confirmed in court) until the legal reforms of 1976.347 The German 
Adoption Act of 1976 changed this practice to adoption by court decree.  
A decree is a final judicial decision issued by a court of law or a judicial body of equivalent 
authority.348 Modern-era adoption laws introduced the concept of adoption by court decree. 
The first adoption law to do so was the Massachusetts Adoption of Children Act of 1851.349 
The legal change started in the Western countries and spread across other countries, such as 
those that inherited European-based adoption laws through colonisation. Tanzania Mainland 
(then Tanganyika) was one of those countries. An adoption decree has different effects 
depending on the form of adoption petitioned for in court. An adoption decree in Tanzania has 
full adoption effects as it permanently alters the relations of the adoptee with his or her birth 
and adoptive families.350 
Customary law adoptions in Africa are concluded mainly by way of agreement between the 
families.351 The only difference from the earlier adoption agreements in Europe is that the 
agreement is not by individuals but instead involves the community.352 Customary law 
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adoption decrees are only possible in countries that have formalised this form of adoption and 
are concluded through a court order. Although the Law of the Child Act, 2009 recognises 
customary child care arrangements in Tanzania, it does not integrate them into the law; hence, 
the court in Tanzania grants no customary law adoption decrees.  
2.3.4.4 Closed/Open Adoption 
Clean-break, absolute secrecy, and no contact characterise the widespread closed adoption 
model originating from modern Western societies. It is a type of adoption defined by lack of 
contact between birth and adoptive parents pre- or post-adoption.353 Confidential adoption is 
its alias because it does not permit disclosure of identities of the adoption triad.354 Closed 
adoptions involve the process of assimilation.355 An adopted child’s past familial ties and 
identity are wholly severed and replaced by the newly acquired ties to the adoptive family. 
Information relating to the parties and circumstances of the adoption also remains sealed. The 
main ground for devising this type of adoption was the child’s welfare. It followed the belief 
that complications and confusion arising from exposure to multiple sets of family relations 
and entanglements should be avoided to foster child development.356 It was assumed that this 
allows the birth family to become reconciled to their loss, the adoptive family to move on, and 
the child to form attachments within their new family environment: a clean slate, a new 
beginning. 
Open adoption, on the contrary, is based on the view that maintaining pre-adoption familial 
links is crucial to forming secure attachments and developing a genuine sense of identity in 
adoption. Research has shown that a child can understand a relationship framework of several 
sets of relations and form attachments that foster rather than deter healthy emotional 
development.357 Therefore, in open adoption, an adopted child is permitted and assisted to 
maintain ties with the birth family.358 The continued relations ease the sense of abandonment 
for the child and for the birth family, allowing for a clear conscience.359 In such adoptions, the 
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birth and adoptive parents maintain contact pre and post-adoption. They even can both 
participate in the separation and placement processes of adoption.360  
The acceptable level of openness differs from one jurisdiction to another. Demick and 
Wapner elaborate on four different levels of openness.361 They explain that it can be, first, 
restricted open adoption (adoptive parents agree to sporadically send birth parents, via the 
adoption agency, pictures and other information about the child’s development for a set time 
after placement); second, semi-open adoption (birth and adoptive parents meet pre-adoption 
without sharing any identifying information); third, full open adoption (birth and adoptive 
parents meet and share information); and fourth, continuing open adoption (birth and adoptive 
parents plan continued contact with the child over the child’s development). Also, the way of 
negotiating and allowing contact varies, from contractual to judicial. For instance, in the UK, 
since the Children Act of 1989, contact orders are made alongside child adoption orders.362 In 
Germany, however, the Civil Code maintains the traditional closed model, and open adoption 
is accommodated only in practice upon the consent of both parties.363 Nevertheless, open 
adoption has now become the norm superseding the common closed model for adoption.364 In 
some jurisdictions, such as Australia, prospective adopters’ approval may be denied when 
aversion to open adoption is detected.365 
Tanzania’s Law of the Child Act allows for open adoption. However, it gives the practice a 
narrow construction that distorts the original conception of open adoption. Under section 
54(3), the Act defines it as adoption by a relative. Admittedly, adoptions within the family, 
even in Western societies, are largely open adoptions by relatives or step-parents. However, 
open adoption is not restricted to family adoptions, but is strongly recommended in child 
welfare adoptions by non-relatives.366 Tanzania’s Adoption of Children Regulations specify 
the effects of open adoption under regulation 22. The regulation entitles the child in open 
adoption to maintain ties with the birth family and retain his or her surname unless agreed 
otherwise. However, it remains unclear whether regulation 22 (a) refers to legal or social ties. 
The Kiswahili translation of the sub-regulation says “ukaribu kati ya familia aliyozaliwa na 
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mtoto anayeasiliwa utunzwe”.367 In English this would mean closeness with the birth family 
should be maintained, which refers to maintaining social ties. This is a pertinent question 
because maintaining legal ties with the birth family will negate the application of section 64 
of the Law of the Child Act in open adoptions. Nonetheless, the English version is the 
original, so the meaning of the subsection remains vague. Regulation 23 of the Adoption of 
Children Regulations empowers the court to make an order regulating contact between the 
child and the birth family unless it is against the child’s best interest. All other adoptions of an 
unrelated child in Tanzania are closed adoptions. 
Customary law adoptions, on the other hand, are predominantly open adoptions. O’Halloran, 
describing customary aboriginal adoptions in Canada as inherently open, shows that the child 
maintains contact not only with their birth family but also with the community.368 In Africa, 
and particularly Tanzania, as shown above, customary child adoptions are not a secret; the 
whole community is aware of the involved familial relations. Contact between the child and 
the birth family is maintained unless there are strong reasons against it.369 
2.3.4.5 Adoptions by Relatives/Non-Relatives 
Adoption by relatives, also known as family or kinship adoptions, means adoption that keeps 
the child within the care of his or her family of origin.370 It includes adoptions by parents, 
step-parents, grandparents, uncles, aunts, siblings, and other relatives.371 The relationship 
between the adoption participants and the motive for adoption determines the role these 
adoptions play. First, according to section 55(1) (b) of the Law of the Child Act, a father or 
mother of a child may adopt their child alone or jointly with a spouse. The role of adoption 
here is to create or strengthen a legal bond between the child and their biological father or 
mother, alone or with their spouse. Illegitimacy is one of the reasons for a biological parent to 
adopt their child372 although the Law of the Child Act makes this unnecessary as it recognises 
all children equally, born within wedlock or not. However, a parent may still prefer 
legitimation of a child through adoption to strengthen legal ties and secure the child’s rights, 
especially inheritance rights.  
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When the father or mother adopts jointly with a spouse, it is known as step-parent adoption. 
O’Halloran cites Lowe’s classification of step-parent adoptions into post-divorce, post-death, 
and illegitimate step-parent adoptions.373 These categories depict circumstances that may 
ordinarily cause a birth parent to adopt their child jointly with a new spouse, in cases of 
divorce, death of a spouse or co-parent, and ‘illegitimacy’. This type of adoption creates a 
legal parental bond between the step-parent and step-child. Section 64(1) (b) and (2) of the 
Law of the Child Act stipulates that the adoption order’s effect is that the child will be 
considered as if he or she was born to the birth father or mother and their spouse naturally in 
lawful wedlock and has never been a child of any other person. Therefore, it completely 
severs the legal relationship between the child and the other biological parent who is not a 
party to the adoption. It also affects the right to family life of that parent and their entire side 
of the family in relation to the adopted child. According to O’Halloran, the legislature in the 
UK proposed special guardianship orders as an alternative to adoption for such scenarios.374  
Other relatives are also allowed to adopt a child under the Law of the Child Act, 2009. These 
include a grandparent, brother, sister, uncle, aunt, or other extended family members. Section 
56(1) (b) specifies that persons aged at least 25 years can adopt their relatives’ children. 
Adoptions by relatives are automatically open adoptions in Tanzania. This is because section 
54(3) of the Act defines open adoption as child adoption by relatives. Section 55(2) of the Act 
follows suit in stipulating that a relative may apply for an open adoption order. Thus, the 
requirements and procedures for open adoption under the Act and regulations 21-24 of the 
Adoption of Children Regulations, 2012 apply.  
Adoptions by non-relatives means adoption undertaken by a person unrelated to the child. 
Whether or not there is a blood link or ‘jus sanguinis’ is the determinant factor in 
distinguishing these two types of adoption. It implies the existence of certain rights attached 
to the circumstances of one’s birth. For instance, a blood link signifies ‘belonging’ to the 
parents, clan, or lineage. Therefore, child adoptions by members of the same bloodline are 
relative adoptions while the others are non-relative adoptions. Adoptions by non-resident 
Tanzanians, which this study focuses on, are actually mainly adoptions by relatives. 
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O’Halloran shows that adoptions by relatives have been the leading type of adoption in the 
UK over the years.375 This is due to the increasing practice of step-parent adoptions, 
especially post-divorce step-parent adoptions.376 This study analyses the motives and effects 
of adoption by relatives in chapter six, in connection with the categories of adopters under 
study. 
2.3.4.6 Domestic/International Adoption 
The African Child Policy Forum conceptualises domestic adoption or in-country adoption as a 
leading measure among other alternative child care measures. This perspective is based on the 
idea that domestic adoption has three significant elements: a national, permanent and family-
based solution for children in need of parental care.377 Domestic adoption refers to adopting a 
child residing within a given country by persons who also reside in that country. It is a type of 
child adoption governed by the national laws of individual countries. On this ground, the legal 
framework and practice of domestic adoption vary from country to country.378 In Tanzania, 
section 56(3) (a) of the Law of the Child Act restricts child adoption to children and 
applicants resident in Tanzania, and to Tanzanians living abroad. Besides general provision 
for adoption by resident Tanzanians, the Act goes further to provide specifically for adoptions 
by non-resident Tanzanians under section 62 and resident non-Tanzanians (foreigners living 
in Tanzania) under section 74. Although adoptions by the latter two groups of people involve 
a foreign element, meaning a foreign residence or nationality, the Act still considers these two 
forms of adoption to be domestic. There are two main qualifying points in such 
considerations: residence requirements, and conclusion of the adoption in Tanzania according 
to Tanzania’s child adoption law.  
On the other hand, international, intercountry or transnational adoption is the practice of 
adopting a child from abroad. O’Halloran describes it as a practice whereby people adopt a 
child from a foreign country while not being resident or domiciled in that jurisdiction.379 
Bartholet defines it as the adoption of a child born in one country by adult citizens of another 
country with the expectation of raising the child in that other country.380 Both authors confirm 
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that the laws of the child’s country of origin determine which children are available and free 
for adoption, as well as whether the child should be adopted in their own country or return 
with the adopters to the receiving country so that adoption procedures can be initiated there.381 
Individual countries enact their own laws to govern the practice. However, the UNCRC under 
Article 21(b), the ACRWC under Article 24(b), and the 1993 Hague Convention on 
Intercountry Adoption provide an international and regional legal framework to regulate 
international adoption.  
The Conventions conceptualise international adoption as a measure of last resort with 
reference to the subsidiarity principle and the desirability of continuity in a child’s upbringing 
and ethnic, religious, cultural, and linguistic background. It means that international adoption 
should be subsidiary to suitable in-country alternative care measures. Chirwa and Mezmur, 
among others, criticise the subsidiarity principle as impractical and potentially detracting from 
the child’s best interests principle.382 Cantwell, however, emphasises that the subsidiarity 
principle should be observed while paying particular attention to the rights and best interests 
of the child, and to professional assessment based on established and comprehensive criteria 
in each case.383 Hague’s Guide to Good Practice for implementing the 1993 Convention 
shows how to implement the subsidiarity principle without compromising the child’s best 
interests.384 
O’Halloran shows that often international adoption is also transracial. She explains that 
removing children from their original family, kin, language, and cultural context can lead to 
identity issues.385 It is also a form of adoption that leads to racial and cultural tensions and 
raises discrimination issues, and it is subject to controversy and contention.386 Agreeing, 
Cantwell confirms that racial and ethnic background is another layer that complicates 
international adoption.387 The subsidiarity principle and desirability of continuity in a child’s 
upbringing and ethnic, religious, cultural and linguistic background can restrict transracial 
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adoptions. Some jurisdictions, such as the UK, have attempted regulation at the matching 
stage and resolved that the child’s best interests should be the ultimate determinant in each 
case.388 Bartholet, championing international adoption notwithstanding the legal and practical 
challenges, says, 
“If we will in the future recognize that unparented children should be seen 
as citizens of the world, with rights to be parented by the first qualified 
parents that step forward, regardless of their race, ethnicity, and nationality, 
then we are sacrificing existing children for absolutely no good reason.”389 
International adoption, unlike domestic adoption, has been subjected to additional scrutiny by 
adoption administrators, practitioners, adjudicators, scholars, and society at large. It thus has 
diverse conceptualisations. Three perceptions from the critics’ camp provide some insights. 
First, they describe it as a type of exploitation and say that international adoption involves the 
rich and powerful from industrialised countries permanently taking the children of the poor 
and powerless from third-world countries across national borders.390 Second, it is criticised as 
a form of modern-day imperialism and neo-colonialism whereby developed countries deplete 
developing countries of their resources, their children.391 The third criticism is that 
international adoption is a global trade characterised by child selling and trafficking.392 
Supporters argue against all the criticisms. They say that international adoption should be 
seen from the standpoint of the child’s fundamental right to a family and quality family life. 
This right requires serving the child’s best interest and not that of the parents, community or 
state. The latter’s views are tainted by the post-colonial conception of children as carriers of 
race, religion and cultural heritage, and condemn them to a life in domestic institutions and 
foster care. Suppoters recommend finding solutions for existing problems and not baning or 
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over-regulating international adoption, which may be counterproductive and harmful to 
children.393  
Child adoptions by non-resident Tanzanians and resident non-Tanzanians, though domestic, 
have some international elements. First, the adoptive parents may have a permanent home in a 
country other than Tanzania. Second, they may expect to raise the adopted child in a country 
other than Tanzania. Third, in the case of adoptions by resident non-Tanzanians, section 74 of 
the Law of the Child Act applies the subsidiarity principle. And lastly, both types of adoption 
engage the International Social Service, an international agency, for background investigation 
before a decision is made. Tanzania Zanzibar also allows for adoptions with an international 
element but there is a clear provision under section 94 of the Children’s Act that bans 
international adoptions.394 Tanzania Mainland provides no such clarity. Although Tanzania 
has submitted reports to the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the 
Child declaring that the country is involved in consultations towards ratifying the 1993 Hague 
Convention on Intercountry Adoption, it has not done so to date.395 Thus, the two types of 
adoption remain domestic, with international elements. 
2.3.5 Concept of the Child’s Best Interests 
The phrase ‘in your own best interest’ is in no way novel. Cantwell establishes its historical 
use as a guiding standard in making decisions for those unable to make their own decisions 
due to unsoundness of mind or immaturity.396 Similar phrases such as: ‘I did it for your own 
good/benefit/advantage’ or ‘I had your best interests at heart’ have for a long time been given 
as grounds for decisions in many communities. Before international recognition of human 
rights, the concept of best interests was used as a rights-championing standard for people with 
various incapacities. It applied to, but was not limited to, children and persons living with 
disabilities. However, the application of the concept was subject to prevailing attitudes and 
perceptions of a particular time and community. As a result, decisions made ‘in the best 
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interests of the concerned’ were not always so in the future.397 However, after the 
development of human rights law, the principle’s recognition and binding nature required 
decisions to be based on recognised human rights and not independently perceived interests. 
International human rights law recognised the concept of best interests and applied it 
exclusively to children. Former beneficiaries of the concept, such as persons living with 
disabilities, had their rights promoted and protected under general and specialised 
international human rights instruments. Although Article 3(1) of the UNCRC, 1989 
popularised the concept, it does not signify its international debut. The concept had already 
claimed a place in international law since the 1959 Declaration of the Rights of the Child.398 
Even before then, it existed in one form or another in numerous national legal systems, 
particularly in family law governing divorce and custody proceedings.399 Alston finds that an 
analogous concept has also long existed in different traditions, whether cultural, religious or 
otherwise.400 The similarity, however, ends there as interpretations and applications of the 
concept are quite diverse. Despite its history and wide-ranging application, it is undeniable 
that the universality of the UNCRC, and especially the assigned status of a cardinal principle, 
put the concept in the limelight. Among other things, it opened up the concept to profound 
scholarly interest. 
The UNCRC, the ACRWC, and other international instruments enshrining the principle of the 
child’s best interests do not define it. The omission has led to its being criticised as 
indeterminate.401 There is a consensus that the gap was deliberate to allow flexibility in 
individual cases and in line with socio-cultural perceptions.402 However, the lack of a precise 
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definition renders the principle vague and susceptible to subjectivity.403 Freeman, quoting 
Thèry, says that the indeterminate principle provides an alibi for dominant ideologies, 
personal arbitrariness, and family and general social policies.404 It allows authorities with the 
mandate to determine the child’s best interests to rely mostly on their discretion and 
understanding of what constitutes a particular child’s best interests in a specified situation. 
Similar to the earlier application of the concept, outcomes of decisions made while applying 
the contemporary principle may still not be unquestionably in the child's best interests. 
In the quest to conceptualise the concept of the child’s best interests, the UN Committee on 
the Rights of the Child (UN CRC) has classified it as a substantive right, a principle of 
interpretation, and a rule of procedure.405 Nevertheless, Zermatten finds that although the 
principle lays a foundation for a substantive right, it does not constitute a subjective or 
substantive right in itself, but only a principle of interpretation and a rule of procedure.406 
First, the UN CRC specifies that as a right, the concept requires that whenever authorities 
consider competing interests, those of the child should be assessed and taken as a primary 
consideration. Second, as an interpretative principle, it demands that whenever a legal 
provision is open to more than one interpretation, the one that most effectively serves the 
child’s best interests be applied. Lastly, as a rule of procedure, it necessitates the decision-
making process to be governed by procedural guarantees in assessing and determining a 
child’s best interests. Although the three categories shed light on the understanding and 
application of the principle, they still do not provide its literal meaning. 
A literal analysis of Article 3(1) of the UNCRC and 4(1) of the ACRWC based on the 
constituent elements of the principle may help to throw light on the concept’s meaning. Some 
professionals and institutions dealing with children’s matters have provided guidelines, 
minimum standards and explanations which assist in the literal interpretation of the 
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concept.407 Scholars, including, but by no means limited to, Parker,408 Alston,409 Freeman,410 
Cantwell,411 and Rwezaura,412  have written extensively on the principle. Judges have also 
shed light on the concept through their arguments in judgements.413 Moreover, institutions 
such as United Nations agencies and the African Child Policy Forum have contributed to 
disambiguation of the concept through guidelines, comments, and reports.414 However, a 
consensus on the outcome of these efforts is far from being reached, leaving room for 
subjectivity, manipulation and abuse of the concept in practice.415 
Further, there exist diverse conceptualisations of the concept from different angles of 
understanding. For instance, the concept may be understood in terms of a child’s needs, 
raising the question of whether physical or psycho-social needs are more important, currently, 
in the short term, or in the long term.416 It can also be interpreted depending on the roles it 
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plays. Zermatten divides these into two categories: control criterion and solution criterion.417 
He also uses the principle’s characteristics as another angle to clarify its meaning.418 Alston 
explains the principle based on three roles it plays: a principle that supports, justifies, or 
clarifies a particular approach concerning issues arising from the UNCRC; a mediating 
principle in case of conflict between rights under the Convention; and a basis for evaluating 
the laws and practices of State Parties.419 According to Alston and Gilmour, the umbrella 
metaphor can also be used to explain it: the principle creates an overarching framework 
within which all other substantive child rights should be interpreted, determined and 
applied.420 Lastly, Rwezaura, referring to sub-Saharan Africa, finds that the concept can be 
interpreted using two different lenses: the wide, African, communal, pre-capitalist lens, or the 
narrower, Western, individualistic, post-capitalist lens.421 
Children deprived of parental care who are possible candidates for adoption need their best 
interests to be assessed and determined. The UNCRC and the ACRWC set a high standard for 
the best interests principle in child adoption. In Articles 21 and 24, respectively, they require 
that the child’s best interests be the paramount consideration in child adoption. Testing how 
authorities can achieve this requirement in practice is another subject of debate. However, 
para 7 of the UN Guidelines, 2010 provides a good insight into what should be done: 
“In applying the present Guidelines, determination of the best interests of 
the child shall be designed to identify courses of action for children 
deprived of parental care, or at risk of being so, that are best suited to 
satisfying their needs and rights, taking into account the full and personal 
development of their rights in their family, social and cultural environment 
and their status as subjects of rights, both at the time of the determination 
and in the longer term. The determination process should take account of, 
inter alia, the right of the child to be heard and to have his/her views taken 
into account in accordance with his/her age and maturity.”422 
 In this study, the best interests principle is used as a yardstick against which Tanzania’s child 
adoption law and practice is measured. The study considers the principle within Tanzania’s 
pluralistic legal framework and assesses how the mandated authorities interpret, determine 
and apply it in child adoption practices. Aspects of the street-level bureaucracy theory are 
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taken into account. The interpretation, determination, and application of the principle in 
Tanzania’s child adoption practice is explored in detail in chapter five.  
2.4 Child Welfare Institutional Framework in Tanzania 
From a literal perspective, the term institutional framework may be defined by looking at the 
meaning of its constitutive words. The word institution has different meanings depending on 
its use. This part uses it as a noun referring to an establishment committed to promoting a 
specified cause of public good.423 Laws, by function, are aimed towards achieving public 
good through regulating human conduct.424 Therefore, institutions, through processes such as 
interpretation and implementation, give effect to the law. Section 3 of the Law of the Child 
Act, for instance, provides a relatively narrow and specialised definition of the term institution 
to include an approved residential home, retention home, approved schools, or institutions for 
socially deprived children and street children, and includes a person or institution that has care 
and control of children. The definition gives an inexhaustive list of institutions that implement 
the Act. Framework, on the other hand, refers to a conceptional structure or structural 
frame.425 Therefore, an institutional framework is a set or system of organisational structures 
and attendant laws, regulations, and procedures for public service delivery.426 Understanding 
its composition and operation necessitates studying the legal and policy framework in which it 
exists. In this sense, institutional and legal frameworks are inseparable. However, in this 
thesis, the institutional framework is treated separately from the legal framework, in order to 
lay a foundation for understanding the background to the study, in chapter three. However, 
this chapter must be read together with chapter four which discusses the legal framework. 
Usually, a given law constitutes, mandates, or licenses institutions meant to enforce it. In 
Tanzania, the Law of the Child Act, 2009 and applicable Regulations made under it establish 
an institutional framework for the execution of child adoption procedures. This part looks at 
the institutions in the context of their establishment, constitution, governance, and mandate in 
the child adoption process. The institutions’ specific functions in the child adoption process 
are not described and discussed in this part but in the following chapters of the thesis.  
In order to cover institutions involved in the whole child adoption process, this part describes 
institutions that are legally mandated to operate in the field of child care and protection. It 
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does not limit itself only to those institutions prescribed in the statute book, but takes an 
inclusive approach that considers institutions found in practice. The primary consideration is 
the collaboration between governmental and non-governmental institutions in service 
provision. Thus, the sections below describe the institutions under three labels depending on 
their relationship with the state—governmental, intergovernmental, and non-governmental 
institutions.  
2.4.1 Governmental Institutions  
The Executive, Legislature and Judiciary are three pillars of the state which discharge state 
authority. Article 4 of the URT Constitution, 1977, prescribes the three pillars vested with the 
powers to exercise and control state authority in Tanzania. Based on the mandate discharged 
by each pillar, the state is the leading player in protecting and providing services to its 
citizens.427 States are considered actors in the global arena. However, states usually employ 
agents, called state actors, to execute their mandates. Therefore, state actors are persons, 
natural or artificial, acting on behalf of the government, the legislative organ or the judiciary 
of a given state. State actors, in this part, means institutions and their human resources 
mandated to implement law and policy relating to child care and protection in Tanzania.  
All three pillars of the state have a role to play in the subject of this study. The legislature 
makes the laws the government implements, and the judiciary interprets them and administers 
justice upon them. However, it is not possible here to fully describe the roles played by these 
state organs. Instead, the focus is on the state institutions empowered under the Law of the 
Child Act and Regulations made under it referring specifically to child adoption. Except for 
courts of law which belong to the judiciary, the other institutions are governmental. This part 
explains the role of courts of law under the label of governmental institutions considering that 
it is neither necessary nor feasible to explain here the constitution and functions of each pillar 
of the state. This part utilises the hierarchical format of ministries, departments (also divisions 
or units), and agencies (MDAs) to simplify the description of governmental institutions.  
2.4.1.1 Courts of Law 
Article 107A of the URT Constitution, 1977 vests the judiciary with the final authority to 
dispense justice. The judiciary in Mainland Tanzania is four-tiered, with the Court of Appeal 
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at the apex, followed by the High Court of Tanzania, then magistrates’ courts divided into 
Resident Magistrates’ Court and District Court, and at the bottom, primary courts.428  
Jurisdiction to issue adoption orders in Tanzania lies only with the court.429 Section 3 of the 
Law of the Child Act and regulation 2 of the Adoption of Children Regulations define the 
term court. However, for purposes of adoption, the definitions in the two instruments differ. 
The Regulations define court as “the High Court, the Resident Magistrate’s Court or District 
Court in which a petition for adoption is lodged”, while the Act mentions only the High 
Court. However, section 54 of the Law of the Child Act empowers the High Court, Resident 
Magistrate’s Court and District Court to receive and adjudicate child adoption applications.430 
The High Court deals with closed adoption while the subordinate courts handle open adoption 
applications. The court’s involvement in child adoption does not begin at the time of 
petitioning for an adoption order only; instead, it may start during child protection 
proceedings in the Juvenile Court in which a child is declared free for adoption.431 The court’s 
role in child adoption is discussed in the following chapters while explaining the child 
adoption procedure in Tanzania.  
2.4.1.2 Ministry of Health, Community Development, Gender, Elderly and Children 
The fifth phase government, in November 2015, established the Ministry of Health, 
Community Development, Gender, Elderly and Children (MoHCDGEC) through the 
instrument gazetted by GN No. 144 of 22nd April 2016.432 It created the new Ministry by 
merging the former Ministry of Health and Social Welfare with that of Community 
Development, Gender, Elderly and Children.433 Ministerial mandates and functions are 
established under the instrument creating the Ministry. The two websites maintained by the 
Ministry detail specific obligations peculiar to its departments and units.434 This study deals 
with issues of family welfare and children rights, which do not directly fall on the health 
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division side of the Ministry but rather on the community development side. Thus, it pays 
particular attention to the mandate and functions of that side of the Ministry.  
In its community development, gender, elderly and children division, the Ministry, in 
collaboration with stakeholders, promotes community development, gender equality and 
equity, children’s rights and family welfare.435 It does so by formulating, propagating, and 
coordinating the implementation of policies, strategies, and guidelines for the provision of 
services. The Ministry collaborates with extra-ministerial departments, parastatal 
organisations, agencies, programmes, and projects connected to the Ministry. It also works 
with and coordinates non-governmental organisations operating in the sector. Additionally, 
the Ministry is required to facilitate collaboration with international organisations such as 
UNICEF and the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of 
Women (UN Women).  Besides the other functions, the Ministry also oversees institutions 
such as Tengeru Institute of Community Development, Community Development Training 
Institutes, Elders Homes, Kurasini National Children’s Home, Retention Homes, Irambo 
Approved School, Institute of Social Work (Dar es Salaam), and Kisangara Institute of Social 
Work. To discharge its mandate and achieve the national development agenda, the Ministry is 
guided by national, regional, and international laws, policies, plans, strategies, and goals. 436   
Below is the ministerial structure that may aid understanding of the constitution, chain of 
command and functioning of the Ministry. It shows a distinct demarcation between health on 
the one side, and community development, gender, elderly, and children on the other. In 
essence, the two former ministries have retained their organisational structures and mandates 
under the umbrella of a single ministry. Only the social welfare division (called a department 
in the Law of the Child Act and its Regulations) that formerly fell under the Ministry of 
Health has now moved to the side of community development. This study is concerned 
chiefly with the Department of Social Welfare (as it is named under the Law of the Child Act 
and Regulations), but this part also briefly describes the children development department and 
legal services unit. This is because their work significantly interacts with and complements 
that of the Department of Social Welfare. The naming of these departments and units has 
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changed since 2018 when the organogram was made. However, they remain slightly 
confusing under the two websites of the Ministry representative of its two distinctive sections.  
Figure 2-1: Organisational Structure of MoHCDGEC437 
 
2.4.1.2.1 Department of Social Welfare 
The Department of Social Welfare,438 within the new Ministry of Health, Community 
Development, Gender, Elderly and Children (MoHCDGEC), bears the responsibility of 
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ensuring that equitable, sustainable and quality social welfare and protection services are 
provided to all vulnerable members of the community.439  The former assistant commissioner 
to the Department described it as consisting of four sections with responsibility for people 
with disabilities and elderly persons; family, child welfare services and early childhood 
development; juvenile justice and correctional services; and social welfare training and staff 
development.440 These sections show the vulnerable groups the Department deals with. In 
addition, the objectives and functions of the Department listed under the Ministry’s website 
serve to portray its clientele and the type of services they require.441 
The Department’s chain of command in the field of social welfare starts at the top with the 
Minister of Health, Community Development, Gender, Elderly and Children, followed by the 
Permanent Secretary responsible for Community Development, Gender, Elderly and Children, 
as can be observed from the organisational structure above. The Department’s direct head is 
the Commissioner of Social Welfare, under whom there are social welfare officers of different 
ranks. As will be explained below, these social welfare officers include those who work at the 
central and local government levels. However, only those who work at the central government 
level are directly under the Commissioner. Section 2 of both the Foster Care Placement 
Regulations and the Adoption of Children Regulations define a social welfare officer by place 
of work, as an officer in the service of the government in charge of a city, town, municipal or 
district council.  However, social welfare officers may also be defined in terms of other 
factors, such as the duties that they discharge (social, psycho-social or legal) or types of 
clients they attend (children, broken families, elderly and disabled persons, the chronically ill, 
substance abusers or persons in conflict with the law).442 
The officers discharge the Department’s mandate. Their work includes developing, revising, 
supervising, and monitoring the implementation of laws, regulations, guidelines, strategies, 
and plans relating to vulnerable persons in the country; also, to ensure quality service delivery 
in the form of building systems, coordinating, and providing care, support, and protection to 
most vulnerable children, children in need of care, children in conflict or contact with the law 
or at risk of offending, and children in need of day care services; and lastly, to ensure the 
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provision of care, support and protection to the elderly in families, communities and as a last 
resort, in institutions. The department's detailed list of functions involved in discharging its 
mandate is available on the Ministry’s website.443 This study focuses on the work of social 
welfare officers in child care and protection, which is discussed in the following chapters.  
The Department’s operations are guided and regulated by various laws, both principal and 
subsidiary.444 In executing their responsibilities, social welfare officers hold a mandate to 
assist in formulating laws, policies, guidelines, strategies, and action plans to regulate social 
welfare service delivery, as well as monitoring and evaluating their implementation.445 The 
resultant legal and administrative instruments determine the Department’s role in various 
processes, including child adoption. The Law of the Child Act and Regulations under it 
prescribe the Department as the core institution to oversee the child adoption practice. Thus, 
the Commissioner and social welfare officers play an essential role in executing the adoption 
procedure from the application stage to obtaining the court’s adoption order. In the following 
chapters, this study critically analyses the role of the department of social welfare as provided 
in the statute book and as experienced in practice.  
2.4.1.2.2 Children Development Department 
The children development department446 oversees the raising of public awareness on 
children’s rights and their implementation. It ensures that involved stakeholders from the 
family level onwards are aware of, and implement, children’s rights of survival, development, 
protection, non-discrimination, and participation. The department comprises two sections: 
child rights and development, and parenting and family care education. The department has 
functions relating to developing, coordinating, monitoring, and reviewing the implementation 
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of national laws, policies, strategies, plans, guidelines, and programmes on children, parenting 
and family development. It also coordinates, monitors, prepares, and submits implementation 
reports of international and regional instruments such as the UNCRC and ACRWC. Besides 
that, the department has the general duty to develop and disseminate educational materials 
and programmes on child rights, care, and protection to children, parents, caregivers, and the 
community. In addition, it coordinates efforts dedicated to increasing children’s participation 
(formation of junior councils), research, collection, and dissemination of information 
(including using a child helpline) to guard against child rights violations and promote 
sustainable development of children and the family. In discharging its duties, the department 
networks with development partners within the country and abroad to coordinate the support 
provided in line with prevailing child laws and policies. The department’s sections expand on 
these functions and deal with each at a deeper level.447  
The findings of this study will shed light on the efficiency of this department in practice. This 
is because the effective functioning of this department presupposes a community that is aware 
of, respects and promotes child rights and laws.  
2.4.1.2.3 Legal Services Unit 
Social welfare officers and most of the other Ministry officials are not lawyers. Their work, 
however, revolves around formulating and implementing laws and other instruments of a legal 
nature. They, therefore, require legal assistance when and where it is needed. It is here that the 
legal services unit448 comes in. This unit, headed by the director of legal services, is mandated 
to provide legal expertise and services to the Ministry’s community development, gender, 
elderly, and children branch.449 Its functions include the provision of legal advice and 
interpretation of laws and other legal documents. It also provides technical support in 
legislative action, including preparation, translation, and revision of legal instruments in 
liaison with the Attorney General’s Office. In addition, the unit participates in negotiations 
that call for legal expertise in the Ministry and liaise with the Attorney General’s Office in 
handling litigation of civil cases and other claims in which the Ministry is implicated.  
The functions of this unit include ensuring that laws and policies are correctly understood and 
applied by the Ministry’s personnel. The study examines how the work of social welfare 
 
447 For further details of the functions of the department and its sections, visit 
https://www.jamii.go.tz/department.  
448 The legal services unit is categorised as a department on the MoHCDGEC’s website at 






officers reflect the execution of this role in practice, particulary in relation to child adoption 
law and procedure.  
2.4.1.3 President’s Office – Regional Administration and Local Government  
The United Republic of Tanzania is divided into geographical areas based on criteria such as 
size, population, and level of development in the area. The largest divisions are called regions 
which are further subdivided into districts, divisions, wards, streets, villages, and hamlets. 
These areas are also administratively divided into jurisdictions that fall under central and local 
government authority. Here, two systems of administration run concurrently; that of the 
central government and local government authorities. The principal laws governing such 
divisions and subdivisions are the Regional Administration Act, 1997, Local Government 
(Urban Authorities) Act, 1982, and Local Government (District Authorities) Act, 1982. These 
Laws derive their legitimacy from Articles 61, 145, and 146 of the URT Constitution, 1977. 
The Ministry responsible for regional administration and local government is the chief organ 
that coordinates the functioning of these administrative divisions.  
The Ministry responsible for regional administration and local government has existed in 
Tanzania in one form or another since independence. Over the years, the Ministry has 
undergone considerable changes, including being established, abolished, re-established, re-
named, and re-positioned within Tanzania’s governance structure.450 Currently, the ministry is 
in the president’s office after its transfer from the prime minister’s office in December 2015. 
Its primary mandate concerns empowering regional administrative and local government 
authorities to improve the provision of services and the quality of life in the communities. 
Also, under section 4 of both the Local Government (Urban Authorities) Act, 1982, and the 
Local Government (District Authorities) Act, 1982, the Ministry is mandated to ensure 
effective and efficient local government.  This study examines the Ministry in so far as the 
provision of social welfare services is concerned. From the regional administration and local 
government organisational structures shown on the Ministry’s website, it is clear that social 
welfare is placed either as a section at the regional level or a department at the local 
government authorities level. Since the Law of the Child Act, 2009 and Child Protection 
Regulations, 2014 stipulate social welfare provision in connection with children at the local 
government level (social welfare department), this study investigates its practice at that level. 
Thus, the study pursues an understanding of the position and work of social welfare officers at 
 
450 President's Office - Regional Administration and Local Governments, “History of Local Government System 




the local government level and the Ministry’s effectiveness in coordinating the functioning of 
institutional structures under its mandate. 
Below are samples of organisational structures for regional administration and local 
government meant to aid understanding of administrative divisions and their chain of 
command. The social welfare department can be traced from the regional level down to local 
government authorities (the sample organisational structure is for municipal councils). Every 
regional and local government authority of the same level in the country has similar structures 
with slight variations. At the regional level, in Dar es Salaam and Arusha, where the field 
research for this study was conducted, the health and social welfare sections, which fall under 
the Regional Commissioner’s political mandate and the Regional Administrative Secretary’s 
administrative mandate, handle social welfare matters. The regional Chief Medical Officer, 
who is also the Assistant Administrative Secretary, usually heads these sections. In Arusha, 
for instance, the direct connection between health and social welfare is apparent as the 
regional social welfare offices are located in the compound of Mount Meru Regional 
Hospital. At the regional level, the health and social welfare sections coordinate and oversee 
rather than implement social welfare laws and policies. Instead, departments of community 
development, gender, and children found in local government authorities (street-level 
bureaucracies in the sense described above) are charged with implementation as they directly 
contact people in their work. Here is where the social welfare departments come in.  
Therefore, the study looks at four municipal councils, three in Dar es Salaam (Kinondoni, 
Ilala, and Temeke) and one in Arusha, and their practice in respect of safeguarding and 
promoting child welfare. 
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Figure 2-2: Organisational Structure for Regional Administration451 
 
Figure 2-3: Organisational Structure for Municipal Councils452 
 
2.4.1.3.1 Local Government Authorities 
A local government is a legally established government operating within a defined local area 
in a given country. It governs through a representative organ, usually a local council 
 
451 Found on the Ministry’s website where a link is provided, among others, to Dar es Salaam Region’s website 
at http://www.dsm.go.tz/organization-structure. 
452 Found on the Ministry’s website which provides a link, among others, to Kinondoni Municipal council’s 




mandated to exercise specific powers only in that jurisdiction.453 In Tanzania, local 
government authority is defined as a district or urban authority in the interpretation sections 
(section 3) of the Regional Administration Act, 1997, Local Government (Urban Authorities) 
Act, 1982, and Local Government (District Authorities) Act, 1982. The laws also define a 
district authority as including a district council, township authority or village council, and an 
urban authority as including a city, municipal or town council. District authorities operate in 
rural areas, while urban authorities are for urban areas.  
Local government in Tanzania has a history dating back to the colonial period. Under German 
direct rule, there was a slight degree of local administration through communal unions 
(Kommunalverbände) established by the Imperial decree of 29th March 1901, and later town 
councils (Stadtgemeinden) established by the Imperial Chancellor’s order of 1910.454 British 
indirect rule encouraged local administration and allowed native authorities (such as 
chiefdoms) from 1926 through the Native  Authority Ordinance (Cap. 72) of 1926.455 It also 
enacted laws for governing towns, districts and municipalities, such as the Township 
Ordinance of 1920, Municipalities Ordinance (Cap. 105) of 1946 and Local Government 
Ordinance (Cap. 333) of 1953.456 The latter introduced a comprehensive system of local 
government but with ethnic discrimination. After independence, a more comprehensive and 
democratic system of local governance was introduced, but due to some challenges, the 
system collapsed in the early 1970s. Then there was a resolution to attempt decentralisation 
by deconcentration.457 It lasted for only a short while, and the local government authorities 
were reinstated effectively from 1984, regulated by the 1982 local government legislation.458 
Afterwards, local governance still experienced fundamental problems that challenged 
performance; hence reforms were proposed in 1996.459 
Since the establishment of local government authorities was based on the need to decentralise 
power, Tanzania has worked towards strengthening decentralisation initiatives through local 
government reform as conceptualised in the 1998 Policy Paper on Local Government 
 
453 Moses M. D. Warioba, Management of local government in Tanzania: Some historical insights and trends 
(Mzumbe: Institute of Development Management, 1999), at p. 1; cited in Mzee M. Mzee, Local Government in 
Tanzania: Does the Local Government Law in Tanzania Give Autonomy to Local Government (Masters 
Dissertation in Law, University of the Western Cape, South Africa, November 2008), at p. 6. 
454 President's Office - Regional Administration and Local Governments, History of Local Government in 
Tanzania (Dodoma, Tanzania), at p. 5. 
455 Ibid., at p. 6. 
456 Ibid., at pp. 7-9. 
457 See the Decentralisation of Government Administration (Interim Provisions) Act, 1972. 
458 President's Office - Regional Administration and Local Governments, History of Local Government in 
Tanzania, above footnote 454, at pp. 9-13. 





Reform.460 In effect, the government initiated and implemented the Local Government 
Reform Programme (LGRP) in two phases; LGRP I (1998-2008) and LGRP II (2009-
2014).461 The reforms worked on decentralisation by devolution (‘D by D’). Decentralisation 
means that political, administrative, and fiscal authority is not concentrated in the central 
government only but is transferred to other lower-level government institutions.462 
Decentralisation can be by deconcentration, delegation or devolution. In the case of 
deconcentration, governmental authority is maintained in the central government and 
transferred down to its different levels such as regional, district, and ward; in delegation, 
semi-autonomous agencies are authorised to perform specific functions on behalf of the 
central government; and in devolution authority is transferred down to local units of 
governance beyond direct control of the central government.463 In decentralisation by 
devolution, the local government becomes autonomous in exercising its authority within legal 
limits, while the central government retains overriding constitutional authority over it. Thus, 
to ensure smooth governance, the Ministry responsible for Regional Administration and Local 
Government is empowered to coordinate central-local government relations and all initiatives 
by other ministries relating to the PO – RALG.464 
The rationale for establishing local government authorities in Tanzania, according to Article 
146(1) of the Constitution, is to transfer authority to the people. The Article gives force to the 
fundamental objectives and directive principles of state policy stipulated under Article 8(1) of 
the Constitution. The Article requires Tanzania’s government to be of the people, by the 
people and for the people. Therefore, the reform programmes which worked towards effective 
decentralisation in the government were meant to implement this constitutional requirement. 
Article 146 also provides a local government mandate which does not end at its participation, 
and that of the people under it, in planning and implementation of development programmes 
in its immediate area and the country at large, but extends to, among other things, ensuring 
 
460 Ministry of Regional Administration and Local Government, Local Government Reform Programme: Policy 
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461 United Republic of Tanzania, President's Office - Regional Administration and Local Governments, Local 
Government Reform Programme I (1998-2008) (1998); and United Republic of Tanzania, Prime Minister's 
Office - Regional Administration and Local Governments, Local Government Reform Programme II 
(Decentralisation by Devolution): Vision, Goals and Strategy (July 2009-June 2014) (14 December 2009). 
462 Ministry of Regional Administration and Local Government, Local Government Reform Programme, above 
footnote 460, at pp. v-vi. 
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law enforcement and public safety of the people.465 In tracking the discharge of the local 
government mandate, this study considers how local government authorities enforce the Law 
of the Child Act and Regulations under it, focusing on the organisation and implementation of 
alternative care for children in need. 
Part VIII of the Law of the Child Act establishes the duty of every local government authority 
to safeguard and promote children’s welfare in its jurisdiction. Sections 94-96 of the Act 
provide that this duty is discharged principally through social welfare officers working at the 
local government level. The officers can be assisted by personnel from pre-determined local 
government authorities while collaborating with the police, parents, and other caretakers such 
as guardians and relatives. Regulation 6 of the Child Protection Regulations, 2014 mandates 
local government authorities to establish a district social welfare department that shall 
safeguard and promote the welfare of children in need of care and protection. It also 
authorises them to appoint the head of the district social welfare department and allocate at 
least four social welfare officers to each department at the district level and at least one social 
welfare assistant at the ward level.466 These officers have to ensure effective service delivery 
to children in need of care and protection, a reason, among others, for placing them closer to 
the community at the ward level. Regulation 6(2) stipulates that local government authorities 
shall refer their mandate and related functions to the social welfare department as far as child 
welfare is concerned.467 This means that whenever officers of the social welfare department 
execute their duties in matters of child care and protection, they are acting on behalf of the 
local government authority for which they work. 
2.4.1.3.2 Social Welfare Departments 
The Child Protection Regulations, 2014 make a distinction between the central Department of 
Social Welfare described above (and written with capital letters) and the local social welfare 
departments referred to in this part. According to the Regulations, a social welfare department 
is a department, unit, section, or other administrative body in the local government authority 
that is responsible for child protection services and acts on behalf of the local government 
authority to safeguard and promote the welfare of children.468 Regulation 6 of the Child 
Protection Regulations, 2014 governs the establishment of social welfare departments. Unlike 
 
465 See also Article 146(2)(a) - (c) of the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, 1977. 
466 Section 2 of the Child Protection Regulations, 2014, above footnote 277 defines social welfare officer to 
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under part XI of the Regulations. 




the Department of Social Welfare, which is only one, social welfare departments are 
established in every local government authority at the district level. The local government 
authority can be a district council or a municipal council, as the case may be.  
A head social welfare officer manages a social welfare department. The head leads at least 
four social welfare officers at the district office and a network of at least one social welfare 
assistant in each ward in the district. Regulation 7(1) sets out the mandate of the head of the 
social welfare department in each district, which is to take all necessary measures to protect 
children within their jurisdiction from all forms of harm. Regulation 7 (2) lists the measures to 
be taken in the discharge of their duties, which in essence, describes the functions of the 
social welfare department. 
The head of the social welfare department, according to regulation 7(2) (l), is answerable to 
the District Executive Director (DED). Section 3 of the Local Government (District 
Authorities) Act, 1982 defines a DED as a director in charge of a district council appointed 
according to section 22 of the Local Government Service Act, 1982. Regulation 7(2) (n) 
refers to a Council Director as the head of the social welfare department’s reporting authority. 
Since a municipal council is established at the district level as well, the head of a social 
welfare department becomes answerable to the municipal director as defined under section 3 
of the Local Government (Urban Authorities) Act, 1982.  
Field research in four municipal councils in Dar es Salaam and Arusha showed that heads of 
social welfare departments and their officers report to the municipal directors. However, since 
social welfare officers discharge responsibilities coordinated and overseen by the section 
responsible for social welfare at the regional level and further up at the ministry level, the 
chain of command moves up and down in that order. Unfortunately, the main ministry 
responsible for social welfare, MoHCDGC, does not directly feature in this chain. Thus, 
although officers in the social welfare department execute functions coordinated by the 
Department of Social Welfare, there lacks a direct accountability chain between the two. 
Therefore, the Commissioner of Social Welfare’s authority over the officers who discharge 
his or her department’s mandate must be reconciled with the direct authority of DEDs and 
others. However, the officers are still accountable to the Commissioner as they fulfil their 
responsibilities in collaboration with the MoHCDGC.469 The resultant organisational structure 
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and interactions are confusing not only to a researcher but also to the social welfare officers 
themselves.470 
The MoHCDGEC employs social welfare officers working at the local government level 
through the PO-RALG. Therefore, they have to discharge the mandates of the two Ministries 
as relating to their jobs. While doing so, they must adhere to and implement the laws, policies 
and guidelines that govern both Ministries. Because they fall under the framework of the two 
Ministries, they also have a complicated chain of command to reckon with. However, the 
Commissioner of Social Welfare remains their primary leader as he or she holds all the legal 
mandates relating to social welfare in the country. Even when the PO-RALG has a social 
welfare matter requiring attention, it must refer it first to the Commissioner, who then 
presents it to the social welfare officers at the local government level. The officers’ 
accountability for the referred matter is directly to the district executives with overall 
oversight from the Commissioner. The cycle goes on.  
Officers, both at the Department of Social Welfare and social welfare departments, implement 
child adoption processes as stipulated under the Law of the Child Act and Regulations under 
it. Since the Act and Regulations do not always show the distinction, it is better understood in 
practice. In the following chapters, this study explains the roles of social welfare officers 
acting at different levels as established by law and as experienced in the field.  
2.4.1.4 Ministry of Constitutional and Legal Affairs – Registration, Insolvency and 
Trusteeship Agency (RITA) 
The history of the Ministry of Constitutional and Legal Affairs dates back to 1961, when the 
then Prime Minister and later president of Tanzania, the late J. K. Nyerere, established it.471 
The Ministry has subsisted over the years whilst weathering changes in title, leadership, and 
organisational structure. While compliance with the Ministry’s vision and mission may have 
also been affected by the changes, it has managed to establish efficient and effective 
constitutional and legal systems that foster the implementation of national development 
policies and plans. To achieve this, the Ministry works towards providing quality and 
accessible legal services for the development and prevalence of social justice, equality, and 
the rule of law in Tanzania. The presidential instrument published under GN No. 144 of 2016 
establishing the Ministry in its current form provides for its current mandate. The Ministry is 
charged with overseeing constitutional affairs, formulation and implementation of policies on 
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legal affairs, legislative drafting, law reforms, administration and delivery of justice, and other 
related legal matters. The Ministry also supervises the performance and development of extra-
ministerial departments, parastatals, organisations, agencies, programmes, projects, and 
human resources under it.  
The Minister responsible for Constitutional and Legal Affairs is the political head of the 
Ministry, assisted by the Deputy Minister, while administrative leadership is by the 
Permanent Secretary to the Ministry. Under their leadership, ministerial and extra-ministerial 
departments and other organisations administer the Ministry’s mandate. This study focuses on 
the role played in child adoption by an agency that operates under the framework of the 
Ministry, the Registration, Insolvency and Trusteeship Agency (RITA).  
Authority to register births, deaths, marriages, divorces, and adoptions is vested in the 
Registration, Insolvency and Trusteeship Agency (RITA).472 RITA is an executive agency in 
the Attorney General’s Office that falls under the framework of the Ministry of Constitutional 
and Legal Affairs. The Agency was established in 2006 to replace the Administrator 
General’s Department, which was also under the AG’s Office. RITA manages information 
concerning key life events, incorporates trustees, and safeguards properties of trusts, 
insolvents, deceased persons, and minors to enable the law to operate efficiently and 
effectively. A Chief Executive Officer, who is also the Administrator General accountable to 
the permanent secretary of the Ministry of Constitutional and Legal Affairs, heads the 
Agency.473 The Agency is divided into departments, units, and sections with their own heads 
who report to the chief executive officer. The registration section, headed by a manager, is the 
part of the Agency that this study focuses on. 
The Agency’s duty to register key life events has a history that dates back to the colonial 
period. In 1917, the Germans enacted a law (Proclamation 15 of 1917) to create a register for 
births and deaths, which was retained by the British and adopted under the Births and Deaths 
Registration Ordinance, 1920 Cap 108.474 These two laws did not make it mandatory for 
people of African descent to register births and deaths. After independence, Tanzania 
Mainland adopted the Births and Deaths Registration Ordinance and changed it into an Act of 
Parliament. The Act establishes the position of the Registrar-General, who oversees 
registration and keeping of register books for all births and deaths in the country.475 The 
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Adoption of Children Act, 1953, required the Registrar-General also to document the change 
in familial status of adopted children.476 In 2009, however, the law changed. It is section 69 of 
the Law of the Child Act, 2009 that now obligates the Registrar-General to keep a register of 
adopted children. In discharging this duty, the Registrar-General effects changes in the 
Register of Births or Adopted Children by marking the entry of the adopted child with the 
word ‘adopted’ or ‘re-adopted’.477 In the end, the Registrar-General issues adoption 
certificates to replace birth certificates of the adopted children.478 The registration practice at 
the RITA offices is discussed further in the chapters explaining the legal framework and 
findings on child adoption practice. 
2.4.1.5 Ministry of Home Affairs 
The Ministry of Home Affairs is responsible for maintaining peace, safety, and order in 
Tanzania in accordance with enacted laws and policies.479 This is why the Ministry hosts 
public service forces under its framework, such as the police, prisons, immigration, and 
firefighting and rescuing forces. These forces form departments under the Ministry together 
with others that deal with probation and community service, refugees, and national 
identities.480 The Ministry also has some other departments and units dedicated to its smooth 
running, such as those dealing with legal services, human resources, and accounts. These 
departments and units inform the functions that the Ministry oversees. The Minister 
responsible for home affairs heads the Ministry, followed by the Permanent Secretary to the 
Ministry and respective Commissioner Generals and Directors of the forces and departments 
under the Ministry.  
This study looks at the Ministry of Home Affairs’ framework as far as the police and 
immigration departments are concerned. This is because these are the departments that have a 
role to play in the child adoption process. The study considers them only to the extent of their 
functions described under the Law of the Child Act, 2009, Regulations made under it, and 
child care and protection practice in the field.  
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2.4.1.5.1 Police Department 
The establishment of Tanzania’s (then Tanganyika’s) police force dates back to the British 
colonial government pronouncement through GN. Vol. 1 No. 21-2583 of 1919.481 Later, the 
force was established by law in 1939, under the Police Force and Auxiliary Services 
Ordinance, 1939.482 This law is the applicable law to date subject to amendments made from 
time to time and its change into an Act of Parliament upon Tanganyika’s independence in 
1961. Since independence, the Police Force has undergone extensive transformation, 
beginning with customising it to serve the interests of Tanzanians and not the colonial power. 
Today, the force is dedicated to preserving peace, maintaining law and order, and protecting 
Tanzanians and their properties by providing quality services that enable prompt detection, 
prevention, and control of crime in the United Republic of Tanzania.483 In discharging its 
mandate, the force is under the command, superintendence, and direction of the Inspector-
General of Police (IGP).  In the order of command, the IGP is followed by commissioners of 
police (CP), other gazetted officers, and police officers of different ranks as provided under 
section 4 of the Police Force and Auxiliary Services Act.  
In the Force, there is a special section dealing with gender and child protection which falls 
under the command of the Commissioner of Police for community engagement.484 The 
section is pertinent since the Law of the Child Act and Regulations mandate the Police Force 
to participate in child care and protection processes. Whenever there are suspicions or a report 
of child abuse, breach or violation of child rights, or a child in need of care and protection, the 
police have the duty to collaborate with social welfare officers to investigate and perform 
other services as authorised by the law.485 Police officers are also involved in juvenile justice 
matters in which they may not primarily be exercising their duty to ensure child care and 
protection but rather discharging their duty to maintain law and order.486 The role of the 
Police Force in child care and protection, and specifically in child adoption, is critically 
discussed in the following chapters of this study. 
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2.4.1.5.2 Tanzania Immigration Services Department 
The Ministry of Home Affairs has a department to deal with immigration services in 
Tanzania.487 The Immigration Services Department deals, among others, with facilitation and 
control of people’s movements in Tanzania according to enacted laws and regulations in order 
to safeguard security and promote the economic interests of the country.488 While executing 
its functions, the department is guided by the Immigration Act, 1995, Citizenship Act, 1995, 
Tanzania Passports and Travel Documents Act, 2002, and Regulations made under these laws. 
According to section 5 of the Immigration Act, the Department’s chief executive officer, 
designated to oversee the discharge of the Department’s mandate, is the Commissioner 
General of Immigration. The Commissioner General, assisted by other commissioners, 
commands officers of different ranks listed under section 6 of the Immigration Act.489 
This study considers the role of the Immigration Services Department only in so far as the 
provision of relevant identification and travel documents for an adopted child is concerned. 
Section 73 of the Law of the Child Act, subject to given conditions, permits an adopted child 
to travel out of Tanzania temporarily or permanently with his or her adoptive family. 
However, the Act and Regulations made under it do not provide the applicable procedure until 
the adopted child is legally eligible to travel with the new family. The study, therefore, 
considers what happens in practice and discusses the findings. 
2.4.2 Intergovernmental Institutions 
Intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) are treaty-established entities comprising two or 
more sovereign states that have resolved in good faith to work together on issues of common 
interest.490 A group of two or more IGOs also makes an IGO.491  During the current era of 
increased globalisation and interdependence of nations, the rationale for creating IGOs is to 
build a platform for successful international collaboration to deal with economic and social 
issues, as well as to preserve peace and security.492 Since IGOs involve the commitment of 
various state governments, they are state-based actors. Examples of socio-political and 
economic IGOs that operate in Tanzania in the area of child care and protection include the 
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UN and the UN system, which include agencies such as UNICEF, UNHCR, UNESCO, 
WHO, World Bank and IMF, and other organisations such as International Committee of the 
Red Cross (ICRC), and African Development Bank. There also exist in Tanzania other state-
based organisations that provide support in the area but are not intergovernmental. These form 
part of Tanzania’s development partners group, including GIZ, CIDA, SIDA, and USAID.493  
Tanzania works together with these organisations since it has signed treaties or other bilateral 
or multilateral agreements for cooperation. The organisations, therefore, obtain legitimacy and 
guidance for their operation from these enforceable agreements. This study focuses on the 
operation of UNICEF Tanzania and its role in child care and protection practice. Tanzania 
was admitted as a UN Member State and became a party to the United Nations Charter in 
1961 as Tanganyika, and in 1964 as the United Republic of Tanzania.494 By being a member 
of the UN, Tanzania also became a member of UNICEF. This Agency’s mandate is to 
safeguard children’s rights as stipulated under the UNCRC, and as referred to in the 
sustainable development goals 2015. UNICEF is involved in numerous programmes in 
Tanzania. Of relevance to this study is their work in child protection and social policy. For 
instance, UNICEF works towards building a comprehensive and effective child protection 
system in Tanzania through raising the government’s awareness and commitment to child 
protection and providing financial and technical support to realise this goal.495 The agency co-
operates closely with the Department of Social Welfare at the ministerial level and 
substantially impacts the social welfare departments in each district. Mainly it assists in law 
and policy formulation and the training of social welfare staff and other child protection 
stakeholders. UNICEF’s website documents its achievements in Tanzania so far.496 In this 
study, a brief discussion of its role in child adoption practice is given in the following 
chapters. 
2.4.3 Non-Governmental Institutions  
The Law of the Child Act under section 3 defines Non-Governmental Organisations by 
reference to the Non-Governmental Organizations Act, 2002. The definition reads, ““Non-
Governmental Organization” also known in its acronym “NGO” means,  
“a voluntary grouping of individuals or organization which is autonomous, 
non-partisan, non profit making which is organized locally at the grassroot, 
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national or international levels for the purpose of enhancing or promoting 
economic, environmental, social or cultural development or protecting 
environment, lobbying or advocating on issues of public interest of a group 
of individuals or organization, and includes a Non-Governmental 
Organization, established under the auspices of any religious organization 
or faith propagating organization, trade union, sports club, political party, or 
community based organization; but does not include a trade union, a social 
club or a sports club, a political party, a religious organization or a 
community based organization.”497  
The Act, under section 2, also defines two types of NGOs, national and international. National 
NGOs are those established according to the Non-Governmental Organizations Act, 2002 
with a scope of operation in more than two regions in the country, while an international NGO 
is that which is established outside Tanzania Mainland. The scope of operation determines an 
NGO’s registration. According to section 23 of the Act, they may be registered at the district, 
regional or national level. Every NGO must be registered under the Act and obtain a 
certificate of registration. If not established under the Act, it must be registered under the law 
establishing it and a compliance certificate must be obtained according to the Non-
Governmental Organizations Act, 2002.498 If unregistered, an NGO’s operation in Tanzania is 
illegal. 
The MoHCDGEC is responsible for the regulation of NGOs. Section 3 of the Non-
Governmental Organizations Act, 2002 stipulates that the Director of NGOs, who is also their 
Registrar, is in charge of their coordination, registration, and connection with the government. 
The Director heads the NGOs Coordination Division in the Ministry. NGOs are the leading 
stakeholders in child care and protection in Tanzania. Although the Law of the Child Act, 
2009 refers to them, it does not explicitly provide for their operation. Only the International 
Social Service (ISS), an international NGO that promotes child protection and welfare, is 
specified under regulation 20(5) of the Adopted Children Regulations.499 The Department of 
Social Welfare works with ISS in international social investigations in respect of child 
adoption applications by resident non-Tanzanians and non-resident Tanzanians, and post-
adoption monitoring. Other NGOs, be it national or international, work with the department in 
numerous areas of child protection but are not directly featured in the statute book. During 
field research, the researcher found that there are several civil society organisations, 
community-based and faith-based organisations, and individual persons that have established 
and run NGOs working in the field of child protection in the country. Some that were 
 
497 Section 2 of the Non-Governmental Organizations Act, 2002, Act No. 24 of 2002 [Cap. 56 R.E. 2002]. 
498 Ibid., section 11. 





contacted and researched are Tanzania Child Rights Forum, Save the Children Tanzania, SOS 
Tanzania in Dar es Salaam, and Pastoral Activities and Services for People with AIDS Dar es 
Salaam Archdiocese (PASADA). Other organisations investigated for this study run approved 
residential homes for children in need of care. These are explained in detail under 
institutionalised care in chapter three.   
NGOs and private persons who are stakeholders of child protection in Tanzania but who do 
not directly receive orders from the government and are not funded by the government are 
non-state actors. They function in Tanzania in compliance with the law that regulates their 
operations: the Non-Governmental Organizations Act, 2002, and any other law under which 
they are established or regulated. Beyond that, their activities are regulated by their 
constitutions or other governing documents that have force of law, contrary to which they 
cannot function.500 There is thus a multiplicity of laws (national, international, or 
organisation-based) governing the network of NGOs constituting the child protection system 
in Tanzania, which cannot be addressed fully in this study.  
2.5 Conclusion 
The theories of legal pluralism and street-level bureaucracy are pivotal analytical tools 
applicable to the subject of the study and the questions that the study poses. Tanzania’s 
pluralistic legal setting and the involvement of street-level bureaucrats in child adoption 
practice were critical determinants for using these theories. Their advanced theoretical 
perceptions are used to explain the legal and social phenomena studied here. These 
phenomena are discussed in the framework of particular concepts to establish their meaning 
and application globally and specifically in Tanzania. The above discussion shows that some 
of the concepts have a subjective meaning and application in Tanzania, for instance, open 
adoption. Also, in the Tanzanian context most of the concepts have acquired unique aspects 
due to prevailing customary and religious laws.  
The above account of the institutional framework shows the state and non-state actors 
involved in child welfare practices in Tanzania. It describes in detail their constitution, 
governance, and mandate. The social welfare offices and the courts of law are the central 
pillar of the institutional framework as far as child adoption is concerned. A child cannot be 
adopted without their participation. Because of the extensive mandate of the Department of 
Social Welfare in child care and protection, no institutions involved in the child adoption 
process can function without its cooperation. The constitution and functional ability of the 
 




department is therefore critical in child adoption practice. However, the decentralisation by 
devolution reform has made the position and work of social welfare officers at the local 
government level unclear. Their responsibilities and accountability fall under the control of 
two different Ministries: the MoHCDGC and PO-RALG. This study investigates the 
functioning of social welfare officers in practice, especially regarding child adoption. 
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Chapter 3:  The Situation of Children in Need of Care and Protection in 
Tanzania 
“No child should be without the support and protection of a 
legal guardian or other recognised responsible adult or 
competent public body at any time.”501 
3.1 Introduction 
Children, at all times, due to their physical and mental immaturity, need care and protection in 
the hands of legally recognised persons.502 Parents and legal guardians have the primary 
responsibility for the upbringing and development of their children.503 The UNCRC and the 
ACRWC recognise the family as the fundamental unit of society designed to provide an 
environment for children to grow up in while receiving care and protection.504 However, there 
are instances in which parents or legal guardians are unable or unwilling to care for and 
protect their child, which makes that family environment unavailable to the child. Under their 
Articles 20 and 25, respectively, these two Conventions refer to a child in that circumstance as 
a child deprived of his or her family environment. Other legal instruments on the child use a 
different formulation to refer to the same group of children. For instance, the UN Guidelines 
on the Alternative Care of Children, 2010, have two alternative labels for them, children 
without parental care505 and children deprived of parental care506. The Law of the Child Act, 
2009 refers to them as children in need of care and protection.507 This chapter explores which 
children belong to this group in Tanzania and discusses the grounds leading to their being in 
this situation. 
 
501 Section 19 of the UN General Assembly, “Guidelines for the Alternative Care of Children”. 
502 Preamble statements No. 9 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, UNCRC (20 November 1989) and 
No. 5 of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, 1990. 
503 Article 18 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, UNCRC (20 November 1989); Article 20 of the 
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, 1990; and sections 7-9 of the Law of the Child Act, 
2009. 
504 See preamble statements No. 5 and 6 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, UNCRC (20 November 
1989); and preamble statement No. 5 and Article 18(1) of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the 
Child, 1990. 
505 See the references under sections 16, 18, 29, 53, 69, 70, 75, 115, 121, 130, and 153 of the UN General 
Assembly, “Guidelines for the Alternative Care of Children”. The Guidelines define a child without parental care 
under section 29(a) as a child not in the overnight care of one of his or her parents for whatever reason or under 
whatever circumstance. 
506 Ibid. See references under preamble statements No. 1 and 3, and sections 7 and 130(b). 




A child without the care and protection of a legally recognised person needs alternative 
care.508 The state or community may arrange for the required substitute care on the basis of 
the applicable laws, whether statutory, customary, or religious. Also, the care may be 
temporary or permanent, family-based or institutional, depending on the circumstances of 
each case. This chapter details the process through which a Tanzanian child in need of care 
and protection goes until alternative care placement. It delves into the relevant legal 
requirements, procedures and principles involved. Further, the chapter studies the role of 
mandated authorities in the process and briefly provides field research findings on alternative 
child care practices in Tanzania.  
The discussion in this chapter builds the background for understanding child adoption law and 
practice in Tanzania. First, it lays out the child protection measures that are applied before a 
child is declared free for adoption. Second, it discusses which children are eligible for 
adoption. This is because child adoption is not necessarily suitable for all children in need of 
care and protection. Lastly, it considers the other alternative care measures available in 
Tanzania and discusses the justification for research on child adoption. 
3.2 Children in Need of Care and Protection 
Children are entitled to enjoy parental care and protection and, whenever possible, live with 
and not be separated from their parents.509 The Law of the Child Act, 2009 under section 3 
gives the word parents a broad interpretation. According to it, any person who cares for a 
child is a parent, not limited to the traditional perception of the child’s biological or adoptive 
father or mother. Following suit, in section 7(2) of the Act, unlike Article 9 of the UNCRC 
and 19 of the ACRWC, the right to grow up with parents is extended to include guardians and 
family. Section 3 of the Act defines these two terms. Family combines the definitions of a 
parent and relative.510 Thus it includes children with their biological or adoptive parents and 
members of the extended family. On the other hand, a guardian is a person who oversees the 
child’s care and manages the child’s rights and property, including those appointed by deed, 
will, or court order. It, therefore, means that a child who resides with any person responsible 
 
508 Article 20 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, UNCRC (20 November 1989); Article 25 of the 
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, 1990; and sections 7(3), 9(3) and (4) of the Law of the 
Child Act, 2009, which specify that children without the care of their parents or guardians need substitute care. 
509 Section 7(1), Law of the Child Act, 2009 enacted in the spirit of Articles 9(1) of the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child, UNCRC (20 November 1989) and 19(1) of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the 
Child, 1990. 
510 It seems to the researcher that the term family could have been used in place of the word relative. Such a 
finding is based on the repetitive inclusion of parents and on the phrase ‘parent, guardian or relative’ used 




for his or her care, be it the biological or adoptive parents, guardians, or relatives, is 
considered to have parental care as per section 7 of the Law of the Child Act, 2009. 
However, the right to grow up or live with parents does not simply end there. A child is 
entitled to enjoy this right without separation from the parents against his or her will. Hence, a 
child must reside with parents or caregivers as long as he or she is in a caring and peaceful 
environment devoid of any harm, abuse, or neglect. Children who lack such an environment 
may voluntarily leave their home to receive care and protection elsewhere, or they may be 
involuntarily separated from their parents if the parents exclude them from their home.511 
Involuntary separation also occurs when a competent authority or court determines, according 
to the applicable laws and procedures, that continued care under the parents, guardians, or 
relatives may cause the child to suffer significant harm or is not in the child’s best interest.512 
In addition, acts of state against the parent, such as detention, imprisonment, deportation, 
exile, or death may involuntarily separate a child from his or her parents.513 The outcome of 
all these situations, whether voluntary or involuntary, is that the child is deprived of parental 
care.  
Section 16 of the Law of the Child Act, 2009 provides an inexhaustive list of circumstances 
that may lead to a child being in need of parental care and protection. The conditions referred 
to do not make the child’s status a foregone conclusion; rather, this must be determined by a 
competent authority or court of law. The authority or court refers to a set of criteria under 
regulation 4 of the Child Protection Regulations, 2014 to determine whether a child is in need 
of care and protection due to ascertained suffering or risk of suffering significant harm. The 
list under section 16 of the Act is where the determination procedure begins. The contents of 
the section are reproduced below for ease of reference: 
“For the purposes of this Act, a child is in need of care and protection if that 
child – 
(a) is an orphan or is abandoned by his relatives; 
(b) has been neglected or ill-treated by the person who has the care and 
custody of the child or by his guardian or parents; 
(c) has a parent or guardian who does not exercise proper guardianship; 
 
511 Child Protection Regulations (2014) under section 2 define children excluded from home as those without 
parental care as a result of parents forcing them out of their homes or behaving in a way that the children have no 
other option but to leave their homes. 
512 Section 7(2) and (3) of the Law of the Child Act, 2009 in line with Articles 9(1) of the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, UNCRC (20 November 1989) and 19(1) of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of 
the Child, 1990. 
513 Section 9(4) of the Law of the Child Act, 2009, together with Articles 9(3) of the Convention on the Rights of 





(d) is a destitute; 
(e) is under the care of a parent or guardian who, by reason of criminal or 
drunken habits, is unfit to have the care of the child;  
(f) is wandering and has no home or settled place of abode; 
(g) is begging or receiving alms, whether or not there is any pretence of 
singing, playing, performing, offering anything for sale or otherwise, or is 
found in any street, premises or place for the purpose of begging or 
receiving alms; 
(h) accompanies any person when that person is begging or receiving alms, 
whether or not there is any pretence of singing, playing, performing, 
offering anything for sale or otherwise; 
(i) is under a care of a destitute parent; 
(j) frequents the company of any reputed criminal or prostitute; 
(k) is residing in a house or the part of a house used by any prostitute for the 
purpose of prostitution, or is otherwise living in circumstances calculated to 
cause, encourage or favour the seduction or prostitution of, or affect the 
morality of the child; 
(l) is a person in relation to whom an offence has been committed or 
attempted under the Anti-Trafficking of Persons Act; 
(m) is found acting in a manner from which it is reasonable to suspect that 
he is, or has been, soliciting or importuning for immoral purposes; 
(n) is below the age of criminal responsibility and is involved in an offence 
other than a minor criminal matter; 
(0) is otherwise exposed to moral or physical danger; 
(p) is under a care of a person with disability and such disability hinders 
such person from exercising proper care or guardianship; or  
(q) in any other environment as the Commissioner may determine.”514 
Determination of significant harm suffered or to be suffered by a child in any of the above 
circumstances is the next step. The Child Protection Regulations under regulation 4(2) define 
harm as ill-treatment and impairment of a child’s health and development inflicted directly on 
the child or on another person but witnessed by the child.515 It specifies that ill-treatment 
includes any form of physical, emotional or sexual abuse and neglect.516 Also, it defines harm 
as any damage to a child’s physical or mental health and weakening of his or her physical, 
intellectual, emotional, social and behavioural development. What connotes significant harm 
 
514 Section 16 of the Law of the Child Act, 2009. 
515 Department of Social Welfare, “Guidelines to the Child Protection Regulations” (May 2013) gives an 
example of witnessed spousal domestic violence which may cause significant emotional and psychological harm 
to a child. 
516 Regulation 4(4) (a)-(d) of the Child Protection Regulations explains elements that constitute physical, 




is, however, not clarified under the Regulations.517 Nonetheless, the Regulations provide 
guiding factors for determining whether a child has suffered or is at risk of suffering 
significant harm. These include the nature of harm; its impact on the child’s health and 
development; the child’s development in the context of his or her family and the wider 
community; any special needs which may impact the child’s development and care in the 
family; and the capacity of parents, guardians or carers to protect the child and meet his or her 
needs.518 
Any child facing the dire circumstances listed under section 16 (reproduced above) and who 
is determined by a competent administrative or judicial authority to be suffering or at risk of 
suffering significant harm, needs care and protection. Actions to be taken following such 
determination depend on the nature and extent of harm and the most suitable solution for the 
child. An account of determination procedures, authorities involved, and their roles is given 
below in part 3.5. Also explicated are the types of decisions made and actions taken to address 
the various situations of children in need of care and protection.  
3.3 Statistics and Factors for Existence of Children in Need of Care and Protection 
Children suffering or at risk of suffering significant harm who require state intervention to 
provide care and protection exist in Tanzania. Some of these children leave the family 
environment of their own volition, while others are either forcefully expelled or, for their own 
best interests, removed. However, competent authorities or courts do not determine all cases 
or identify all children in need of care and protection. Also, not all of those identified go 
through the determination process. Therefore, statistical data available on children in need of 
care and protection may include only those identified and not necessarily determined. 
Integrated data on children deprived of parental care is not available in Tanzania. For this 
study, the researcher contacted several authorities with a mandate to determine such cases in 
search of first-hand official statistics. None of the authorities had systematic physical or 
electronic data storage.519 Therefore, the only hope was the National Bureau of Statistics 
(NBS), an institution charged with statistical data management in Tanzania. NBS issues 
 
517 Department of Social Welfare, “Guidelines to the Child Protection Regulations” define significant harm as a 
specific or over-time accumulation of incidents which interrupt, alter or impair the development of a child. 
518 Regulation 4(5) of the Child Protection Regulations. 
519 Authorities responsible for determination, including the Department of Social Welfare, local government 
authorities and the Juvenile, District, Resident Magistrate and High Courts, were visited during field research in 
Tanzania from January to March 2018 and 2019. They had no unified data on children that they had determined 




readily available official and reliable statistics in a wide range of demographic fields.520 
Regrettably, NBS had no unified statistics regarding children without parental care. 
Nevertheless, bits and pieces of demographic data published by the Bureau provide insight 
into the existence of children in need of care and protection. Also, several child care 
institutions and individuals have, at various times, researched on children in need of care and 
protection in Tanzania. Their reports present information on the subject, albeit fragmented 
and inconsistent. This study uses the reported information to show the existence of children in 
need of care and protection in Tanzania. 
This part, therefore, presents non-conclusive statistics of children in need of care and 
protection gathered from various reports published in the period ranging from 2009 to 2019. 
The part below presents the statistics to support the discussion on factors leading to the 
existence and increase of children in need of care and protection in Tanzania.  
3.3.1 Rapid Population Growth  
Tanzania’s population more than quadrupled from 12.3 million in 1967 to 55.9 million in 
2019.521 The 2012 National Population and Housing Census depicted a 3.1% average annual 
intercensal growth rate.522 Such rapid growth is attributable to the high fertility rate in 
Tanzania. Tanzania’s Demographic and Health Survey (TDHS) of 2015/2016 reported a total 
fertility rate of 5.2 births per woman with 3.8 births per woman in urban areas and 6.0 births 
per woman in rural areas.523 The same survey found a decrease in the infant mortality rate, 
which stood at 43 infants per 1,000 births compared to 46 in 2012 and 51 in 2010.524 The 
statistics show a constant increase in the child population in Tanzania.  
Children constitute approximately half of the total population.525 Children in the age group 0-
4 constitute the most significant percentage of the population by age group.526 An increase in 
the percentage of children in this age group (0-4) can be seen between the 2012 National 
Population and Housing Census (NPHC) and the 2018 population projections.527 Although 
life expectancy at birth has increased from 61.8 in 2012 to 65.5 in 2019, there is a steady 
 
520 NBS’s publications are accessible at www.nbs.go.tz. The Bureau was a respondent institution in this study 
during field research conducted in Tanzania from January to March 2019. 
521 National Bureau of Statistics, Tanzania in Figures 2018 (Dodoma, 2019), at p. 18. It presents a compilation 
of series of data from 2013 to 2019. 
522 Ibid., at p. 18. 
523 Ibid., at p. 26. 
524 Ibid., at p. 27. 
525 National Bureau of Statistics, Population Distribution by Age and Sex (2013) shows in Table 1.1 at p. v that 
the child population aged 0-17 constitutes 50.1% of the total population. The same statistics are reflected in the; 
National Bureau of Statistics, Tanzania in Figures 2018, above footnote 521. 
526 See population distribution by age and sex as reproduced below based on projections from National Bureau of 
Statistics, Tanzania in Figures 2018, above footnote 521, at p. 21. 




percentage decrease moving up the population age pyramid, which is evidence of challenged 
survival in Tanzania.528 The shrinking adult population is one explanation for the existence of 
children without care and protection due to the loss of parents, guardians or relatives. 
Figure 3-1: Tanzania’s Population Trend in Millions, 1967-2019  
 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics, Tanzania in Figures 2019529 
Figure 3-2: Percentage Distribution of the 2019 Projected Population by Age Group and Sex, 
Tanzania 
 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics, Tanzania in Figures 2019530 
 
528 Ibid., at p. 22 and 23; and United Nations Development Project, Human Development Indices and Indicators: 
2018 Statistical Update for United Republic of Tanzania (UNDP, 2018). 
529 Population trend based on Population Censuses of 1967, 1978, 1988, 2002 and 2012 in National Bureau of 




3.3.2 Poverty  
Tanzania is among the poorest countries in the world. Although the United Nations 
Development Project (UNDP) in 2017 reported an increase in the country’s human 
development value from 0.370 in 1990 to 0.538 in 2017, it still dwells in the low human 
development category at number 154 out of 189 countries and territories.531 In 2019 it fell 
even lower to number 163.532 The World Bank found Tanzania to have sustained a steady 
economic growth averaging 6-7% a year over the past decade.533 It also reported a decline in 
the poverty rate from 34.4% in 2007 to 28.2% in 2012 and 26.8% in 2016. Despite the 
economic growth and decline in poverty rates, the total number of poor people did not 
decrease. The World Bank cites Tanzania’s high population growth rate as the reason behind 
persistent poverty among citizens. About 70% of Tanzanians live below $2 a day, which 
stands close to the international poverty line at $1.90 based on Purchasing Power Parities 
(PPP).534 
In 2016, the NBS, in collaboration with UNICEF, published a report on child poverty in 
Tanzania.535 It found that 74% of the total child population in Tanzania live in 
multidimensional poverty, meaning deprivation in at least three dimensions. The dimensions 
considered were nutrition, health, protection, education, information, sanitation, water, and 
housing. The report also said that 29% of all children resided in households living below the 
monetary poverty line. It found that 81% of children in rural areas compared to 40% in urban 
areas lived with three or more deprivations, while in the case of monetary poverty, 33% of 
rural children compared to 10% of urban children lived in poverty.  
Poverty weakens the ability of the family and community to take care of its children.  It is in 
many ways a root factor in cases of children being deprived of parental care and protection.536 
Persistent poverty deprives children of an adequate standard of living, forces them to engage 
in harmful commercial activities, including sex work, escalating chances of contracting HIV 
 
530 United Republic of Tanzania, National Bureau of Statistics, “Tanzania in Figures 2019”, 
https://www.nbs.go.tz/nbs/takwimu/references/Tanzania_in_Figures_2019.pdf, at p. 21. 
531 United Nations Development Project, Human Development Indices and Indicators: 2018 Statistical Update 
for United Republic of Tanzania (UNDP, 2018). 
532 Ibid. 
533 The World Bank, “Overview: The World Bank in Tanzania”, 
https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/tanzania/overview. 
534 The World Bank, “Tanzania Mainland Poverty Assessment: A New Picture of Growth for Tanzania 
Emerges”, https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/tanzania/publication/tanzania-mainland-poverty-assessment-
a-new-picture-of-growth-for-tanzania-emerges. 
535 National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) and United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), Child Poverty in 
Tanzania (Dar es Salaam, June 2016). 
536 Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, Department of Social Welfare, “The National Costed Plan of Action 





infections, and exposes children to violence due to increased tensions within the household 
and community.537 It also pushes children to the streets to evade abuse, where they beg or 
steal for a living, and are at a higher risk of trafficking.538 
3.3.3 Prevalence of HIV/AIDS  
Tanzania is one of the sub-Saharan countries severely hit by the HIV/AIDS epidemic.539 The 
National AIDS Control Programme established in 1988 reported the first three diagnoses of 
HIV/AIDS in the country at Ndolage hospital, Kagera Region, in November 1983.540 From 
that time, the disease ravaged people of all ages and sexes across all regions in Tanzania. The 
prevalence of HIV/AIDS in the country varies substantially depending on age, gender, sexual 
preferences, socio-economic status, and geographical location.541 The Tanzania HIV Impact 
Survey (THIS) 2016-2017 published HIV infection prevalence rates among persons aged 15 
years and older, with an average of 4.9% (6.3% among females and 3.4% among males).542 
The rate corresponds to an estimated 1.4 million people of 15 years and above living with 
HIV/AIDS in Tanzania. The prevalence rate varies drastically among regions, with 11.4% 
recorded in Njombe and below 1% in Lindi. The Survey also reported a general annual new 
HIV infection incidence of 0.24%, which translated to approximately 72,000 new infections 
yearly (48,000 among females and 24,000 among males). It estimated HIV infection 
prevalence among children of 0-14 years at 0.4%. The estimate was based on parents’ reports 
and ARV detection data, revealing that only 50.1% of children living with HIV/AIDS in 
Tanzania had been diagnosed. Women, adolescents, children, and key populations, such as 
female sex workers, are the most affected by the epidemic in Tanzania. A fact sheet published 
by UNICEF showed that women comprise about 60% of people aged 15-49 infected with 
HIV. It also showed that Tanzania has 5% (98,000) of the total world adolescent population 
(10-19 years) living with HIV, and that infection among key populations is high. For instance, 
 
537 United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), Is Tanzania a Better Place for Children? (Dar es Salaam, 
November 2014), at p. 23. 
538 Ibid. 
539 Eastern and Southern Africa is the region with the world's highest HIV/AIDS new annual infections rate of 
30% amounting to about 800,000 new infections recorded in 2017. Information obtained from “Global HIV and 
AIDS statistics”, https://www.avert.org/global-hiv-and-aids-statistics, 14/10/2019. 
540 Ministry of Health, Community Development, Gender, Elderly and Children, National Aids Control 
Programme, “HIV/AIDS in Tanzania”, http://nacp.go.tz/site/about/hiv-aids-in-tanzania. 
541 United Republic of Tanzania, Ministry of Health, Community Development, Gender, Elderly and Children, 
National Aids Control Programme, “National Guidelines for the Management of HIV and AIDS”, 
http://nacp.go.tz/site/NATIONAL_GUIDELINES_FOR_THE_MANAGEMENT_OF_HIV_AND_AIDS_2019.
pdf (April 2019) at p. 5. 
542 Tanzania Commission for AIDS (TACAIDS) and Zanzibar AIDS Commission (ZAC), Tanzania HIV Impact 




an estimated 26% of female sex workers lived with HIV and AIDS in mainland Tanzania.543 
Also, by 2015 there were approximately 250,000 children aged 0-14 living with HIV and 
AIDS.544 
UNAIDS reports that annual HIV/AIDS-related deaths decreased from 48,000 in 2010 to 
24,000 in 2018.545 This decrease goes along with the reduction in new annual HIV infections 
from 83,000 in 2010 to 72,000 in 2018. The lessening effects of the HIV/AIDS epidemic are 
the result of considerable efforts by state and non-state actors to end it, recently by striving to 
accomplish the 90-90-90 UNAIDS Global Target by 2020.546 The Target was that by 2020 
90% of people living with HIV should know their HIV-positive status, 90% of people who 
know their HIV-positive status should have accessed treatment, and 90% of people on 
treatment should have suppressed viral loads. In 2018 UNAIDS reported that of the people 
living with HIV/AIDS in Tanzania, 78% knew their status, 71% were on treatment, and 62% 
had achieved viral suppression.547 Despite good progress reported, the number of persons 
living with HIV/AIDS keeps increasing, for instance from the 1.4 million reported in the 
2016-2017 survey to 1.6 million reported in 2018.548 Thus, the epidemic remains a threat to 
the social and economic development of the country.549 
From the statistics above, it is evident that the number of HIV/AIDS-related orphans and 
vulnerable children has been increasing in Tanzania since the 1980s.550 In 2012, a child-
rights-based situational analysis reported that Tanzania had about  3 million HIV/AIDS-
 
543 Information obtained from United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) Tanzania, “HIV and AIDS Fact 
Sheet”, https://www.unicef.org/tanzania/media/566/file/UNICEF-Tanzania-2017-HIV-fact-sheet.pdf. 
544 United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), Is Tanzania a Better Place for Children?, above footnote 537 at 
p. 14. 
545 UNAIDS, “United Republic of Tanzania country report 2018”, 
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546 Affirmed in Tanzania Commission for AIDS (TACAIDS) and Zanzibar AIDS Commission (ZAC), Tanzania 
HIV Impact Survey (THIS) 2016-2017: Final Report, above footnote 542; and in United Republic of Tanzania, 
Ministry of Health, Community Development, Gender, Elderly and Children, National Aids Control Programme, 
“National Guidelines for the Management of HIV and AIDS”. 
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HIV Impact Survey (THIS) 2016-2017: Final Report, above footnote 542, which at pp. 18-19 reports 60.6%, 
93.6% and 87.0% in the same order. 
548 Tanzania Commission for AIDS (TACAIDS) and Zanzibar AIDS Commission (ZAC), Tanzania HIV Impact 
Survey (THIS) 2016-2017: Final Report, above footnote 542; and UNAIDS, “United Republic of Tanzania 
country report 2018”, above footnote 545. 
549 Tanzania Commission for AIDS (TACAIDS) and Zanzibar AIDS Commission (ZAC), Tanzania HIV Impact 
Survey (THIS) 2016-2017: Final Report, above footnote 542 at p. 22. See also Ministry of Health and Social 
Welfare, Department of Social Welfare, “The National Costed Plan of Action for Most Vulnerable Children, 
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related orphans.551 An HIV/AIDS and Malaria Indicator Survey published in 2013 reported 
that 9% of persons below 18 years (over 2 million children) in Tanzania were orphaned by the 
death of either one or both parents due to HIV/AIDS.552 In 2015, some reports said that about 
1.3 million children were orphaned due to HIV/AIDS in Tanzania.553 The orphaned children 
become especially vulnerable as they remain with ailing relatives, old and weak grandparents, 
in child-headed households, or within a community incapable of caring for them due to 
illness, poverty, deteriorating living conditions, as well as stigma.554  In addition to being 
orphaned, many young and adolescent children also live with HIV. Lack of adequate care 
through incapacity, neglect or abandonment by caregivers place these children in the category 
of children deprived of parental care. The epidemic has considerably weakened Tanzania’s 
families and communities, mainly in their ability to care for their children, which leads to the 
increase of children in need of care and protection.555 
3.3.4 Family/Social Disintegration  
Several reports cite family and social disintegration as one reason for the increase of most 
vulnerable children in Tanzania.556 The term disintegration means two things. First, the 
breakdown of the nuclear unit, the family, where parents and children end up separated. 
Second, the overextension and ultimate snapping of the traditional care safety net that has 
guaranteed care and protection of children within the extended family and community for 
centuries. The vicious cycle of poverty, the impacts of HIV/AIDS, a rise in domestic and 
social violence and abuse, tensions between traditional and modern values and structures 
(e.g., upsurge of divorce, marital separation and single parenthood), the effects of 
globalisation and increased migratory movements (e.g., rural-urban migration) have all played 
 
551 SOS Children’s Villages Tanzania, Child Rights Based Situational Analysis of Children without Parental 
Care and at Risk of Losing Parental Care (Dar es Salaam, 2012), at pp. 13 and 34. 
552 Tanzania Commission for AIDS (TACAIDS), Zanzibar AIDS Commission (ZAC), National Bureau of 
Statistics (NBS), Office of the Chief Government Statistician (OCGS), and ICF International, Tanzania 
HIV/AIDS and Malaria Indicator Survey 2011-12 (Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 2013), at p. 11. 
553 Tanzania Ministry of Community Development, Gender and Children, UNICEF and Global Affairs Canada, 
Building a holistic child protection system, step by step, in the United Republic of Tanzania (2015), at p. 3; also 
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), Is Tanzania a Better Place for Children?, above footnote 537, at p. 
14. 
554 SOS Children’s Villages Tanzania, Child Rights Based Situational Analysis of Children without Parental 
Care and at Risk of Losing Parental Care, above footnote 551, at p. 34. 
555 Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, Department of Social Welfare, “National Guidelines for Improving 
Quality of Care, Support, and Protection for Most Vulnerable Children in Tanzania” (September 2009), at p. 1; 
and SOS Children’s Villages Tanzania, A Snapshot of Alternative Care Arrangements in Tanzania (Innsbruck, 
Austria, 2013), at p. 5. 
556 Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, Department of Social Welfare, “The National Costed Plan of Action 
for Most Vulnerable Children, 2007-2010”, at pp. i and 26; Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, Department 
of Social Welfare, “National Guidelines for Improving Quality of Care, Support, and Protection for Most 
Vulnerable Children in Tanzania”, at p. iii; and Mmasa Joel and Mbaula Walter, Social Protection Targeting the 




significant roles in breaking up families and communities in Tanzania. Family-, kinship- and 
community-based child care have sustained a big blow due to the breakdown, adding to the 
number of children in need of substitute care and protection.557  
Family and social disintegration have, for instance, become one of the reinforcing agents of 
practices such as child abandonment. The weakening capacity of the family and community to 
absorb and care for unwanted children or children with disabilities, children born out of 
wedlock, born to teenage girls, destitute parents or sex workers and the like, has spiked up 
child abandonment rates.558 There is a tendency in Tanzania for mothers to leave children in 
pit latrines, damp sites, bus stands, other people’s doors, and such other places.559 People who 
do this range from teenage girls to grown women who abandon their newborn babies or young 
children in such locations. During field research in Tanzania between January and March of 
2018 and 2019, child abandonment was one of the leading reasons for the upsurge in children 
deprived of parental care.560 For example, a privately owned children’s home reported having 
facilitated about 100 adoptions, in most cases of children who had been abandoned.561 
Children living on the streets is another consequence of family or social disintegration. 
Admittedly, there are complex reasons why a child should live on the streets, such as relating 
to urbanisation and its effects. Nevertheless, lack of adequate parental care and protection 
within the biological/extended family or community is the main reason. The exact number of 
children living in the street in Tanzania is unknown. Various published survey reports cover 
different parts of the country at different times. A survey of 95 districts in 2012 found 33,952 
children living on the street in Tanzania.562 In Dar es Salaam alone in 2012, an estimated 
 
557 It is significant to note that these agents of disintegration have not devastated traditional alternative child care 
systems in all societies in Tanzania. A former social welfare officer at Monduli, Arusha, explained in an 
interview that in his 8 years work experience in the area he did not come across orphans or street children who 
originated from the Maasai communities of Longido, Ngorongoro and Monduli, three out of the seven district 
councils in Arusha.  Interview with social welfare officer 1-Arusha, social welfare regional office, Arusha, on 
19.03.2019. 
558 Tanzania Child Rights Forum, Tanzania Child Rights Status Report (Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 2013) at p. 39. 
559 Story of Atuganile (not her real name) written by Buguzi Syriacus, “Foster Care: A New Home for Those 
Abandoned”, The Citizen (Monday, 26th July 2016); also covered by Frisone Chiara, “Working a System to 
Protect Children in Tanzania”, https://blogs.unicef.org/blog/working-system-works-well-protect-children-
tanzania/. 
560 Social welfare officers, managers of approved residential homes, advocates and child adopters interviewed 
said that many children deprived of parental care had been abandoned by their biological parents and relatives 
and the surrounding community did not take them in.  
561 Since its establishment in 2006 up to February 2019 when the interview was conducted, the home has 
facilitated over 100 child adoptions most of which were of abandoned children whose families and relatives 
could not be found. 
562 Abdulwakil Saiboko, “Number of Street Children on the Increase”, Tanzania Daily News (21st April 2012). A 
more recent report is available in Malanga Alex, “Over 800,000 Tanzanian Children Living in High Risk 




5,580 children were living on the streets.563 In Mwanza, a newspaper reported over 2,500 
children living on the street in 2016.564 The highest number of children living on the street 
ever reported in Tanzania is 437,500.565 Life on the street is hazardous, so that these children 
are in urgent need of care and protection.566 
3.3.5 Compliance with Child Protection Laws  
In 2009, Tanzania’s Legislature enacted a long-awaited comprehensive law of the child.567 
The Law of the Child Act, 2009 domesticates both the UNCRC, 1989 and the ACRWC, 1990. 
To operationalise the law, the Minister responsible for social welfare enacted several 
regulations as empowered by section 157 of the Act.568 Together with other legislation 
relating to matters affecting children, the Act establishes a protective legal framework for the 
child.569 Despite the existing legal framework, which could considerably improve the 
situation, levels of child abuse, violence, exploitation, and neglect are still high in 
Tanzania.570 Non-compliance with the law is a contributing cause of the problem. 
Three main points may explain persistent non-compliance with the child laws in Tanzania. 
First, lack of knowledge and understanding of the laws and their operation. In 2008 the 
National Costed Plan of Action (NCPA) I reported that legislators, policymakers and judicial 
 
563 Dar es Salaam Counts over 5,000 Homeless Children, Wanted in Africa (19th May 2013). 
564 The Plight of Mwanza Street Children in Tanzania, The Sunday Mail (04th December 2016). 
565 This number is given in various writings relating to street children in Tanzania since 2012. It is given in 
Consortium for Street Children, “Tanzanian Street Children”, https://www.globalgiving.org/projects/tanzanian-
street-children/; and in Navuri Angel, “Removing Children from Streets is everybody’s responsibility”, The 
Guardian (18th January 2018). 
566 More on the experiences of street children in Tanzania can be found in Joe L. P. Lugalla, Jesse K. Mbwambo, 
“Street Children and Street Life in Urban Tanzania: The Culture of Surviving and its Implications for Children’s 
Health”, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 23(2) (1999): pp. 329–44; Ruth Evans, “Poverty, 
HIV, and Barriers to Education: Street Children's Experiences in Tanzania” Gender and Development 10(3) 
(2002): pp. 51–62; Amury Zena and Komba Aneth, Coping Strategies Used by Street Children in the Event of 
Illness, Research Report 10/1 (Dar es Salaam: REPOA, 2010); and Maryknoll Sisters, “The Life of Street 
Children in Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania”, https://www.maryknollsisters.org/2015/07/24/the-life-of-street-children-
in-dar-es-salaam-tanzania/. 
567 The push to have a comprehensive child protective law can be traced in various texts such as Rwezaura, 
Wanitzek, “The Law and Practice Relating to the Adoption of Children in Tanzania”, above footnote 22, at pp. 
160-161; and Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, Department of Social Welfare, “The National Costed Plan 
of Action for Most Vulnerable Children, 2007-2010”, at pp. 30-31. 
568 Foster Care Placement Regulations (2012); Adoption of Children Regulations (2012); Children Homes 
Regulations: GN. No. 155 of April 2012 (2012); Law of the Child (Retention Homes) Rules (2012); Law of the 
Child (Apprenticeship) Regulations (2012); Law of the Child (Child Employment) Regulations (2012); Child 
Protection Regulations, above footnote 511; and Law of the Child (Juvenile Court Procedure) Rules (2016). 
569 Law of Marriage Act, 1971; Employment and Labour Relations Act (2004); Penal Code (1945); Sexual 
Offences Special Provision Act (1998); Criminal Procedure Act (1985); Tanzania Evidence Act (1967); Anti-
trafficking in Persons Act (2008); Refugee Act (1998); Persons with Disabilities Act, and many others. 
570 United Republic of Tanzania. Ministry of Health, Community Development, Gender, Elderly and Children, 
“National Plan of Action to End Violence Against Women and Children in Tanzania (NPA-VAWC) 2017/18 – 
2012/22”, http://www.mcdgc.go.tz/data/NPA_VAWC.pdf (2016), at pp. 2-3; and African Child Policy Forum 
(ACPF), Implementing Child Rights in Tanzania: What is working well, what is not: Background paper to the 




officers lacked knowledge of laws and policies relating to children’s issues.571 In 2016 the 
African Child Policy Forum found that district councillors and officials concerned with child 
matters had no knowledge or awareness of the law, making them unaccountable.572 During 
field research in Tanzania from January to March of 2018 and 2019, a lack of knowledge and 
understanding of the law of the child was a constant finding across respondent ministries, 
departments, agencies, and individuals. Social welfare officers, who to a large extent 
implement child laws in Tanzania, are trained in social work rather than law. They reported 
that courses tailored specifically to raising their legal awareness were rare. When government 
officials with the mandate to make, change and implement law and policy lack knowledge of 
the law and policy in the first place, how then can the general public comprehend, let alone 
comply with such laws? 
Second, Tanzanians have yet to develop a culture to comply with the law without force. In 
2014 UNICEF argued that compliance with the law is not a virtue inbred in the Tanzanian 
community.573 It further submitted that non-compliance with child laws in Tanzania is rooted 
in the customary lack of respect towards children and their rights. The African Child Policy 
Forum (ACPF) also named traditional beliefs and practices as hindrances to implementing 
child laws and rights in Tanzania.574 Similarly, NCPA I and II and National Plan of Action to 
End Violence Against Women and Children (NPA VAWC) call for a change in existing 
social norms that do not foster child protection in Tanzania.575 Thus, Tanzanians need to 
cultivate a national culture of complying with child laws rather than clinging to prevailing 
traditional norms that derogate from children’s rights. Having a legal framework for child 
protection does not help much if people do not abide by the laws.  
Third, there are challenges in respect of law enforcement. Limited capacity in terms of 
human, financial and infrastructural resources are the leading encumberment to 
implementation of the law. Only a small fraction of the required number of social workers are 
 
571 Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, Department of Social Welfare, “The National Costed Plan of Action 
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572 African Child Policy Forum (ACPF), Implementing Child Rights in Tanzania: What is working well, what is 
not, above footnote 570, at p. 44. 
573 United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), Is Tanzania a Better Place for Children?, above footnote 537, at 
p. 27. 
574 African Child Policy Forum (ACPF), Implementing Child Rights in Tanzania: What is working well, what is 
not, above footnote 570, at p. 51. 
575 Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, Department of Social Welfare, “The National Costed Plan of Action 
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available in Tanzania. For instance, an assessment of the social welfare workforce in 2012 
found an estimate of 437 officers working nationwide, with a deficit of 3,367 officers from 
national to ward level.576 And the available officers still needed education and training.577 
Also, governmental ministries, departments and agencies do not work in sync with non-
governmental organisations responsible for children.578 They make separate, uncoordinated 
and sometimes duplicated or counterproductive efforts to implement the law. Budget 
discussions and allocations give low priority to institutions dealing with children. The ACPF 
found that funding for children’s programmes at the local government level has become 
almost entirely the responsibility of external funders.579 Besides, the ministry responsible for 
children’s budget allocation (MHCDGEC) largely focuses on health rather than child welfare. 
Consequently, work-enhancing infrastructures like computers, telephones, photocopiers, 
printers, scanners, vehicles, and the like are not standard fixtures in the offices or working 
environment of social welfare officers in Tanzania.580 Under such circumstances, ensuring 
compliance with the law becomes a struggle. 
3.3.6 Respect for Human and Child Rights  
Tanzania has national, regional, and international obligations to respect, promote and protect 
human rights within its territory. The responsibilities arise from the Constitution, national 
laws and multiple international and regional instruments to which Tanzania is a party. With 
specific regard to children, Tanzania has signed, ratified, and domesticated the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989 and the African Charter on the Rights and 
Welfare of the child, 1990. Despite the existing framework, the country struggles with 
persistent violations of children’s rights.581 Such violations augment the odds of children 
needing substitute care and protection.  
 
576 United Republic of Tanzania, Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, Department of Social Welfare, 
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577 Ibid., at pp. 26-32; and African Child Policy Forum (ACPF), Implementing Child Rights in Tanzania: What is 
working well, what is not, above footnote 570, at p. 56. 
578 African Child Policy Forum (ACPF), Implementing Child Rights in Tanzania: What is working well, what is 
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Development, Gender, Elderly and Children, “National Plan of Action to End Violence Against Women and 
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579 African Child Policy Forum (ACPF), Implementing Child Rights in Tanzania: What is working well, what is 
not, above footnote 570, at p. 52. 
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In 2009, a national survey of violence against children in Tanzania found that three out of ten 
females and one out of seven males aged 13-24 years had experienced sexual violence before 
reaching 18.582 Similarly, for both males and females, three quarters experienced physical 
violence and one quarter experienced emotional violence from an adult or intimate partner 
before the age of 18. A human rights report published in 2018 showed that sexual violence 
against children was on the rise, with 10,551 and 13,457 police-reported cases in 2016 and 
2017, respectively.583 A national child labour survey conducted in 2014 found that among 
14.7 million children aged 5-17 years, 4.2 million, 28.8% of children in that age group, were 
engaged in child labour.584 Further, 74.7% of the children in child labour were doing 
hazardous work.585 Child labour persists despite the existence of a comprehensive legal 
framework to prevent harmful child labour in Tanzania. 
Similarly, traditional harmful practices such as Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) continue 
despite being illegal in Tanzania.586 About 8% of female respondents in the 2009 violence 
against children survey reported having gone through FGM.587 Child trafficking is also a 
violation of children rights in Tanzania. Although efforts to identify and protect victims are 
still low, in 2016, the government identified, and referred to an NGO, 80 domestic child 
trafficking victims.588 
Efforts to ensure children’s rights are promoted and protected are ongoing in Tanzania. The 
ACPF found the proliferation and diversity of national plans of actions towards implementing 
children’s rights as a success factor because they cover all child rights.589 They are also 
comprehensive and well-executed; thus, their effective implementation may bring about a 
change in the child rights story in Tanzania.590  However, the required implementation 
remains far beyond reach. 
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3.3.7 Child Protection System Coordination 
The child welfare mandate in Tanzania is spread across multiple administrative organs at 
national, regional, district and community levels. At different levels, there are state and non-
state actors. State actors comprise ministries, departments, agencies, desks, units and officers 
from the top national level to the lowest street-level bureaucrat.591 Non-state actors include 
national and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs), community and faith-
based organisations (CBOs and FBOs), development partners, and donor groups operating in 
the country. All these actors form part of the child protection system.  
The quantity and diversity of actors constituting the child protection system require 
impeccable coordination. The Ministry of Health, Community Development, Gender, Elderly 
and Children (MoHCDGC) is the national coordinator of matters on child welfare. 
Nevertheless, the President’s Office – Regional Administration and Local Government (PO-
RALG) is the implementer of law and policy on child welfare. The chain of command from 
PO-RALG moves from regional administration to local government authorities at the district 
level headed by district council or municipal council directors. At the bottom, it moves to 
ward, village or mtaa (street) executives who directly handle children’s issues in their local 
communities. However, coordination of all state and non-state actors from the top rank of the 
MoHCDGC is poor. The Ministry has a mandate over a wide range of the most sensitive 
issues in society. Health has almost overrun all other responsibilities of the Ministry in terms 
of budget and focus.592 The Ministry also lacks a smooth chain of command down to local 
government authorities. Social welfare officers at that level report to their immediate 
district/municipal council directors, who are not directly accountable to the MoHCDGC but 
the PO-RALG. Hence there is a break in coordination.  
Further, responsibility for issues concerning child welfare is not exclusively vested in the 
MoHCDGC; rather, it is scattered across multiple ministries, departments and agencies 
(MDAs).593 Coordinating the implementation of numerous national policies, plans of action, 
 
591 Michael Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucracy: The Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Service (New York: 
Russell Sage Foundation, 1980), at pp. xi-xvi, describes street-level bureaucrats as public officers who directly 
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592 Ministerial budget projections presented in the Parliament of Tanzania provide indications of this 
circumstance. For more details, see United Republic of Tanzania, Ministry of Health, Community Development, 
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and strategies relating to child welfare spread out across the MDAs is a challenge.594 
Coordination, support, monitoring, evaluation, inspection, and supervision of all actors 
constituting the child protection system is difficult to achieve.595 For instance, in the absence 
of proper monitoring, some child welfare institutions operate without a legal licence in the 
country.596 Thus, the weak coordination of child welfare services leaves children without the 
needed care and protection. 
3.4 Alternative Care for Children Deprived of Parental Care 
Alternative care means care provided to a child whose own family, even with support, is 
unable or unwilling to provide adequate care.597 The state is vested by the international 
community with the responsibility to ensure that a child receives appropriate alternative care 
when needed.598 According to their national laws, states must ensure that children are given 
special protection and assistance, including alternative care for parentless children, children 
temporarily or permanently deprived of their family environment, and those who in their own 
best interests cannot remain in their family environment. Section 1 of the UN Guidelines for 
the Alternative Care of Children, 2010 categorises these children as deprived or at risk of 
being deprived of parental care.  
As used in the UNCRC and the ACRWC, family environment refers to a wide range of child 
care arrangements within the family. Wanitzek affirms that in the African context, it includes 
care within the extended family.599 It aligns with the definition of the family under section 2 
of the Law of the Child Act, 2009, which encompasses close relatives. Parental care, on the 
other hand, may be construed in different ways depending on the context. The UN Guidelines, 
 
594 United Republic of Tanzania. Ministry of Health, Community Development, Gender, Elderly and Children, 
“National Plan of Action to End Violence Against Women and Children in Tanzania (NPA-VAWC) 2017/18 – 
2012/22” attempts construction of a harmonised coordination structure. However, while analysing it, the ACPF 
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accountability mechanism; see African Child Policy Forum (ACPF), Implementing Child Rights in Tanzania: 
What is working well, what is not, above footnote 570, at pp. 38-40. 
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596 SOS Children’s Villages Tanzania, A Snapshot of Alternative Care Arrangements in Tanzania, above 
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Arusha for instance, about 15 children’s homes were found to be operating without licences.  
597 Section 5 of UN General Assembly, “Guidelines for the Alternative Care of Children”. 
598 Article 20 (1) and (2) of the UNCRC, 1989; Article 25 (1) and (2) (a) of the ACRWC, 1990 and section 5 of 
the UN Guidelines for the Alternative Care of Children, 2010.  
599 Wanitzek, “Child Adoption and Foster Care in the Context of Legal Pluralism: Case Studies from Ghana”, 
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2010 do not define parental care. However, under sections 29(a), (b) and 30(b) defining 
children without parental care, the Guidelines narrowly construe parental care as care 
provided by a child’s parents, either natural or adoptive.600 In the Tanzanian context, because 
the law perceives parental care in a broader sense, a child deprived of a family environment or 
parental care refers to a child without adequate care by any competent person. Section 7(3) of 
the Law of the Child Act, 2009 establishes the right to alternative care for such a child 
pursuant to a determination by a competent authority or court of law.  
Alternative care takes different forms. The measures proposed under Article 20(3) of the 
UNCRC, 1989 include “inter alia” foster placement, kafala under Islamic law, adoption, and 
placement in suitable child care institutions. The ACRWC, 1990 under Article 25(2) (a) 
prioritises alternative family care, including, “among others”, placement in foster care or 
suitable institutions. The provisions of both Conventions use phrases that indicate they have 
not exhausted the list of possible care arrangements. While considering alternative care 
solutions, they both require that proper regard be paid to the desirability of continuity in a 
child’s upbringing and the child’s ethnic, religious, cultural and linguistic background.601 This 
standard, teamed with the inclusion of the Islamic kafala, cultural background considerations, 
and the phrase inter alia, demonstrate that the treaties do not take cognisance of only statutory 
forms of alternative care but also those under customary and religious laws. This is evident 
under the UN Guidelines, which specify forms of alternative care as formal and informal.602 
The Law of the Child Act, 2009 also recognises both formal and traditional arrangements for 
alternative care of children.603 
The process of placing a child in alternative care depends on the child’s needs and available 
care arrangements. Competent public or private bodies organise placement in collaboration 
with public or private caregivers.604 Prior to placement, the principles and standards of 
alternative care must be applied to determine whether the child should be placed in care and 
in which care setting.605 The UN Guidelines, 2010 set up three pillars on which alternative 
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above footnote 18 at p. 228. 
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603 Section 9(3) and (4) of the Law of the Child Act, 2009.  
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child care should rest: the principles of necessity, suitability, and the child’s best interests. 
Other general principles are also named to govern alternative care practice. It is significant 
that these principles and standards do not apply directly to informal alternative care. For this 
reason, section 27 of the UN Guidelines, 2010 sets the scope of the guidelines as limited to 
formal care with a caveat that they may apply to informal care where indicated (for instance, 
under sections 56 and 76-79).  
In order to capture a picture of the practice of care for children deprived of parental care in 
Tanzania, alternative care forms, principles and placement laws and procedures are discussed 
below. The UN Guidelines are used as a model to guide the discussion.  
3.4.1 Forms of Alternative Care 
Alternative child care can be formal or informal. Care is formal if it is provided in a family 
environment as ordered by a competent administrative or judicial authority or in a residential 
environment provided by a public or private facility, whether or not resulting from 
administrative or judicial action.606 In other words, all placements with a state-recognised 
caregiver are formal. Once the placement is an outcome of administrative or judicial action, 
even in kinship care, then it is formal.607 However, placements in residential facilities are 
formal, regardless of whether they are by order of a competent authority or by direct request 
of a parent or guardian. Under sections 18(6) and 133 of the Law of the Child Act, 2009, all 
residential facilities must be approved and licensed before operating; hence they are state-
recognised and regulated.608 Formal care provision and regulation is under state law. In 
Tanzania, the Law of the Child Act, 2009 and Regulations under it are the applicable law.  
Informal care is a private arrangement for the care of a child in a family setting by a relative, 
close friend of the family or any other person in their individual capacity, not ordered by any 
administrative, judicial, or accredited body.609 Provision of informal care is usually open-
ended. The arrangement may be at the initiative of the child, his or her parents or any other 
person. In many countries globally, and especially in Africa, most children without the care of 
their parents are informally cared for by their relatives, family friends, neighbours, or 
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members of the community.610 Informal care is regulated mainly by customary law. For 
instance, in Tanzania, the 1963 Local Customary Law (Declaration) (No. 4) Order under its 
first schedule provides directions for the guardianship of children without parental care within 
the extended family or the lineage.611 
Alternative care can be family-based or residential. According to the wording of Article 20(3) 
of the UNCRC and Article 25(2) (a) of the ACRWC, family-based arrangements such as 
foster care, Islamic kafala, and adoption should be given priority over residential 
arrangements. Regulation 3(3) (a) of Tanzania’s Child Protection Regulations, 2014 states 
that placement should be family-based rather than institutional. It means that placement in an 
alternative family is preferable to placement in a residential facility. The UN Guidelines, 2010 
expanded the list of alternative care measures under the treaties by incorporating other 
measures, including informal ones, which are largely family-based. The Moving Forward 
Handbook categorises the alternative care measures in two main groups: placement in an 
existing family and placement in residential care.612 Kinship care, foster care, and other 
family-based care measures such as care by a fit person or family as practised in Tanzania 
(section 18(3) (b), Law of the Child Act, 2009) belong to the first category. In the second 
category, there is family-like care, where children in a residential facility are grouped into 
households under a caregiver who acts as their parent. In Tanzania, SOS Children’s Village 
and Kijiji cha Furaha in Dar es Salaam provide an example of family-like care.613 Other 
examples are large-scale group residential care common in many residential facilities and, 
lastly, supervised independent living arrangements typical for those transiting from a care 
setting to independent living in the community. 
Alternative care can also be permanent or temporary. Children need stability. The requirement 
to consider the desirability of continuity in a child’s upbringing and the child’s ethnic, 
religious, cultural and linguistic background when selecting a suitable alternative care 
measure is based on this need. On this ground, permanent alternative care solutions are 
preferable to temporary arrangements. For instance, sections 2(a), (b) and 12 of the UN 
Guidelines, 2010 advocate for permanency-oriented alternative care solutions. The term 
permanency under the Guidelines refers not to perpetuity but rather to the stable nature of the 
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care setting.614 Section 60 emphasises a stable environment, whether the child is reintegrated 
in his or her family or placed in family-based or residential care. According to section 2(b) of 
the Guidelines, a child should be in temporary care only when permanent solutions are being 
sought, are not possible, or are not in the child’s best interest. Tanzania’s Child Protection 
Regulations, 2014 under Regulation 3(3) (b) have it as a general principle that placement of a 
child should be permanent rather than temporary. Of course, there are exceptions depending 
on the circumstances of each case and on the consideration of other principles and standards 
of alternative care. Alternative care measures perceived as permanent are generally family-
based, such as adoption, kafala and sometimes kinship care. However, foster care placement, 
although family-based, is not regarded as permanent. It ranges from short-term to long-term 
care, which concludes when a child attains the age of majority.615 Residential care 
arrangements are temporary and are supposed to be measures of last resort.616 
3.4.2 Principles of Alternative Child Care 
The 1986 UN Declaration on Social and Legal Principles relating to the Protection and 
Welfare of Children laid down alternative care principles for national and international 
placement.617 The UNCRC (and the ACRWC), together with the 2010 UN Guidelines on the 
Alternative Care of Children, cement those principles. These instruments agree that family is 
the natural environment for the care and protection of children, and that the top priority is for 
all children to remain in the care of their parents.618 Also, no child should remain without care 
and protection whenever parental care is unavailable or inadequate.619  In such an occurrence, 
care by relatives, a substitute family or, if necessary, an institution should be the next care 
options considered, in that order.620  
A body of pre-set principles must guide alternative care placement considerations. This study 
groups such principles in two categories: fundamental and general principles. Fundamental 
because they go to the core of the decision whether a child should be placed in alternative care 
or not. And general because they act as criteria to determine compliance with the fundamental 
principles. Determining whether care is genuinely needed (necessity principle), is provided 
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appropriately (suitability principle), and is in the child’s best interest (best interests principle), 
are the fundamental principles. Comparing the cardinal principles and the other principles and 
rights under the UNCRC and ACRWC can explain the distinction between fundamental and 
general principles. The general principles build on the framework of the fundamental 
principles. 
3.4.2.1 Necessity Principle 
A child should only be placed in alternative care when there is an absolute undeniable need to 
do so. The UN Guidelines under section 14 rule that removing a child from his or her family 
is a measure of last resort. Section 15 confirms that removal should be on extreme grounds 
only, poverty and its direct consequences notwithstanding. The Handbook interpreting the 
Guidelines lays down three main action points to operationalise this principle.621 The points 
are extracted from sections 32-52 of the UN Guidelines devoted to providing legislative, 
policy and practical suggestions to ensure cohesion of the family and prevention of the need 
for alternative care. According to the Guidelines, these suggestions are the following: 
First, there are preventive measures against situations and conditions that make a child need 
alternative care. Preventive action can be taken to avoid or combat a wide range of 
circumstances, so that the child can remain in his or her family’s care. The Handbook lists the 
following:  
“…poverty, inadequate housing, lack of access to effective health, 
education and social welfare services, HIV/AIDS or other serious illness, 
substance abuse, violence, imprisonment and displacement, as well as birth 
to an unmarried mother and discrimination on the basis of ethnicity, 
religion, gender and disability.”622  
It refers to this as the primary level of prevention where the state must ensure the general 
public’s access to essential services, social justice, and protection of their rights.623 Prevention 
is summed up under sections 32-38 of the Guidelines, which encourage states to address 
select policy issues and implement initiatives that support and strengthen families to promote 
parental care. 
 Second, there are gatekeeping mechanisms that ensure children placed in alternative care are 
only those who cannot remain in the care of their parents or within the extended family and 
community. Gatekeepers include trained and qualified professionals working for competent 
bodies or authorities (such as judicial bodies) concerned with placement, including public and 
private care agencies. Gatekeeping measures are relevant to children at risk of being 
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abandoned, relinquished, or removed from parental care. Sections 39-48 of the Guidelines and 
the secondary level of prevention under the Handbook provide for this action point.624 To 
begin with, according to section 34 of the Guidelines, families that experience difficulties in 
caring for their children should receive support specific to their challenges. This includes 
support to adolescent parents according to sections 36 and 41 of the Guidelines. Next, for 
children with the impending risk of being abandoned or relinquished, social support, 
including counselling, should be given to their parents so they can continue caring for their 
children.625 When the children cannot remain with their parents, informal alternatives such as 
placement with relatives, should be sought. Public and private care agencies must not receive 
children without inquiry; they must refer parents to other appropriate services before 
placement. Lastly, in the case that removal from parental care cannot be avoided, it should be 
done in response to a professional assessment and subject to judicial review when parents 
object.626 In extreme cases, such as where a child’s sole caregiver is deprived of his or her 
liberty, the Guidelines under section 48 propose alternative sentencing to detention in 
custody.627 
Third, regular reviews of alternative care placements must be conducted. The Handbook 
terms this action point as tertiary prevention because it comes after the fact.628 It involves 
reintegrating a child in alternative care into his or her family at an appropriate time and under 
appropriate conditions. From the beginning, the Guidelines under sections 2(a) and 3 require 
family reintegration as the ultimate end of the placement. Sections 14 and 15 recommend 
regular reviews of removal decisions. In addition, sections 49-52 of the Guidelines propose 
professional assessment of reintegration possibilities and how to do this with regard to the 
child’s best interests.629 Reintegration, however, is not simply returning home. It is a gradual 
and supervised process that requires follow-up in consideration of the reasons for the 
separation and the child’s age, needs and evolving capacities.630 Therefore, this action point 
prevents a child from unnecessarily remaining in alternative care while keeping the child’s 
well-being in sight.  
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3.4.2.2 Suitability Principle  
After determining that a child needs alternative care, what follows is yet another 
determination in respect of an appropriate placement. Provision of care must be in a suitable 
manner. To ensure this, the Handbook sets two action points to check the suitability of the 
placement.631 The points are drawn from, among others, sections 57-68 of the Guidelines 
providing for the determination of the most appropriate form of care. Thus, alternative care 
placement is only suitable if: 
First, all care settings meet general minimum standards. Care providers in both family-based 
and residential care settings must meet a set of criteria prior to placement. The Guidelines 
recommend minimum standards for alternative care settings in various sections from which 
states could develop the criteria. The standards pertain, for instance, to conditions of care, 
staffing, funding, child protection and access to basic services.632 To ensure compliance, there 
must be a mechanism through which care settings are assessed based on the criteria and 
remain subject to regular inspection and monitoring.633   
Second, the proposed care setting meets the needs of the child. This action point involves 
matching an individual child with the most appropriate care setting depending on his or her 
needs. It requires two things: a range of available care options, so there is a real choice 
according to sections 53-54 of the Guidelines, and an established systematic procedure for 
determining the most suitable option according to section 57 of the Guidelines.  
A range of options allows meticulous assessment to determine the most suitable care setting 
for a child, and guards against frequent changes of care setting, which are discouraged under 
section 60 of the Guidelines. It provides for a range of family-based, family-like, and 
community-based care options, which take precedence over residential care according to 
sections 53 and 54 of the Guidelines. Nevertheless, it also includes residential care which, 
according to sections 21 and 23 of the Guidelines, may complement the other options and in 
individual cases be the “appropriate, necessary and constructive” option.  
In determining suitable placement, there must be a clear purpose to find the most appropriate 
care setting for the child and permanency in due course, based on the short-term and long-
term view.634 Determination of the most suitable option combines preventive gatekeeping 
under the necessity principle with reactive gatekeeping under the suitability principle. Thus, 
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gatekeeping generally involves determining whether a child needs alternative care, efforts to 
retain the child in his or her family environment, and when not possible, finding the care 
setting that is most responsive to the child’s needs.635 For the determination process, the 
Guidelines under sections 57, 64 and 65 recommend rigorous action by a team of qualified 
professionals guided by established judicial and administrative procedures in consultation 
with the child, his or her parents or legal guardians or other significant persons. Again, 
continuity in a child’s upbringing is a robust agenda in determining the most suitable care 
option for a child as per sections 58 and 62 of the Guidelines. Regular reviews, every three 
months as suggested by section 67 of the Guidelines, form part and parcel of the never-ending 
determination of placement suitability and working towards the permanency goal.636 Of 
course, the best interests of the child are central to the whole determination process. 
3.4.2.3 The Best Interests of the Child Principle 
The third of the fundamental principles of alternative care and a pillar of the 2010 UN 
Guidelines is the best interest of the child principle.637 Article 3(1) of the UNCRC requires 
public and private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities and 
legislative bodies, whenever making decisions affecting the child, to take as a primary 
consideration the child’s best interest. The principle establishes three co-dependent 
requirements.638 One, whenever involved, the decision-making authorities must consider the 
child’s best interests. Two, while the child’s interests are the primary consideration, the rights 
and interests of other persons involved must also be considered. And three, consideration of 
the child’s best interests is one right among others, so that the final decision must be 
compliant with the other rights of the child. 
In decisions relating to alternative care such as family separation under UNCRC Articles 9(1), 
20(1), and child adoption under Article 21, the child’s best interests become the absolute 
determiner. This means that, while considering removing a child from his or her family 
environment or when deciding for adoption as the most suitable care setting, the best interests 
of the child take precedence over the interests of all other involved persons. However, the 
responsibility to determine the child’s best interests and the requirement to comply with other 
rights cannot be compromised.  
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The criteria for best interests determination (BID) are not a component of Article 3 of the 
UNCRC. The drafters left it open to allow for flexibility of determination depending on the 
circumstances of each case. Nevertheless, the Committee on the Rights of the Child and the 
UN High Commissioner for Refugees have developed guidelines for determining the child’s 
best interests.639 Specific to the alternative care context, the Handbook interpreting the UN 
Guidelines lists seven criteria upon which BID should be based.640 Considering the seven 
points, it is clear that the principle of the child’s best interests underlies all principles of 
alternative care, including necessity and suitability, and determines all actions regarding 
placement.641 In Tanzania’s context, the best interests of the child principle is stated under the 
Law of the Child Act, 2009 section 4(2) and reiterated under regulation 3 of the Adoption of 
Children Regulations, 2012, regulation 3(1) (a) of the Child Protection Regulations, 2014 and 
regulation 3(f) of the Children’s Homes Regulations, 2012.  
The best interest of the child principle and its application generally and specifically in 
alternative care, particularly child adoption, is discussed in detail in chapter five of this thesis.  
3.4.2.4 General Principles 
The principles guiding the provision of alternative care are based on, among others, children’s 
rights as recognised under the UNCRC and the ACRWC. The UN Guidelines, 2010, based on 
the UNCRC, set general principles and perspectives of alternative child care in sections 3-26. 
The Handbook, which interprets the Guidelines, discusses the general principles in Chapter 
II.642 Borrowing from the framework of the Handbook, this study groups the principles and 
perspectives into three: basic and overarching standards, primary policy orientations, and state 
responses. This part lists the principles and standards established under the UN Guidelines 
and Tanzania’s Law of the Child Act and its Regulations without going into a detailed 
discussion of each one of them.  
3.4.2.4.1 Basic and Overarching Standards 
This category includes standards that determine how alternative care services are structured 
and provided. They consist of approaches, the summation of which ensure compliance with 
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the fundamental principles of necessity, suitability, and the child’s best interests. They include 
the following: 
A child should remain in or return to his or her family environment provided it offers 
adequate care and protection. Therefore, the family should be given protection and assistance 
to ensure that it discharges its caregiving responsibilities in the community. This standard is 
based on preamble statement number 5 of the UNCRC and number 4 of the ACRWC, Article 
3 of the 1986 UN Declaration, sections 3 and 32-52 of the UN Guidelines and regulation 3(a) 
of Tanzania’s Children Homes Regulations, 2012.  
If a child cannot remain in his or her family, alternative placement should be family-based 
rather than institutional. This standard is stated under Article 20(3) of the UNCRC and 25(2) 
(a) of the ACRWC, sections 2(a) and 53 of the UN Guidelines, regulation 3(3) (a) of 
Tanzania’s Child Protection Regulations, 2014 and 3(d) of the Children’s Homes Regulations, 
2012. 
Placement should be permanent rather than temporary. Placement should ensure care in a 
safe, stable and supportive environment so that a child puts down roots and develops a feeling 
of belonging. Frequent placement changes must be avoided. Sections 2(a) and (b), 12 and 60 
of the UN Guidelines and regulation 3(3) (b) of the Child Protection Regulations, 2014 lay 
down this standard. 
Siblings should not be separated by alternative care placement unless it is in their best 
interest. Where separation is unavoidable, contact should be maintained among siblings unless 
their wishes or interests dictate otherwise. Sections 17, 22 and 62 of the UN Guidelines and 
regulation 3(e) of the Adoption of Children Regulations, 2012, 3(3) (c) of the Child Protection 
Regulations, 2014 and 3(k) of the Children Homes Regulations, 2012 provide for this 
principle. 
Placement in residential care should be temporary rather than permanent, and a measure of 
last resort used only when determined most suitable for the child’s needs. Article 20(3) of the 
UNCRC uses the words ‘if necessary’ in formulating this principle. It is also reiterated under 
sections 21 and 23 of the UN Guidelines advocating for de-institutionalising the care system 
and regulation 3(c) of the Children Homes Regulations, 2012. 
Alternative care must be available to all children in need without discrimination. For instance, 
children living with disabilities or with other special needs are also entitled to special care, 
treatment, and facilities for their rehabilitation and equal opportunities in education and 
training to develop their maximum potential whenever possible. Such provision is only 




2 of the UNCRC and 3 of the ACRWC, sections 9(b), 10, 34(b), 117 and 132 of the UN 
Guidelines and regulation 3(j) of the Children Homes Regulations, 2012 stipulate the 
principle of non-discrimination.  
Mandated authorities shall always ascertain and duly consider a child’s wishes and feelings as 
far as practicable depending on a child’s evolving capacities. This principle is based on 
children’s right to opinion and participation under Article 12 of the UNCRC and 7 of the 
ACRWC, reiterated in sections 6, 7, 40, 49, 57, 64, 65, 67, 94, 98, 99, 104 and 132 of the UN 
Guidelines, and regulation 3(a) and (b), of the Adoption of Children Regulations 2012, 3(1) 
(b) and (c) of the Child Protection Regulations, 2014 and 3(b)  of the Children Homes 
Regulations, 2012.  
Whether preventive or reactive, all decisions and actions to strengthen families or provide 
suitable alternative care must be made on a case-by-case basis. Only when authorities 
consider the circumstances of each case can specifically tailored solutions that are in the best 
interests of the child concerned be reached. Sections 6 and 57 of the UN Guidelines stipulate 
this principle.  
In determining the most suitable placement for any child, due regard should be paid to the 
desirability of continuity in a child’s upbringing and the child’s ethnic, religious and cultural 
background. This principle means that placement should be national, and close to a child’s 
familiar locality, rather than international. It is set under Article 20(3) of the UNCRC and 
25(3) of the ACRWC, Article 21(b) of the UNCRC and 24(b) of the ACRWC requiring inter-
country adoption to be a measure of last resort, sections 58 and 62 of the UN Guidelines, and 
regulation 3(c) of the Adoption of Children Regulations, 2012, 3(3) (d) of the Child 
Protection Regulations, 2014 and 3(g) of the Children Homes Regulations, 2012. 
All competent bodies, public and private, engaged in decision-making relating to alternative 
child care should act expeditiously in the process. Any delays in decisions regarding the 
child’s future may prejudice the welfare of the child. Sections 43 and 58 of the UN Guidelines 
and regulation 3(d) of the Adoption of Children Regulations, 2012, 3(3) (e) of the Child 
Protection Regulations, 2014 and 3(h) of the Children Homes, 2012 provide for this principle.  
3.4.2.4.2 Primary Policy Orientations 
The main objective of the UN Guidelines 2010 is to set forth desirable orientations for policy 
and practice meant for application in all sectors that deal with issues of alternative child care 
directly or indirectly.643 The Handbook, which seeks to put the Guidelines into practice, 
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further digests its provisions and suggests several implications for policy-making in 
alternative care. This part does not discuss all policy issues raised in the two documents but 
concentrates on only three as follows: 
Poverty. The former chairperson of the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child 
acknowledged that in most countries children are placed in alternative care mainly because of 
poverty.644 Research has shown that in most countries, regardless of their economic affluence, 
children are relinquished by their parents or removed from parental care due to the inability of 
the parents to meet their material needs.645 The African Child Policy Forum, for instance, 
found that poverty is a criterion for adoptability in most African countries.646 For this reason, 
the Committee on the Rights of the Child under section 15 of the Guidelines directs that 
poverty should never be the sole justification for a child’s removal from parental care, 
placement in alternative care, or denial of family reintegration. Instead, poverty, whether 
financial or material, should signify that a family needs support and strengthening. Tanzania’s 
Child Protection Regulations, 2014 under regulation 42(7) clearly state that a child shall not 
be placed in care where the likelihood of suffering harm is solely due to poverty. In 
collaboration with projects such as Tanzania Social Action Fund (TASAF), the Community 
Development Department coordinates efforts to support families financially and materially in 
Tanzania.647 This practice responds to the policy laid down in national plans such as NSGPR I 
and II, NCPA I and II, and the current NPA-VAWC. 
Corruption. As a matter of principle, section 20 of the Guidelines requires that placing a child 
in alternative care should never be motivated by the care providers’ political, religious or 
economic goals. A child should be placed in alternative care purely because there is an 
unavoidable need to do so. The Handbook gives an example of child ‘harvesting’ as being 
tempting for owners of residential facilities which are privately funded depending on the 
number of children they host. Policies that seek to crush corrupt practices in child care in 
Tanzania include the current movement for the de-institutionalisation of child care.648 Reports 
of corrupt practices in child adoption by social welfare officers colluding with managers of 
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residential facilities in Arusha, for instance, justify the decision to close down facilities that 
seek to profit from the plight of children without parental care.649 
De-institutionalisation. The Guidelines under sections 21 and 23 recognise residential care as 
a necessary and complementary component in the range of alternative care options. However, 
placing a child in a residential facility should be because it is in the child’s best interests and 
not because of time or resource constraints. Due to the potentially damaging and long-term 
impacts to the child of receiving impersonal and inadequate care in residential care facilities, 
termed as institutions under section 23 of the Guidelines, there is a need to de-institutionalise 
the care system. Although not articulated as an outright ban on institutional care, the 
Guidelines’ strategy is to progressively eliminate care in institutions. Initiatives or permission 
to establish a new residential facility should take this strategy into account. The Handbook 
under Focus 3 provides action plans on how to de-institutionalise appropriately.650 Tanzania is 
also currently working towards fulfilling this policy by attempting to bolster traditional care 
practices, placement with fit persons, and reviewing residential facilities to close down those 
that operate beyond the ambit of the law.651 
3.4.2.4.3 State Responses 
Implementation of alternative care laws and policies require the will of the state. All pillars of 
the state, administrative, legislative, and judicial, must support proper alternative care 
practice. Recognising this, the Guidelines recommend to the state measures to promote the 
application of its provisions. Sections 24-26 set three fundamental principles to promote 
states’ response to ensure quality alternative care provision. The principles are as follows: 
Cooperation among governmental entities. States have the responsibility to use their 
maximum potential, human and financial resources to ensure the timely, optimal and 
progressive provision of alternative care throughout their territories. To achieve this, 
cooperation is necessary among all government bodies, whether directly or indirectly 
concerned with alternative care prevention or provision. Efforts to secure child and family 
welfare must be mainstreamed and coordinated in the government ministries, agencies, and 
departments. Support from development partners requires the same cooperative framework in 
order to make an actual difference. The ACPF in 2016, while researching on implementation 
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of child rights in Tanzania, found that cooperation and coordination among governmental 
authorities and other stakeholders need to be vitalised.652  
Provision of a specifically tailored policy framework for alternative care. Section 26 of the 
Guidelines encourages states to draft country- or profession-specific policy statements that 
will build upon and make the Guidelines’ policy perspectives relevant to their national or field 
realities. In doing so, it urges quality improvement rather than lowering of standards. The 
Child Protection Regulations of 2014 respond to this call. Under Regulation 5, for instance, 
the Regulations require the Commissioner for Social Welfare to develop standards to regulate 
the conduct of agencies, departments, approved residential homes or institutions, non-
governmental organisations and individuals working with children suffering or at risk of 
suffering harm. 
Seeking international assistance. In line with Article 4 of the UNCRC, section 25 of the 
Guidelines gives states the responsibility to determine whether international assistance is 
needed and seek it in implementing the Guidelines. Requested international assistance must 
be consistent with the provisions of the Guidelines. This will avoid the imposition of 
alternative care solutions from abroad that are not in line with state policy or the situation on 
the ground.653 
3.5 Procedure to Enter into Formal Care in Tanzania 
The Law of the Child Act, 2009 and Regulations under it outline procedures for placing a 
child in alternative care. The Child Protection Regulations, 2014, provide the child protection 
procedure before placement. It covers the whole process from receiving and screening 
referrals, investigation, needs assessment and placement authorisation. From there, 
placement-specific regulations take over and provide the requisite procedure for placing a 
child with a fit person or family, foster carer, adopter, or residential facility. 
It is significant to note that Child Protection Regulations were drafted two years after the 
Regulations for foster care placement, adoption and children’s homes came into force in 2012. 
There have been no efforts to synchronise the provisions of the Regulations. As a result, there 
are some procedural discrepancies between the letter of the law and practice when it comes to 
alternative care placement. For this reason, the whole procedure under the Child Protection 
Regulations is outlined in this part to provide a basis for distinction from practice. Also, this 
 
652 African Child Policy Forum (ACPF), Implementing Child Rights in Tanzania: What is working well, what is 
not, above footnote 570 at pp. 51-53. 
653 Cantwell et al., Moving forward, above footnote 608, at p. 46. International assistance should not pressure 




part explaining the procedure before placement should be read together with the next part on 
types of placements to identify and understand any procedural discrepancies.  
3.5.1 Child Protection Referrals 
Anyone who knows of a child suffering or at risk of suffering harm, a child who is lost, 
abandoned, or excluded from home, a child who is in exploitative labour or a child whose 
parent, guardian, relative or custodian is refusing or neglecting to provide the child’s basic 
needs, should report this to the authorities.654 The Child Protection Regulations refer to such 
communication as child protection referral. Section 95 (1) of the Law of the Child Act binds 
any community member with evidence or information of child rights infringement or neglect 
as stated above to report to the local government authorities in their area. Under section 95(6) 
of the Act, a person in contravention of this responsibility is liable to a fine of at least fifty 
thousand shillings or three months imprisonment or both. The Child Protection Regulations 
extend the community member’s responsibility to any professional, staff member or volunteer 
working with or providing services to children or families. A member of the community may 
report orally (including by telephone) or in writing. However, in the case of a professional, 
staff member or volunteer, an oral report must be confirmed in writing and filed.  
A member of the community is required to report to the local government authority in their 
area. Regulation 11(3) (a)-(g) of the Child Protection Regulations defines local government 
authority by inclusion. An intake social welfare officer is the first designated receiver of child 
protection referrals in the district.655 Others are a ward or district social welfare officer, a 
ward, village or mtaa (street) executive officer, a member of the Most Vulnerable Children 
Committee (MVCC)656, or a police officer of the area. Professional referrers are limited to 
reporting to intake or ward social welfare officers. When referrals are made to any of the 
officers listed other than the intake social welfare officer, the officers, according to 
regulations 11(4), (5), and 12(3), must, within 24 hours of receiving the referral, inform the 
intake social welfare officer about it. According to regulations 11(7) and 12(4), the identity of 
a community member referrer and the information about the child referred are confidential 
unless circumstances warrant disclosure upon authorisation. 
 
654 Regulations 11(1) (a) - (d) and 12(1) (a) - (d) of the Child Protection Regulations. 
655 An intake social welfare officer is defined under regulation 2 and is appointed by the Head of Social Welfare 
Department according to regulation 10 of the Child Protection Regulations. 
656 Defined under regulation 2 of the Child Protection Regulations as 'a subcommittee to the public and social 
welfare committees/social services committees at the City, Municipal, Town and District Councils and at the 




Regulation 13 provides for the processing of the referral. Once an intake social welfare officer 
receives a referral, the first step is to ascertain whether there has been a previous referral for 
the same child. The next step is to file the referral, which for a previously referred child 
involves re-opening his or her old file if it was already closed, and for a subsequently referred 
child opening a new hard copy file. In the presence of an electronic case management system, 
the information recorded in the hard copy file should also be stored electronically. 
Information in the file includes the date of the referral, details of the referrer including name 
and whether a community member or professional, the reported concern and basic details of 
the child such as name, age, address, name of parents, guardian or carer, siblings, school, or 
any child welfare service attended. 
According to regulation 11(6), the intake social welfare officer should consider the received 
referral and, within 24 hours, determine whether there is cause for concern and whether the 
matter needs further investigation. If the intake social welfare officer reasonably believes 
there is no immediate risk of harm, he or she may request a ward social welfare officer to 
clarify with the referrer about the nature of the concerns and how they arose. The ward social 
welfare officer must contact the referrer by meeting, phone, or e-mail within 48 hours of 
being requested. Following that, within 24 hours of obtaining requested information from the 
referrer, the ward social welfare officer should report it to the intake social welfare officer. 
Based on the information received, the intake social welfare officer shall, within 24 hours, 
determine whether there is a cause for concern that warrants an investigation. 
Feedback to the referrer is part and parcel of the procedure. Regulations 11(8) and 14(5) (a) 
require an intake social welfare officer, within 72 hours, to acknowledge receipt of 
information and assure the referrer that he or she will work on it. Also, when the decision is 
not to proceed with investigation of the received referral, regulation 12(8) requires feedback 
to the referrer within 24 hours. The officer must record the decision not to investigate in the 
child’s hard copy file, and where there is no further action, the file should be closed. 
During field research in Tanzania, it was found that para-social workers and community 
caseworkers are an essential connection between the community and social welfare 
departments in terms of relaying referrals.657 In Bunju Ward, Kinondoni District, Dar es 
Salaam, a para-social worker explained that they make referrals and act as emergency care 
providers pending determination of a further cause of action.658 According to the social 
worker, the main reason is that there are no emergency care centres in the ward, district or 
 
657 Interview with para-social worker, Bunju Ward, Kinondoni District, Dar es Salaam, on 16.01.2019. 




even region for children in need of immediate care, such as children who have been violated, 
or who are lost or abandoned, or children excluded from home. The social welfare officer in 
charge of Bunju Ward, while affirming, said that responding to the referrals according to the 
timelines set under the Regulations is rarely possible due to constraints of time and resources 
that necessitate care at the homes of para-social workers and community caseworkers. 
Sometimes the procedure is considerably delayed resulting in the temporary placement of 
referred children in an approved residential facility pending determination of their situation. 
3.5.2 Initial Investigation 
Initial investigation is warranted when an intake social welfare officer has received a referral 
in accordance with regulation 14(1)(a) – (e) and has established that there is reasonable cause 
for concern. Although an intake social welfare officer may determine whether to investigate, 
it is the head of the district social welfare department who gives directions to undertake an 
initial investigation. The investigation is intended to determine whether intervention is 
justified to prevent a child from suffering or continuing to be at risk of suffering harm. The 
mandate to carry out an initial investigation lies with intake social welfare officers. When 
unavailable, the head of the social welfare department appoints another officer at the social 
welfare department or a ward social welfare officer to investigate. In the event of lack of 
capacity of the department or absence of a ward officer, a member of the Ward MVC 
Committee trained in conducting child protection investigations should investigate.  
Where the evidence suggests that there is an immediate risk of harm, or this is determined 
according to section 96(2) of the Law of the Child Act, the initial investigation must be 
completed within 24 hours. In all other cases, initial investigation commences within 72 hours 
of the referral and concludes within seven days. However, when the information received 
constitutes or may constitute a criminal offence against the child, the intake social welfare 
officer should liaise with the police as early as possible within 24 hours of receiving the 
referral and carry out a joint investigation guided by Regulation 15(2).  
Adhering to the principle of the child’s right to opinion and participation, regulation 16 sets 
up standards for interviewing referred children. It emphasises the need for the interview to be 
conducted by or in the presence of a social welfare officer. Where a criminal offence is 
involved, the child should only be interviewed by a police officer professionally trained to 
interview children who have suffered or are at risk of suffering harm or who have witnessed 
or are victims of crime. The interview should not be in the presence of parents or any person 




does not speak the language of the interviewer, a cost-free interpreter should be provided. 
Also, because interviewing a child must be kept to a minimum, audio or video recording is 
recommended whenever practicable. Regulation 17 makes such unedited audio or video tapes 
of a child’s interview admissible as evidence in court. 
When determined necessary by a social welfare officer or jointly with the police, medical 
examination forms part of the initial investigation. Consent of the child’s parents, guardian or 
carer is required. According to Regulation 20, if such parental consent is not forthcoming, 
then alternative consent by the child to medical examination and any necessary treatment will 
suffice. However, the child must be of sufficient age and maturity, a fact to be determined by 
the doctor responsible for the examination. According to section 95(3) (a) of the Law of the 
Child Act, in all cases where the parent, child or both refuse consent, the head of the social 
welfare department must seek a court order permitting the examination.659 As stipulated by 
regulations 20(5) and 21(2), the court must hear such an application on the day the officer 
submits it. As an exception, the requirement of consent is waived when emergency treatment 
to prevent loss of life or permanent damage to the child is required.  
Initial investigation cannot be undertaken without the participation of the child and his or her 
parent, guardian or carer. According to regulation 18, where a parent, guardian or carer is 
unwilling to participate or make the child available for investigation, a social welfare officer 
accompanied by a police officer may enter and search the premises where the child usually 
resides or is being kept, as per section 96(1) of the Law of the Child Act. If the officers do not 
find the child, regulation 19 requires the head of the social welfare department, on behalf of 
the local government authority, to file an emergency application for an interim care or 
supervision order and for a search and production order within it, in accordance with rule 111 
of the Juvenile Court Rules.660 If there is reasonable cause to believe that the parent, guardian 
or carer may remove the child from the premises he or she is believed to be present in, the 
application should be for an exparte search and production order according to rule 113 of the 
Juvenile Court Rules. Upon finding the child in either scenario, where there is reasonable 
cause to believe the child or any other child in the premises is suffering or is at risk of 
suffering harm or needs immediate care and protection, the child should be removed to a 
place of safety.  
 
659 According to section 95(4) of the Law of the Child Act, 2009, the Primary Court is the court of first instance 
but in accordance with sections 97 and 98 of the Act, the court referred to here is the Juvenile Court. 
660 Law of the Child (Juvenile Court Procedure) Rules is erroneously cross-referenced under regulation 19 of the 
Child Protection Regulations, which may be due to the revocation of the Juvenile Court Rules, 2014 GN. No. 




3.5.3 Removal to a Place of Safety 
In the course of an initial investigation, when a social welfare officer determines that a child is 
at immediate risk of suffering harm, he or she may, in the company of a police officer, 
remove the child to a place of safety for a period not exceeding seven days.661 Regulation 2 of 
the Child Protection Regulations defines ‘place of safety’ as care of a child by a relative, fit 
person, foster parent, in a fit institution or any other place where the child can be safely 
accommodated awaiting the decision of the head of the social welfare department or the 
Juvenile Court regarding future care.662 Any place of detention such as a police cell, retention 
home, approved school or prison does not constitute a place of safety. Regulation 22(5) 
includes accommodation in a hospital as a place of safety and mentions accommodation in a 
residential facility only as a matter of last resort. Regulation 22 is an improvement of section 
96(4) of the Law of the Child Act, which has a shorter list of accommodation places and, 
according to the listing order, suggests placement in a residential facility as the first resort.  
When the officers remove a child to a place of safety, his or her parent, guardian or carer must 
be informed of the whereabouts of the child. Also, they will be allowed contact as soon as 
practicable provided there is no risk of the child being harmed and that this in the child’s best 
interests. A parent, guardian or carer shall not be allowed to remove a child from a place of 
safety whenever there is a reasonable belief that the child will be at immediate risk of 
suffering harm once removed. The local government authority shares parental rights and 
responsibilities for a child in a place of safety, and the parents’ rights and responsibilities may 
be limited to a necessary extent. However, a parent or guardian retains the right to appeal to 
the Juvenile Court against both the child’s removal to a place of safety and refusal to permit 
contact.  
The Law of the Child Act and Child Protection Regulations set time limits regarding removal 
to, staying in and extending care in the place of safety. Regulation 22 requires the social 
welfare officer in charge to inform the head of the social welfare department about removing 
a child to a place of safety within 24 hours. Where a child is removed to a place of safety by a 
police officer in the absence of a social welfare officer, the police officer is required to inform 
the intake social welfare officer about the removal immediately. If not yet underway, the 
initial investigation should commence within 72 hours of receiving information on a child 
removed to a place of safety. A child’s accommodation in a place of safety according to both 
 
661 Section 96(2) of the Law of the Child Act, 2009 read together with regulation 22(1) and (2) of the Child 
Protection Regulations. 




the Act, section 96(2), and the Regulations, regulation 22(2), should not exceed seven days. 
For this reason, the Regulations require the social welfare officer and head of the social 
welfare department to consult about extending accommodation in the place of safety within 
72 hours of the removal. Upon deciding to seek an extension, an application to the Juvenile 
Court should be made within five days from the first time a child is removed to a place of 
safety. This timeline in the Regulations alters the one set under the Act, section 96(3), which 
requires a social welfare officer to seek a court order for the child within fourteen days. 
Notification to the parent, guardian or carer of intention to apply for the extension must be 
made not later than on the day of application, unless they cannot be found and the requirement 
is waived.  
When applying to extend accommodation in the place of safety, according to regulation 23(6), 
an application for a care order may be made simultaneously. Nevertheless, regulation 23(9) 
permits a social welfare officer to allow a child whose place of safety has been extended by 
the court to return to his or her parents, guardian or carer if it appears safe to do so.  
Regulation 23(2) specifies that the child’s best interests shall be the paramount consideration 
when deciding on whether to extend accommodation in the place of safety. As a rare 
provision, regulation 23(3) names five criteria for determining the child’s best interests 
precisely for the purpose of extending accommodation in the place of safety. Such 
specification of criteria has the potential to make best interests determination systematic in 
practice.  
3.5.4 Social Investigation 
Once officers complete the initial investigation, they should place a written report in the 
child’s file in accordance with regulation 14(6) of the Child Protection Regulations. Based on 
the investigation findings, the intake social welfare officer, in consultation with the head of 
the social welfare department, and a police officer where a crime is involved, shall decide 
regarding the referral. The officers can make three types of decision according to regulation 
24(1). One, no further action is required; two, the family should be referred to the MVC 
Committee in the area for support; and three, there is reasonable cause for concern. The first 
two decisions can only be reached when there lacks any reasonable cause to believe the child 
or any other child in the household is suffering or is at risk of suffering harm. When officers 
reach such a decision, regulations 24(2), 25(1) and (2) of the Child Protection Regulations 
require them to give feedback to the referrer. The child’s file should then be closed or, where 




criminal case. The social welfare department must keep the closed file until the child attains 
21 years of age.   
When the officers find reasonable cause for concern, a social investigation according to 
regulation 26 is required. As regulation 25(4) (a) and (b) stipulates, the officers should notify 
the referrer that they are still investigating the referral and will inform him or her when a 
decision is made. A social investigation is intended to determine whether the child is suffering 
or is at risk of suffering harm and whether the parent, guardian or carer can promote the 
child’s health and development and appropriately respond to the child’s needs. It must be 
concluded within seven days. An intake social welfare officer in charge of the social 
investigation collects and analyses information from all sources, including a child of sufficient 
maturity, a parent, guardian or carer, professionals working with the child or family, medical 
examination results and existing records on the child. 
Regulation 26(4) requires the intake social welfare officer in consultation with the head of the 
social welfare department, and the police where a crime is involved, to decide on the next step 
after completing a social investigation. They can make four types of decision. When there is 
no reasonable cause to believe the child or any other child in the household is suffering or at 
risk of suffering harm, no further action should be taken, or the family should be referred to 
the MVC Committee in the area for support. If there is reasonable cause to believe the child is 
suffering or is at risk of suffering harm, then the child should be referred to a child protection 
conference, and if the child is suffering harm or at immediate risk of suffering harm, then 
emergency action to safeguard the child is required. When emergency action is required, the 
child should be removed to a place of safety as per regulation 22, explained above.  
3.5.5 Child Protection Conference 
As regulation 27 of the Child Protection Regulations stipulates, when emergency action to 
safeguard a child is not required, but reference to a child protection conference is, according 
to regulation 26(4)(c), the intake social welfare officer should hand over the case to an 
assigned social welfare officer. Regulation 2 defines an assigned social welfare officer as a 
social welfare officer assigned to a child’s case by the head of the social welfare department. 
The assigned officer is required to convene a child protection conference within ten days after 
completion of a social investigation. 
A child protection conference aims to provide all professionals working with the child and the 




are made to safeguard and promote the child’s welfare.663 As listed under regulation 27(4)(a)-
(g), any person determined by the assigned officer to have a relevant contribution to make to 
the case may participate in the conference.664 The deliberations of the conference revolve 
around the child’s health, development and well-being and whether his or her parents, 
guardian or carer can promote these and ensure the child’s safety. The conference may decide 
on the likelihood of the child suffering harm in the future and recommend action to safeguard 
the child, specifying its mode of execution and intended outcomes. 
Regulations 30-34 provide in detail the rules and procedures of the child protection 
conference, chairing of the conference, professional discussion, minute-taking and 
dissemination and handling of conference documents. Regulation 35 covers the decision of 
the child protection conference. The chairperson of the conference and the participating 
professionals must decide whether a child is at continuing risk of suffering harm. According 
to regulation 35(2), the proof is on a balance of probabilities. Where there is not sufficient 
evidence to prove that a child is suffering harm, the conference may recommend that no 
further action be taken or the child be referred to an MVC Committee. Where the conference 
finds that the child is at continuing risk of suffering harm and that a child protection plan can 
safeguard the child’s health and development, it should draft such a plan in accordance with 
regulation 36. However, where the conference concludes that a child protection plan is not 
adequate to safeguard the child against harm or impairment of his or her health and 
development, the case must be referred back to the head of the social welfare department for 
immediate action. While the Regulations do not define immediate action, regulation 2 
declares “in need of immediate care and protection” to mean that a child is likely to suffer 
harm unless removed from the place where he or she is living. Therefore, immediate action 
may translate to emergency action, which involves removing the child to a place of safety as 
stipulated under regulation 26(5).  
Some of the provisions under regulation 35 may be counterproductive. For instance, a parent, 
guardian or carer is required to consent to and comply with a child protection plan; otherwise, 
there will be an immediate referral for further action to safeguard the child. However, this is 
not the same as for a child referred to the MVC Committee, since regulation 35(4) specifies 
that refusal of the Committee’s services shall not be sufficient cause to re-open the child’s 
 
663 Regulation 29 of the Child Protection Regulations further explains the information required at the conference. 
664 Regulation 28 of the Child Protection Regulations provides for the involvement of the child, the parent, 




case. Left alone, this child’s case may progress to the point that the child needs immediate 
care and protection while a stricter provision could avoid it. 
3.5.6 Child Protection Plan 
According to regulation 36, a child protection plan aims to safeguard the child from further 
harm and promote his or her health and development while remaining in the family home with 
a parent, guardian, or carer. Another member of the family may also care for the child if the 
parents agree. The child protection conference drafts a child protection plan based on the 
findings of the social investigation. The plan must detail how the child is to be protected with 
the object of reducing the risk of harm and promoting the child’s safety, health and welfare in 
the short and long term. The plan must also specify actions and responsibilities, including 
contact with professionals and relatives, as well as set timelines for those actions and progress 
reviews. The plan should consider the wishes and feelings of the child and views of the 
parent, guardian or carer to the extent that they are in the best interests of the child. 
In consultation with the assigned officer, the head of the social welfare department should 
finalise the child protection plan submitted by the chairperson of the child protection 
conference within seven days of receipt. The duration of the plan should not exceed 12 
months. Upon receiving a copy of the plan, the parent, guardian or carer must sign an 
agreement to its provisions. If the child is of sufficient age and maturity, the assigned officer 
should explain the plan to him or her and obtain an agreement to the plan recorded in writing. 
Professionals and services working with the child, regardless of participation in the 
conference, are also entitled to a copy of the plan. Lastly, the officers must register children 
subject to a child protection plan in the vulnerable children register, and they must remain 
registered, even when no longer subject to a plan, until they attain the age of 18 years.665 
The law requires that the child protection plan be subjected to progress reviews, the dates of 
which must be shown in the plan. The first review must take place no later than 28 days after 
its commencement. Subsequent reviews shall be carried out every three months during the 
subsistence of the plan. The rules and procedures of the child protection conference, including 
the same chairperson, shall prevail during subsequent review conferences of the child 
protection plan. Regulation 37 sets out the aims of the review and matters requiring decision-
making. The review will show whether the plan is adequate to safeguard the child, ensure that 
the plan is followed and recommend whether the plan should continue in the current form or 
 
665 An MVC Register should be established and kept by the head of social welfare department according to 
regulation 7(2)(i) of the Child Protection Regulations. However, no such register could be accessed during field 




be changed to meet the child’s needs. The review conference may make recommendations to 
the head of the social welfare department, such as that the plan should continue as initially 
drafted, that it should be varied, that it is no longer necessary to safeguard the child, or that 
further intervention is required to safeguard the child. 
In consultation with the assigned officer, the head of the social welfare department must act 
on every recommendation and must be guided at the same time by the child’s best interests. 
The officers may accept, reject, vary, or seek further reconsideration on the recommendations 
of the review conference. If the plan is not sufficient to safeguard the child and further 
intervention is required, the head of the social welfare department shall order an additional 
social investigation to be undertaken and completed within seven days. Where necessary, 
according to regulation 37(19), the head, together with the assigned officer, may decide on 
further action to protect the child from harm and promote his or her health and development 
within 72 hours of receiving the social investigation report. The assigned officer shall 
communicate any plan changes to the parent, guardian, or carer. This regulation does not 
specify what further action entails. 
3.5.7 Assistance and Accommodation  
According to regulation 38(1) of the Child Protection Regulations, any child who presents or 
who is referred to the department as lost, abandoned, seeking refuge or who is without 
parental care for whatever reason needs care and protection. Section 94(5) of the Law of the 
Child Act and regulation 38(1) and (2) of the Child Protection Regulations make local 
government authorities responsible for assisting and accommodating such children. 
According to regulation 38(2) and (3), the local government authority in the area where the 
child ordinarily resides, or is found if the child has no fixed residence, has the immediate duty 
to assist any such child. However, if another local government authority has been responsible 
for the child, it should continue to do so. Section 94(6) requires local government authorities 
in collaboration with the police force to find the child’s parents, guardians or relatives and 
return the child to his or her ordinary place of residence. Upon failure to do so, the authority 
should refer the child’s case to a social welfare officer. 
Regulation 38(4) says that the social welfare department should provide assistance and 
accommodation while an initial and social investigation regarding a child is taking place. The 




depending on the availability of resources.666 The Act and the Regulations do not define the 
phrase ‘assistance and accommodation’. However, while regulation 2 of the Child Protection 
Regulations does not define the term assistance, it does define accommodation as meaning 
accommodation provided for a continuous period exceeding 24 hours. The definition does not 
shed much light on understanding what comprises assistance and accommodation. Although 
regulation 38 makes no explicit statement on the definition, an implication can be drawn 
under sub-regulation (1) which says that the authorities should provide accommodation 
because the child has no access to his or her home for reason of being lost, abandoned, 
excluded, run away or removed from such home. Therefore, assistance can be the summation 
of care and protection services the authorities provide to such children pending their return 
home or until they find another durable solution.667 Assistance and accommodation respond to 
the duty placed on states under Article 20(1) of the UNCRC and Article 25(1) of the 
ACRWC, requiring states to provide special protection and assistance to children deprived of 
their family environment. 
According to regulation 38(5), before a child is accommodated, the social welfare department 
must ascertain and give due consideration to the child’s views and feelings regarding the 
provision of accommodation as far as this is practicable and consistent with the child’s 
welfare.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
The department shall also assume parental rights and responsibilities over the                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
accommodated child until the child’s parent, guardian or carer is found.668 Once found, the 
child should be placed back in their care unless the child objects or a social welfare officer 
believes removal from the accommodation may cause the child to suffer harm. In such a 
scenario, the officer should refer the child’s case to the head of the social welfare department, 
who, according to regulation 38(8), must determine within 72 hours whether further action to 
safeguard the child such as removal to a place of safety is necessary.669 
Interviews with para-social workers and ward social welfare officers revealed no emergency 
centres that the social welfare department can use to accommodate children while other 
procedures are ongoing.670 Hence children who are lost, abandoned, seeking refuge or without 
 
666 Regulation 41 of the Child Protection Regulations refers to the responsibility of the sending district regarding 
assistance and accommodation of a child transferred to another district. 
667 See regulations 58 and 59 of the Child Protection Regulations which outline the duties of local government 
authorities pertaining to children in their care. 
668 Regulation 60 of the Child Protection Regulations regulates the transfer and extent of shared parental rights 
and responsibilities. 
669 Regulation 38(8) is a result of incorrect numbering of the Child Protection Regulations. It should be 
regulation 38(6). 




parental care are usually accommodated in the short term in the houses of community 
volunteers or local government officials such as ten-cell leaders. When a child’s parents, 
guardians or carers are not found within a week, the officer will most likely place the child in 
a residential facility. The practice of placing children in individuals’ homes without any 
assessment has proved to be risky both for the child’s and the hosting family’s welfare. A 
para-social worker at the Bunju Ward, Kinondoni District Dar es Salaam reported multiple 
thefts at her home due to hosting ‘lost’ children.671 
Regulation 59(1) (c), read in conjunction with regulation 62(1) and (2)672 of the Child 
Protection Regulations, says that local government authorities can place children requiring 
assistance and accommodation with a relative, a friend or person connected to the family, a 
foster parent, a fit person, or a residential home. However, it might take a while to arrange for 
such accommodation, especially when accessibility is not guaranteed. This explains why in 
practice, the officers first place children in emergency accommodation which is available, 
although not established under the law.  
3.5.8 Placement into Care 
The Child Protection Regulations under regulation 38(9) provide for alternative care 
placement of children without parental care. Before placement considerations, the provision 
requires efforts to reunite a child who is lost, abandoned, or seeking refuge, with his or her 
parents, guardian or carer. If this is not possible because the child’s parents are dead, cannot 
be found, or lack capacity, or the child is in conflict with the law and falls under regulation 
39, the head of the social welfare department, after an initial and social investigation, must 
determine further interventions necessary to safeguard the welfare of the child.  
Children who have gone through the detailed child protection procedure above, and are re-
referred to the head of the social welfare department under the terms of regulation 37(19), are 
also subject to further intervention. Although regulation 37 does not specify any such 
interventions, those listed under regulation 38(9) apply to these children.  
 
671 Interview with para-social worker, Bunju Ward, Kinondoni District, Dar es Salaam, on 16.01.2019. ‘Lost’ 
means the para-social worker was sceptical of the child’s status hinting that some children present as lost or 
abandoned for purposes of finding an opportunity to steal. This supposition could not be proved during the 
subsequent field research; it is a case for future research.  
672 The numbering for regulation 62(2) is skipped in both the English version of the Child Protection 
Regulations, 2014 and the Kiswahili version, Tafsiri ya Kanuni za Usalama wa Mtoto za Mwaka 2014 (GN No. 
169 of 13.05.2016). However, regulation 62(3) (a) refers to what would ordinarily be considered as regulation 
62(1) (a) as regulation 62(2) (a). Therefore, this study considers the types of placements as appearing under 




The Regulations list three types of further intervention to be undertaken. These include 
placement with relatives, admission into voluntary care, and application for a care or 
supervision order in relation to the child. The sub-parts below explain each intervention. 
3.5.8.1 Care by Relatives 
The word relative is defined under section 3 of the Law of the Child Act to include a 
grandfather, grandmother, brother, sister, cousin, uncle, aunt, or any other member of the 
extended family. In the definition of family under the same section, the Act includes close 
relatives who live in a household with either biological or adoptive parents and their children. 
Therefore, a child can be under the care of relatives within the meaning of the Act only if they 
do not reside together with the child’s parents in the same household.  
As part of the child’s right to identity, section 6 of the Law of the Child Act recognises and 
protects the child’s right to know members of his or her extended family. Section 7 mentions 
the child’s right to grow up with his or her family, including relatives, unless it is against the 
child’s best interest. As explained above, Tanzania’s child law considers children in the care 
of their relatives as children with parental care. Hence, where a child is sufficiently cared for 
by relatives under whatever arrangement, even when his or her parents are alive and able, the 
law considers the child as having adequate parental care.673 
Also, whenever a child is without adequate parental care, be it from parents, a guardian or a 
relative, the law still depicts placement with other relatives as an alternative care measure of 
first resort. Section 9(4) of the Law of the Child Act confirms this by providing that once a 
child is orphaned, a relative from either side of the family may assume parental responsibility, 
whether by a statutory or traditional arrangement. Traditional arrangements may be according 
to the Local Customary Law (Declaration) Order, 1963 or the living customary law of the 
given ethnic group. Cementing this position, section 16(a) lists an orphaned child as one in 
need of care and protection only when abandoned by his or her relatives. 
The Child Protection Regulations under regulation 38(9), also in support of the position 
above, list placement with relatives as the first intervention for a child in need of alternative 
care. Notably, during a child’s protection conference, information on ‘other relatives’’ 
capacity to safeguard and promote the child’s health and development is required under 
regulation 29(1). It means that when a child needs alternative care, the priority will be 
placement with a relative who is capable of safeguarding the welfare of the child. Further, 
regulation 42(1) (b) (iii) and (4) (c) requires a child to be placed under voluntary care only 
 
673 Sections 7 and 9 of the Law of the Child Act, 2009 and the child protection procedure under the Child 




when the authorities determine that placement with relatives is not possible or will not 
safeguard the welfare of the child. Lastly, regulation 44(2), also in agreement with this 
position, provides that an application for a care or supervision order should be made only 
when the social welfare department has considered and found inadequate the capacity and 
willingness of relatives to care for and protect the child from harm. 
Placement with a relative may be informal, guided by customary law, or formal, ordered by a 
competent administrative or judicial authority in conformity with statutory law. Although the 
Law of the Child Act and the Child Protection Regulations recognise informal care by 
relatives (informal kinship care), they do not lay down any standards or procedures for its 
execution or regulation. Of course, it may be argued that the lacuna is deliberate to give 
precedence to customary law over traditional child care arrangements. However, studies have 
found that lack of state involvement exposes children under informal kinship care to higher 
risks of suffering harm.674 Formal kinship care may be an outcome of the child protection 
procedure or an order of the Juvenile Court. For instance, as part of the child protection plan 
under regulation 36(2), a child can be placed with “other members of the family” with the 
consent of the child’s parents. Also, a court care or supervision order may place a child with a 
relative according to section 18(3) (d) and 19(3) of the Act. However, section 18(3) (d) 
appears inconsistent with regulation 44(2) stated above, which requires an application for a 
care or supervision order to be made after placement with a relative is determined inadequate 
to safeguard the child’s welfare. A plausible explanation is that a court order subjects care 
given or likely to be given by a relative to supervision and review, in order to address any 
inadequacies in safeguarding the child’s welfare. Otherwise, it makes no sense to place a child 
with a relative whose care and protection is already determined inadequate. 
3.5.8.2 Voluntary Care 
A child may be admitted into the voluntary care of a local government authority in two 
circumstances, as stipulated in regulation 42(1)(a), and (b) of the Child Protection 
Regulations. First, when based on a social investigation report, there is reasonable cause to 
believe that the child is at risk of suffering harm if not placed in care; alternatively, second, 
when a child protection plan is not sufficient to safeguard a child, and his or her case is 
referred back to the head of the social welfare department according to regulation 37(17). 
Voluntary placement for a child subjected to the child protection procedure may only be done 
 
674 See references in Rwezaura, “'This is not my child': integrating orphans into the mainstream of Tanzania's 
society”, above footnote 550; and in Rwezaura, “The Value of a Child: Marginal Children and the Law in 




with the parents’ consent.675 For a child covered by regulation 38, who is lost, abandoned, or 
seeking refuge, this can only be done subject to three preconditions: first, reunification with 
parents is impossible; second, parents are, for whatever reason, incapable of caring for the 
child; and third, placement with relatives is inadequate to safeguard the child’s welfare. 
In addition to the grounds above, regulation 42(4) adds one more prerequisite for admission 
into voluntary care. A child should be received into care only when supporting the parents to 
continue caring for their child is insufficient to safeguard the child’s welfare. The support 
referred to here may include family support services and counselling as per section 94(3) and 
(4) of the Act and regulation 7(2) (e) of the Child Protection Regulations. Regulation 42(7) 
reiterates a similar tenet by specifically denying a child’s admission into care where poverty is 
the sole or primary ground for the likelihood of suffering harm. In such case, the Regulations 
propose referral to the MVC Committee to receive services.  
Placement in voluntary care requires a plan. An assigned social welfare officer is responsible 
for preparing a care plan before he or she admits a child into voluntary care. When admission 
is a matter of emergency, the officer must prepare the care plan within 21 days of admitting 
the child into care. The contents of a care plan are outlined under regulation 48 and may be 
drawn up in accordance with relevant guidance provided by the Commissioner of Social 
Welfare. The parent and the child (if of sufficient age and maturity) have to agree with the 
care plan after receiving explanations from the assigned social welfare officer as stipulated 
under regulations 42(5) and 48(2). The parent must understand the effect of placing the child 
in voluntary care, and that it involves conditions such as that notice of 14 days will be 
required to remove the child from care subject to review unless placement was temporary for 
an agreed period; the local government authority may apply for a care order when determined 
necessary to safeguard the welfare of the child; and the authority will share parental rights and 
responsibilities with the parent and will determine where the child lives and with whom. The 
parent must also understand the child access arrangements and arrangements for care plan 
reviews. According to regulation 42(8), the head of the social welfare department must 
consider whether it is necessary to apply for a care order if the parent disagrees with the care 
plan.  
In the case of voluntary care placement, a child shall have the same legal status as a care order 
subject. According to regulation 42(9), the local government authority assumes responsibility 
for the child in the same way as for a child under a care order or one provided with assistance 
 
675 Regulation 42(6) of the Child Protection Regulations require the head of the social welfare department to 




and accommodation according to section 94(5) of the Act.676 Subject to 14 days notice, 
voluntary care placement may be terminated as indicated under regulation 43. A parent may 
issue such notice orally or in writing accompanied by an explanation of the change of 
circumstances and details of the care arrangements for the child, including where the child 
will live, with whom, and plans for the child’s education and health care. If the head of the 
social welfare department has reasonable cause to believe that removal may expose the child 
to harm, he or she may direct a social welfare officer to take the child to a place of safety 
according to regulation 22(3) in order to prevent termination of the placement. The child 
protection procedure set out in Parts VI to VIII of the Child Protection Regulations and 
explained above must be followed in such cases. 
Regulation 59(1) (b) read together with regulation 62(2) provide placement options for a child 
in voluntary care. However, regulation 62(2) (a), concerning placement with relatives, may 
not apply. This is because for a child to be placed under the voluntary care of the local 
government authority, the care by relatives option must have already proven impossible. This 
researcher finds that blanket provisions such as those given under regulations 59(1) and 62(2) 
fail to be specific to the demands of each type of care intervention available to the local 
government authorities. During field research, it was found that care by fit persons or foster 
parents, which could be provided urgently and short-term, is not yet widely practised to 
sufficiently accommodate children placed under voluntary care. Also, local government 
authorities own no child care facilities. Therefore, the reasonable conclusion to draw here is 
that placement in voluntary care equals, in most instances, placement in residential care 
facilities.677 Since the Tanzanian government owns only one children’s home located at 
Kurasini, Dar es Salaam, placement is either at Kurasini or in one of the numerous privately 
owned facilities in the country. This practice poses a significant challenge to adherence to the 
three cardinal principles of alternative care and the de-institutionalisation efforts of the child 
protection system.  
3.5.8.3 Care by Court Order 
A court order becomes necessary when a child is suffering or is likely to suffer harm, and 
placement with relatives or under voluntary care of the local government authority is either 
impossible or inadequate to safeguard the child’s welfare. On behalf of the local government 
 
676 The duties of local government authorities in respect of such children are detailed under Part XI of the Child 
Protection Regulations. 
677 This conclusion is based on the responses of social welfare officers during field research in Tanzania in 
January-March 2019. They explained that they rely on institutional care because it is still the most readily 




authority, the head of the social welfare department may, according to regulation 44, apply to 
the Juvenile Court for a care or supervision order for such a child based on three possible 
grounds: the harm is due to the parental care given or likely to be given, the child is out of 
control, or the head of the social welfare department is convinced that only a care or 
supervision order can safeguard the child’s welfare.678 Regulation 44(2) posts a caveat 
requiring the application to be lodged only after the head of the social welfare department has 
considered and found inadequate the capacity and willingness of relatives to protect the child 
from harm.  
Section 24(2) of the Law of the Child Act emphasises that an application for a care or 
supervision order should be made only after all possible alternative methods of assisting the 
child have proved unsuccessful. Also, an application may be made if the significant harm 
suffered or likely to be suffered requires removing the child from where he or she resides, or 
if the danger the child is exposed to is so severe as to compel immediate removal. According 
to section 25(1), the objective of the order centres on three points in such circumstances. 
These are removing the child from harm, assisting the child and those he or she is living with, 
and solving or ameliorating the problem necessitating the order, so that the child can return to 
the community. These apply depending on whether the child is either the subject of a care 
order or a supervision order. 
A care order is different from a supervision order. Although the Act and the Regulations do 
not define them in their interpretation sections, their import can be deduced from provisions 
relating to them. 
3.5.8.3.1 Care Orders 
The purpose of a care order is to remove a child from a place where he or she suffers or is 
likely to suffer significant harm. It is provided for a maximum period of three years subject to 
extension, or until a child attains 18 years, whichever is earlier.679 It transfers parental rights 
and responsibilities, including the child’s custody, to the local government authority 
responsible for the child.680 The authority has to determine the most suitable alternative care 
placement for the child through the social welfare department. According to section 18(3) of 
the Act, placement can be with an approved residential facility, a fit person, an approved 
foster parent or at the home of a parent, guardian or relative. It can also be child adoption 
 
678 Reiterated under rule 100 of the Law of the Child (Juvenile Court Procedure) Rules. The rule also requires 
that application for a care or supervision order be in the best interest of the child. 
679 Section 18(4) of the Law of the Child Act, 2009 and rules 104 and 105 of the Law of the Child (Juvenile 
Court Procedure) Rules. 





which is provided for under section 24(1) if the child’s parent, guardian or relative does not 
show any interest in his or her welfare during a period defined by the court. In such a case, if 
the social welfare department finds child adoption to be the most suitable care measure 
according to the dictates of the child’s best interest, proceedings to free the child for adoption 
can be undertaken according to regulations 49 and 50 of the Child Protection Regulations and 
rule 99 of the Juvenile Court Rules. 
3.5.8.3.2 Supervision Orders 
A supervision order is intended to prevent a child from suffering harm while the child remains 
in the home, custody and care of a parent, guardian or relative.681 The order empowers a 
social welfare officer or a fit person from the local community to supervise the care given to 
the child.682 Hence, pursuant to section 19(6) of the Act, the person living with the child must 
allow visits by the supervising authority to the child’s home and must inform the authority of 
any change of address. According to regulation 55 of the Child Protection Regulations, the 
visits commence after the first week of receiving a supervision order. They continue once 
every 28 days after the first visit and last for the entire duration of the order. The court issues 
the order for one year subject to extension, or until a child is eighteen years old, whichever 
comes first.683  
3.5.8.3.3 Interim Care and Supervision Orders 
Interim care and supervision orders, unlike a full order, may be made at the first hearing or 
before the final hearing during care or supervision order proceedings. Section 18(7) of the Act 
specifies that the court cannot issue an interim care order unless the child is suffering or is 
likely to suffer significant harm. According to rule 94(2) of the Juvenile Court Rules, inability 
to serve the child’s parent, guardian or carer with the application for a care order before the 
cessation of a place of safety in respect of the child, is a ground to make an interim order. In 
such a case, the court may issue an emergency interim care order for 72 hours to allow for 
service of the application or dispensing with it. Moreover, according to rule 94(6), an interim 
order may be made to allow for processing of a medical or psychiatric examination, 
assessment or report regarding the child or any respondent to the proceedings. Generally, an 
interim care or supervision order may subsist for the time specified in it, which shall not 
 
681 Section 19(2) of the Law of the Child Act, 2009, regulation 51 of the Child Protection Regulations, and rule 
107 of the Law of the Child (Juvenile Court Procedure) Rules. 
682 Section 19(3) of the Law of the Child Act, 2009 regulation 53 of the Child Protection Regulations, and rule 
110 of the Law of the Child (Juvenile Court Procedure) Rules. 





exceed eight weeks. It can be extended for twenty-eight days upon the parties agreeing, which 
does not necessitate their appearance in court for the extension.  
3.5.8.3.4 Application for a Care or Supervision Order 
An application for a care or supervision order is made in accordance with the Juvenile Court 
Rules.684 The local government authority for the area where the child ordinarily resides or if 
the child is without parental care, where he or she is found or appears, is responsible for the 
application. Unlike voluntary care placement, application for a care or supervision order 
requires no parental consent.685 Regulation 46 of the Child Protection Regulations only 
requires the social welfare department to make oral and written communication to the child’s 
parents in whatever manner they will best understand. The information relayed should include 
a notice of intention to apply for the court order, the nature and extent of the concerns, and the 
right to and possible sources of legal representation. If the child falls under regulation 38, and 
the parent, guardian or carer is unknown, or cannot be found even after reasonable inquiry, or 
is incompetent, the court may waive the requirement of notice at the initial hearing. A child of 
sufficient age and maturity should also receive a notice of intention to apply for the order if it 
is in his or her best interest.   
With the application for a court order, the social welfare department must submit written 
statements regarding the child’s family background, actual or likely harm suffered, and the 
child’s wishes and feelings. Regulation 47 lists further documentation required, including a 
care or supervision plan, initial and social investigation reports if available, evidence of 
communication of the application notice to the child’s parent, guardian or carer, and a signed 
consent where a parent, guardian or carer have consented to child adoption.  
3.5.8.3.5  Care and Supervision Plans 
The Juvenile Court may not make a care order or a supervision order regarding a child unless 
presented with a care plan or a supervision plan.686 Details on the content of the plans are 
provided in regulations 48 and 52 of the Child Protection Regulations. A care plan ensures 
that the selected alternative care arrangement meets the child’s physical, mental, educational, 
emotional, social, and cultural needs. It considers these needs on a short and long-term basis 
with regard to the child’s upbringing and future. On the other hand, a supervision plan seeks 
to identify how a child’s short-term needs will be met while living in his or her family home. 
 
684 Rule 91 of the Law of the Child (Juvenile Court Procedure) Rules. 
685 Ibid., rule 109(2). This rule provides that a supervision order, and not an application for such order, shall be 
made with the consent of the child's parent or guardian. 




The main concern is to supervise the care given to the child to ensure that the child’s welfare 
is safeguarded.  
3.5.8.3.6 Other Orders Accompanying Care and Supervision Orders 
While making a care or supervision order, the court may make other accompanying orders as 
stipulated under rules 98 and 108 of the Juvenile Court Rules. The main order involves 
placing a child under the care or supervision of the applicant local government authority or 
otherwise depending on the court’s discretion based on the child’s best interests, specified 
under rules 98(2) and 108(2). The other orders include a search and production order and an 
exclusion order covered under rules 111 and 116 of the Juvenile Court Rules. Also, an order 
for access to a child under a care order may be applied for separately as provided under rules 
102 and 103 of the Juvenile Court Rules. 
3.5.8.3.7 Reviewing, Varying and Discharging Care or Supervision Orders 
A care or supervision order may be varied or discharged depending on the assessment of 
progress reported in periodical reviews conducted according to the care and supervision plans. 
According to sections 20 and 25(2) of the Act and regulation 54 of the Child Protection 
Regulations, an assigned social welfare officer must carry out regular reviews to ensure the 
plan works and that the child is not suffering harm. The officer may also apply to the court to 
vary the order if it no longer suffices or discharge it if it is no longer needed. A care or 
supervision order can be discharged according to section 23 of the Act, regulation 75 of the 
Child Protection Regulations, and rule 106 of the Juvenile Court Rules. Part XII, containing 
regulations 66-74 of the Child Protection Regulations, gives details of the procedure and 
requirements of reviews of the orders. 
In practice, as found during field research in Dar es Salaam, social welfare officers find the 
review procedures and requirements cumbersome and impossible to comply with in each 
case.687 They cited workplace pressures caused by the shortage of time and resources as their 
stumbling block. They said that regular visits to assess the child’s progress and conduct 
placement reviews, as specified in the Regulations, are impossible.688 This is because they 
have a massive workload due to insufficient human resources to deal with the cases they 
receive, which limits their time for out of office activities. Also, there are no vehicles to 
facilitate transportation to different parts of the city to conduct visits, nor is there financial 
 
687 Interview with and observation of social welfare officers in the Kinondoni District social welfare department 
in January-February 2019. 
688 Regulation 70 of the Child Protection Regulations require the assigned social welfare officer to provide a 
report on the child's progress for purposes of reviewing the placement. A progress report requires visits to assess 




support to pay for public or private transport. Therefore, they conduct the reviews on the basis 
of procedures developed through practice in the department and use their intuition garnered 
through experience to determine which cases require closer follow-up than others. In the 
opinion of the researcher, this practice is a typical demonstration of street-level bureaucracy 
in the daily work of social welfare officers in Tanzania. 
3.5.8.3.8 Observations on Care and Supervision Orders 
Some provisions concerning care and supervision orders in the Law of the Child Act may be 
confusing. For instance, section 18(3) (d), referring to placement at the home of a parent, 
guardian or relative, should not apply to children under care orders in the opinion of this 
researcher. This is because section 24(2) (a) of the Act specifies that a care order should be 
applied for only after all alternative care options have been unsuccessful. Regulations 42(1) 
(b) (iii), 42(4) (b) and (c) and 44(2) also support the position that a child should be placed in 
care only if no parent, guardian or relative of the child can provide adequate care. Even with a 
court order, placing a child in the home of a parent, relative or guardian whose care has 
already determined as inadequate is to put the child at risk.  
Further, section 24(1) of the Act with the marginal note “care order and adoption” should 
distinctly provide for the prospect of child adoption in relation to a child under a care order, 
including freeing the child for adoption as covered by regulations 49 and 50 of the Child 
Protection Regulations and rule 99 of the Juvenile Court Rules. The wording of this section 
limits it to children under a supervision order rather than a care order. It means that if the care 
of a parent, guardian or relative of the child under supervision is still insufficient to safeguard 
the child’s welfare, then the child qualifies for placement in other alternative care measures as 
mentioned. However, the section includes children under care orders as well, which brings the 
argument above into focus. Children under care orders cannot still be in the care of the parent, 
guardian or relative.  
Further, the mention of other alternative care measures such as foster care and residential 
facilities under section 18(3) should also apply to a child under a supervision order whose 
parent, guardian or relative show no interest in his or her welfare as per section 24(1). Also, 
sections 24(2) and 25 are more applicable to care orders than supervision orders, but the 
drafter still includes supervision orders under them. Since the Child Protection Regulations 
and Juvenile Court Rules were drafted years after the Act, in 2014 and 2016, respectively, 




3.6 Types of Placement 
According to regulation 57 of the Child Protection Regulations, a care order places a child in 
the care of the applicant local government authority. However, regulation 59(1) clarifies that 
not only a care order places children in the care of a local government authority. They could 
be there because they are received into voluntary care or accommodated by the social welfare 
department during case management. It is the duty of local government authorities, as 
stipulated under regulation 58, to provide a child under their care with suitable 
accommodation. In discharging this duty, the authorities need to find an appropriate 
placement for the child. Regulation 62(2)(a) - (c), read together with section 18(3) of the Act, 
lists four types of placement: with a relative, friend or person connected to the family; foster 
parents; fit persons; or in an approved residential home.689 Placement decisions must adhere 
to the conditions set under regulation 62(3), which, among others, requires preference to be 
given to placement with a relative, friend or person connected to the family. If possible, the 
child should remain near his or her former home, not be separated from siblings, be able to 
continue with education and training, and in the case of disability, have suitable 
accommodation that meets his or her specific needs.  
Below is a brief exploration of each type of placement from a legal and practical perspective. 
3.6.1 Placement with Relatives 
Child care by a relative has already been extensively discussed above. When an 
administrative or judicial organ orders a person to care for a relative’s child, this is considered 
as formal placement with a relative. It differs from care by relatives through traditional 
arrangements that are very common in the Tanzanian setting. As mentioned above, the Law of 
the Child Act recognises and refers to both customary law and statutory law child care by 
relatives under section 9(4) of the Act, albeit only in the case of orphaned children. This part 
only distinguishes care ordered by an administrative authority from that ordered by a judicial 
authority. 
Regulation 38(9) (a) of the Child Protection Regulations lists care by relatives among the 
types of formal placement that the head of a social welfare department can arrange for to care 
for a child in need. This type is placement with a relative ordered by an administrative 
authority. According to the Regulations, this type of placement is the first resort for all 
children who are lost, abandoned, or seeking refuge; for those whose parents are dead, cannot 
 
689 It is significant to note that section 18(3)(d) lists the home of a parent, relative or guardian rather than the 
home of a relative, friend or person connected to the family as specified under regulation 62(2)(a) of the Child 
Protection Regulations, 2014. The researcher finds the provision of the Act under section 18(3)(d) mistaken, as 




be found or are incapable of caring for the child; or where the child is in conflict with the law. 
This position is reflected under regulations 42(1) (b) (iii), 42(4) (c) and 44(2), which require a 
child to be admitted into voluntary care or be placed under a care or supervision order only 
where care by a relative is impossible or insufficient to safeguard the welfare of the child. 
Regulation 62(3) (a) also reflects this by requiring that priority be given to care by relatives, 
friends or persons connected with the family. The phrasing of Regulation 38(9) (a) means that 
the social welfare department takes care of the whole process of placing a child with a 
relative. Taking regulation 36(2) into consideration, the officers must follow the child 
protection procedure in placing a child with a relative. The placement should be monitored 
according to the set procedure under the Regulations. Regrettably, the Law of the Child Act 
does not provide any guidance on administrative placement with relatives. 
Placement with relatives by judicial order is two-fold. On the one hand, it can be the result of 
court proceedings where the court declares a relative as the legal guardian or custodian of a 
child, such as under section 9(4) in the instance that the biological parents of a child are 
deceased. On the other hand, it can be the outcome of care or supervision order proceedings 
according to sections 18 and 19 of the Law of the Child Act. The Act and the Regulations 
provide for procedures, requirements and monitoring of a child placed with relatives under a 
care or supervision order. Sections 20 and 21 of the Act establish the responsibility of social 
welfare officers to monitor the child through home visits, to carry out counselling, and to vary 
or discharge the order when necessary. However, the Act does not have specific provisions 
for the first type of judicial order described above in respect of placing a child under the care 
of a relative. This omission may be because the Act has no provisions on guardianship. 
During field research, it was observed that in practice, by the time children’s cases reach the 
authorities, it is rare that relatives are available and willing to safeguard the welfare of the 
child adequately. In most cases, where a child lacks parental care, relatives are the first to 
respond to the plight of the child. If the child has not been taken in by relatives, this indicates 
their incapacity or disinclination to do so. Therefore, formal placement with relatives occurs 
in very few cases. Another observation relates to the monitoring of children placed with 
relatives. Social welfare officers seldom monitor children placed with relatives as required by 
law. The officers generally find monitoring challenging due to workplace pressures caused by 
the shortage of time and human, financial and infrastructural resources. In trying to manage 
their time and workload, the officers assume that children placed with relatives are well cared 




3.6.2 Placement with Fit Persons 
According to section 3 of the Law of the Child Act, a fit person is a person of full age, sound 
mind, high moral character and integrity, and able to look after a child. Moreover, it is a 
person whom a social welfare officer has approved as being able to provide a caring home for 
a child who is not his or her relative. In the context of child care, a fit person is not necessarily 
limited to a single person, but could be a husband and wife in a family environment.690 In this 
scenario, it is referred to as a fit family. In addition to the term fit person, the law also 
contains the term fit institution. Section 18(6) of the Law of the Child Act indicates that a 
manager or patron of an institution or residential home may be designated as a fit person 
provided that the Commissioner has approved their institution or residential home by notice 
published in a Gazette. The Child Protection Regulations, 2014 under regulation 2 define a fit 
institution as “an approved residential home or other institution approved by the 
Commissioner for Social Welfare to accommodate a child.” Therefore, a fit person may refer 
to a single person, a married couple, or a representative of an institution (manager or patron of 
it).  
According to the Law of the Child Act, placement with a fit person may be invoked in a 
varied set of scenarios and for different purposes. These scenarios and purposes under the Act 
relate to children in two different groups. The first category covers children in conflict with 
the law, for whom the authorities may use this type of placement widely. For this group of 
children, placement with a fit person may be used in lieu of a remand prison (section 104(1)), 
imprisonment (section 119(2) (c)), and placement in an approved school (section 125). The 
second category uses fit persons for children in need of care and protection in instances that 
do not relate to juvenile justice. Section 18(3) (b) of the Law of the Child Act lists placement 
with a fit person as one of the possible alternative care arrangements for a child under a care 
order. A fit person may also act as a supervisor according to section 19(3) of the Act. This 
subsection specifies that a fit person may act in the place of a social welfare officer and 
supervise the care of a child under a supervision order while at the home of a parent, guardian 
or relative.691 Also, in exceptional cases, fit persons can be used to provide care for children 
whose mothers are imprisoned (section 144(3) (d)). This study focuses on the second category 
of children. However, legal requirements and procedures for care arrangements with fit 
 
690 Information gathered from an interview with a social welfare officer in charge of fit persons practice in 
Temeke District, Dar es Salaam Region on 04.02.2019. 
691 According to regulation 53(3) of the Child Protection Regulations, 2014 the head of a social welfare 





persons are not clear as these Regulations are yet to be published. During field research in 
early 2019, both the Department of Social Welfare and UNICEF Tanzania indicated that the 
Regulations are being finalised and would be released soon. However, they had not been 
released up to the time this thesis was written. 
In the absence of official Regulations providing legal requirements and procedures for 
placement with fit persons, this study relies on information obtained during field research.  
First of all, initial practice on placement with fit persons was prompted by the project titled Fit 
Family Scheme engineered by UNICEF Tanzania in collaboration with the government and 
launched in 2013.692 The project was initiated in Dar es Salaam and extended to five other 
regions in Tanzania, these being Mwanza, Mbeya, Kilimanjaro, Iringa, and Njombe.693 Up to 
2019, UNICEF Tanzania supported the Department of Social Welfare in training social 
welfare officers from 58 local government authorities (58 districts out of 185) on how to 
operationalise the fit person scheme in their areas.694 Temeke District in Dar es Salaam was 
used as the pilot district for the scheme, followed by Siha in Kilimanjaro and Magu in 
Mwanza, and progressing to other districts. At the time of field research, it was operating in 
more than 60 districts.695 The researcher successfully accessed information from Temeke, 
which was one of the locations of the study and a pioneering district for the scheme.  
In Temeke District, the fit persons programme actively started in 2014 with the search for fit 
persons. 696 The social welfare department called for volunteers through announcements 
posted at the district and ward levels. Interested persons were required to fill application 
forms and submit them to the head of the social welfare department through the offices of 
their ward or street executives. Eligibility criteria included marital status (preferably married, 
if single, only women), permanent residence in Tanzania, being within a certain age limit (35-
55 years) and having no criminal record. A significant number of people came forward and 
applied.697 Upon receiving the application forms, the social welfare department sorted through 
them to identify eligible candidates. Those who were considered eligible were further 
 
692 Getrude Mbago, “UNICEF recommends Tanzania to invest more on 'Fit Family' scheme”, The Guardian (20 
September 2018). 
693 Ibid. 
694 UNICEF Tanzania, A real home for the first time: Learn more about the fit family programme in Tanzania 
(05 July 2019). 
695 Interview with social welfare officer in charge of fit persons practice in Temeke District, Dar es Salaam 
Region on 04.02.2019 and interview with a child protection specialist working with UNICEF Tanzania, Masaki 
Dar es Salaam, interviewed on 21.02.2019. 
696 Information resulting from an interview with social welfare officer in charge of fit persons practice in Temeke 
District, Dar es Salaam Region on 04.02.2019. 
697 The respondent social welfare officer could not recall the exact number of people. She said that many came 




assessed to establish their suitability as fit persons. The assessment included an investigation 
of the applicant’s home, moral standing, and financial capacity. The main point of the 
assessment was to ensure that fit person placement is in the best interest of the child to be 
placed and the existing children of the family. After the assessment, the head of the social 
welfare department approved ten applicants as the first batch of fit persons to be used in the 
pilot scheme. The successful applicants were then registered in the fit persons register 
maintained at the district social welfare department. Lastly, the department trained them to 
take on their new roles.  
The ten successful applicants were still serving as fit persons in Temeke at the time of field 
research for this study in 2019. The only change had been the division of Temeke District and 
the formation of the new District of Kigamboni. Some of Temeke’s wards and fit persons fell 
in the new District. Also, one of the fit persons had died and was yet to be replaced at the time 
of the field research. These persons took care of two categories of children: children in need 
of care and protection, and children in conflict with the law. At any particular time, one fit 
person or family was required to care for no more than three children. Since these children 
had needs with financial implications, the fit persons received financial support for necessities 
such as school fees and supplies, medical services, clothing and food. They rarely received 
support in cash; instead, the officers arranged for delivery of material things or organised 
services. UNICEF Tanzania provided funding to the government to financially support fit 
persons at the pilot stage. Later on, UNICEF left it to the government to guarantee the 
scheme’s sustainability. 
Fit person placement is an emergency and short-term measure. Social welfare officers use it 
as an emergency placement in the process of case management, for instance to accommodate 
a lost or abandoned child while following the usual procedure to find their parents or their 
home, or to decide on alternative care. It is short-term and lasts for a maximum of six months. 
If a child’s case lasts longer than this, the social welfare department seeks a long-term 
solution. The officer in Temeke District said that in most cases, if no clear prospects for the 
child’s future are on the horizon after six months, the child is placed in a children’s home. She 
also said that in some cases, children stay longer in fit person placement than the six months, 
especially where removal will not be in the child’s best interests, and there is no pressure to 
urgently free the place for another child.  
The procedure for fit person placement is entirely within the mandate of the district social 




uncomplicated in the opinion of the social welfare officers.698 The placement uses persons 
already approved and active in the field, and therefore well known by the social welfare 
officers. To place a child requires a letter from the police and a cover letter from a social 
welfare officer stating why the child needs the placement. If it is not in an emergency 
situation, accompanying the two documents must also be information about the child obtained 
from the child’s file. Then the social welfare officer in charge of the child’s case makes a 
telephone call to the most suitable fit person considering the characteristics of the case and 
arranges to drop the child at their home.699 There is no contact with the Department of Social 
Welfare or required approval of the Commissioner in this process, making it less formal. 
Above is an account of the fit person scheme from a practical perspective. It is acknowledged 
that requirements and procedures may have differed considerably from one district to another 
during the initial phase, without uniform regulations. However, during field research, there 
were indications that social welfare officers had internal regulations for the scheme within the 
social welfare departments. The author, nonetheless, was not able to access these and 
therefore has to await a comprehensive law and procedure on the fit person programme under 
future Fit Persons Regulations.  
The fit persons or fit family scheme, as launched in 2013, has made considerable strides since 
then. Although it still lacks formally published regulations, the measure has played a 
significant role in catering to children in need of care and protection. While it was not 
possible to assemble any reliable statistics on the number of fit persons and children served 
over the years up to 2019, specifically in Temeke, and generally in the districts where it was 
in operation, UNICEF Tanzania and other stakeholders have shared success stories of the 
scheme.700 
3.6.3 Foster Care Placement  
Foster care, also known as fosterage, is defined under section 3 of the Law of the Child Act as 
a voluntary and temporary child care and protection measure provided by a family or an 
individual unrelated to the child. In this type of placement, the placed child is a foster child 
and the carer a foster parent or family. The Foster Care Placement Regulations, 2012 define 
these terms in regulation 2. Section 52(2) of the Law of the Child Act adds some detail to the 
 
698 Interviewed social welfare officers indicated this during field research in January-March 2019. 
699 This was the experience shared by the social welfare officer in charge of fit persons practice in Temeke 
District.  
700 See for example Chiara Frisone, In Tanzania, child protection systems keep children safe from harm: "'We 
are ready!' Children have a right to survive" (18 July 2016); Getrude Mbago, “'Fit Family' scheme bears fruit in 
Mbeya Region”, The Guardian (26 September 2018); and UNICEF Tanzania, A real home for the first time, 




definition of a foster parent, who is defined as “a person who is not the parent of a child but is 
willing and capable to undertake the care, welfare and maintenance of the child.” The 
eligibility criteria established under regulation 8(1) (a)-(e) of the Foster Care Placement 
Regulations, read together with sections 32 and 53 of the Act, specify that a child is eligible 
for foster care if he or she is under a care or interim care order (section 18(1)), has been 
committed to an approved residential home or institution by a care or supervision order 
(section 32(1) and 53(1) (a)), or has been placed in an institution by a person (section 53(1) 
(c)). It also includes children for whom a social welfare officer recommends placement in an 
approved residential home or institution (section 53(1) (b)) or who have been placed in foster 
care for temporary custody (section 53(7)). In the light of regulations 59 (1) (a)-(c) and 62(2) 
(b) of the Child Protection Regulations, 2014, children in other circumstances may also be 
placed in foster care. For instance, children taken into the voluntary care of the local 
government authority may be placed in foster care, although they do not necessarily meet the 
eligibility criteria under regulation 8(1). 
Foster care is a voluntary care measure in Tanzania.701 Under section 32(2) of the Act and 
regulation 4(1) of the Foster Care Placement Regulations, persons interested in fostering a 
child may apply. However, the applicant must meet the requirements set out in regulation 5 of 
the Foster Care Placement Regulations. The age limit is 21-65 years. Both single and married 
Tanzanians and non-Tanzanians may foster, but non-Tanzanians must have resided in 
Tanzania for at least two and a half consecutive years prior to the application. The number of 
fostered children for each parent should not exceed three at a given time. Regulation 4(1) 
requires an application to foster a child to be made to the Commissioner of social welfare. In 
practice, such applications are received on behalf of the Commissioner by social welfare 
officers in the local government authorities at the ward or district levels. 
If the applicant is eligible, assessment for suitability to be a foster parent as per regulation 6 of 
the Foster Care Placement Regulations follows. An assigned social welfare officer carries out 
the assessment and reports to the Commissioner, who decides to approve or turn down the 
application. According to regulations 8(5) and 9, the Commissioner’s decision is based on the 
social investigation report submitted together with the assessment report. Once the 
Commissioner approves the applicant as a foster parent, he or she is registered in the foster 
carer register maintained at the district and national levels pursuant to regulation 7 of the 
Foster Care Placement Regulations. During field research, it was not possible to access such a 
 




register, either at the Department of Social Welfare headquarters in Dodoma or in the four 
districts studied. The main reason for inaccessibility was not confidentiality, but rather that 
the register did not exist, at least not in the form stipulated under the regulations.702 A register 
of foster care placements, required by regulation 7(6), was not accessible for the same reason. 
Thus, it was impossible to obtain reliable statistics on the number of foster parents or 
placements during field research. When asked about the unavailability of the registers, a high-
ranking officer at the Department of Social Welfare said,  
“Social welfare officers are very busy officers. Not every department in 
municipal or district councils is good at keeping records. Even if they were, 
the data might not reach the Commissioner because the officers have to first 
report to their municipal or district directors, who have to submit their 
reports to the Commissioner after that. It involves a long process that is 
often not completed.”703 
Placement in foster care must be in accordance with a foster care plan as provided for under 
regulation 17 of the Foster Care Placement Regulations. As the plan considers the views and 
feelings of the child’s biological parents (regulation 17(4) (c)), their consent to the placement 
comes first as required under regulation 8(3) of the Foster Care Placement Regulations. 
According to section 27(1) of the Law of the Child Act, foster parents assume parental 
responsibilities during foster care placement with the consent of the child’s parents. 
Regulations 11 and 12 specify the rights and responsibilities of foster parents, while 
regulation 13 specifies the rights of a foster child. However, regulation 12 does not mention 
full parental rights, but only limited rights pertaining to day-to-day decisions regarding the 
fostered child. Full parental rights, according to section 18(2) are transferred to a social 
welfare officer when a child is placed in foster care by a care or interim care order. In the case 
that a child is in foster care without a care order, for instance after being taken into the 
voluntary care of a local government authority, parental rights according to regulation 42(5) 
(d) of the Child Protection Regulations will be shared by the local government authority, the 
birth parent and foster parent. To ensure that foster parents and children enjoy their rights and 
discharge their responsibilities, they receive support in varied services as stipulated under 
regulations 14 and 15 of the Foster Care Placement Regulations. In Tanzania, foster parents 
 
702 Interview with a social welfare officer at the adoption desk in Dodoma on 22.03.2018. During the interview, 
the officer showed the researcher a list of names recorded in a counter book and explained that it is the current 
list of foster care applicants, some of whom have already been given foster children while others are still in the 
process of being assessed. This was not a register of standby foster parents but rather of applicants who, in the 
respondent’s opinion, were in most cases prospective adopters. 




do not receive financial support from the government as is the practice in other 
jurisdictions.704  
Foster care is a temporary measure. It can be provided both in the short-term and long-term 
but remains temporary. This is because a foster child does not become a permanent member 
of the foster family, as happens for instance in child adoption. Foster care placement 
terminates with the discharge of the order placing the child in foster care or upon a child 
attaining 18 years.705 Regulation 18(1) of the Foster Care Placement Regulations provides for 
placement termination, including on the grounds of abuse, placement no longer serving the 
child’s best interests or reunification with the biological family. For this reason, foster care 
placement requires regular reviews in the form of supervision visits as directed by regulation 
16 of the Foster Care Placement Regulations. 
The Law of the Child Act under sections 32(1) and 53(1), together with the Foster Care 
Placement Regulations under regulations 4(3) and 8(1) (b)-(d), emphasises the position of 
approved residential homes or institutions as the source of children to be placed in foster care. 
These instruments do not state other places from which children placed into foster care may 
originate. The reason for the omission is the previous law on foster care: the Children’s 
Homes (Regulation) Act and Children’s Homes Regulations of 1968 emphasised children’s 
homes as the primary source of children eligible for foster care.706 However, since the Foster 
Care Regulations under regulation 8(1) (a) consider children under care or supervision orders 
to be eligible for fostering, then approved residential homes or institutions should not be as 
overemphasised as they are. Also, considering regulations 59(1) and 62(2)(b) of the Child 
Protection Regulations, social welfare officers may use foster care to provide care and 
protection for a wide range of children in need. For instance, foster care can be used to 
accommodate a child pending placement determination as stipulated under regulation 59(1)(c) 
of the Child Protection Regulations. 
Foster care is an independent placement in its own right. However, it can also be part of child 
adoption in the form of pre-adoption care. The Law of the Child Act requires this form of care 
 
704 For instance, in Ghana, the Children's Amendment Act, 2016: Act No. 937 while amending Part IV of the 
Children's Act, 1998: Act No. 560 establishes a Foster-Care Fund under section 72 which aims at providing 
financial support to foster parents in maintaining their foster children. The use and management of the Fund are 
further provided for under sections 73-76 of the Act. 
705 According to regulation 18(7) of the Foster Care Placement Regulations, 2012, a child is not required to 
remain in foster care after attaining 18 years but may need to remain up to the age of 21 years if still undergoing 
educational or vocational training pursuant to regulation 18(8). The Regulations are silent on where the child 
who leaves foster care should go. 
706 For further details of practice under this law, see Rwezaura; Wanitzek, “The Law and Practice Relating to the 




for prospective adopters as stipulated under sections 56(3) (b) and 74(1) (c) of the Act and 
regulation 4(7) of the Adoption of Children Regulations, 2012. The researcher found that pre-
adoption care is the dominant form of foster care in practice. Interviewed social welfare 
officers explained that given the socio-economic situation in the country, it is implausible that 
people should volunteer to care for unrelated children without receiving any financial support. 
This partly explains the lack of a register of foster carers. Tanzanians and non-Tanzanians 
alike apply to foster children mainly in order to fulfil the requirement of pre-adoption care. 
However, the officers reported that a considerable number of resident Tanzanians fostering 
children as a prerequisite for adoption do not proceed with an adoption petition but keep the 
foster child indefinitely. Rwezaura and Wanitzek reported a similar practice where native 
Tanzanians preferred formal foster care to child adoption, and, unlike Europeans and Asians 
who had also applied for foster care, they did not end up adopting the child.707 
The author was interested in finding out what the social welfare office does when prospective 
adopters stop at fostering. In replying to this question, social welfare officers, both at the 
central and local government levels, showed how this practice disturbed them.  
“When an applicant does not follow the procedures and time limits, it 
creates more work for us in terms of follow-up. Follow-up demands more 
time and human resource, which we do not have to begin with. This is why 
those foster carers have remained with the children for so long already. 
However, the Commissioner usually sends alert letters to the foster carers 
but taking the child away is not an option in our case.”708  
On possible solutions, the officers indicated that there were plans to follow up on the 
indefinite foster carers and make them adopt the children. There was, however, no talk of 
plans to formalise them as foster carers instead. Nevertheless, a ward social welfare officer 
shared a story that served to show that it is possible to convert pre-adoption care into a foster 
care placement. He said, 
“A Kenyan lady residing in Tanzania found a boy who was formerly a child 
living on the street in a children’s home that was about to close down. She 
liked the child and wanted to adopt him. She applied to the ward social 
welfare office for adoption. The social welfare officer in charge visited the 
child’s family to inform them, and they agreed to give up the child for 
adoption. The lady started to care for the child in pre-adoption foster care. 
After a while, the child manifested naughty behaviour, including not 
sleeping at home. The lady tried to find help and even involved the police. 
Throughout the process, she never gave up taking care of the boy. Once the 
boy turned 18 years old, the ward social welfare officer advised the lady to 
 
707 Ibid., at p. 158. 
708 Interview with social welfare officer, Bunju Ward, Kinondoni, Dar es Salaam on 04.01.2019 and also with 




let go. The office then made efforts to reunite the boy, who was no longer a 
child, with his birth family.”709 
This is what exists in practice. However, it is not what the law says. It is a pure example of 
how street-level bureaucrats implement law and policy during case management in a way that 
is shaped by the prevailing circumstances of their work. 
The Law of the Child Act, 2009 and the Foster Care Placement Regulations, 2012 establish 
foster care placement requirements and procedures. A complete account of these is not within 
the scope of this part, but some pertinent issues relating to the law and practice of fostering 
that turned up during field research have been discussed.710 The next chapter, which provides 
the legal framework for child adoption, discusses further legal and practical issues relating to 
foster care in connection with the law and practice of child adoption.  
3.6.4 Institutional Care Placement 
Regulation 2 of the Children’s Homes Regulations, 2012 defines institutional care as “a range 
of facilities and services serving most vulnerable children and children in need of care and 
protection in a group setting.” Under Part XI, the Law of the Child Act divides institutional 
caregivers into two groups, namely, approved residential homes and institutions, and daycare 
centres and crèches. This part refers to the first category. Section 3 of the Law of the Child 
Act defines such institutions by inclusion. They comprise approved residential homes, 
retention homes, approved schools, institutions for socially deprived children and street 
children, a person or institution that has care and control of children, and any other 
establishment designated as such by the Commissioner for Social Welfare. Considering that 
the list of available institutions is quite extensive, it is significant to indicate that this study 
focuses only on children’s homes as defined under section 2 of the Children’s Homes 
Regulations, 2012. These are defined as “an institution other than an approved school and a 
retention home, where five or more most vulnerable children or children in need of care and 
protection are received, cared for, and maintained, either gratuitously or for payment by a 
person who is not a relative or guardian of the child.” In addition, because regulation 2 of the 
Children’s Homes Regulations, while defining the term institution for purposes of the 
Regulations, excludes approved schools, retention homes and crisis centres, this part excludes 
the same from its scope of coverage.  
 
709 Interview with social welfare officer, Bunju Ward, Kinondoni, Dar es Salaam on 04.01.2019. 
710 For a full discussion of the law and practice of foster care in Tanzania, see Veronica G. Buchumi, The Right 
to Alternative Care for Children in Tanzania: An Inquiry into the Law and Practice of Foster Care (Doctoral 




Institutional care placement is listed under section 18(3) (a) of the Law of the Child Act and 
regulation 62(2) (c) of the Child Protection Regulations as one type of alternative child care. 
Both provisions refer to it as care in an approved residential home. Section 3 of the Law of the 
Child Act defines an approved residential home as a licensed home where a child receives 
substitute and temporary family care. However, other provisions under the Act refer to 
placement in “an approved residential home or institution”.711 Section 133(8) of the Act lists 
what constitutes approved residential homes and institutions. The list includes some 
institutions excluded by the Children’s Homes Regulations and from the scope of this study as 
explained above. This study’s rationale for the exclusion includes placement grounds listed 
under section 137(1) of the Act and regulation 59(1) of the Child Protection Regulations. 
Some of the grounds, such as a child being in conflict with the law, are beyond this study’s 
scope.  
The Law of the Child Act and the Children’s Homes Regulations provide the law and 
procedure for placement in children’s homes. Placement in a children’s home is provided for 
in sections 18(3) (a) and 137(1) of the Act. A child may be placed in a children’s home 
pursuant to a care order; pending a court order for care and protection;712 when a social 
welfare officer has determined it the most suitable place; or when an officer has approved 
placement for an orphan to whom family or foster care is unavailable. Other ways may be 
through the child presenting himself or herself at the children’s home or being taken there by 
another person as stipulated under section 53(1) (c) of the Act and regulation 16(4) (a) and (b) 
of the Children’s Home Regulations. Regulation 16 of the Children’s Home Regulations 
provides the placement procedure. The requirements and procedures for admission into a 
home vary slightly depending on the circumstances of placement. Parental consent is, 
however, necessary for such placement. According to regulation 16(1), a social welfare 
officer gives consent when placement falls under sections 18 and 137(1) of the Act. This is so 
because, among other reasons, section 18(2) of the Act gives a social welfare officer parental 
rights over a child placed under a care order.713 In the case of emergency situations stipulated 
 
711 See sections 18(6), 19(7), 21, 27, 31(7), 32(1), 37(3), 40, 53(1), 96(4) and the whole of Part XI (a) of the Law 
of the Child Act, 2009.  
712 Section 31(7) of the Law of the Child Act, 2009 directs a social welfare officer to place a child in an approved 
residential home or institution pending a care or supervision order of the court when it is not issued within 
fourteen days (probably referring to the period in which a child is taken to a place of safety). A similar provision 
is reiterated under section 96(4) of the Act. 
713 The section should be read together with regulation 60(1) of the Child Protection Regulations, 2014 which 
provides that an applicant local government authority assumes parental rights for a child placed under a care 
order. According to regulation 6(2), the social welfare department in a local government authority exercises the 




under regulation 16(4) (a) and (b) of the Children’s Homes Regulations, the law waives 
parental consent and procedures for official admission as explained under regulation 16(5) 
and (6). The Act under Part XI, together with the Children’s Homes Regulations, describes 
extensively the principles, requirements and procedures for placement in a children’s home. 
This part does not endeavour to cover them comprehensively. Instead, it focuses on some key 
issues relating to institutional care in the law and as observed during field research.  
According to the principle formulated in regulation 3(c) of the Children’s Homes Regulations, 
institutional care placement in Tanzania should be a temporary measure and a last resort. It is 
temporary if the children are awaiting a further administrative or judicial decision regarding 
their care. Also, children may be placed for a time while seeking other care solutions, such as 
foster care or family reunification, according to section 137(3) and (5) and regulation 22 of 
the Children’s Homes Regulations. It is a measure of last resort because other care measures 
must be given priority over it. This means that a child should be placed in a children’s home 
only when no other care option is available or when it has been determined that institutional 
care is the most suitable option for the child. Even in these scenarios, the placement of 
children in a children’s home must be in their best interest as stipulated under regulations 3(f), 
4(1) and 22(1) of the Children’s Homes Regulations. In practice, however, the researcher 
found that institutional care is neither a measure of last resort nor temporary in a considerable 
number of cases. Children’s homes are used as a measure of first resort pending further 
action, which is in accordance with sections 18(3) (a), 31(7), and 137(1) (a) of the Act. 
Unfortunately, in many cases, there is no ‘further action’. The scarcity of other suitable care 
alternatives (fit persons or foster parents) may explain this practice. This state of affairs, 
combined with the workload pressures of social welfare officers which limit their ability to 
follow up each case, leads to children staying in homes until they reach majority. In most 
cases, this practice does not serve the best interests of the child. When discussing this, a 
respondent social welfare officer said, 
“Children remain in residential homes when their assigned officers find no 
way to place them in a family-based care measure. And once these children 
grow older, it becomes increasingly difficult to get an alternative to the 
homes. For instance, adopters want only younger children. Hence, the older 
ones remain in the homes, get educated and trained to be self-reliant, and 
when they are 18, they leave.”714  
 
714 Interview with social welfare officer 1-Kinondoni District, Dar es Salaam, on 23.01.2019. Regulation 22(7) of 
the Children’s Homes Regulations requires homes to prepare children approaching 18 years for independent 
living. Also, while working with the homes, social welfare officers, in consultation with the child, are required to 
find accomodation and employment or placements for further educational or vocational training. How these 




A child cannot be placed in a children’s home unless the Commissioner of Social Welfare has 
approved and licensed the home under section 133 (2)-(5) of the Act and regulations 5-7 of 
the Children’s Homes Regulations. Thus, as per section 146(2) (a) of the Act, a person 
operating a children’s home without a licence commits an offence punishable by a fine and/or 
imprisonment. Licensing is meant to safeguard the child’s welfare because licensed homes are 
monitored, supervised, directed, and inspected in accordance with the requirements of 
sections 134-136 and 151 of the Act and regulations 27-28 of the Children’s Homes 
Regulations. If monitoring and inspection prove a home to be unfit, the Commissioner must 
cancel the licence, as per section 140 of the Act, and provide an alternative arrangement for 
the children placed in it. During field research, it was found that there were a considerable 
number of homes operating without licences. Also, the Department of Social Welfare was in a 
dilemma regarding closure of the unlicensed homes because it had no safe places to take the 
children to.  A social welfare officer working in the social welfare department for Arusha city 
council said, 
“Since Arusha is a touristic city, many Europeans pass through it. As they 
usually are interested in helping children, they assist resident Tanzanians in 
opening children’s homes and sponsoring them. To maintain this 
sponsorship, the owners always try to find children to place in their homes. 
They treat these homes as a business. Hence, they are not overly concerned 
with making them legal; they, instead, continue operating without licences. 
Our recent monitoring and inspection undertaking found that fifteen 
children’s homes are operating without licences in Arusha. Unfortunately, 
we cannot close them immediately as it will risk the children’s welfare.”715 
UNICEF Tanzania, whose emphatic agenda was the de-institutionalisation of child care in the 
country, found this a challenge. The respondent UNICEF child specialist opined,  
“UNICEF Tanzania intends to work with the government to ensure that 
only a few well-managed children’s homes remain in operation. Placing 
children in institutions must be the very last resort. This is the clearest 
position for UNICEF Tanzania now.” 716 
Institutionalised care remains a prominent mode of child care in Tanzania. In 2011, the 
Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, with the support of UNICEF Tanzania, carried out a 
national survey assessing institutional care in the country.717 The survey found that there were 
282 children’s homes in Tanzania, with 11,216 children.718 Arusha was the region with the 
 
715 Interview with social welfare officer 2-Arusha City, on 19.03.2019. 
716 Interview with child protection specialist, UNICEF, in Dar es Salaam on 21.02.2019. 
717 Open University Consultancy Bureau, A Draft Report on Assessment of the Situation of Children in 
Institutional Care in Tanzania (November 2011). 




most significant number of homes, standing at 39. During field research in 2019, the 
researcher found the following statistics for Arusha: 
Table 3-1: Number of Children’s Homes in Arusha719 
Number of Children’s Homes in Arusha, March 2019 
Licensed 13 There were 32 children’s homes in 2018. The 
Commissioner closed down 4 homes that were in 




It is evident that in view of the extent of the problem of children in need of care and 
protection, as described in this chapter, the number of children living in homes is still 
relatively low. Although the survey’s findings are almost a decade prior to this study, the 
number of children in the homes could not have grown to account for the statistics discussed 
earlier in the chapter. Since it was not in the scope and capacity of this study to do a national 
survey of institutional care, it is difficult to explain where the remaining children in need of 
care and protection are accommodated. This is after considering the low level of fit person 
and foster care practice. Of course, as already explained, a substantial number of children live 
and work on the street. Still, they do not account for the numbers represented in the reports 
discussed in this chapter. In this case, it is reasonable to surmise that there are cracks and 
holes in the child protection system. Still, the question of how de-institutionalisation will be 
achieved remains.  
Pertinent to this study is the role played by approved residential homes and institutions in the 
child adoption process. As specified under section 3 of the Law of the Child Act, such homes 
provide temporary care for children pending family reunification, fosterage, or adoption.720 
Sections 32(1), 53(1) and 143 of the Law of the Child Act specify that homes provide care for 
children before being placed in foster care or adopted. Section 53 of the Act and Regulation 8 
of the Foster Care Placement Regulations show that children eligible for foster care and later 
adoption mainly originate from homes or institutions. Thus, in simple terms, children’s homes 
are the primary source of children put up for adoption in Tanzania. 
Patrons/matrons or managers of approved residential homes or institutions have significant 
roles to play in the adoption process. First and foremost, they have parental responsibility for 
 
719 Interview with social welfare officer 2-Arusha city, on 19.03.2019 produced the statistics. 
720 Sections 137(3)-(5) and 143 of the Law of the Child Act, 2009 specify that managers of residential homes and 
the Social Welfare Department are required to work towards a more permanent solution for children in 




the children placed in their homes or institutions according to section 27 of the Act. Second, 
they can identify children in their care whom they consider suitable for foster care and 
adoption.721 Third, under section 58(1) of the Act, consent for adopting a child from a 
children’s home should be sought from the respective patron/matron or manager who has 
parental rights over the child. Last, further cementing their role in adoption, section 143(3) of 
the Act requires the Commissioner to consult the patron/matron or manager of an approved 
residential home or institution when deciding regarding the adoption of a child in his or her 
care. 
3.6.5 Child Adoption  
Child adoption, the special focus of this study, is one of Tanzania’s formal alternative care 
measures. It is an alternative care measure that provides a child in need of care and protection 
with a family environment.  However, it is in a different class from the four types of 
placement discussed above. Section 18(3) of the Act does not list it as an alternative care 
placement option. Instead, section 24(1) of the Act lists it as a care option for a child under a 
care or supervision order whose parent, guardian or relative does not show any interest in his 
or her welfare within a specified time. When suitable and available for a child, child adoption 
provides a permanent solution through a new adoptive family. The adopted child’s familial 
relations thus permanently change with parental rights and responsibilities transferring from 
the biological to the adoptive parents. For this reason, once child adoption is concluded, the 
adopted child is not considered to be in an alternative care placement.  
As child adoption is the special focus of this study, it is examined in all its details in the 
following chapter. 
3.7 Conclusion  
There are a significant number of children in need of parental care and protection in Tanzania. 
Section 16 of the Law of the Child Act provides an extensive list of circumstances in which 
these children live. The listed circumstances do not necessarily mean the children are without, 
or deprived of, parental care; others have parental care, but it is inadequate. This study 
considers those children who, for whatever reason, can never return to or remain in the care of 
their parents, guardians, or relatives, and hence are freed for adoption. 
The Law of the Child Act and the Regulations made under it build a legal and institutional 
framework for the care and protection of children in need. Unfortunately, these laws have 
multiple errors ranging from language, typos, incorrect numbering, and cross-referencing 
 
721 According to section 32(1) and (3) of the Law of the Child Act, 2009 and rule 9(1) (b) of the Foster Care 




inconsistencies within the same text or across different texts. The legal framework they create 
has interpretative issues arising from the different timelines of the Act’s enactment and 
Regulations’ adoption. Also, the drafters’ intention is not always clear, which may lead to 
misapplication of the law. For these reasons and others to be explored in the following 
chapters, the practice of child care and protection is complicated. 
The principles of alternative care, for instance, are not consistently incorporated in the Act 
and Regulations. The Act does not include a list of alternative care principles. These are found 
under the Regulations. The Foster Care Placement Regulations have the least provision for the 
principles, while the Children’s Homes Regulations include the most comprehensive list. 
Thus, adherence to these principles in child protection practice is inconsistent, which may 
impinge on the best interests of some children. Uniform across all instruments is the 
requirement for all administrative and judicial action to adhere to the best interests of the child 
principle. 
Alternative care placement provisions in the Act and Regulations are sometimes in conflict. 
There lacks clarity between Regulation 44(2) of the Child Protection Regulations and other 
provisions that children under voluntary care of a local government authority or subject to a 
care order of the court may be placed with relatives. Following the child protection procedure 
laid down in the Regulations, children subject to voluntary care or care order arrangements 
are those whom social welfare officers have confirmed cannot be adequately cared for by 
their relatives. Thus, suggesting placement with relatives as an option for them is a 
contradiction. 
The Law of the Child Act recognises kinship care. However, its regulation remains a 
challenge. The law provides for the monitoring of formal placements with relatives. 
Nonetheless, social welfare officers rarely achieve this in practice. Informal kinship care ends 
with its recognition in the Act. The Act contains no further provisions regarding standards or 
safeguards. Although state intervention in traditional child care remains debatable, issues 
regarding children’s exposure to significant harm in kinship care cannot be ignored. There 
must be a balance for the child’s best interest. 
The laws establish a range of formal alternative care measures in response to the suitability 
principle. However, these measures are not sufficiently practised in terms of extent and 
compliance with the law. For instance, the Act introduced placement with fit persons in 2009, 
but it has not yet taken off as a measure practised in all districts in the country. Its Regulations 
had not been published at the time of writing, more than a decade after the measure was 




does not live up to its potential under the law. There are no standby registered foster carers as 
the Act envisages. These practical shortfalls leave children languishing in institutional care, 
mostly against their best interests. Also, they increasingly make institutional care the measure 
of first resort, against the principles laid down in the law. 
Despite these challenges, the Child Protection Regulations establish a robust, comprehensive 
child protection procedure, which, if implemented, guarantees adherence to the principle of 
the child’s best interests. However, enactment of the Regulations did not go hand in hand with 
enhancing the work conditions of social welfare officers. The existing workplace pressures 
arising from the shortage of resources, such as time, qualified human resources, infrastructure, 




Chapter 4:  Legal Framework on Child Adoption in Tanzania 
“When an adoption order is made, the adoptive parent of the 
child shall assume the parental rights, duties, obligations and 
liabilities of the child with respect of custody, maintenance and 
education as if the child was born to the adoptive parent in a 
lawful wedlock and was not the child of any other person.”722 
[emphasis added] 
4.1 Introduction 
The Law of the Child Act, with several Regulations made under it, covers broad issues 
concerning child welfare. Together, they provide a comprehensive but inexhaustive 
framework for child adoption. As this chapter endeavours to show, several other laws come 
into play regarding the legal framework of child adoption in the country. 
This chapter explores the current legal framework regulating child adoption in Tanzania. The 
main objective is to familiarise the reader with the multiple legal orders that govern child 
adoption and give a step-by-step walk through the legal requirements and procedures entailed. 
Where relevant, the chapter also provides a critical analysis of the law, based on insights 
gained during field research. The ultimate aim is to achieve an understanding of legal and 
policy aspects that govern child adoption in Tanzania.  
4.2 National Law 
National or domestic laws include all sets of laws, rules and regulations that apply within the 
Tanzanian territory. Since Tanzania is a union composed of Tanzania Mainland (formerly 
Tanganyika) and Zanzibar, only some of the laws apply to the entire country. Others apply 
only to one part of the union. Child welfare does not fall within the pool of union matters 
listed under the first schedule to the 1977 Constitution. Therefore, the Law of the Child Act, 
as it specifies under section 2, applies only to Mainland Tanzania. Tanzania Zanzibar has its 
own Children’s Act.723 This chapter mainly analyses the laws that apply in Tanzania 
Mainland. In the instance that it refers to a law that does not so apply, details will be given of 
its territorial application. The primary sources of domestic law in Mainland Tanzania are the 
Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, 1977, principal and subsidiary legislation, 
case law, received law, customary law, and religious law. Within these categories, the chapter 
explores the domestic laws that govern child adoption.  
 
722 Section 64(1) (b) of the Law of the Child Act, 2009. 




4.2.1 Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, 1977 
The Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania guarantees fundamental rights and 
freedoms.724  Such provisions are in the Bill of Rights as covered under Articles 12-19 of the 
Constitution. The Constitution also establishes a mechanism for redress where there is a 
violation of human rights under the Bill.725 However, it does not explicitly provide for 
children’s rights, especially for their care and protection. Thus, only inferences can be drawn 
from its general provisions. For example, Article 13(1), which guarantees equal protection 
before the law, means that measures are needed to ensure the safety of children in danger. The 
same is also true of Article 14, which provides that “every person has the right to live and to 
the protection of his life by the society in accordance with the law.” The words ‘every person’ 
include children. Thus, alternative child care is a way of ensuring the protection of children, 
especially of children in need. 
Lack of express provision for children’s rights and welfare may signify that the Constitution 
shows its age. In recent years, Tanzanians started to show their discontent with the current 
Constitution, which led to the constitutional review process in 2011. The fourth phase of 
government under President Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete initiated the process through the 
Constitutional Review Act.726 The review process, however, was never concluded, as political 
and other diverging interests polarised it. Its unfinished product was the Proposed Draft 
Constitution of 2014 with no force of law, as a referendum to legitimise it was never called. 
The proposed draft, however, had some comprehensive provisions covering children’s 
welfare. For example, Article 50 of the Proposed Draft Constitution, 2014, codified children’s 
rights. Unfortunately, the draft rests on the government shelves, leaving the old Constitution 
in operation with no explicit promotion and protection of children’s rights and welfare. 
4.2.2 Principal Legislation 
Principal legislation or Acts of Parliament are laws enacted by the Parliament of the United 
Republic of Tanzania.727 The Parliament derives its legislative power from Articles 63(3) (d) 
and 64 of the Constitution (URT Constitution) of 1977. In matters of family and child law, 
there are two specialised Acts of Parliament. These are the Law of Marriage Act, 1971, which 
governs marital and parental relations, and the Law of the Child Act, 2009, which covers all 
issues relating to children. Both Acts play a part in the practice of alternative care of children. 
 
724 Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania. 
725 See the details in Article 30 of the Constitution and Basic Rights and Duties Enforcement Act, [Cap 3 R.E 
2019]. 
726 Constitutional Review Act, 2011 [Cap 83 R.E 2014]. 




4.2.2.1 Law of Marriage Act, 1971 
In 1969, the Government of Tanzania issued a White Paper with recommendations for a new 
law of marriage.728 The intention was to unify and harmonise the multiple prevailing regimes 
of the law of marriage at the time. Thus, the law would recognise marriages as long as they 
were celebrated under the recognised legal systems, for example under Islamic, customary, or 
Christian rites.729 The White Paper recommendations led to the enactment of the Law of 
Marriage Act of 1971. With its several amendments, this Act has been the core source of 
family law in Tanzania since 1971.  
The Law of Marriage Act governs the inception, subsistence and dissolution of marriage and 
its consequences as well as associated matters. Naturally, children as fruits of marriage are 
provided for under the legislation. However, provisions for child care are limited to matters 
proceeding from marriage breakdowns such as custody, maintenance, distribution of 
matrimonial property and other matrimonial reliefs. 
Alternative care for children at risk of or deprived of parental care is not a matter extensively 
covered under the Law of Marriage Act, 1971. It was only in 2009 that the Law of the Child 
Act (discussed below) addressed this matter comprehensively. Before 2009, alternative child 
care was governed in a piecemeal style with its regulation scattered across several pieces of 
legislation such as the Adoption of Children Act, 1953, the Children’s Homes (Regulation) 
Act, 1968 and the Children’s Homes Regulations,1968. 
It is not that the Law of Marriage Act did not provide for alternative child care at all, but it did 
so only in a very specific manner. The Act provided alternative care mainly in the form of 
child custody once a marriage has broken down and both parents are found unfit to have 
custody of their child or children. In that situation, section 125(1) of the Law of Marriage Act 
provides for alternative care through the court, in which the custody of a child is entrusted to a 
relative or an association concerned with children’s welfare. As far as child adoption is 
concerned, the Act defines a child in section 2(1) as including an adopted child. This means 
that wherever a child is mentioned under the Act, it also refers to an adopted child. Further 
reference to adopted children in the Act is limited to Section 14(4), where marital relations 
between adopters and adoptees are prohibited.  
 
728 The Government of Tanzania, Government Paper No. 1 of 1969: Government Proposals on Uniform law of 
Marriage (Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 1969). 
729 Law Reform Commission of Tanzania, Report of the Commission on the Law of Marriage Act, 1971 (Act 




4.2.2.2 Law of the Child Act, 2009 
Failure to sufficiently provide for and protect the child in the Law of Marriage Act, 1971 and 
the piecemeal framework of child laws necessitated the reform and consolidation of laws 
relating to children. The reform of child law in Tanzania culminated in the enactment of a 
unified Law of the Child Act in 2009. The Law mainly covers four areas as stipulated in its 
long title: promotion and protection of children’s rights and welfare in line with commitments 
under international and regional instruments; parentage and care of children in terms of child 
affiliation, custody, maintenance, foster care, adoption, and institutional care; employment 
and apprenticeship; and juvenile justice.  
To ensure the promotion of child welfare, the Act identifies a child in need of care and 
protection under section 16 and proceeds to establish mechanisms for his or her well-being. 
The Act and Regulations under it provide for the formal process of child care and protection. 
As shown above in chapter 3, it starts with referrals to the social welfare department, which 
may extend to court orders of care or supervision. If a child’s home is unsafe, removing the 
child becomes necessary, and alternative care placements under section 18(3) of the Act, such 
as placement with fit persons or foster parents, admission to a children’s home, or adoption, 
become necessary.  
The Law of the Child Act, 2009 is the principal source of adoption law and procedure in 
Tanzania. It applies together with several Regulations made under it.730 Provisions on child 
adoption are in Part VI of the Act. Sections 62 and 74 of the Act provide for adoption by non-
resident Tanzanians and resident non-Tanzanians, the special focus of this study. A detailed 
account of the law and procedure regarding these two types of child adoption follows in other 
parts of this chapter below. 
4.2.3 Subsidiary Legislation 
Section 4 of the Interpretation and Application of Laws Act defines subsidiary legislation as 
orders, proclamations, rules, rules of court, regulations, notices, by-laws, or other instruments 
made under a parent Act by a lawful authority. Several rules and regulations relating to child 
welfare were made under the Law of the Child Act, 2009. These laws are relevant as they 
guide child adoption procedure and practice. They include the Child Protection Regulations of 
2014, the Foster Care Placement Regulations of 2012, the Adoption of Children Regulations 
of 2012, the Children’s Homes Regulations of 2012, and the Juvenile Court Procedure Rules 
of 2016.  
 
730 The power to make regulations for child adoption and other related matters is vested in the Minister under 




4.2.3.1 Child Protection Regulations, 2014 
These Regulations were enacted in 2014 under section 157(a) of the Law of the Child Act.731 
They provide general principles and guide action for the care and protection of children 
suffering or at risk of suffering harm. The Regulations map out the entire procedure from 
identifying children in need of care and protection to their removal to a place of safety, 
provision of assistance and accommodation or placement in care. They also identify the 
institutions and personnel responsible for the whole protection process.  
Adoption of children is an alternative care measure with the potential to respond to all 
principles guiding child care decisions listed under regulation 3 (2) (a)-(e). Recognising the 
role of child adoption in the care and protection of children, regulation 7(2) (g) requires heads 
of social welfare departments to establish and maintain adoption services in their districts. 
Further, in the preparation of a care plan for purposes of a care order, regulation 48(1)(b) (to 
be read together with section 24 of the Law of Child Act) specifically requires a social 
welfare officer to consider and declare whether adoption is in the best interests of the child. 
Where child adoption is the most suitable option for the child, regulation 49(4) directs the 
Juvenile Court in care order proceedings to declare the child free for adoption. Thereafter, 
according to regulations 49(5) and 50(5), child adoption procedures under the Law of the 
Child Act, 2009 and Regulations under it shall follow suit.  
4.2.3.2 Foster Care Placement Regulations, 2012 
The Child Protection Regulations list placement with foster parents as an alternative solution 
for children deprived of parental care.732 Foster Care Placement Regulations are made 
pursuant to section 157(b) of the Law of the Child Act, 2009. The Regulations lay down the 
procedure and requirements for foster care placement in Tanzania.  
According to sections 56(3) (b), 59(5), and 74(1) (c) of the Law of the Child Act, 2009, foster 
care placement, depicted as pre-adoption care, is a legal prerequisite of child adoption. Within 
the required foster care period, a bond is created between the prospective adoptive parents and 
the child. An assessment of the viability of adoption is based on observations during this 
period. For resident non-Tanzanians, the required foster period is a minimum of three months. 
The Law of the Child Act or Foster Care Placement Regulations do not specify the necessary 
foster period for non-resident Tanzanians. Hence it is presumably a minimum of six months 
 
731 Child Protection Regulations, 2014. 
732 Foster Care Placement Regulations 2012, G.N 153 of 2012. Regulation 38 read together with 62 indicate that 
children in need of assistance and accommodation, which includes children lost, abandoned, seeking refuge or 




as stated under section 56(3) (b) of the Act. The Foster Care Placement Regulations thus 
govern part of the process of child adoption.  
4.2.3.3 Adoption of Children Regulations, 2012 
These Regulations are made under sections 75 and 157(c) of the Law of the Child Act, 
2009.733 They provide the legal requirements and procedures for child adoption. The 
Regulations underline the paramountcy of the child’s best interests as the governing principle 
in all decisions relating to child adoption. The determination criteria for the best interests of 
each child are listed under regulation 3(a)-(e). This means that the adoption of children by 
non-resident Tanzanians and resident non-Tanzanians should only be allowed if it is in the 
child’s best interests. However, the Regulations do not go into much detail concerning these 
two types of adoption.734 Thus, this chapter extensively analyses the relevant legal 
requirements and procedures and how they work out in practice. 
4.2.3.4 Children’s Homes Regulations, 2012 
Regulations to establish and maintain standards for approved children’s homes are made 
under sections 145 and 157(a) of the Law of the Child Act.735 Under regulations 3, 4, 9 and 
12, the Regulations provide a long list of principles and children’s rights that must be adhered 
to in the care and maintenance of children in the homes. Apart from guiding children’s lives 
in homes, these principles also establish the right of children to be placed in non-institutional 
alternative care. Thus, regulation 3(c) stipulates that placement in institutional care must be a 
measure of last resort and temporary.  
Regulation 22(4) stipulates that in case of failure to reunite the child with his or her parent, 
relative or guardian, a social welfare officer should identify the most suitable alternative care 
option for the child. Reading this sub-regulation together with section 143 of the Law of the 
Child Act, 2009, child adoption may be the most suitable option when it is in the child’s best 
interest. The Children’s Homes Regulations are significant in the child adoption regulatory 
framework because, according to the Act, the Adoption of Children Regulations and the 
Foster Care Placement Regulations, children put up for adoption mainly originate from 
children’s homes.  
 
733 Adoption of Children Regulations 2012, G.N No. 197 of 2012. 
734 The English version of the Adoption of Children Regulations obtained from the Attorney General's Office 
does not have provisions for these types of adoption due to a page numbering problem that truncates the 
Regulations. Instead, their provision is available under sections 25-26 and 27-28 of the Kiswahili version of the 
Regulations, Tafsiri ya Kanuni za Uasili Watoto za Mwaka 2012. 




4.2.3.5 Law of the Child (Juvenile Court Procedure) Rules, 2016 
The Law of the Child Act under section 97 makes the Juvenile Court responsible for hearing 
and determining matters relating to children. Section 99 of the Act also enables the Chief 
Justice to make rules to guide procedure and practice in the court. In 2016, the Juvenile Court 
Procedure Rules were adopted to protect children’s rights under the Act and provide uniform 
procedure and practice in all juvenile court establishments in Mainland Tanzania.736 
According to section 98 of the Law of the Child Act, juvenile courts have jurisdiction in 
criminal and civil matters. The courts, therefore, do not only deal with cases where the child is 
in conflict with the law. They also come in where the care, maintenance and protection of a 
child is at issue.  The Juvenile Court Rules give procedures for determining parentage, 
custody, access, maintenance, and care and protection of children.  
Child adoption is one of the alternative care measures that a juvenile court needs to consider 
and authorise. According to rule 99, in an application for a care order where the care plan is 
for adoption, the court has to look at the evidence presented, including consent or lack of 
consent to adoption, before declaring the child free for adoption. The process of freeing a 
child for adoption includes determining a child’s adoptability but does not conclude the 
adoption process itself. Both the Act and the Rules confer jurisdiction for child adoption not 
on the Juvenile Court, but on the High Court, and in cases of open adoption on the Resident 
Magistrates’ Court or the District Court.  
4.2.4 Case Law 
Tanzania’s legal system is based on the English common law system. Therefore, the doctrine 
of stare decisis by which case law is generated applies. The doctrine originates from a Latin 
maxim Stare decisis et non quieta movere, which translated as the obligation to stand by prior 
decisions and not disturb matters already settled. According to this doctrine, courts in the 
common law tradition are bound or persuaded by the principle or rule established in a 
previous case involving facts or issues similar to those of the present case.737 Observance of 
precedents is founded on the need for consistency and certainty in the administration of 
justice, where similar cases yield similar outcomes. 
Case law is also known as judge-made law. Before the Law of the Child Act, 2009, judges 
made rules to regulate the adoption of children by non-resident Tanzanians and resident non-
Tanzanians because there were no provisions for this under the Adoption of Children Act, 
 
736 Law of the Child Act (Juvenile Court Procedure) Rules, 2016 GN. No. 182 of 2016. 




1953.738 These rules became binding or persuasive in subsequent similar adoption petitions. 
For instance, the case of Master Ayaz and Two Others has become a classical case whose 
precedent has been used in determining similar questions of law in other adoption petitions.739 
In the recent legal regime, rules made by judges and magistrates on diverse points of adoption 
law, even under the repealed Adoption of Children Act, 1953, apply in subsequent adoption 
petitions. The doctrine of precedents may be observed further under chapter six, where some 
cases are discussed. 
4.2.5 Received Law  
English law was applicable in Tanzania during the colonial period. The Judicature and 
Application of Laws Act makes it applicable to date. According to section 2(3), applicable 
laws to Tanzania are common law, doctrines of equity, statutes of general application and 
powers, procedure, and practice before Courts of Justice in England enforceable on 22nd July 
1920. However, their applicability is said to depend on the local circumstances in Tanzania.  
Sections 9 and 14-18 of the Judicature and Application of Laws Act also make laws passed in 
the UK and in India enforceable in Tanzania. The only difference is the reception date of 
these laws. Only Acts enforceable in the United Kingdom before the 22nd of July 1920 and the 
1st of December 1920 in India are applicable. Applicability is also limited by the list of Acts 
in the first and second schedules of the Judicature and Application of Laws Act. These 
received laws have an impact on child adoption law and practice in Tanzania. For instance, 
the Indian Succession Act of 1865 listed under the second schedule is still applicable in the 
legal framework for probate and administration of estates in Tanzania. Since this law and 
others in its class may affect adopted children’s inheritance rights in Tanzania, it makes 
received laws a legal source to reckon with in child adoption practice. This study, however, 
does not analyse received laws in any specific terms relating to the subject of the study.  
4.2.6 Customary and Religious Law 
Section 11 of the Judicature and Application of Laws Act recognises and permits customary 
law in specified circumstances in Tanzania. According to section 11(3), courts may apply 
customary law prevailing within their area of local jurisdiction, if multiple, then of the area 
where the matter arose, or whichever is determined applicable.740 Section 12 of the Act 
 
738 Rwezaura, Wanitzek, “The Law and Practice Relating to the Adoption of Children in Tanzania”, above 
footnote 22, pp. 143–147. 
739 High Court of Tanzania, At Dar es Salaam, “In the Matter of Adoption Ordinance, Cap. 335 and in the Matter 
of Master Ayaz and Two Others”, LRT (1978). 
740 Further details on customary law and its applicability are in the Magistrates Courts Act. See for example 




empowers district councils to declare or modify local customary laws. In the spirit of the 
section, after independence, customary laws in Tanzania were unified and codified in the 
Declarations of Customary Laws, 1963.741 The Declarations are not representative of the 
customary laws of all communities in Tanzania. Also, because customary law is dynamic, 
living rather than recorded customary law reflects the prevailing customary norms in each 
community.742 
For a long time in Tanzania, customary laws have played a central role in the care and 
protection of children. Traditional care of children, kin- or community-based, has remained 
informal and regulated by customary law. The Law of the Child Act under section 9(4) 
recognises traditional arrangements for the care of orphan children. Also, in child adoption, 
section 68 of the Act subjects an adopted child to customary law where the adoptive parent is 
also subject to it. Customary law, therefore, influences the child adoption legal regime in 
Tanzania.  
Religious law is also recognised as a source of law in Tanzania. The Judicature and 
Application of Laws Act and other laws permit the application of religious law in family 
matters. For example, according to section 11(1) proviso (ii) of the Judicature and Application 
of Laws Act, Islamic law may apply in marriage, divorce, guardianship, inheritance, wakf, and 
similar matters for Muslims. Nevertheless, formal child adoption is not one of those matters 
as it is not permissible under Islamic law. Section 76(1) of Tanzania Zanzibar’s Children’s 
Act provides explicitly that child adoption provisions do not apply to persons professing the 
Islamic faith.743 Instead, a form of adoption called kafala is practised as provided for under 
section 75 of Zanzibar’s Children’s Act. Since the Law of the Child Act does not provide for 
kafala, the researcher finds the practice of child adoption by Muslims in Tanzania Mainland 
an interesting subject of observation.  
4.2.7 International and Regional Law 
Tanzania is a member of the international community and a State Party to several 
international and regional organisations. Relevant to this part are its legal obligations incurred 
under treaties concluded under the umbrella of the organisations. Concerning child welfare, 
instruments of the United Nations (UN), the African Union (AU), the East African 
 
741 Local Customary Law (Declaration) Orders, 1963. 
742 Living customary law refers to the observed unwritten, accepted and binding practices of a particular 
community. It adapts and changes according to the prevailing conditions in the community. See Himonga, “The 
Future of Living Customary Law in African Legal Systems in the Twenty-First Century and Beyond, with 
Special Reference to South Africa”, above footnote 46. 




Community (EAC), and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
domesticated in Tanzania are most significant to the study.  
Much as international conventions and treaties are a source of law in Tanzania, they do not 
automatically apply. The application of international law in the country follows the dualist 
school of thought. This means that national law and international law are two separate legal 
orders. Thus, it is not enough that Tanzania has signed or acceded to an international 
instrument.  For any international law to be justiciable in the country, a second step is 
required. Under Article 63(3) (e) of the 1977 URT Constitution, the Parliament must ratify it. 
Ratification is later followed by incorporation into national law. 
When an international law is incorporated in national law, this is called domestication. 
However, even where certain provisions of a signed and ratified international instrument do 
not appear in an incorporating statute, those provisions remain binding according to the 
principle of pacta sunt servanda.744 Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties prohibits states from evading their international obligations under treaties by 
invoking the excuse of absence from or conflict with national law. 
4.2.7.1 United Nations’ Instruments 
Tanzania is a party to several treaties concluded by the United Nations that provide for child 
protection and well-being. These include the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 
1951; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966; the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966; the United Nations Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 1979; the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989; the Convention Concerning the Prohibition and 
Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour, 1999 and the 
United Nations Convention on People Living with Disabilities, 2006.  
As far as child adoption is concerned, the most pertinent instrument is the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989. Apart from being signed and ratified, the 
Convention has been extensively incorporated in the Law of the Child Act, 2009. Most 
noteworthy is the replication in the Act of the four cardinal principles that govern 
interpretation of the Convention. These principles are non-discrimination under section 5; the 
child’s best interest under section 4(2); the right to life, survival and development under 
section 9, and respect for the child’s views under section 11 of the Law of the Child Act, 
2009. Also, relating to alternative care of children, the Act reflects Articles 20 and 21 of the 
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Convention that provide for various measures such as foster care placement, child adoption, 
and placement in suitable institutions.745  
Regarding child adoption, Article 21 gives the State the duty to ensure that the child’s best 
interests shall be the paramount consideration. The standard is maintained in part VI of the 
Act and throughout its provisions, and under regulation 3 of the Adoption of Children 
Regulations. Section 59 of the Law of the Child Act, 2009, which provides for conditions of 
an adoption order, for instance, proves that the Act conforms to the Convention’s provisions. 
It reflects the requirements for competent authorities to be involved in child adoption while 
emphasising adherence to law and procedure. The section also demands gathering pertinent 
information on the child, obtaining consent for adoption, and offering counsel when 
necessary. The remainder of Article 21 is echoed in the Act, not in the sense of inter-country 
adoption but rather adoption by non-Tanzanians.746 The conclusion of bi- or multilateral 
arrangements or agreements is not included within the framework of adoption presented by 
the Act. 
Also forming part of the legal framework are the United Nations Guidelines for the 
Alternative Care of Children, 2010.747 The Guidelines aim at enhancing the implementation of 
the UNCRC and other international instruments providing for the well-being of children at the 
risk of being deprived of or deprived of parental care. This is a non-binding instrument that 
aims at informing policy and practice of alternative care in individual states. Because 
Tanzania has domesticated the UNCRC, the Guidelines apply to executive, legislative and 
judicial bodies, private child-welfare stakeholders, and the general public in matters of 
alternative care. 
The United Nations’ instruments mentioned in this part have a bearing on child welfare and 
adoption in one way or another. They do not represent an exhaustive list. Nonetheless, they 
are fundamental when considering issues of child care in Tanzania. The United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989, is an indispensable ingredient in the child 
adoption legal framework recipe in Tanzania. Domestication of the Convention under the Law 
of the Child Act, 2009 reinforces adherence to it. 
4.2.7.2 African Regional Instruments 
Tanzania is a member of the African Union. In respect of the promotion and protection of 
human and children’s rights and welfare, Tanzania signed and ratified the OAU Convention 
 
745 See Parts IV, VI and XI of the Law of the Child Act, 2009. 
746 Section 74 of the Law of the Child Act, 2009 provides for adoption by non-Tanzanians (foreigners). 




Governing Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, 1969; the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights, 1981 (Banjul Charter); the African Charter on the Rights and 
Welfare of the Child, 1990; the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 1998; the 
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in 
Africa, 2003; and the African Youth Charter, 2006. The position of these instruments in the 
Tanzanian legal framework does not differ from other international law instruments. They 
also require ratification and incorporation in national laws. 
The instruments named above provide for the welfare of children at different levels. In some 
of them, child welfare can only be deduced from their provisions. For instance, the Banjul 
Charter recognises the collective rights and freedoms of all African peoples.748 The closest it 
comes to explicitly providing for child welfare is under Article 18, which provides protection 
for the family. Specifically, Article 18(3) of the Charter charges states to protect children’s 
rights as stipulated under international declarations and conventions. Therefore, though not 
clearly stated, it follows that the right to alternative care for children deprived of family care 
is guaranteed under the Charter. 
The 1990 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child is the principal African 
instrument on child welfare. The Charter is a version of the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, 1989, tailored to the African context. Thus, incorporation of the Charter 
in Tanzania’s domestic law is apparent as its provisions barely differ from those of the 
UNCRC. Those sections of the Act that adopt an Africanised perspective from the Charter 
reflect its spirit much more clearly. For instance, section 15 of the Law of the Child Act, 
2009, which establishes a child’s duty and responsibility, follows Article 31 of the Charter. 
Article 24 of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, 1990 covers child 
adoption. Although most elements of the provision are reflected in the sections providing for 
child adoption under the Law of the Child Act, 2009, a crucial part is underplayed. For 
instance, there is no clear machinery established under the Act or the Adoption of Children 
Regulations to monitor the well-being of the adopted child in accordance with Article 24(f) of 
the Charter.  
When considering child adoption law in Tanzania, due attention must be paid to the 1990 
Charter. The Charter in its entirety is binding on the State and can be used to guide child 
adoption practice. For instance, weaknesses in domestic law on post-adoption monitoring can 
 




be redressed based on what the Charter provides because it is a part of the legal framework on 
child adoption.749 
4.2.7.3 African Sub-Regional Instruments 
Tanzania is a Member State of the East African Community (EAC) and the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC). These are sub-regional economic communities committed 
to cooperating and integrating in socio-economic development, politics, and security issues. 
Agreements concluded in these sub-regional groups become enforceable in Tanzania through 
the domestication process discussed in the preceding sections. For instance, in recognition of 
the dualist system, Article 8(2) of the EAC Treaty, 1999 requires the member states, called 
Partner States in the case of the EAC, to enact legislation to give effect to the treaty. Several 
EAC and SADC instruments provide for a similar requirement.750 
 In so far as child welfare is concerned, the blocs have not yet done much in terms of binding 
instruments. Although most of their Treaties and Protocols provide for social welfare in 
general, they do not specifically address the needs of the child.751 With the increase in abuse 
of children in Africa in recent years, it is imperative for the two blocs to state their standing 
on child welfare. On the one hand, the EAC has adopted instruments such as the Bujumbura 
Declaration on Child Rights and Well-being of 2012,752 the Child Rights Policy of 2016,753 
and the Strategic Plan on Gender, Youth, Children, Persons with Disabilities, Social 
Protection and Community Development (2012-2016).754 The SADC, on the other hand, has 
adopted the Code of Conduct on Child Labour, 2000755 and the Protocol on Gender and 
Development, 2008756. Other EAC and SADC instruments dedicated to boosting socio-
economic development in their respective regions imply the promotion of children’s welfare, 
but the instruments stated above are more forthright.  
In the Bujumbura Declaration of 2012, the EAC Partner States committed themselves to 
strengthening their legal and policy frameworks on children. They agreed to ratify and 
 
749 Article 24(f) of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child,1990, requires every African 
country practising child adoption to establish a machinery for monitoring the child's well-being post-adoption. 
750 For example, see Article 6 of the SADC Protocol on Gender and Development, 2008. 
751 The EAC Treaty, 1999 is built on the principle of promoting and protecting fundamental human rights and 
freedoms and Article 120(c) urges Partner States to co-operate amongst themselves in order to develop and adopt 
a common approach in social welfare towards disadvantaged and marginalised groups, including children. Also, 
Article 39 of the Common Market Protocol makes a call to the Partner States to harmonise their social policies 
towards protection of vulnerable groups, including children. 
752 Bujumbura Declaration on Child Rights and Wellbeing in East African Community (03.09.2012). 
753 EAC Child Policy 2016 (2016). 
754 Strategic Plan on Gender, Youth, Children, Persons with Disabilities, Social Protection and Community 
Development (2012-2016) (2012). 
755 Code of Conduct on Child Labour (2000). 




domesticate international and regional instruments related to children to enhance the 
protection of children in the region. The States realised the need to harmonise child laws and 
establish institutions and mechanisms for implementation, enforcement, monitoring, and 
reporting while involving children, families, and the community in such processes.757 Also, 
they resolved to collaborate with other child rights stakeholders in the region.758 These 
commitments, if implemented, will have a revolutionary impact on the law of child adoption 
in the region.  
The idea to have an EAC Child Rights Policy was conceived in the Bujumbura Declaration.759 
The Policy realises the commitments made under the Declaration, formulates priority areas, 
and provides policy statements for each area. The policy packs quite a punch as a statement of 
intentions that influence legal and policy formulations, implementation, enforcement, 
monitoring, and reporting within the Partner States.  
The SADC Code of Conduct on Child Labour, 2000 and the Protocol on Gender and 
Development, 2008 promote children’s rights. While the Code mainly aims to prevent child 
labour and protect children from it, the Protocol seeks gender equality and equity in Southern 
Africa. They both advocate for enacting national legislation, adopting policy, programmes, 
and actions against child labour and gender discrimination. The Code further promulgates 
fighting against HIV/AIDs, eradicating poverty, prioritising education, and strengthening 
response and enforcement mechanisms for children’s physical health, welfare, and social 
protection.760 Although these instruments do not cover the right to alternative care, they 
recognise the brokenness of families and communities due to HIV/AIDs and violence. These 
problems have led to an increase in children in need of alternative care. In other words, these 
instruments encourage the social protection of children, which may translate into supporting 
the establishment of frameworks for alternative care provision in member states’ jurisdictions. 
4.3 Policy Framework 
Policy is a statement of intent meant to direct the accomplishment of a public benefit that 
would otherwise not be achieved even with the best utilisation of available resources. It must 
be well researched and thought out and grounded on the reality of existing circumstances and 
 
757 Paragraph 1(b) and (m) of the EAC Council of Ministers, Bujumbura Declaration on Child Rights and 
Wellbeing in East African Community, 2012. 
758 Ibid., paragraph 2. 
759 Ibid., paragraph 1 (c). 




in order to have the desired consequence.761 Policies usually cover a particular subject matter 
in its broadness. 
4.3.1 National Policies 
National policies are adopted by the government and published in an official gazette to guide 
both public and private institutions in discharging their responsibilities in the given policy 
area. Most national policies in Tanzania touch on the welfare of children as children are part 
and parcel of the general population. However, only a few have children as their principal 
subject matter. Some key policies on children’s matters include the Child Development 
Policy, 2008762; the National Education and Training Policy, 2014;763 and the National Youth 
Development Policy, 2007.764 Other child-related policies that address the welfare of children 
include the National Health Policy, 2017,765 and the HIV/AIDS Policy, 2001.766  
The Child Development Policy, 2008, is the principal policy on children in Tanzania, and is 
the policy that this part focuses on. It is a second edition of the 1996 Child Development 
Policy. The review focused on the changing socio-economic situation in the country with the 
aim of reformulating policy statements for the better realisation of children’s rights. These 
changes included the increasing effects of HIV/AIDs, globalisation, the free trade system, and 
moral disintegration of the community.767 Although the 1996 Policy was already based on the 
UNCRC 1989, the Declaration of the World Summit for Children of 1990 and the Millennium 
Development Goals 2000, the 2008 revision aimed at re-emphasising the five pillars of child 
rights: the right to life and survival, development, protection, participation, and non-
discrimination. 
The 2008 Policy provides a situational analysis, raises issues, and espouses policy statements 
for these five pillars of child rights to which it is dedicated. It also recognises that the 
HIV/AIDs pandemic, family breakdown, gender violence, poverty, hunger, and drought have 
 
761 A good policy needs to be founded on evidence, be legitimate, have political and financial feasibility and 
address the key challenges in the policy area. The argument is drawn from Suleman Sumra, Will the '2014 
Education and Training Policy' prepare Tanzanian children to face challenges of the 21st century?: HakiElimu 
position paper on the education and training policy 2014 (Dar es Salaam: HakiElimu, October 2015), at pp. 17-
20. 
762 United Republic of Tanzania, Ministry of Community Development, Gender and Children, “Child 
Development Policy” (Second edition) (March 2008: English version 2010). 
763 Ministry of Science and Technology, National Education and Training Policy, 2014 (Dar es Salaam: 
Government Printers, 2014). 
764 Ministry Labour, Employment and Youth Development, National Youth Development Policy, 2007 (Dar es 
Salaam, Tanzania: Government Publishers, 2007). 
765 Ministry of Health, Community Development, Gender, Elderly and Children, The National Health Policy 
(Dar es Salaam: Government Printers, 2017). 
766 The Prime Ministers Office, National HIV/AIDS Policy (Dar es Salaam: Government Printers, 2001). 
767 See Paragraph 4 of the United Republic of Tanzania, Ministry of Community Development, Gender and 




led to increased numbers of orphans and vulnerable children.768 For the care of these children, 
the Policy advocates for family life through returning children to their families or 
strengthening community-based or societal systems of care.769 
The Policy underlines the significance of alternative care for children without parental care. 
This is apparent in the Policy’s devotion to realising the child’s fundamental rights observed 
through the five pillars it is founded on. The right to alternative care is underscored by the 
Policy’s focus on children’s rights, evident in the call for enactment and amendment of laws 
that promote and protect children’s rights. It is also seen in the recommendations on signing 
and ratifying international and regional instruments on children’s rights.770 Commendable is 
the call for coordination of children’s issues through a comprehensive institutional 
framework, and for linking the 2008 Policy with other national policies to establish an 
extensive policy framework for children.771 
4.3.2 National Guidelines, Strategies and Action Plans 
A considerable body of documents has been prepared and adopted with a direct or indirect 
focus on improving child welfare in Tanzania. These include guidelines, strategies, and action 
plans. These texts build on the policy framework because they are either groundwork for or 
extensions of national policies. They are usually drafted and adopted by government 
ministries departments with the help of public and private stakeholders. As part of the policy 
framework, this part briefly discusses select crucial documents affecting children’s right to 
alternative care. 
4.3.2.1 National Strategy for Growth and Poverty Reduction (NSGPR) I & II  
The National Strategy for Growth and Poverty Reduction (NSGPR), popularly known as 
MKUKUTA in Tanzania, was a development-specific policy crafted and used throughout the 
fourth phase government from 2005 to 2015.772 It had two five-year phases of 
implementation, from 2005/2006 to 2009/2010 and 2011/2012 to 2014/2015.773 The strategy 
presented the government’s commitment to accelerate economic growth and fight poverty in 
Tanzania. The intent to fulfil such a commitment lies in its design to realise Millennium 
 
768 Ibid., paragraph 51. 
769 Ibid., paragraphs 48 and 51, at pp. 18 and 20, respectively. 
770 Ibid., paragraphs 61 and 64, pp. 24–27. 
771 Ibid., paragraphs 62, 64, 78 and Chapter 7, 25-26; 28-29. 
772 MKUKUTA is the acronym of the Strategy in Kiswahili whose long form is: Mpango wa Kukuza Uchumi na 
Kuondoa Umaskini Tanzania. 
773 Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs, The National Strategy for Growth and Poverty Reduction 
(NSGPR) II, above footnote 773.Vice President's Office, United Republic of Tanzania, The National Strategy for 




Development Goals 2015774 and the Tanzania Development Vision 2025.775 The ultimate goal 
of this policy framework was to transform Tanzania into a middle-income country with a 
competitive and robust economy, good governance, high quality of life, high standards of 
education and learning, peace, stability, and unity.776 This strategy has inspired the spirit of 
legislation, policy, and government function during the two phases and beyond. 
MKUKUTA I & II share the same envisaged development outcomes arranged in clusters with 
specific goals. Cluster II of the strategy in both phases addressed the improvement of quality 
of life and social well-being. Goals under this cluster were, among other things, the 
improvement of children’s well-being and social protection, including orphans and vulnerable 
children.777 Specifically concerning vulnerable children without family care, the strategy 
aimed to strengthen social protection measures to remove unacceptable levels of insecurity 
and deprivation. It advocated for social assistance programmes and safety nets to protect the 
vulnerable. Although not articulated, it is implied that alternative care for children deprived of 
parental care, including child adoption, is envisioned within the operational targets of the 
strategy. 
4.3.2.2 National Costed Plan of Action for Most Vulnerable Children (NCPA) I & II 
Most vulnerable children (MVC) include children living in child-headed and elderly-headed 
households, orphans, disabled children, and children living with a parent in destitute 
conditions.778 Tanzania’s government realised that the number of MVC was increasing due to 
extreme poverty, the effects of the HIV/AIDs epidemic, and social disintegration. Such socio-
economic challenges have weakened traditional care systems involving the extended family 
and the community. This has affected the availability of care, support, and protection for 
children in need. In response, the government devised NCPA I & II (2007-2010 and 2011-
2013), which established a framework of strategic actions to improve standards of service, 
service delivery, and harnessing of resources for the care, support, and protection of MVC. 
The NCPAs also recognised and sought to review, amend, reform, or harmonise laws, 
policies, guidelines, strategies, and programmes related to MVC. These instclude the law of 
 
774 United Nations Millennium Declaration: A/RES/55/2 (18 September 2000). 
775 United Republic of Tanzania, Planning Commission, Tanzania Development Vision 2025 (Dar es Salaam: 
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776 Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs, The National Strategy for Growth and Poverty Reduction 
(NSGPR) II, above footnote 773, p. 1. 
777 See Goal 3 and 6 of Cluster II, ibid., pp. 70–82. 
778 Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, Department of Social Welfare, “The National Costed Plan of Action 
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the child, national child development, health, and HIV/AIDs policies, MKUKUTA I & II, 
Millennium Development Goals and Development Vision 2025. 
Both of the NCPAs strongly advocated for family-based care for children deprived of parental 
care. They prioritised reunification with birth families where tenable, followed by care within 
the extended family and community-based care. Where the mentioned measures proved 
unavailable, their emphasis was on promoting child adoption for children without families.779 
Realising that most children within the MVC group may need short- or long-term alternative 
care, the NCPAs provided a strategic plan for their social protection.780 
4.3.2.3 National Guidelines for Improving Quality Care, Support and Protection for 
Most Vulnerable Children in Tanzania  
In 2009 the Department of Social Welfare adopted guidelines to direct public and private 
stakeholders in the care, support, and protection of most vulnerable children (MVC) in 
Tanzania. The Guidelines are meant to help stakeholders to improve the quality of essential 
services to the most vulnerable children and provide them without variation in content and 
quality. The demand for guidelines, and for the NCPA, arose from the increase in the number 
of most vulnerable children in Tanzania due to socio-economic factors, such as extreme 
household income poverty, effects of the HIV/AIDs epidemic, family breakdown, and 
weakening of the kinship and community-based care that had catered for these children in the 
past.781 
The Guidelines are a progression from the 2003 Guidelines for Community Based Care, 
Support and Protection of the MVC, which replaced the 1994 National Guidelines and 
Strategies for Care of Orphans. The National Framework on Quality Standards of Care for 
Service Provision to Most Vulnerable Children 2008 and thematic areas of NCPA I (2007-
2010) gave a base to the eight key service areas that require quality improvement under the 
2009 guidelines.782 The guidelines provide two service areas that promote family-based 
alternative care for children deprived of family care, family-based care and support, and social 
protection and security.783 Provisions under these two areas state formal foster care and child 
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adoption as measures available in Tanzania to ensure a child is cared for in a family 
environment. 
4.3.2.4 National Plan of Action to End Violence Against Women and Children in 
Tanzania (NPA-VAWC) 
Recognising that violence against women and children is rampant in Tanzania and that past 
efforts to end it have not succeeded, the government adopted the NPA-VAWC in December 
2016.784 The plan of action responds to Tanzania’s commitment to end all forms of violence 
against women and children as promulgated in international, regional, and national 
instruments. Also, targets under the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 2030, African 
Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want, and Tanzania Development Vision 2025 provided stimuli 
for the preparation and adoption of NPA-VAWC. Tanzania’s status as a pathfinder country in 
the Global Partnership to End Violence Against Children played a central role in securing this 
plan. 
NPA-VAWC is a plan that has taken centre stage in implementation after the NCPAs, which 
concluded in 2013. Relating but differing from the NCPAs, NPA-VAWC’s agenda focuses on 
building systems that will prevent all forms of violence against women and children and 
respond to the plight of the victims. The plan creates a framework that identifies eight 
thematic areas in which operational targets are set with specific implementation approaches, 
plans, and strategies. In thematic area six, which is geared towards response and support 
services for victims of violence, alternative care is on the list of priority actions for children at 
risk of or victimised by violence.785 It is recognised that care may be temporary or permanent 
depending on the situation in each case. Also, that the most suitable kind of alternative care 
must be determined in each case. This can include adopting children who have suffered 
violence, in order to permanently remove them from the violent environment.  
4.4 Legal Requirements for Child Adoption in Tanzania 
Under the Law of the Child Act and its Regulations, the child adoption framework establishes 
criteria for persons who can adopt and children who can be adopted. The criteria are vital to 
assist the involved actors in determining the adoptability of a child and the eligibility of the 
adopter. Also, they help ensure that child adoption is the most suitable option and, in the 
child’s best interest.  
 
784 United Republic of Tanzania. Ministry of Health, Community Development, Gender, Elderly and Children, 
“National Plan of Action to End Violence Against Women and Children in Tanzania (NPA-VAWC) 2017/18 – 
2012/22”, pp. 2–3. 




The Act envisages different types of adoption. These include adoption by birth parents, 
relatives, resident Tanzanians, non-resident Tanzanians, and resident non-Tanzanians. This 
chapter discusses the law and procedure on child adoption. However, there will be a particular 
emphasis on adoptions by non-resident Tanzanians and resident non-Tanzanians, as they form 
the special focus of this study.  
4.4.1 Child Adoptability 
Determining the adoptability of a child requires proving that adoption is the most suitable care 
option for the child. The test of adoptability should not end at suitability but extend to the 
necessity of adoption. Adoptability is not just a legal concept but takes into account social, 
psychological, medical, and emotional elements of child welfare. Thus, an adoptable child is 
one whose legal and psycho-social status makes it clear that adoption is required and is 
potentially beneficial.786 
The adoptability of a child is a central question demanding an answer before any decision to 
adopt is made. Surprisingly, all principal legal instruments on this matter, including the 
UNCRC, ACRWC, and the Law of the Child Act, 2009, lack a definition of child 
adoptability. Instead, one can deduce its meaning by assessing their general provisions 
relevant to this matter. For example, Articles 21 of the UNCRC and Article 24 of the 
ACRWC emphasise that competent authorities must determine adoptability based on 
established procedure and relevant and reliable information on the child’s status and the 
child’s parents, guardians, and relatives. Thus, in these Articles, adoptability means that after 
considering all factors, adoption is the best option to secure and protect a child in need of 
alternative care. This part explores criteria under the Law of the Child Act and Regulations 
that establish a child’s adoptability. 
4.4.2 Adopter’s Eligibility 
Who may adopt? Eligibility means satisfying a particular set of criteria that gives a person the 
right to do or obtain something. Unfortunately, neither the UNCRC nor the ACRWC, the 
principal international and regional instruments regarding child welfare, define a person 
eligible to adopt. State parties have the reserved mandate to define and set criteria for 
eligibility to adopt in their laws. The Law of the Child Act, 2009 and Regulations made under 
it provide such criteria for Tanzania. However, it is significant to note that determination of 
eligibility does not end at ability but instead extends to suitability to adopt. Hence, apart from 
 





fulfilling legal conditions, social workers investigate every prospective adopter to determine 
their suitability to adopt.  
4.4.3 Criteria for Adoptability and Eligibility to Adopt  
Like many other African countries, Tanzania has numerous criteria for establishing who is 
adoptable and who may adopt.787 However, the criteria set in the law and procedure for child 
adoption under the Law of the Child Act and its Regulations are not exhaustive. This is 
because the final decision on the adoptability of a particular child may also depend on other 
factors not necessarily mentioned in the law, for example, opinions presented by social 
welfare officers.  The law tasks these officers to conduct a social investigation where their 
professional knowledge, skills, and experience become vital in determining the suitability for 
adoption of both children and applicants. This means that even though there are general legal 
criteria for consideration before approving an adoption, the specific administrative 
considerations may be broad and may vary from case to case. However, this part focuses only 
on criteria found under the Act and its Regulations. Administrative considerations are 
explained in chapter six. 
4.4.3.1 Status of the Child 
The status of a child who qualifies for adoption varies depending on the type of adoption 
envisioned. Two factors are decisive for this, i.e. whether the adoption is open or closed and 
whether the adopter is Tanzanian or not. Under sections 54(3) and 55(2) of the Law of the 
Child Act, open adoption is restricted to relatives. In other words, an open adoption is a form 
of child adoption where only relatives of the child are permitted to adopt. Section 3 of the 
Law of the Child Act recognises grandparents, brothers, sisters, cousins, uncles, aunts, or any 
other member of the extended family as a child’s relatives.788 This definition is wide enough 
to include the extended family, regardless of how its membership is construed in Tanzania’s 
numerous ethnic groups. The implication is to extend the responsibility of care to other family 
members beyond the nuclear family so that a child remains connected to his or her family 
roots. Apart from this, the Act and Regulations on child adoption do not specifically establish 
the status of a child eligible for open adoption beyond being a relative of the adopter. 
 Closed adoption, among other things, involves adopting non-related children. Section 24 of 
the Law of the Child Act qualifies children for adoption under this type to include those put 
under a care or supervision order whose parent, guardian, or relative do not show any interest 
in their welfare while the order subsists. In other words, in the Tanzanian context, closed 
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adoption applies to children who do not find care within the extended family. Children placed 
under care or supervision orders include those suffering or likely to suffer significant harm 
based on circumstances described under section 16 of the Law of the Child Act. The section 
mentions seventeen circumstances which make children subject to the sort of environment 
that presents nothing but danger to them. 
According to section 137 (1) of the Act, children exposed to significant harm may be placed 
in approved residential homes or institutions as an immediate protective measure, pending 
suitable placement in family-based care. Such children can be placed in foster care or may 
qualify for adoption if this best serves their interests.789 Previously adopted children are 
eligible for re-adoption as stipulated under section 63 of the Act. However, the law does not 
provide grounds for re-adoption. However, it can be assumed that in cases of re-adoption the 
same grounds apply as those for adoption, i.e. to provide a child in need of care and protection 
with a family-based environment. Therefore, the non-relative status of children in closed 
adoptions goes hand in hand with the circumstances described in this paragraph.  
To be adoptable by a resident non-Tanzanian, a child has to meet further criteria. First, he or 
she must acquire the status of a child adoptable under closed adoption unless the non-
Tanzanian adopter is a relative of the child. Second, according to section 74(1) of the Act, for 
the child to be adopted by a resident non-Tanzanian, there must be further proof that such a 
child cannot be placed in a foster or adoptive family or be cared for in any manner that is in 
the child’s best interests while the child is in Tanzania. Here, the section attempts to 
incorporate the principle of continuity in a child’s upbringing and the child’s ethnic, religious, 
cultural, and linguistic background. It, therefore, makes adoptions by resident non-Tanzanians 
a measure of last resort and considers continued upbringing in Tanzania in the Tanzanian 
child’s best interest. 
4.4.3.2 Best Interests of the Child 
Regulation 3 of the Adoption of Children Regulations names the child’s best interests as the 
paramount consideration in making any decisions concerning child adoption. It means that a 
child is adoptable only when it is proven that adoption is in his or her best interest.790 A two-
part test is required to determine whether adoption is in the child’s best interest. The first part 
takes place before declaring a child free for adoption. According to regulation 48(1) (b) of the 
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Child Protection Regulations, social welfare officers, while preparing a long-term care plan as 
part of care order proceedings, may recommend that a child be freed for adoption on the basis 
of their assessment of the child’s case. At this point, the officers would have already 
determined child adoption as the most suitable option and thus in the child’s best interest. 
The second part takes place before the court grants an adoption order. With the assistance of a 
social investigation report, the court determines whether adoption is in the child’s best 
interest. The social investigation report, as provided for in sections 59(2) (b), 74(3), 74(4) (b), 
and 75(2) (d) of the Law of the Child Act, 2009 and Regulation 11 of the Adoption of 
Children Regulations, 2012, is a vital document in every adoption proceeding that assists the 
court in best interest determination.  
Criteria for determining whether adoption is in the child’s best interest are provided under 
Regulation 3(a)-(e) of the Adoption of Children Regulations. The social investigation report 
template (A.C. Form No. 7) also guides social welfare officers in ascertaining whether 
adoption is in the child’s best interest.791 Further details on the best interest of the child 
principle regarding its interpretation, determination, and application in practice follow in 
chapters five and six of this thesis.  
4.4.3.3 Consent 
Free and informed consent is a core prerequisite for adoption. Several persons are required to 
give consent before the court can make an adoption order. First, section 57 of the Act and 
regulation 5(1) of Adoption of Children Regulations require consent from those who have a 
direct connection with and authority over the child. These include any parent, guardian, or 
relative of the child. Second, the requirement of consent extends to any person the court 
considers as having rights or responsibilities in respect of the child under an agreement or 
court order. These persons must consent as required by section 58(1) of the Law of the Child 
Act, 2009, regulation 49 of the Child Protection Regulations, and rule 99 of the Juvenile 
Court Rules, 2016. Third, sections 56(1) (c) and 58(2) require the consent of an applicant’s 
spouse where the other spouse has solely applied for adoption. Lastly, the prospective 
adoptive child must also consent to the adoption. Section 59(1) (c) of the Act and regulation 
5(3) of the Adoption of children Regulations makes such consent mandatory if the child is at 
least fourteen years of age, provided he or she has sufficient maturity to understand the 
meaning and effects of adoption and is capable of expressing an opinion. 
 




Consent, both parental and by the child, must be informed. According to section 59 (1) of the 
Act, informed parental consent means that the parents understand the effects of adoption, 
especially permanent deprivation of parental rights. Regulation 5(5) of the Adoption of 
Children Regulations requires commissioners for oaths or consular officers, before whom 
consent is given, to explain the effects of adoption to persons giving parental consent before 
they give their consent. For child consent, regulation 11(7) of the Adoption of Children 
Regulations requires social welfare officers to explain to the prospective adoptee the meaning 
and effects of adoption in a manner that the child can understand.  
The Adoption of Children Regulations, 2012 under regulation 5(1) and (2) stipulate that it is 
the applicant’s obligation to obtain consent. However, regulation 49(1) of the Child Protection 
Regulations, 2014, places the duty to obtain parental consent on the social welfare officer in 
charge of the child’s case. This procedure is applicable in care order proceedings before a 
juvenile court, where the care plan is for adoption. Thus, in cases where there are no care 
order proceedings for the child, applicants need to obtain parental consent on their own.792 
This discrepancy in the law exists due to different timelines in enacting the Regulations and 
lack of their harmonisation.  
Regulation 5(4) of the Adoption of Children Regulations sets requirements for valid consent. 
It must be in writing and signed before a commissioner for oaths or consular officer if 
obtained abroad. In the case of care order proceedings, regulation 49(2) of the Child 
Protection Regulations provides that consent must be signed in the presence of a magistrate of 
the Juvenile Court. Parental consent must be in the format set out under A.C. Form No. 3 
available in the Adoption of Children Regulations’ Schedule. However, the Regulations do 
not provide a format for an adoptee’s consent. 
This part notes how fundamental consent is in child adoption. Thus, the law allows 
withdrawal of consent. This provision provides an opportunity to a parent or a child who has 
appraised him or herself of the nature of adoption to reconsider their decision. Parents may 
accept adoption of their children in the belief that they stand to benefit from their adopted 
children in the future and do not lose their parental ties altogether. The opportunity to 
withdraw consent caters for such a scenario to avoid parents becoming victims of their 
ignorance. Under regulation 6 of the Adoption of Children Regulations, withdrawal is 
possible within sixty days after the date of consent. The withdrawal of parental consent must 
 
792 Although, as explained in chapter three, application for a care order is required under the law for children 
who cannot remain in the care of their relatives or voluntary care of a local government authority, it is a process 




be in a format set out in A.C Form No. 5 of the Schedule to the Adoption of Children 
Regulations. Although the Regulations do not provide a format for a child’s consent, they do 
provide one for withdrawal of consent, in A.C Form No. 6.  
Notwithstanding the significance of parental consent in child adoption, the court can dispense 
with it in four scenarios. These scenarios are found in different provisions of the Act and 
Regulations, these being section 57(2) (a) - (b) of the Law of the Child Act, regulation 7(1) 
(a)- (c) of the Adoption of Children Regulations, regulation 50 (1) and (2) of the Child 
Protection Regulations, and rule 99 (2) and (5) of the Juvenile Court Rules. 793 The court 
dispenses with the consent requirement, first, when it is satisfied that the parent, guardian, or 
relative has neglected or persistently ill-treated the child. In this case, it does not matter that 
the parent, guardian, or relative refuses to consent; to safeguard the child’s best interest, the 
court elects to forego the requirement. Second, consent can also be dispensed with when no 
person with parental rights and responsibilities for the child is known or can be located. This 
scenario is common in cases of lost or abandoned children. Third, consent is waived when the 
available person lacks the capacity to consent. Legal or mental challenges may be the cause of 
such incapacity. And fourth, the consent requirement may be set aside when consent is 
unreasonably withheld. If the court determines that there is no valid ground for the parent to 
deny consent to adoption, it applies its discretion in deciding whether to dispense with it. 
Regulation 7(2)-(5) of the Adoption of Children Regulations, regulation 50(3) of the Child 
Protection Regulations and rule 99(3), (4), (6) and (7) of the Juvenile Court Rules give 
detailed criteria for the court to consider in dispensing with consent. While exercising its 
discretion, the court is aided by written and oral reports submitted by the appointed social 
welfare officer regarding the child’s best interests.794 The court must also consider that any 
delays in making decisions on a child’s care are only justified if in the child’s best interest.795 
4.4.3.4 Age Requirement 
Section 2 of the Adoption of Children Regulations provides the age limit for adoption. 
Together with other relevant sections of the Act, this section defines a child as a person below 
the apparent age of eighteen years.796 The use of the word ‘apparent’ may be explained by the 
provisions of regulation 9 of the Adoption of Children Regulations, in which the court is 
 
793 The Child Protection Regulations, 2014 and Juvenile Court Rules, 2016 provide on dispensing with consent 
in respect of applications for a care order where the care plan is for adoption and the child needs to be freed for 
adoption.  
794 Regulation 7(6) of the Adoption of Children Regulations, regulation 50(3) of the Child Protection Regulations 
and rule 99(8) of the Juvenile Court Rules. 
795 Regulation 7(7) of the Adoption of Children Regulations and rule 99(9) of the Juvenile Court Rules. 





required to determine the child’s age for adoption purposes. The court should consider a birth 
certificate or a certificate signed by a medical officer attesting to the child’s age as sufficient 
proof of that age. However, there can be situations where the child’s age has not been proved 
to the court’s satisfaction. In that case, in accordance with section 70(1) (a) of the Law of the 
Child Act, the court can determine the probable date of birth for adoption purposes.  
The law sets age restrictions for adopters. Section 56(1) (a) of the Act permits adoption by an 
applicant whose age is at least twenty-five years old. Further, that applicant must be at least 
twenty-one years older than the prospective adoptee. For example, an adoption of a ten-year-
old child by a person who is twenty-five years old is not possible. In such a case, the adopter 
must be at least thirty-one years old. However, there is an exception when the adoption is by a 
relative. In that case, section 56(1) (b) maintains the same minimum age limit of twenty-five 
years but does not limit the age difference between adopter and adoptee to at least twenty-one 
years. Therefore, it is possible for a relative who is twenty-five years old to adopt a child aged 
ten. In either case, if it is a joint application, at least one of the applicants should meet the age 
requirement. The age restrictions are intended, among others, to ensure the adopters are of 
sufficient maturity to fully understand and commit to their new parental rights and 
responsibilities. However, some lenience exists for relatives because the children still remain 
in the care of their extended families.  
The age restrictions include the maximum age for adopters, which regulation 12 (1) of the 
Adoption of Children Regulations sets as fifty years. For applicants beyond this age, the court 
has the discretion to decide whether to grant the adoption or not. There is a presumption that 
the adoption of a child below ten years of age by such an applicant would not be in the child’s 
best interest. That notwithstanding, the court may take into account other considerations to 
arrive at the most appropriate conclusion, such as a social investigation report signifying 
otherwise. 
Where the adopter is the biological mother or father of the child, no age requirement is 
prescribed in the law.  
4.4.3.5 Marital Status 
Section 55(1) of the Law of the Child Act specifies that an adoption application may be made 




her spouse. Section 56(4) categorically prohibits authorisation of adoption to joint applicants 
who do not fit these categories.797 
The other envisaged type of adoption applicants is those who apply to adopt individually. For 
instance, one spouse can apply to adopt a child. In that case, section 56(1) (c) requires the 
other spouse’s consent to the adoption. This is practical because the law assumes that the 
adopted child will still be under the influence of the non-adopting spouse. As for a sole male 
applicant, section 56(2) of the Law of the Child Act restricts adoption unless the man is 
adopting his son. In other words, a male person cannot adopt another man’s child or his own 
daughter unless exceptional circumstances warrant the order. The subsection omits to specify 
whether the male applicant can be single or must be married. However, the law gives a 
specific green light for single Tanzanian women who wish to adopt, as section 56(1)(d) of the 
Act stipulates. By referring to Tanzanian single women, the law excludes non-Tanzanian 
single women from adopting in the country. Yet, lack of a similar precision under section 
56(2) means that a single non-Tanzanian man may apply to adopt his son or any other child 
when special circumstances permit. For open adoption, there are no such restrictions. 
According to section 55(2), a relative, in the singular, may apply to adopt a child. No specific 
reference to the relative’s marital status is provided under the Act and Regulations, nor does 
the law distinguish between female and male relatives. 
The law does not provide the rationale for these restrictions on closed adoptions. However, it 
may lie in the socio-cultural perceptions of Tanzanian society.798 Marriage is honoured in 
Tanzania. A married person acquires an elevated status in society that goes along with respect 
and trust. Some laws endorse this social value, for instance by emphasising the difference 
between children born in and out of lawful wedlock.799 Numerous Tanzanians still frown 
 
797 The wording of the subsection could lead to a mistaken interpretation. While it intends to limit joint 
applications to a married couple, it uses the words “husband and wife or father and mother” which creates an 
impression that the father and mother applying together need not be married. 
798 Interviews with social welfare officers and random members of the public who shared their opinions on these 
matters during field research in Tanzania form the basis for this information. 
799 Affiliation of illegitimate children is still required and practised under customary law and is recognised by 
section 35(c) of the Law of the Child Act. Also, despite the promotion and protection of children’s rights under 
the Act, it fails to erase all discrimination between legitimate and illegitimate children. For instance, such 
discrimination can clearly be observed in their inheritance rights in relation to their parents’ estates. While 
section 10 of the Law of the Child Act, 2009 recognises children’s right to enjoyment of their parent’s estate, 
section 36(4) of the Act subjects inheritance rights of a child born out of wedlock to their father’s religious 
beliefs. Depending on the professed religion, in an intestate devolution of property, a child born out of wedlock 
may not be eligible to inherit. In Islam for example, illegitimate children are excluded from inheriting (see Surat 
An-Nisaai of the Holy Qur’an). For further discussion on the inheritance rights of illegitimate children under 
Islamic law, see Mustafa M. Mzee, “Islamic Law of Inheritance: The Case of Illegitimate Child and Possibility 
of Having an Assets of Deceased Father: A Tanzanian Case Study”, Journal of Law, Policy and Globalization, 




upon single parenting. This practice is discouraged on the basis of customary and religious 
laws. To beget a child outside a legally, customarily, or religiously recognised relationship is 
immoral or sinful in the eyes of many people.800 Following the same logic, a single man may 
not be trusted to take care of children, especially female ones, as this may lead to sexual 
relations. A single woman is trusted on the basis of society’s conviction that women possess a 
natural nurturing character enabling them to care for children. It is probably due to these same 
socio-legal perceptions that non-Tanzanian single persons are not allowed to adopt a child, 
except for a man adopting his own son. 
Section 55(1) (b) raises an interesting question in respect of the marital status of adopters. It 
allows a father or mother of a child to apply for adoption either individually or jointly with his 
or her spouse. However, it does not explain why a mother or father would adopt her or his 
child or why they would adopt the child jointly with their spouse. This issue has been touched 
on in chapter two of this thesis in the context of child adoption by relatives. In a nutshell, 
biological parents can adopt their children to legitimate their relationship. In the case of a 
child born out of wedlock, they may apply separately or together with their new spouses. It 
can also be done to strengthen parent-child legal ties, especially for single parents. A single 
mother, for instance, could adopt her child to ensure that the father’s relatives do not lay a 
legal claim to her child in the future. Of course, the father, if alive and known, must consent 
to the adoption. Biological parents adopting their children is not common in Tanzania, nor 
easily understood in the context of customary and religious laws. There are special 
requirements and procedures in those laws for affiliating an ‘illegitimate’ child to the parents 
and their wider families.801  
Considering that the requirement of married status for joint adoptions excludes numerous 
persons from adopting in Tanzania, Section 58(3) of the Law of the Child Act becomes an 
alarming provision. It prohibits adoption orders in favour of any person referred to under 
section 55 of the Act if such a person “practices or is of the civil relationship or marriage”. 
Civil relationship or marriage is not defined under the Act. However, civil marriage is defined 
 
800 Emily A. Onyango, “Single Parenthood”, Transformation: An International Journal of Holistic Mission 
Studies 19(1) (2002): pp. 80–82; Kolawole O. Paul, “The Church and Single Parenting in Africa”, International 
Journal of Social Science and Economics 1(1) (2021): p15; Abiodun Olayiwola, Adekunle Olowonmi, 
“Mothering Children in Africa: Interrogating Single Parenthood in African Literature”, Cadernos de Estudos 
Africanos (25) (2013): pp. 141–59; “Surviving and thriving as single mothers”, The Citizen (Saturday, 09th June 
2018). 
801 Customary laws on child affiliation in Tanzania differ from one ethnic group to another and keep evolving. 
For a discussion of religious law on child affiliation, see Isa A.-R. Sarumi, Azizah b. Mohd, Norliah b. Ibrahim, 
“A Polemical Discourse over the Legitimation of Illegitimate Children under Islamic Law”, IIUM Law Journal 




under Sections 25 and 29 of the Law of Marriage Act, 1971 as a marriage ceremony where a 
government official solemnises the marriage. It is an entirely valid marriage in the eyes of the 
law in Tanzania, and for some other jurisdictions (such as Germany)802 the only kind 
warranting official recognition.  
Interpreting the sub-section to refer to this type of marital union becomes an absurdity. If one 
attempts to deduce the drafter’s intention, it would have made more sense if reference was 
being made to civil partnerships. The problem is that Tanzania does not recognise or permit 
civil partnerships as conceptualised and practised in other jurisdictions. Practising civil 
partnerships in Tanzania would amount to a criminal offence under sections 154 and 157 of 
the Penal Code.803 This may have been the basis for the provision. Nevertheless, no provision 
in the Act directly refers to an applicant’s or a child’s sexual orientation.804 
4.4.3.6 Residence Requirement 
Section 56(3) (a) of the Law of the Child Act requires adoption orders to be granted only in 
respect of a child and an applicant who reside in Tanzania. Since this Law applies only in 
Mainland Tanzania, its provisions do not extend to children or applicants residing in Zanzibar. 
The meaning of the word residence is not given under the Act. Rwezaura and Wanitzek say 
that it is difficult to define the term residence without particular consideration of the legal 
context in which it is applied.805 Quoting Bromley, the authors define residence as a person’s 
physical presence in a territory with the aim of remaining there for an extended period 
sufficient to make the presence non-transitory.806  
Under the same sub-section, the law exempts Tanzanians who are living abroad from the 
residence requirement. They can adopt a child from home provided they fulfil other 
conditions in the Act. Non-Tanzanians, however, must be residents in Tanzania to be eligible 
as child adopters. Section 74(1) (b) of the Law of the Child Act requires a minimum of three 
years consecutive residence before a non-citizen can adopt a child. It is unlikely that anyone 
would come to reside in Tanzania for three years only to fulfil the adoption conditions. This 
 
802 According to section 1310 of the German Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch -BGB) (1896, entered into 
force on 01.01.1900) a valid marriage in Germany is that which is officiated by a duly certified registrar of 
marriages and which usually takes place at the civil registry office or 'Standesamt'. Foreign marriages concluded 
in other forms are also recognised in Germany subject to certain conditions. For further details, visit 
https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/konsularisches/eheschliessung-node. 
803 In Tanzania, it is a penal offence for a person to have carnal knowledge of any person against the order of 
nature. See sections 154 and 157 of The Penal Code [Cap 16 R.E 2019]. 
804 Further details on sexual orientation and eligibility to adopt in most African countries are given in African 
Child Policy Forum (ACPF), Africa: The New Frontier for Intercountry Adoption, above footnote 91, at pp. 23-
24. 
805 Rwezaura, Wanitzek, “The Law and Practice Relating to the Adoption of Children in Tanzania”, above 





requirement, therefore, targets those who, for various other reasons, already live in the 
country. The rationale behind this residence requirement is to ensure that the non-citizen 
adopters understand Tanzania’s culture and environment. This understanding may assist in 
adhering to the desirability of continuity in a child’s upbringing and the child’s ethnic, 
religious, cultural, and linguistic background. 
4.4.3.7 Fostering Requirement 
Foster care is defined under section 3 of the Law of the Child Act to mean temporary care and 
protection for a child provided voluntarily by a family or an individual not related to the child. 
According to section 56(3) (b) of the Act, no court shall grant an adoption order unless the 
child has been in the continuous care of the applicant for a minimum of six consecutive 
months before a child adoption application is submitted. This requirement is meant to allow 
the prospective adopter to bond with the child and get to know him or her well so that the 
decision to adopt is fully informed. For resident non-Tanzanians, section 74(1) (c) shortens 
the period to a minimum of three months. Apart from shortening the foster period, and unlike 
the above provision, section 74 does not say that the child should be in the continuous care of 
the applicant during these three months. Also, it is significant to note that only section 74(1) 
(c) refers to the pre-adoption care period as a foster period.  
Section 59(5) imposes a further pre-adoption foster care condition in relation to the adoption 
order. It specifies that an adoption order shall not be granted for any child unless there is 
proof that the child has been in the continuous care and custody of the petitioner for at least 
three consecutive months immediately before the order. Therefore, once the petitioner fulfils 
the pre-adoption care requirement and obtains the Commissioner’s approval to adopt the 
child, the child must still remain in their continuous care (to ensure there is at least three 
months continuous care before the order). The Act and Regulations do not specify whether the 
three months stipulated are additional to the required foster care period before submitting a 
child adoption petition. Thus, the aggregate duration of pre-adoption care required before the 
adoption order is issued remains uncertain. It probably depends on how long it takes before 
the adoption order is granted. For instance, if it does not take long then the initial pre-adoption 
care period may satisfy section 59(5). However, if it takes about a year before the order is 
issued, circumstances may change. For example, in the case of a non-resident Tanzanian who 
fosters the child for six months before petitioning the court for an adoption order, they could 
be forced to return to their country of residence for employment or business engagements 
before the order is issued. The subsection implies that, if this occasions a break in the 




continuous care before the order can be granted. In addition, there is a prescribed sixty-day 
waiting period before the court can issue an adoption order provided under regulation 13(3) of 
the Adoption of Children Regulations. This is a two-month grace period during which parents 
or guardians may withdraw their consent to the adoption. Again, the Act and Regulations do 
not specify how these durations interact with each other. However, it is reasonable to assume 
that the required period of continuous care before the order runs concurrently with the 
stipulated grace period.  
The definition of foster care given above implies that relatives applying for open adoption are 
not bound by the foster care requirement since it is a practice for non-relatives. However, this 
exception is not expressed anywhere in the Act or Regulations. Instead, there is a requirement 
under section 54(2) of the Act and regulation 21(2) of the Adoption of Children Regulations 
for open adoption to follow the procedures and conditions set under the Act and Regulations. 
The pre-adoption foster care practice in open adoption is discussed further in chapter six. 
It is significant to note that the Act and Regulations do not expressly require pre-adoption 
foster care to be done within Tanzania; and that regulation 60(5) of the Child Protection 
Regulations stipulates that the court can grant a care order for a child to live outside the 
United Republic. This means that non-resident Tanzanians may do pre-adoption care in their 
host countries, provided they apply to adopt children whose care orders permit living outside 
the United Republic. 
4.4.3.8 Suitability for Adoption  
The previous sections have discussed in detail the concept of eligibility for adoption. 
However, the law introduces another criterion known as suitability for adoption. An adoption 
application cannot be approved unless a social welfare officer determines that both the 
applicant and child are suitable for adoption. According to regulation 11(6) of the Adoption of 
Children Regulations, the obligation to determine suitability lies with a social welfare officer. 
To do this, a social welfare officer must visit the applicant’s home. Assessment of the home 
and the views of the applicant’s existing children are the cited criteria for the suitability to 
adopt assessment under regulation 11(10). Additional criteria under regulation 11(13) include 
background information about the applicant, such as criminal record and health status, as well 
as the child’s health status, and, where applicable, a description of special needs. A.C. Form 
No. 7 provides a template for a social investigation report, with further criteria for suitability 
to adopt under its paras. 2.6 and 7-12. These criteria revolve around general and personal 




In the case of the child, para 10.1 of A.C. Form No. 7 requires a social welfare officer to state 
whether the child is suitable for adoption. The officer can do so after considering the child’s 
background, care history and needs guided by questions under paras. 3-6 of A.C. Form No. 7. 
Based on the assessment, the officer is required to record under para 11 whether the child and 
the applicant(s) can be recommended for adoption.  
In adoptions by non-resident Tanzanians and resident non-Tanzanians, apart from social 
investigation under Regulation 11, additional assessment of an applicant’s suitability to adopt 
is required. Section 74(1) (e) of the Act and regulations 26(2) and 28(b) of the Adoption of 
Children Regulations demand assessment of an applicant’s suitability to adopt by a 
recognised authority or other competent authority in the applicant’s country of residence or 
origin where appropriate. The Regulations provide no procedure for obtaining such an 
assessment from abroad.  
The Law of the Child Act and the Adoption of Children Regulations do not list 
comprehensive criteria for suitability to adopt or be adopted that social welfare officers may 
uniformly adhere to. The social investigation report template (A.C. Form No. 7) is the only 
guidance available.  
4.4.3.9 Criminal Record 
Regulation 11(13) (a) of the Adoption of Children Regulations requires additional background 
information about every applicant, including criminal record. According to para 9.9 of A.C. 
Form No. 7, this background check is intended to determine whether the applicant has been 
convicted of offences that pose a danger to children. For example, the investigation will focus 
on offences related to child exploitation and sexual abuse. Persons with such a record are 
likely to be deemed unsuitable to adopt. The assumption here is that the adopted child may 
not be safe in the hands of such a person. Thus, proceeding with the adoption may be against 
the child’s best interest.  
Section 74(1) (d) of the Law of the Child Act specifically prohibits child adoption by a non-
Tanzanian with a criminal record. It is immaterial whether the crime happened in his or her 
country of origin or any other country. In attempting to be thorough, the law extends the 
investigation beyond Tanzania. In addition to the information gathered during the social 
investigation in Tanzania, regulation 28(d) of the Adoption of Children Regulations requires 
details of an applicant’s criminal record from the country of origin or residence. Further, such 
a record is not confined to child abuse but extends to other criminal issues. Regulation 26(2) 




non-resident Tanzanian has a criminal record, there is no specific ban on adopting in the law, 
unlike for resident non-Tanzanians. 
Detailed provisions on the applicant’s criminal record are necessary, especially because 
offences against children are rampant. Thus, without proper checks, adoption may end up 
being a mechanism for legally obtaining children for exploitation. Thus, strict measures 
relating to criminal records serve to promote the child’s best interest in adoption. The law, 
therefore, applies caution in automatically disqualifying a non-Tanzanian from adopting if he 
or she has a criminal record. Interestingly, however, a Tanzanian, whether resident or not, 
remains eligible despite having a criminal record unless the social welfare officer finds that 
the crime committed renders the applicant unsuitable to adopt. This is because there is no 
specific provision in the law prohibiting the adoption in such a circumstance. The court relies 
on the social investigation and the discretion of the social welfare officer. 
4.4.3.10 Subsidiarity Principle 
The word subsidiary is synonymous with subordinate. It means something is placed in or 
assigned to a lower priority, rank, class, or position.807 Regarding adoption, subsidiarity traces 
its meaning to Articles 21(b) of the UNCRC and 24(b) of the ACRWC. In these provisions, 
the subsidiarity principle requires that international adoption be an alternative child care 
measure of last resort. This means international adoption should only be considered if the 
child cannot be placed in a foster or adoptive family or cared for in any suitable manner 
within the country of origin. Tanzania maintains that it does not practise international 
adoption but allows domestic adoptions by non-citizens resident in the country. Under section 
74(1) (a) of the Law of the Child Act, the law applies this principle to child adoptions by 
resident non-Tanzanians. It qualifies the principle by adding the child’s best interests as the 
test for a suitable manner of care within Tanzania. It means adoption by a resident non-
Tanzanian should not be denied just because a child has been placed in a children’s home 
within Tanzania. The question should be, is this manner of care suitable for the child and in 
his or her best interest? The phrase ‘within Tanzania’ takes into account a possible change of 
country of residence for a child adopted by a resident non-Tanzanian, which is characteristic 
of international adoptions. Thus, it emphasises the ‘internationality factor’ in the child 
adoptions under study. 
Regulation 28(a) of the Adoption of Children Regulations requires social welfare officers to 
comprehensively inform the court of all efforts made to provide suitable alternative care for 
 




the child within Tanzania. The regulation stipulates that the information required is beyond 
what is provided in the social investigation report. Para 3 of A.C. Form No. 7 asks social 
welfare officers to provide a chronology of events that depicts interventions attempted before 
considering child adoption as a long-term solution. Further, under para 5.4 of A.C. Form No. 
7, in case of adoption by non-resident Tanzanians and resident non-Tanzanians, social welfare 
officers must give an account of national placements considered and steps taken for the child 
to be adopted within the country.  
Here some questions may arise concerning what the subsidiarity principle guards against. The 
researcher finds that it seeks to ensure, among others, compliance with the principle requiring 
due consideration of the desirability of continuity in a child’s upbringing and of the child’s 
ethnic, religious, cultural, and linguistic background. Another question arises concerning 
whether the subsidiarity principle should apply in any way to the two types of adoption that 
are regarded as domestic, considering that the UNCRC and the ACRWC apply it specifically 
to international adoption. Also, although adoptions by non-resident Tanzanians have an 
international element, the Act and the Regulations do not specifically apply the principle to 
them. Thus, it is not clear whether para 5.4 in A.C. Form No. 7 is sufficiently binding in the 
case of adoptions by non-resident Tanzanians without any provision in the Act and the 
Regulations to that effect. Further discussion on the meaning and application of the 
subsidiarity principle in child adoption practice in Tanzania follows in chapters five and six. 
4.4.3.11 Financial Gain 
Any payment or reward made, given, or received for adoption is prohibited unless sanctioned 
by the court. Section 59(1) (d) of the Law of the Child Act provides that the court may not 
grant an adoption order unless it is satisfied that the applicant has not received or agreed to 
receive any payment for the adoption, and also that no person has made or given or agreed to 
make or give any payment or reward to the applicant for the adoption unless ordered by the 
court. In addition, section 72 of the Act stipulates a general prohibition on any person giving 
or receiving payment or reward for an adoption order or any arrangement which may or may 
not lead to an adoption order unless the court approves. As per regulation 19 of the Adoption 
of Children Regulations, approved payments are limited to the costs of the petition and do not 
extend to personal gain. Contravention of the prohibition on financial gain is a criminal 
offence penalised by a maximum of five million shillings fine or two-year imprisonment term 




4.4.3.12 Recognition of Adoption Award 
An adoption order must be recognised as valid for it to take legal effect. Adoption orders 
granted by Tanzanian courts are recognised by the state and become operational upon 
issuance. The effects of the order under section 64 of the Law of the Child Act apply, and 
sections 69 and 70 confirm the transfer of parental rights and responsibilities by registering 
the adoption and providing an adoption certificate. Such recognition may not be as automatic 
in other states. Section 74(1) (f) requires the court, before issuing an adoption order for a non-
Tanzanian adopter, to prove that it will be recognised and respected in his or her country of 
origin. The burden of proof in the provision lies with the applicant. The Regulations include 
no procedure or conditions for the fulfilment of this requirement. 
Non-resident Tanzanians may adopt children in Tanzania while intending to take the children 
abroad to live with them. In this case, proof of recognition of the adoption award in the 
country in which they reside is also crucial. There is, however, no provision to such effect in 
the Act and Regulations. 
4.5 Child Adoption Procedure 
As discussed in the previous sections, the criteria for eligibility for adoption are a stepping 
stone to understanding the entire procedure for child adoption. This part clarifies each stage 
along the way to an adoption order. It depicts the involvement of various authorities mandated 
to act in the child adoption process. Based on field research findings, brief insights into 
practice at each stage are provided where necessary. 
4.5.1 Application to Adopt a Child 
Child adoption is a process that involves petitioning in a court of law. However, the child 
adoption application process culminates rather than commences with the court. Sections 56(3) 
(b), 59(5), and 74(1) (c) of the Law of the Child Act require all prospective adoptive parents 
to first foster a child for at least three or six months, depending on the circumstances, before 
lodging a child adoption petition. Therefore, an application to adopt begins with a foster care 
application. According to section 32(2) of the Law of the Child Act and regulation 4(1) of the 
Foster Care Placement Regulations, such an application must be submitted to the 
Commissioner of Social Welfare. The application must be in a prescribed form, F.C. Form 
No. 1, as provided for under Regulation 4(1) of the Foster Care Placement Regulations. A 
template of the form is available in the Regulations’ Schedule. 
Even though the application for foster care must be made to the Commissioner, it is not 




to foster a child made to the Commissioner shall be forwarded to a social welfare officer or a 
patron or manager of an approved residential home. This means that these persons may 
receive the application on behalf of the Commissioner. However, regulation 6(1) of the Foster 
Care Placement Regulations requires the Commissioner to assign to a social welfare officer 
the duty to assess the applicant(s) within seven days after receiving the application. Based on 
these provisions, the Commissioner receives all foster care applications in Tanzania and then 
specifically appoints social welfare officers to evaluate them.  
The direct top to bottom chain of command presumed in the provisions does not exist within 
the Department of Social Welfare.808 Here, the Regulations fail to build on the foundation of 
section 53(2) referred to above. They do not provide a straightforward procedure for where to 
go and whom to contact during the initial steps of an application to foster a child. However, 
during field research, it was observed that in practice social welfare officers at the ward, 
district, or municipal social welfare offices, as the case may be, are responsible for receiving 
applications on behalf of the Commissioner. Typically, an initial visit by prospective foster 
parents is to a ward or district social welfare office. One goes to the municipal or regional 
office if an area lacks a district social welfare office. Thus, where it mentions the 
Commissioner, the law is referring to the mandate of the office rather than the individual. This 
mandate is delegated to social welfare officers who discharge the requirements of the law. 
Just like in child adoption, not everyone is eligible to apply for foster care. Section 52 of the 
Law of the Child Act and regulation 5 of the Foster Care Placement Regulations give 
eligibility criteria for foster parents. A person who is not a parent of the child, who is of high 
moral character and proved integrity, and who is willing and capable of undertaking the care, 
welfare, and maintenance of the child may apply for recognition as a foster parent. According 
to Regulation 5(2) of the Foster Care Regulations, such a person should be at least twenty-one 
and not more than sixty-four years of age. For someone older than sixty-four, fostering a child 
is only possible under exceptional circumstances; the Regulations do not specify these. Both 
Tanzanian and foreign couples and single persons can foster a child in Tanzania. For 
foreigners, regulation 5(1) (c) requires residence of at least two and a half consecutive years 
before the application. However, there is no criterion regarding non-resident Tanzanian 
applicants. 
Some provisions under the Foster Care Placement Regulations delete the distinction between 
foster care as an independent alternative care measure and as a form of pre-adoption care. For 
 
808 The institutional structure of the Department of Social Welfare explained in chapter two depicts the breaks in 




instance, the eligible age for prospective adopters is set at a maximum of fifty years, while for 
foster carers is at sixty-four years. When only the age limit under the Foster Care Regulations 
is considered, an older adoption petitioner will be barred from adopting in court on the 
grounds of age. Also, regulation 12 (4) of the Foster Care Placement Regulations provides for 
the right of every foster parent to apply for adoption after six months of foster care. It 
presumes that all foster care placements should culminate in child adoption.  
4.5.2 Assessment of Applicants 
Rule 6 of the Foster Care Placement Regulations charges social welfare officers with 
conducting a thorough assessment of prospective foster parents to establish their suitability to 
care for a child. Within seven days of receiving an application, the Commissioner sets the 
assessment’s wheels into motion.  
The assessment, among others, involves visiting the applicant’s homes to investigate whether 
it is adequate for fostering. During such visits, the social welfare officers gather the views of 
resident children on the prospective foster care placement. Further, in collaboration with 
medical personnel and the police, the officers investigate whether the people residing in the 
applicant’s home have a mental illness or criminal record that may affect a foster child in any 
way. Social welfare officers, through meetings, also test the ability of the applicant to meet 
the requirements of any or a specific child.  
To complete the assessment, the officers require three written references from persons who 
have known the applicant or applicants for at least three years, vouching for their good 
character and suitability to foster a child. The references should be from a close relative, an 
immediate neighbour, and a ward, village, or street executive officer or, where appropriate, an 
employer. References of this nature may be more readily available for resident Tanzanians 
than non-resident Tanzanians or non-Tanzanians. Regulation 6 of the Foster Care Placement 
Regulations does not provide for the procedure to obtain references where applicants are non-
resident Tanzanians or non-Tanzanians. Close relatives or neighbours of such applicants, who 
have known them for at least three years, may be unavailable in Tanzania at the time when 
needed by social welfare officers for interviews. Further, the ‘at least three years’ threshold 
also contradicts Rule 5(1) (c) and (d), which makes non-Tanzanians who have been in 
Tanzania for at least two and a half years eligible to foster a child.  
Once the assessment is complete, social welfare officers must submit their report in the 




application.809According to regulation 6(8), the Commissioner, giving due regard to the 
assessment report, considers the application and informs the social welfare officer and 
applicant(s) of the decision to approve or reject the application within ninety days of receiving 
the application. 
4.5.3 Child Identification 
Foster Care Placement Regulations play a significant role in the identification of a child for 
adoption. This is so because the adoption procedure commences with an application to foster 
a child. Regulation 6(3) (b) of the Foster Care Placement Regulations stipulates that a 
prospective foster parent may apply to foster any child or a specific child. According to 
regulation 9(1) (a), it is a specific child if he or she is already identified in the foster care 
application. Under regulation 9(1) (b) and (c), it is any child if he or she is to be selected from 
those recommended or identified as potentially suitable for foster care placement by social 
welfare officers, managers, or patrons of approved residential homes or other institutions.810 
In both cases, the child must meet the criteria listed under regulation 8(1) of the Foster Care 
Placement Regulations.  
Children eligible for foster care placement under regulation 8(1) include those under a care 
order according to section 18(3) (c) of the Law of the Child Act. Further included are children 
committed to approved residential homes or institutions by a care or supervision order, by a 
social welfare officer as the most suitable place for the child or by any person in accordance 
with sections 32(1) and 53(1) (a) – (c) of the Act. Also, children in need of temporary custody 
under foster care placement according to section 53(7) of the Act are eligible. 
Children eligible for foster care placement are, however, not necessarily adoptable. The Foster 
Care Placement Regulations do not differentiate between children eligible for foster care with 
a view to adoption and those whose eligibility is limited only to foster care placement. For 
instance, children requiring temporary custody according to section 53(7) of the Act (which 
may be read together with section 104) are eligible for foster care under regulation 8(1) (e) of 
the Foster Care Placement Regulations. Nonetheless, these children may not be eligible for 
adoption. A clear distinction would be advantageous in practice. For instance, integrating 
child identification provisions under the Foster Care Placement Regulations with regulations 
49 and 50 of the Child Protection Regulations, 2014, which provide for the procedure to free 
 
809 See F.C. Form No. 2 of the Foster Care Placement Regulations. 
810 A social welfare officer in conjunction with a manager or patron of an approved residential home or 
institution may recommend a child for foster care placement according to section 32(1) of the Law of the Child 




children for adoption during care order proceedings, would be the first step towards 
establishing a distinction.  
The Foster Care Placement Regulations do not clearly state how and where a specific child in 
a foster care application is obtained. In practice, if not relatives’ children, specific children are 
those whom prospective adopters have met before deciding to adopt them. Practice shows that 
the prospective adopter and adoptee usually meet in the community or children’s home or 
institution before the adoption application. 
The Regulations do not specify how a prospective foster parent obtains a child from among 
those identified as potentially suitable for foster care. In practice, the applicants detail the 
characteristics of the child they would like to foster and ultimately adopt.811 Social welfare 
officers include this information in their assessment reports. Once the Commissioner approves 
the application, he or she issues a letter allowing the applicant to visit a children’s home or 
institution to identify a child that matches the characteristics. The letter allows the applicant to 
foster a child of their choice for adoption purposes.  
It is worth noting here that social welfare officers do not select a child for the applicants. 
Instead, the applicants get to select a child independently. This practice is purely subjective 
and depends on the applicant’s wishes and preferences. It may be criticised as not child-
centred as the determinant factor is not the child’s needs but the adopter’s preferences. It is 
the opposite of what regulation 4(3) of the Foster Care Placement Regulations suggests. This 
provision empowers managers of approved residential homes or institutions to recommend a 
specific child to be fostered by a foster parent listed in the foster parents’ register. Such a 
recommendation is based on the needs of the child, and hence more child-centred. 
4.5.4 Consent 
Once a child has been identified and meets the eligibility criteria for foster care placement, the 
next step is obtaining parental and child consent. Regulation 8(3) of the Foster Care 
Placement Regulations places on social welfare officers the duty to inform parents or 
guardians of prospective foster children on the purpose and legal effect of foster care 
placement. The objective is to ensure that parents or guardians can give their informed 
consent. Thus, the Regulations have gone a step further in the F.C. Form No. 6 under the 
Schedule to the Foster Care Regulations to provide a template for obtaining such consent.  
 






The requirement for consent extends to the prospective foster child as well. According to 
regulation 8(2) (d), social welfare officers, when practicable, are required to ascertain the 
wishes of a prospective foster child regarding the proposed foster care placement and give 
them due weight during decision-making depending on the child’s age and maturity. In other 
words, a child who can reasonably articulate his or her wishes must have a say in decisions 
concerning the placement.  
However, there are circumstances where consent may not be readily given. As provided for in 
regulation 8 (4) (a) of the Foster Care Placement Regulations, these include cases where the 
parents have neglected or persistently ill-treated the child. In such cases, the Commissioner 
has the power to dispense with the consent requirement. Further, as provided in regulation 
8(4) (b)-(d), the Commissioner may dispense with the consent requirement where parents 
cannot be located, are unable to give consent, or one or both parents withhold consent, as long 
as foster care placement, according to the social investigation report, is in the child’s best 
interest.  
Under the Law of the Child Act and its Regulations, it is unclear whether a prospective 
adopter must seek parental consent twice, first to foster and later to adopt the child. However, 
considering that the Foster Care Placement Regulations and the Adoption of Children 
Regulations lay down distinct procedures for each measure, consent, which is a requirement 
in both, may be procured at both stages. As already explained, if the procedure for care order 
proceedings has been followed and a child has been declared free for adoption, there is no 
further need to seek parental consent in the adoption process. The Child Protection 
Regulations under regulation 49(4) direct that a child for whom parental consent has been 
obtained and who has been declared free for adoption, should be placed with adoptive 
parents.812 However, regulation 49(5) specifies that placement must be according to the 
adoption procedure under the Law of the Child Act and the Adoption of Children Regulations. 
Regulation 49(6) directs that a person with parental rights and responsibilities towards the 
child who has given consent to the adoption need not be a party to the adoption proceedings. 
This means their earlier recorded consent is sufficient for adoption order purposes.  
4.5.5 Social Investigation Report 
In child welfare practice, social investigation and reporting are among the crucial 
undertakings of social welfare officers. A social investigation is central to almost all decisions 
 
812 Rule 99(1) of the Juvenile Court Rules, 2016 supports the same position. In the case that the court dispenses 
with consent, the position is the same as when consent is given as provided under regulation 50(4)-(6) of the 
Child Protection Regulations, 2014 and rule 99(11) and (12) of the Juvenile Court Rules, 2016. However, there 




that affect children’s welfare, including care, supervision, custody, access, maintenance, 
fostering, adoption, and the like.813 Social investigations are crucial because they form the 
basis for judicial and administrative decisions concerning the child. For example, sections 
45(2), 74(3), 74(4), and 75(2)(d) of the Law of the Child Act and regulations 9 and 11 of the 
Foster Care and Adoption of Children Regulations require the Commissioner and courts of 
law to arrive at their decisions on the basis of social investigation reports. In conclusion of 
investigations regarding foster care placements, the Commissioner receives the findings of the 
social investigations in the prescribed form.814 
Typically, social investigation touches on a wide array of issues that affect child welfare. The 
investigation may concern the child, caregivers, or any other person who may be affected by a 
child welfare decision. For instance, in the case of foster care, regulation 9(2) and (4) of the 
Foster Care Placement Regulations specifies that the investigation covers the child, his or her 
biological family, and the prospective foster parent(s) to establish the suitability of foster care 
placement in respect of each. While conducting the social investigation, social welfare 
officers must ascertain the views of each party regarding the foster care placement. Among 
other things, regulation 9(5) of the Foster Care Placement Regulations requires them to 
consider the possibility of reuniting the child with the biological family and, in the absence of 
such a family, to obtain a police report declaring the status of the child’s parents. Further, they 
are also responsible for determining whether the envisaged foster care placement or child 
adoption is in the child’s best interests.815 
A social investigation may be done at two different stages of the foster care placement 
process, depending on the circumstances of each case. In the case where a child is specified in 
the foster care application, the investigation is carried out alongside assessment of the 
applicant according to regulation 6(7) of the Foster Care Placement Regulations. If the child is 
unspecified, the social investigation comes after the prospective foster parents have selected a 
child with the Commissioner’s approval. In this instance, the Commissioner under regulation 
8(5) of the Foster Care Regulations must decide on the application within thirty days of 
receiving the social investigation report. The Commissioner may also direct a social welfare 
officer to approve foster care placement on his behalf, which should be done within thirty 
days after the social investigation report is completed. According to Regulation 8(6) and (7), 
 
813 See for example Sections 31, 45, 59(2), 74(3) and 75(2)(d) of the Law of the Child Act, 2009. 
814 See F.C. Form No. 7 on Social Investigation Report as provided for in the Schedule to the Foster Care 
Placement Regulations. 





particular attention must be paid to obtaining parental consent and ensuring that siblings, 
especially twins and triplets, are not separated. 
4.5.6 Registration of Foster Carers 
Once a foster care application has been approved, the applicants are registered as foster carers 
according to regulation 6 (9) of the Foster Care Placement Regulations. The Commissioner of 
Social Welfare and officers of the department are responsible for maintaining a register of 
approved foster carers in a prescribed form at the district and national levels.816 In the register, 
foster carers individually or as a couple are given unique serial numbers which identify them 
in all foster care placement documents.817 Regulation 7(3) of the Foster Care Placement 
Regulations portrays the register for foster carers as a source for foster parents for both short-
term care (such as temporary custody) and long-term care of children. Maintaining such a 
register guarantees the existence of standby or emergency foster carers who can be called 
upon to foster any child according to regulation 4(3) of the Regulations. 
 Prospective adoptive parents who foster children only to fulfil the legal requirements for 
adoption must also be registered. This procedure, in response to regulation 7(5) of the 
Regulations, may lead to unnecessarily numerous ‘no longer interested in fostering’ entries in 
the register after the pre-adoption foster period. 
There is also a requirement under regulation 7(6) of the Foster Care Placement Regulations 
that children in foster care must be registered in the prescribed form at both district and 
national levels.818 Similar to foster parents, regulation 7(7) of the Foster Care Placement 
Regulations requires social welfare officers to give unique placement serial numbers to 
identify a child at all levels in documents related to foster placement. According to this 
provision, a prospective adoptive child in foster care must also be entered in the register. 
According to regulation 7(2) and (8), social welfare officers are responsible for maintaining 
up-to-date district registers of foster carers and placements that they should submit to the 
Commissioner monthly. The Foster Care Placement Regulations, under regulation 7(9), 
require social welfare officers to make an entry in the register of foster carers and the register 
of placements to the effect that the foster parent is unsuitable for fostering where a child has 
been removed from their care for reasons of abuse under regulation18 (1) (a) of the 
 
816 Regulation 6(9) and (10) read together with regulation 7 of the Foster Care Placement Regulations, 2012. The 
prescribed form is F.C. Form No. 3, Foster Carers’ Register, made under regulation 7(1) of the Foster Care 
Placement Regulations found under the Schedule to the Regulations. 
817 Regulation 7(1) of the Foster Care Placement Regulations, 2012. 




Regulations. The Regulations do not require a similar entry once a child has been removed 
from foster care placement or if there is a change of status for other reasons such as adoption. 
The spirit of regulation 4(3) of the Foster Care Placement Regulations, 2012 can be 
interpreted as meaning that the register of foster carers should include persons volunteering 
and on standby to foster children whenever the need arises. However, in practice, only those 
who apply to foster children, especially in pre-adoption care, are registered.819 Further, there 
is a gap between the law and practice regarding keeping the foster care register. Practice 
shows that social welfare officers do not keep such registers as required by regulation 7. No 
social welfare office visited during field research could produce a comprehensive, up-to-date 
register of foster carers.  
4.5.7 Foster Care Placement 
Section 32(4) of the Law of the Child Act entitles the Commissioner to approve or reject a 
foster care application after considering the suitability of the applicant(s) to foster a child and 
whether the placement is in the child’s best interest. In arriving at a decision, the 
Commissioner is aided by the assessment report, social investigation report, and other 
relevant documents attached to the application.820  
When the application is approved, the identified child is placed with the foster care parent(s).  
4.5.8 Home Visits/Supervision Visits 
The responsibilities of social welfare officers towards a child do not end upon placement. 
Regulation 16 of the Foster Care Placement Regulations requires them to carry out post-foster 
placement follow-up. During their visits, social welfare officers make observations about the 
child’s welfare, progress, conduct and changes, if any, in the foster family. They also elicit the 
child’s views on the placement, taking into account the child’s age, maturity, and stage of 
development. The observations made are then recorded in a report and filed. This type of 
monitoring is essential for safeguarding the best interests of the child after placement. If the 
child’s interests are no longer upheld, social welfare officers deal with existing protection 
issues and may even consider termination of placement. 
Although the law requires these visits to monitor and evaluate placements, social welfare 
officers do not consistently execute them in practice according to the time schedules 
 
819 Interview with social welfare officer at the adoption desk in MoHCDGEC headquarter offices in Dodoma, on 
25.02.2018. The respondent showed the researcher a book in which prospective foster carers are listed in 
shorthand and explained that most of them are applying to foster a child for adoption purposes. 




prescribed in the Act and Regulations. The previous chapter expounding the child protection 
procedure already sheds light on this matter, and it is also further discussed in chapter six. 
4.5.9 Child Adoption Approval 
Applications for adoption orders, unlike those for foster care placement, are lodged in a court 
of law.821 Before a foster parent lodges an application for an adoption order, he or she must 
notify the Commissioner of the intention to adopt at least three months before an adoption 
order is made, as provided for under Section 56(3) of the Law of the Child Act. However, 
although the law only requires notification, in practice, before the court process commences, 
the Commissioner must approve the adoption in the form of a letter submitted to the court.822 
As already noted, the Commissioner’s decision, among others, is aided by the reports of a 
social welfare officer on supervision visits during placement and the developed foster care 
plan.  
4.5.10 Child Adoption Petition 
A child adoption petition is an application for an adoption order lodged in a court of law. It is 
a document drawn up in the prescribed format of A.C. Form No. 1 found in the Schedule to 
the Adoption of Children Regulations. The petition may be filed in the High Court, Resident 
Magistrate’s Court, or District Court, depending on the type of adoption order sought. Section 
54(1) (a) and (b) of the Law of the Child Act directs that an application for closed adoption 
goes to the High Court, while an application for open adoption goes to the Resident 
Magistrate’s or District Court. The petitioner must meet all eligibility requirements, as 
discussed above, and attach relevant documents to support the petition. The required 
documents include identification documents, marriage certificates, and affidavits verifying the 
petition. 
Further, as discussed above, evidence of parental consent must accompany the petition. 
Section 75(2) (b) of the Act provides for the admission of consent as documentary evidence 
for purposes of the adoption order. According to regulations 5 and 7 of the Adoption of 
Children Regulations, consent from parents and guardians should be obtained before filing the 
child adoption petition unless it cannot be obtained and the court has dispensed with it. 
As stipulated under Regulation 4(4) of the Adoption of Children Regulations, the applicant 
may apply for an adoption order before a judge or magistrate in person or through an 
advocate. While sitting in chambers, the judge or magistrate may give preliminary 
 
821 Details are in section 54 of the Law of the Child Act, 2009. 
822 Practice observed in the perusal of court files on child adoption during field research in Dar es Salaam and 




instructions as to service of documents, the appointment of a guardian ad litem or requirement 
of further consent. These are prerequisites of the adoption petition proceedings. 
4.5.10.1 Service of Documents 
Following regulation 4(6) of the Adoption of Children Regulations, a court process server 
oversees tendering and delivery of all petitions, notices or documents regarding child adoption 
applications unless directed otherwise by the court. All parties to an adoption petition must 
receive relevant documents regarding the proceedings in court. The documents must be copies 
of the original, signed by the registrar or magistrate in charge and bearing the court seal. 
Service of the documents requires verification by affidavit unless directed otherwise by the 
judge or magistrate. 
According to regulation 8 of the Adoption of Children Regulations, replies to the petition may 
be made by persons whose consent is required by the Act and should be made by way of 
swearing an affidavit.823  
4.5.10.2 Appointment of a Guardian ad litem 
‘Ad litem’ is a Latin phrase that means ‘for the suit’. A guardian ad litem is a person 
appointed by a court order to represent the interests of incapable persons such as minors for 
the duration of legal action. The Adoption of Children Act, 1953, under its section 11(2), had 
empowered the court to appoint ‘some person’ to act as guardian ad litem and safeguard the 
child’s interests before the court. This person could be a relative, a close friend, neighbour, or 
a street or ten cell executive officer who could sufficiently represent the child’s best interest in 
court. The Law of the Child Act, 2009, together with Adoption of Children Regulations, have 
retained the practice of appointing a guardian ad litem in adoption proceedings, although there 
is a slight change.  
Today, regulation 4(5) of Adoption of Children Regulations provides that a guardian ad litem 
for purposes of adoption proceedings must be a social welfare officer. Regulation 2 of the 
Adoption of Children Regulations defines a guardian ad litem as “a social welfare officer 
appointed by the Commissioner for Social Welfare to represent the rights of the child in court 
during the entire process of child adoption application”. The power to appoint a social welfare 
officer to act as guardian ad litem is now vested in the Commissioner of Social Welfare and 
not the court. According to section 74(4) of the Law of the Child Act and regulation 4(4) of 
 
823 The researcher was able to view samples of these affidavits and other documents in the child adoption court 





the Adoption of Children Regulations, the court retains the power to make an order requiring 
the Commissioner to appoint a social welfare officer to act as guardian ad litem. 
Section 59(2) of the Law of the Child Act stipulates that the court must not make an adoption 
order without a social investigation report that supports the adoption. Once a guardian ad 
litem is appointed, the duty to undertake a social investigation and report to the court befalls 
him or her.824 As analysed above in the context of eligibility criteria, the purpose of the 
investigation is to establish the suitability of the adoption and determine whether it is in the 
child’s best interest. The court relies on the social investigation report to determine whether 
granting an adoption order is in the child’s best interest. 
Under Regulation 11(12), a guardian ad litem is also required to provide information beyond 
the social investigation report on the background of the prospective adopter. Such information 
may include criminal records, especially for child abuse, the adopter’s and the child’s health 
status, and a description of any special needs. Specifically, for adoption by non-resident 
Tanzanians and resident non-Tanzanians, a background check on the prospective adopters is 
added in the terms of reference for a guardian ad litem. The requirement to conduct an 
additional background investigation on the prospective adopters is embedded under section 
74(3) of the Act and regulations 26 and 28 of the Adoption of Children Regulations, 2012. 
Apart from guardian ad litem, according to section 59(2) of the Act, the court may also order 
any other person or local government authority to make a report regarding the application. 
According to regulation 11(11) of the Adoption of Children Regulations, when another person 
or authority prepares a social investigation report, a copy should be submitted to a social 
welfare officer who must review it and give feedback to the court.  
4.5.10.3 Hearing 
Regulation 10 of the Adoption of Children Regulations authorises the registrar or magistrate 
in charge to set a date for hearing the petition. They can do so after confirming that all 
required documents have been filed and served to the satisfaction of the court and the 
guardian ad litem. The parties are informed of the date of hearing by notice drawn up in the 
format set out under A.C Form No. 6 found in the Schedule to the Adoption of Children 
Regulations. The notice should be served on all parties not less than seven days before the 
appointed day of the hearing. 
 
824 Sections 59(2), 74(3), 74(4) (b) and 75(2) (d) of the Act read together with regulation 11 of the Adoption of 
Children Regulations, 2012. The information unearthed in the investigation and in the course of the adoption 
matter, according to regulation 17, is confidential and a social welfare officer can only divulge it in the required 




Child adoption hearings, as prescribed under regulation 10(2) of the Adoption of Children 
Regulations in line with section 75(2) (a) of the Law of the Child Act, are held in camera 
where the presiding judge or magistrate does not interpose any other matter in the duration of 
the hearing. Once the adoption matter is called for determination, all parties to the application 
should appear in court as required. According to Regulation 14(2), the court may compel 
attendance of the parties (which may be in person or through an advocate) or decide to 
determine the matter in their absence. The court might also, however, require each party to 
appear before it separately for an interview. For the child, such interviews may be of utmost 
importance. Sections 11 and 59(1) (b) - (c) of the Act, together with regulations 3(a) - (b), 
5(3), and 11(6) - (7) of the Adoption of Children Regulations, require the court to consider the 
child’s views if the child is capable of forming an opinion on the adoption. 
4.5.11 Child Adoption Order 
Once satisfied that all the conditions for the order have been met and that the adoption is in 
the child’s best interest, the court grants an adoption order. This is in accordance with the 
conditions set out in section 59 of the Act and regulation 13 of the Adoption of Children 
Regulations. However, since the law allows a grace period of sixty days to withdraw consent 
for the child adoption, regulations 6 and 13(3) of the Adoption of Children Regulations 
preclude the court from issuing an order within this time. Only after expiry of this period can 
the court proceed to grant the adoption as petitioned. The order, when issued, should be in the 
prescribed format set out in A.C. Form No. 9 (a) or (b) for closed or open adoption, 
respectively.  
The two forms referred to in the previous paragraph are substantially similar, both in format 
and content. However, they do not reflect the content of section 59(4), which specifies that 
particulars of the adopter and adoptee should be in the adoption order. Thus, in practice, the 
court departs from the format of A.C. Form No. 9 to include the specified particulars in the 
order.825 The downside of this is the production of orders that considerably differ in format 
and content from one another.  
Granting of an adoption order does not signify the end of the court’s influence on the adopted 
child’s life. When granting the adoption order, according to section 59(3), the court may make 
other conditions concerning the child. For example, the court may require the adopter to enter 
a bond to make provision for the child as it thinks necessary. This provision implies that the 
court has the mandate to ensure that the adopted child’s best interests are safeguarded beyond 
 
825 The researcher observed that the court used templates with different formats when issuing adoption orders. 




child adoption proceedings. It emphasises the significance of post-adoption monitoring and 
support. 
An adoption order can also be amended or appealed against. Section 71 of the Act allows 
adoptive parents and children to apply to the court to amend errors in their particulars as 
appearing on the adoption order. The court is empowered to make amendments that include 
insertion of the country of birth of the child or the child’s date of birth if it was not specified 
and the court considers it to be the date or probable date of the child’s birth. When the court 
allows an appeal, it restores the child to the status before the adoption order was made. 
Adoption orders are not the outcome of all child adoption proceedings. In some adoption 
matters, as stipulated under section 60 of the Act, the court may postpone determination of the 
petition and instead make an interim order. According to section 60(3) and (4) of the Act, 
although all provisions regarding consent for adoption apply to the interim order, it is not 
equivalent to an adoption order. An interim order grants custody of the child to the applicant 
for not more than two years as probation before granting an adoption order. The order may 
include terms regarding the child’s maintenance, education, and supervision as the court finds 
fit. While the order subsists, the child shall be under the supervision of a social welfare officer 
and cannot travel outside the country without the court’s permission.  
The Act does not provide grounds for interim orders. Since the Adoption of Children 
Regulations are also silent in this respect, there are no set criteria in the law to guide the court 
in its decision to grant an interim instead of a full adoption order. Further, during field 
research the researcher did not come across child adoption rulings in which the court has 
granted such an order. Thus, it remains unclear under which specific circumstances the court 
may find it necessary to issue interim orders. One can only assume that an interim order is 
given when adoption is in the child’s best interests, but the court has some doubts about the 
adopting parent’s ability or commitment to care for the child. In such circumstances, placing 
him or her under probation is a safer alternative.  
The court may also decide to issue neither an adoption order nor an interim order. In such a 
case, depending on the reasons for not granting the order, the court may dismiss or strike out 
the petition.826 The Law of the Child Act and Adoption of Children Regulations do not 
specify the course the court should take. Nevertheless, according to Regulation 13(4) of the 
Adoption of Children Regulations, the status quo prevails in such an occurrence. This means 
 
826 For instance, in the ruling of High Court of Tanzania, At Dar es Salaam, “In the Matter of the Law of the 
Child Act, 2009 and In the Matter of A (Infant) and In the Matter of an Application for an Adoption Order by 




the child shall remain in the care of the applicant as a foster child. Circumstances will only 
change when the court so directs or the social welfare officer in charge decides to terminate 
the foster care placement. 
4.5.11.1 Registration of an Adoption Order 
Just like birth, a child’s adoption requires registration. Section 69(1) of the Act requires the 
Registrar-General to register all adoption orders. The Registrar-General is the custodian of a 
register of adopted children as per section 69 of the Act.827 According to section 70(1), the 
court must include in every adoption order a directive to the Registrar-General to make an 
entry in the Adopted Children Register following the prescribed format in the Schedule to the 
Act. Section 69 requires the Registrar-General also to register interim orders in the Adopted 
Children Register. This is an anomaly as interim orders are not full adoption orders, and the 
court may rescind them at its discretion. 
To ensure no loopholes in the registration process, the law under sections 69(2) and 70(6) of 
the Law of the Child Act, and regulation 18(1) of the Adoption of Children Regulations, 
require registration to be done within thirty days from the day when the adoption order was 
issued.  Also, the provisions place the duty to serve the adoption order to the Registrar-
General on a High Court registrar. For adoptions handled in lower courts, i.e. open adoptions, 
the responsibility lies with the magistrate in charge. Apart from adoption orders, Regulation 
18 also requires that adoption petitions and every consent to the adoption be submitted to the 
Registrar-General.  
The registration process makes official the legal recognition of an adopted child. Since the 
child’s status has changed, section 70(4) of the Act directs the Registrar-General to mark the 
word ‘Adopted’ against the entry of the identified child in the Register of Births. In the case 
of a child previously adopted, the entry must reflect that fact, marking the child’s registration 
with the word ‘re-adopted’ as stipulated under section 70(5) of the Act. Subject to section 
70(2) and (3) of the Act, there are other particulars that the order requires the Registrar-
General to enter in the Register. Their entry follows the scheduled prescribed format (under 
columns 2-6), similar to the particulars required under section 59(4) of the Act. The records 
pertaining to the adoption of children in both Registers of Births and Adoptions remain 
confidential and not accessible to the public or any person except with a court order. 
 
827 Registrar-General is defined under section 3 of the Law of the Child Act, 2009 as the Registrar-General of 
births and deaths appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Birth and Deaths Registration Act, 1920 




 The Registrar-General has similar obligations regarding amending entries to the Registers 
following court orders resulting from amended adoption orders. As provided under section 71 
of the Act, the court may amend the adoption order pursuant to an adopter or adoptee’s 
application to correct errors in the particulars. According to section 71(2), the amendments 
may include the insertion of the country and date of birth of the adopted child. Once made, the 
court must communicate such amendments to the Registrar-General to effect changes in the 
Register. Also, where an appeal against an adoption order is allowed, the court that made the 
order is responsible for directing the Registrar-General to delete any marking made against an 
entry in the Register of Births and cancel any entry made in the Adopted Children Register.  
4.5.11.2 Legal Effects of an Adoption Order 
An adoption order creates life-altering changes in parent-child relations. Section 64 of the 
Law of the Child Act enunciates the impacts of an adoption order on family and other existing 
relations. Concerning pre-adoption relations, an adoption order severs all rights and 
obligations of any nature, even those existing under customary law, of the child’s parents or 
any other person connected with the child.828 Concerning post-adoption relations, the order 
bestows all rights and obligations pertaining to custody, maintenance, and education of the 
child on the adoptive parent(s) as if the child was born to them in lawful wedlock and has 
never been a child of any other person. In the case of orders made jointly to a husband and 
wife, they assume the new parental rights and responsibilities together. In such a joint venture, 
the adopted child relates to the husband and wife as his or her parents, as if born to them 
naturally.  
In simple terms, an adoption order erases all legal ties that bound the child before the 
adoption. Phrases ‘was not the child of any other person’ and ‘as if born to them naturally’ 
under section 64(1) (b) and (2) have a significant legal impact on relations between the birth 
family and the adoptive family. They obliterate any legal standing that the birth parents, 
guardians, relatives, or persons with parental responsibilities over the child by agreement or 
court order ever had regarding the child. The legal rights and obligations are entirely 
transferred to the adoptive family.  
Section 14(4) of the Law of Marriage Act, 1971 is a good illustration of the legal effects of an 
adoption order on the two families. The sub-section declares adoptive children and parents to 
be in the prohibited degrees of consanguinity. This means that they cannot intermarry. 
Nevertheless, the law does not declare such prohibition with regard to birth parents and other 
 




close blood relatives of the child after the adoption order.829 The law is also silent on 
prohibited relationships with close relatives of the adoptive parents. However, section 66(1) 
(d) of the Law of the Child Act refers to them as relatives of the adopted child. Here, the 
question of the social effects of an adoption order arises. The new legal relations created by 
the adoption order impact already existing and future social relations. Depending on the social 
values of a given society, especially as influenced by other prevailing normative orders such 
as customary and religious laws, clashes are bound to occur. For instance, Muslims in 
Mainland Tanzania can adopt a child under the formal law of adoption. However, Islamic law 
does not recognise formal adoption but only kafala, a weaker version of it. Muslim adoptive 
parents and their extended family who live by the principles of Islam may not recognise and 
abide by the effects of an adoption order in their social life. 
A different dimension emerges where a birth parent adopts his or her child. Adoption is done 
to either legitimate their parent-child relationship or integrate the child into a new family to 
which the birth parent belongs.830 The adoption may be sole or joint with a spouse of the birth 
parent. This type of adoption contains a puzzle regarding the legal effects of the adoption 
order on parental relations. Does the order erase the natural parent-child relationship only to 
supplant it with a new legal relationship as articulated under section 64 of the Law of the 
Child Act? Parental rights and obligations remain with the birth parent; hence, in that regard, 
the order only serves to cement the relationship. For an illegitimate child, the order 
additionally confers a parent-child relationship as if born within lawful wedlock. And for both 
legitimate and illegitimate children, it serves to create a parent-child relationship with the 
birth parent’s spouse. However, strictly speaking, the adoption order changes the legal status 
of the birth parent and child. They become adoptive parent and child, and instead of a birth 
certificate, the child will have an adoption certificate. During field research at the RITA 
offices in Dar es Salaam, the researcher learnt that the birth certificate of an adopted child 
must be surrendered during the adoption order registration process.831 
 
829 The rest of section 14 of the Law of Marriage Act, 1971 prohibits relationships between blood relatives with a 
broad spectrum of degrees of consanguinity. Sexual relations between such relatives are incestuous and 
forbidden under sections 158, 160 and 161 of the United Republic of Tanzania, Penal Code, 1945 [Cap. 16. R.E 
2009]. 
830 The law provides for this type of adoption. An illegitimate child may be adopted by his or her birth father 
alone or together with his spouse to legitimise their relationship or a birth father or mother may, together with a 
spouse, adopt a legitimate child of a former union to integrate him or her in a new family of which the parent is a 
member. See Sections 55(1)(b) and 56(2) of the Law of the Child Act, 2009. 
831 Interview with a high-ranking officer, and a legal officer and custodian of the Adopted Children Register, 




An adoption order affects an adopted child’s residence and nationality. When adoptive parents 
choose to live abroad with their adopted child, the child’s residence changes in cases of 
adoption by non-resident Tanzanians, and both the child’s residence and nationality may 
change in cases of adoption by resident non-Tanzanians. After an adoption order has been 
issued, according to section 73 of the Act, only a written thirty-day notice to the 
Commissioner of Social Welfare is required before a child may permanently depart from the 
country. Before travelling abroad, however, the adoptive parents must procure a new passport 
for their adoptive child. Then, the national laws of the receiving country will govern the entry, 
residence, and nationality of the adopted child. Tanzania’s relevant immigration and 
citizenship laws, particularly the Immigration Act832 and the Citizenship Act,833 do not 
specifically provide for the effects of adoption orders on the child’s migratory and citizenship 
status. Section 10 of the Citizenship Act allows for the naturalisation of a minor child of 
Tanzanian citizens, which may include adopted children. However, in adoptions with an 
international element, this provision may only apply to non-resident Tanzanian adopters who 
adopt a non-Tanzanian child resident in Tanzania, for instance a refugee. 
The legal effects of formal adoption extend to property rights and succession. On intestacy, 
according to section 65 of the Law of the Child Act, an adopted child is by no means entitled 
to inherit from his or her birth parents. The child, however, will inherit from the adoptive 
parent on intestacy as if he or she is a natural child of the deceased. In the testamentary 
disposition of property post-adoption, whether oral or in writing, according to section 66 of 
the Act, any express or implied reference to an adoptive parent’s children shall be construed 
as including the adoptive child. Section 66(3) of the Law of the Child Act, 2009 clarifies the 
term disposition as used in the section to mean, “disposition of any interest in property by any 
instrument whether inter vivos or by will, including codicil.” Sections 66 and 67 of the Act 
ensure that whether the testament was made pre or post the adoption order, the adoptive 
child’s right to inherit from the adoptive parent is still protected.  
Whether an adoptive parent is entitled to inherit from an adoptive child is a question not 
addressed in the Act. However, since the effects of the adoption make their relationship 
synonymous with that of birth parent and child, if birth parents can inherit from the estate of 
their deceased children, so can adoptive parents. Also, the Act does not articulate whether an 
adopted child can or should (where so provided) inherit from his or her birth parents in 
 
832 Immigration Act, 1995. 




testamentary disposition. Since Tanzania’s law on wills allows for testamentary freedom, this 
remains within the birth parents’ discretion.834  
The effects of an adoption order in relation to customary law under the Act raise some 
questions. According to section 64(1) (a), all rights, duties and liabilities of the birth family 
and others connected to the child pre-adoption, including under customary law, cease to 
apply. Nevertheless, section 68 of the Act subjects adopted children to customary law as if 
they are natural children of the adoptive parents, provided the adoptive parents are also 
subject to it. This provision may conflict with the effects of an adoption order regarding the 
rights and responsibilities of members of the bloodline recognised under customary law. For 
instance, in open adoption, where the birth and adoptive families are related by blood and are 
both subjects of customary law, it is questionable whether the legal effects of adoption will 
still hold in the social reality of life in view of section 68. Would customary law recognise the 
permanent change in familial relations, for example, between grandparents and 
grandchildren? Also, where customary laws on property rights and inheritance apply, will the 
provisions of section 65 be justified? These questions on legal pluralism and its effects on 
child adoption are discussed further in chapter six. 
4.5.12 Post-adoption Monitoring 
The child adoption process involves gradual evolvement of trust and relinquishment of 
control by the state as it passes to the adoptive parents. To ensure a child is protected beyond 
adoption, state actors have the mandate to monitor the adoptive family after the adoption 
process has been concluded. According to regulation 16 of the Adoption of Children 
Regulations, monitoring should begin three months after the adoption order. Social welfare 
officers are responsible for making supervision visits to the homes of adopters residing in 
Tanzania. While there, they should meet in private with the adopted children to elicit their 
views on the adoption, bearing in mind each child’s age, maturity, and stage of development. 
Afterwards, officers are obligated to write reports on every monitoring visit and put them in 
respective children’s files. According to regulation 16(4) of the Adoption of Children 
Regulations, if there are any protection issues, the provisions of the Act and Regulations on 
child protection must be applied.835  
 
834 A recent decision of the High Court of Tanzania discusses and delimits this freedom; for further details, see 
High Court of the United Republic of Tanzania (Dar es Salaam District Registry), At Dar es Salaam, “Benjamin 
Benson Mengi and 3 Others vs. Abdiel Reginald Mengi and Benjamin Abraham Mengi”, Unreported 
(18.05.2021). 
835 There is no specific provision under the Law of the Child Act, 2009 or the Child Protection Regulations, 2014 





For adopters who do not reside in Tanzania, regulation 16(5) of the Adoption of Children 
Regulations provides for their post-adoption monitoring. Such adopters include non-resident 
Tanzanians and non-Tanzanians who have left Tanzania to return to their home or their host 
countries. In these cases, the Commissioner has the mandate to consult the International 
Social Service to conduct post-adoption monitoring on behalf of the Department of Social 
Welfare. 
4.6 Conclusion  
The legal framework of child adoption in Tanzania is characterised by multiple legal orders 
that do not stand at par. However, they interplay in practice and may be invoked alternatively 
depending on the nature of a specific case. For instance, customary or religious laws may also 
apply in pre- or post-adoption decision-making where involved parties are subject to such 
laws. The legal framework is also broad and complex, and the multiplicity of applicable laws 
may occasion errors with other rules being overlooked or disregarded. For instance, it is 
challenging for a social welfare officer who is not trained in law to understand the 
constellation of legal orders involved and how they apply to child adoption practice. 
The existence of multiple unharmonised national policies and strategic plans also confuses the 
practice of child welfare in Tanzania. The implementation of these policies and plans is 
inconsistent and may be counter-productive.836 The other challenge is the lack of smooth 
succession from one strategic plan to the next. In practice, once the period of implementation 
of a plan has lapsed, the plan is wholly abandoned without any further follow-up. Lack of 
proper review of a previous plan’s success and failure results in making new plans that may 
not fully cater to the needs in the field. This practice occasions a disconnection that affects the 
implementation of laws and policies on child welfare, including child adoptions. For instance, 
the NPA-VAWC, which is the current leading strategic plan in social welfare, focuses mainly 
on violence and its effects on women and children, while NPA I & II, its predecessors that are 
no longer implemented, were broader based and had more potential for addressing child 
welfare problems in Tanzania. 
The Law of the Child Act, 2009, and the Regulations made under it are riddled with 
misconceptions, contradictions, ambiguity, omissions, and errors in language, typos, 
numbering, and cross-referencing. Despite the recent law review in 2019 that edited some 
parts of the Law of the Child Act, the flaws still subsist. The translation of the Regulations 
into Kiswahili only helps in part as the translator does not correct the problems of the original 
 
836 These were the findings of the ACPF's research reported in African Child Policy Forum (ACPF), 




document. For example, open adoption is misconceived under the Act. There are omissions in 
setting specific legal requirements and procedures that may apply exclusively to this type of 
child adoption. In practice, it results in contradictions or uncertainties, for instance regarding 
whether a relative who is a prospective adopter needs to foster a child for six months or not. 
During field research for this study, social welfare officers gave contradictory answers when 
asked this question. Adoptions by non-resident Tanzanians face similar challenges. The Act 
and the Regulations do not provide precise requirements and procedures to regulate this type 
of child adoption.  
Erroneous cross-referencing between the Act and the Regulations is seen in the case of the 
Child Protection Regulations, 2014. This document was drafted two years after most of the 
other Regulations and makes multiple mistakes when referring to their provisions. These 
mistakes are more pronounced when referring to the Juvenile Court Rules because it refers to 
the revoked Rules of 2014 and not the current ones of 2016. The Regulations are, therefore, in 
need of amendment.  
Another weakness in the law of child adoption is the fact that several different procedures for 
formal care measures influence child adoption. These include the rules and procedures for 
Child Protection, Children’s Homes, Foster Care Placement, and, ultimately, the Adoption of 
Children Regulations. What makes it such a challenge is the lack of clarity and uniformity in 
the requirements laid down in these different procedures. Where an international element 
comes in, such as in child adoption by non-resident Tanzanians and non-Tanzanian residents, 
matters are further complicated. For instance, the Foster Care Placement Regulations provide 
for the eligibility of non-Tanzanians to foster under regulation 5(1) (c) and (d), but there is no 
further mention of non-Tanzanians throughout the Regulations even where different 
procedures are required. Also, the Foster Care Placement Regulations provide no procedural 
guidelines for foster care by a prospective adoptive parent who is a non-resident Tanzanian. 
Further, there are shortcomings in the law that may obscure the Department of Social 
Welfare’s operations in child adoption. For example, foster care placement as a prerequisite 
for adoption is regulated in the same way as foster care placement as an independent care 
measure. Joining the two in the same procedure raises practical challenges, such as registering 
prospective adoptive parents as foster carers. They are usually foster carers for only six 
months and are not willing to foster any other child apart from the one they intend to adopt.  
The Law of the Child Act and its Regulations require some reforms. The latter were enacted 
at different times and not in the proper sequence. The Child Protection Regulations, which 




foster care, and adoption. As a result, they set requirements and procedures which may be 
beneficial to a child deprived of parental care but are not followed in practice because the 
earlier regulations have already taken root. Also, since the Act and the Regulations were 
drafted at different times by different drafters, they do not form a harmonious body of law and 
hence create difficulties in implementation.  
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Chapter 5:  The Best Interests of the Child Principle 
“In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by 
public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, 
administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests 
of the child shall be a primary consideration.”837 
5.1 Introduction 
Children, due to their tender age, are physically and mentally immature, hence vulnerable. 
Being so, they require special care and protection. For this reason, different societies at 
different times have developed various measures to protect their children. One of them, which 
appears to have gained universal acceptance, is the best interest concept.838 It requires that all 
decisions made for or on behalf of children be in their best interest. The development of the 
concept has led to its incorporation in international, regional, and national legal instruments as 
a guiding principle in all actions concerning children. 
Before most nations incorporated the best interests of the child principle into their domestic 
legal frameworks, they were already applying the welfare principle to children’s matters.839 
For instance, Tanzania’s law of marriage which has been in application since 1971, enshrines 
the welfare principle.840 The welfare principle differs from the best interest principle primarily 
in terms of scope. The welfare principle requires that children’s welfare should be the main 
consideration when making decisions concerning them, rather than the broader spectrum of 
their ‘best interests’.841 The child rights movement, which led to a change of paradigm 
whereby the child ceased to be an object of care and started being a subject of rights, 
occasioned the move from the welfare principle to the best interest principle.842 The UNCRC 
marks the culmination of that movement and incorporates Article 3(1), which articulates the 
 
837 Article 3(1) of the United Nations, Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
838 Alison Diduck, Felicity Kaganas, Family Law, Gender and the State: Text, Cases and Materials (London: 
Hart Publishing, 2012), p. 373. 
839 For a discussion on inclusion of the best interests of the child principle in domestic laws prior to the UNCRC, 
see Alston, Gilmour-Walsh, The Best Interests of the Child, above footnote 82, at pp. 3-4. 
840 See section 125 of the Law of Marriage Act. A number of other national jurisdictions still have the welfare 
principle in their laws concerning children, for example the United Kingdom under Section 1 of the Children’s 
Act, 1989 and Ghana under Section 2 of the Children’s Act, 1998, Act No. 560 of the Parliament of the Republic 
of Ghana. The UK still applies the welfare principle since no domestic statute incorporates the UNCRC, hence 
there is no obligation for English authorities to apply the best interest of the child principle as articulated in the 
Convention. See Nigel V. Lowe, Gillian Douglas, Bromley's Family Law (Oxford: Univ. Press, 2007), at p. 454, 
fn. 33. 
841 For a discussion of the differences between the two principles, see Lowe, Douglas, Bromley's Family Law, 
above footnote 840, at pp. 450-479. 
842 For further details, see contributions in Detrick, The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 






best interests principle. Recognition of children’s rights, such as the right to be heard and 
participate in decision-making as articulated in Article 12 of the UNCRC, played a significant 
role in elevating the child to a subject of rights. Thus, children are no longer passive objects of 
care but active holders of rights. 
Section 4(2) of Tanzania’s Law of the Child Act incorporates the best interests of the child 
principle. However, the Act, like the UNCRC, which it domesticates, does not include an 
interpretation of the principle. Therefore, its interpretation, determination, and application are 
flexible depending on each case’s circumstances. Achieving this in practice is not as 
straightforward as it may appear to be. This is because, in most cases, children are not able to 
say what is best for them. Thus, determining what is best for them largely depends on views 
expressed by other people.  
The indefinite state of the principle, in Cantwell’s opinion, breeds misconception and 
manipulation.843 This is because it potentially renders the principle vague and susceptible to 
subjectivity. As a result, authorities mandated to determine children’s best interests may rely 
primarily on their discretion and understanding of what exactly constitutes the best interests of 
a particular child in a specified situation.844  
There have, however, been efforts to address the principle’s indeterminacy. These include 
institutional and professional efforts in the form of guidelines and minimum standards, court 
decisions and commentaries on the principle. For instance, United Nations institutions such as 
the UN CRC’s Comment845 and UNHCR’s Guidelines846 have made attempts to shed light on 
the principle. Nevertheless, as exhaustive and enlightening as the institutional and 
professional efforts may be, the best interests principle remains an interpretative and 
determinative challenge in practice.  
This chapter analyses the jurisprudence on the principle at international, regional, and national 
levels. The main objective is to deduce how the principle works in practice to safeguard 
children’s interests in child adoptions with a foreign element. The chapter commences with 
tracking the principle’s development from its debut in the international legal arena to its 
articulation in recent instruments such as the UNCRC. It then goes regional, where its 
exploration of the principle is limited to Africa and nationally to Tanzania. The legal analysis 
 
843 Cantwell, The Best Interests of the Child in Intercountry Adoption, above footnote 89, p. 9. 
844 Stephen M. Cretney, J. M. Masson, Rebecca J. Bailey-Harris, Rebecca Probert, Principles of Family Law 
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2008), p. 730. 
845 Committee on the Rights of the Child, “General comment No. 14 (2013) on the Right of the Child to Have 
His or Her Best Interests Taken as a Primary Consideration (art. 3 para. 1)”. 





aims to achieve a better understanding of the concept by examining its construction in several 
instruments. Considering the various formulations may aid its interpretation. This, however, is 
not the only intention of the analysis. The laws are also investigated to see whether they 
establish any criteria, procedures, or other mechanisms to determine the child’s best interests 
and guide application of the principle.  
Then, based on available guidelines and literature, the chapter discusses what is generally 
meant by the child’s best interests and how to determine them. After this, the scope is 
narrowed down to consider the meaning and application of the principle in child adoptions, 
particularly with an international element. Lastly, the chapter provides a practical example of 
how mandated authorities in Tanzania interpret, determine, and apply the principle in this type 
of child adoption. Throughout the chapter, there is a weighing of how the deliberate decision 
to leave the principle’s determinacy flexible to allow for diversity in individual cases and 
varying socio-cultural perceptions affects its application.  
The conclusions drawn from this chapter partly answer the research question regarding how 
adoptions with an international element in Tanzania are determined in the child’s best interest. 
5.2 The International Context 
There is sufficient evidence to show that some national legal systems had already 
incorporated the best interests of the child principle, albeit in varying forms, before its 
enshrinement in international legal instruments. For instance, some authors demonstrate that 
the best interests principle already existed in English jurisprudence before the adoption of the 
UNCRC.847 They argue that the British Empire had already incorporated the principle in its 
national laws and included it in those exported to its colonies. However, it is significant to 
note that the principle referred to was essentially the welfare principle rather than the best 
interests principle.848  
The best interests principle has developed in different forms in different communities 
throughout centuries of making decisions affecting children. Most domestic laws, formal and 
informal, have conceived and applied it as the welfare principle. Thus, the advancement of the 
welfare principle and its application contributes to understanding the evolution of the best 
interests principle. Tracing the development of the welfare principle in the UK, for instance, 
shows that relying on the child’s welfare as a guiding principle in determining disputes 
evolved out of the Chancery Court’s practice in wardship and guardianship cases in the late 
 
847 Alston, Gilmour-Walsh, The Best Interests of the Child, above footnote 82, at pp. 3-4. 





eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.849 During the early nineteenth century, common law still 
upheld paternal rights over the child’s well-being unless doing so endangered the child’s 
welfare in a severe and significant way.850 Fathers had near-absolute rights over their children 
in the sense that they could exercise paternal rights exclusively without consulting the 
children’s mothers  and without considering the welfare of the children.851 Departure from 
this practice came through women’s struggle for equality in relation to parental rights.852  
In 1886, the English parliament, for the first time, enacted legislation directing courts to pay 
heed to the infant’s welfare.853 The Guardianship of Infants Act, 1925 elevated the child’s 
welfare to a first and paramount consideration while deciding on a child’s custody or 
upbringing.854 For many years since, the English parliament and courts have kept enhancing 
the meaning and scope of applying the welfare principle.855  
However, the children’s rights movement saw a shift from the welfare to the best interests 
principle. In most societies, the UNCRC has played a central role in the change. For instance, 
in Tanzania, reliance on the welfare principle in child custody and maintenance disputes 
under the 1971 Law of Marriage Act changed after the domestication of the UNCRC under 
the 2009 Law of the Child Act. In the UK, nevertheless, the welfare principle has held fast.856  
The best interest of the child principle became an internationally renowned standard after its 
inclusion in the UNCRC.857 This inclusion, however, does not mark the debut of the principle 
in the international legal arena.858 The earliest international formulation of the principle can 
be traced back to the 1959 Declaration of the Rights of the Child.859 The 1959 Declaration 
originates from the League of Nations’ 1924 Geneva Declaration of the Rights of the Child 
orchestrated by the joint efforts of acclaimed child rights activists Eglantyne Jebb and Janusz 
Korczak.860 However, the 1924 Declaration did not include an express formulation of the best 
 
849 Cretney, Masson, Principles of Family Law, above footnote 242, p. 717. 
850 Diduck, Kaganas, Family Law, Gender and the State, above footnote 838, pp. 378–379.  
851 Cretney, Masson, Principles of Family Law, above footnote 242, p. 579. 
852 Diduck, Kaganas, Family Law, Gender and the State, above footnote 838, p. 379. 
853 See Section 5(4) of the Guardianship of Infants Act (Great Britain) (1886). 
854 Diduck, Kaganas, Family Law, Gender and the State, above footnote 838, p. 379. 
855 For a discussion of the principle's advancement, see Lowe, Douglas, Bromley's Family Law, above footnote 
840, at pp. 450-479. 
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857 United Nations, Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
858 See details at para 2 of the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC), “General comment No. 14 
(2013) on the right of the child to have his or her best interests taken as a primary consideration (Art. 3, para. 
1)”, p. 3. 
859 See Principle 2 of United Nations, “Declaration of the Rights of the Child”. Also, the authors in Alston, 
Gilmour-Walsh, The Best Interests of the Child, above footnote 82, at p. 4 refer to the principle's enshrinment in 
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interests of the child principle but provided five statements on the child’s general welfare.861 
These statements were amended and augmented, resulting in the ten Principles of the 1959 
Declaration adopted by the United Nations.862 
The 1959 Declaration laid a foundation for the UNCRC. During the UN International Year of 
the Child, 1979, the UN Commission on Human Rights began considering transforming the 
1959 Declaration into a convention on children’s rights.863 In this year, the UN Commission 
on Human Rights began to consider the Polish government’s proposal of 1978, which 
suggested that the Principles of the 1959 Declaration should be converted into binding 
international law in the form of a convention on children’s rights.  
An assembly of government delegates formed drafting working groups and met annually in 
Geneva for about a decade (1979-1988).864  They ultimately produced a 54-Article instrument 
in 1989.865 Others, such as representatives of non-governmental organisations and United 
Nations bodies and specialised agencies, also participated in deliberations during the drafting 
period.866 The UN General Assembly adopted the resultant instrument in 1989 as the 
UNCRC, famed as the most successful international instrument.867 The UNCRC was not the 
first human rights treaty to provide on the protection of the child, though it was the first to 
enshrine children’s rights in the strict sense.868 In the previous instruments, for instance in the 
1959 Declaration, the child was still an object rather than a subject of rights.869 Also, the 
previous instruments were Declarations, making the UNCRC the first instrument with 
obligations. Therefore, the UNCRC is the most authoritative and comprehensive legal 
instrument stating the fundamental rights of children.870 
 
861 Geneva Declaration of the Rights of the Child (26 September, 1924). 
862 Ennew, “The History of Children's Rights: Whose Story?”, above footnote 842. 
863 Cretney, Masson, Principles of Family Law, above footnote 242, at p. 585; and Ennew, “The History of 
Children's Rights: Whose Story?”, above footnote 842. 
864 Ennew, “The History of Children's Rights: Whose Story?”, above footnote 842. 
865 Ibid. 
866 See Paragraph 21 of Part 1 of “Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action: Adopted by the World 
Conference on Human Rights in Vienna on 25 June 1993”, 
https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/vienna.aspx, 5.6.2020. 
867 There were 140 signatories and 196 parties as of June 2021. See United Nations, “Convention on the Rights 
of the Child: Status as at: 11-06-2021 01:37:41 ED”, 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-11&chapter=4&clang=_en. 
868 Under the earlier international instruments, such as the 1924 and 1959 Declarations, the child was still not an 
owner of rights hence what they recognised were still not sufficiently clear as children rights compared to the 
UNCRC. This is also the same under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (10 December 1948) for 
instance as stipulated under Article 25(2)   
869 Alston, “The Best Interests Principle: Towards a Reconciliation of Culture and Human Rights”, above 
footnote 399, at p. 4. 




The UNCRC contains a broadly accepted formulation of the best interests principle.871 One 
author argues that when discussing the Convention, of its 54 Articles, Article 3 is of ‘primary 
importance’.872 Others argue that the principle has gained a central and unassailable 
position.873  Adding substance to this, the Committee on the Rights of the Child affirmed that 
Article 3 (1) provides not only a principle of interpretation for the whole Convention but also 
a right in itself and a rule of procedure.874 
The best interests of the child principle was a subject of considerable debate during the 
drafting period of the UNCRC.875 Although it was modified to suit different socio-cultural 
and economic realities of the international community’s members, it remains a contentious 
topic of debate.876 Despite this, the principle is likened to a golden thread that runs through 
and highlights not only the rights embodied in the UNCRC but the entire international child 
rights jurisprudence.877 The next part traces this thread as it flows through various relevant 
international legal instruments that enshrine the best interests principle. The main objective is 
to identify provisions of the principle in the instruments and analyse their literal formulations 
to gauge their meaning.  
5.2.1 United Nations Instruments  
International instruments providing mainly for the child are not the sole instruments 
enshrining the best interests of the child principle. Rather, the principle is spread across 
several instruments touching on children’s matters in a general or specific way. This part 
concentrates on the principle’s provisions in instruments adopted by the United Nations.  
 
871 Alston shows that the UNCRC has achieved a universal character, as has the best interests principle under 
Article 3(1) of the Convention. Alston, “The Best Interests Principle: Towards a Reconciliation of Culture and 
Human Rights”, above footnote 399, at pp. 1-5. 
872 Kate Standley, Family Law (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997), p. 164. 
873 Diduck, Kaganas, Family Law, Gender and the State, above footnote 838, p. 373. 
874 See paragraph 6 of the Committee on the Rights of the Child, “General comment No. 14 (2013) on the Right 
of the Child to Have His or Her Best Interests Taken as a Primary Consideration (art. 3 para. 1)”, p. 4. 
875 See part of the discussion in Detrick, The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, above 
footnote 403, at pp. 131-140. 
876 The state delegations brought different proposals and suggested amendments to the text of Article 3(1) to suit 
the socio-cultural and economic circumstances of their countires during its deliberations. Ibid., at p. 132-140. 
877 The phrase and implication of ‘a golden thread’ is borrowed from the expression of Tebutt AJ (as he then 
was) in the case of Kaiser v. Chambers (1969) 4 SA 224 (C) at 228G read in B. Clark, “A "golden thread"?: 
some aspects of the application of the standard of the best interests of the child in South African family law”, 




5.2.1.1 Declaration on the Rights of the Child, 1959 
After witnessing how the devastation of the Second World War affected children, the Member 
States of the United Nations resolved that the child is owed the best that humanity can give.878 
To protect children in the future, the UN declared the ten Principles in the 1959 Declaration 
on the Rights of the Child. The 1959 Declaration amended and added substance to the earlier 
declaration of 1924 under the League of Nations. Principle 2 of the 1959 Declaration 
articulates the best interests of the child principle. It advocates that when enacting laws for the 
child’s special protection and total development, facilitated by all means, in a manner healthy 
and normal, promoting freedom and dignity, the child’s best interests shall be the paramount 
consideration.879 
The wording of Principle 2 expresses three main points: the subject, purpose and scope of the 
best interests principle. Together with the status accorded to the principle, these three aspects  
will guide the following analysis of the principle’s formulations in this Declaration and other 
subsequent instruments. 
First, ‘the child’ is the subject of the best interests of the child principle. The Declaration does 
not define the term child. Nonetheless, its provisions refer to a human person below the age of 
legal majority.880 The wording of each Principle suggests the Declaration provides for 
individual children as opposed to a group of children or all children.881 The only difference is 
under Principle 1, which extends the rights under the Declaration to ‘every child’ without 
discrimination. However, the Principle uses the possessive and reflexive pronouns his/himself 
at the end of the provision limiting it to individual children. In the end, the Declaration covers 
all children, albeit independently. 
Second, the purpose of invoking the best interests of the child principle, according to 
Principle 2, is the life, survival, and development of the child. Interestingly, the Declaration 
sets one of the later cardinal principles of the UNCRC (principle of life, survival and 
development of the child) as the ground for applying the best interests of the child 
principle.882 The principle requires the child to have all opportunities and facilities within the 
 
878 See the preamble to the United Nations “Declaration of the Rights of the Child”, p. 19. Para 5 reiterates the 
1924 Declaration of the Rights of the Child’s preamble.  
879 Ibid., Principle 2. 
880 See ibid., Paragraphs 1, 3, and 5 where a child is considered as a human person before birth and afterwards 
but limited to the time when such person is still of physical and mental immaturity.  
881 The Declaration mainly uses the third-person singular pronouns he/his/himself. There is no gender sensitivity, 
and presumably the male pronouns include the female child as well. 




means of the law or otherwise to ensure a healthy and normal development while being free 
and dignified.  
Third, the scope for invoking the best interests of the child principle extends only to the 
enactment of laws for the above purpose. This means Principle 2 is limited only to legislative 
action for the child’s life, survival, and development in exclusion of all other actions that may 
also concern the child. The Principle makes the best interests of the child principle the 
ultimate determinant of the legislation as it has the status of paramount consideration. 
Principle 7 of the Declaration adds another dimension to the best interests of the child 
principle. It makes the best interests principle a guiding standard for those responsible for the 
education and guidance of the child. Parents occupy the front seat in this respect. In addition, 
the provision refers to a wide range of other individuals, such as teachers, religious leaders, 
and the community in general, as well as governmental and non-governmental institutions 
responsible for children’s upbringing and education. Thus, Principle 7 extends the scope of 
the best interest principle beyond the legislators specified under Principle 2. However, it does 
not specify whether the best interests of the child principle is of primary or paramount 
importance in this context.  
This Declaration benchmarks the first inclusion of the best interests of the child principle in 
an international human rights instrument. It holds a unique position because it serves as a 
foundation for other contemporary formulations of the best interests principle. As the 1924 
and 1959 Declarations laid the basis for the future of international children’s rights, one 
cannot help speculating about their influence on present-day formulations of the best interests 
of the child principle. An analysis of the ensuing instruments will unveil the connection if 
any. 
5.2.1.2 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 
1979 
Sex is a present-without-fail ground against discrimination in almost all international human 
rights instruments. It comes as no surprise because one of the central goals of the United 
Nations is to reaffirm faith in the equal rights of men and women.883 Despite this assurance, 
the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) found the general non-discrimination 
guarantees insufficient to protect and promote women’s rights and fundamental freedoms in 
 




certain vulnerable areas.884 The CSW produced several Declarations and Conventions to 
increase such protection and promotion.885  
These instruments created a piecemeal framework on the basis of which the Commission, 
later on, found incompetent to wage an effective war against women’s discrimination. 
Therefore, in 1967, an initial comprehensive instrument was adopted, the Declaration on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women. However, there remained a relentless demand 
for a binding instrument with normative force. To satisfy the demand, the Commission, in 
collaboration with other UN bodies and agencies, produced the 1979 Convention on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).886 
A question may arise here: why seek the best interests of the child principle in a women’s 
Convention? The simplest explanation is that CEDAW addresses the girl child, the role of 
women in the family, parenting, and children’s upbringing.887 This naturally brings in the 
interests of the child. Moreover, the Convention enshrines the best interests of the child 
principle in Articles 5 (b) and 16(1) (d) and (f). 
Article 5 fights against gender stereotypes and the fixing of parental gender roles based on 
social and cultural prejudices. The provision suggests the use of family education to champion 
an understanding of the maternal biological role of women as a social function and that the 
upbringing and development of children is a duty shared by both men and women. It further 
requires that, in all cases, the primordial consideration be the interest of the children. 
Article 5 (b) says that children belong to the men and women charged with their upbringing 
and development, and includes any, every, and all children. In this Article, the formulation of 
the best interests principle does not include the usual qualifying superlative ‘best’ but only the 
word ‘interest’. It thus broadly implies the advantage, benefit, or welfare of children. The 
scope of application of the principle given in this provision is “in all cases”. Although one 
could interpret this as meaning in all cases concerning the child, it is limited to the cases 
 
884 UN Women, “A brief history of the CSW | Commission on the Status of Women”, 
https://www.unwomen.org/en/csw/brief-history, 2021-06-14. 
885 Such as the Convention on the Political Rights of Women, 1952, the Convention on the Nationality of 
Married Women, 1957, the Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of 
Marriages, 1962, and the Recommendation on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and 
Registration of Marriages, 1965. 
886 United Nations, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (New York, 
1979) A brief history of the process is available at https://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/history.htm. 
887 See Para 13 of the Preamble to, and Artilce 4(2), 5(b), 9(2), and (16) of the Convention on the Elimination of 




under Article 5 (b). The word primordial (from Latin primordialis) gives to the interests of the 
children the status of primacy of consideration.888 
Article 16 of the Convention is dedicated to eliminating discrimination against women at the 
inception of, during, and on dissolution of marriage.889 The interests of children come into 
play when seeking to establish the same rights and responsibilities for men and women in 
cases of parenthood, guardianship, wardship, trusteeship, adoption and the like.890 The subject 
and scope of application of the best interests of the child principle in Article 16(1) (d) and (f) 
is similar to that under Article 5 (b). However, the two Articles invoke the principle for 
different purposes. Here, it is required that the interests of the children be considered 
whenever the rights and responsibilities of men and women are determined, be it in 
parenthood, wardship or adoption. The status of the principle has also changed from 
primordial to paramount. This means the interests of the children and not of the men or 
women are supreme in these cases. 
CEDAW is a Convention dedicated to women’s and girls’ rights. It deals with children 
collectively in the context of care by their parents. There is an argument that the inclusion of 
the best interests of the child principle in the Convention shifts the central focus of some 
provisions from women to children.891 It appears to shift the intention of Article 5 (b) and 
Article 16 (1) (d) and (f) from promoting and protecting women’s rights to promoting and 
protecting children’s rights by demanding their interests be the first or the determinative 
consideration in all such cases. This part is not concerned with this debate; rather, its aim is to 
show that the inclusion of the principle in CEDAW was a big step towards protecting the 
rights of the girl child and of all children. 
 
888 See discussion on the use of terms primordial, primary, and paramount and what they may mean in Alston, 
“The Best Interests Principle: Towards a Reconciliation of Culture and Human Rights”, above footnote 399, at 
pp. 12-13. 
889 See Para 6 of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, “General 
Recommendation on Article 16 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women”, https://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cedaw/docs/comments/CEDAW-C-52-WP-1_en.pdf 
(CEDAW/C/GC/29) (26 February 2013), at p. 2. 
890 See Article 16 (1) (d) and (f) of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women (New York, 1979). 
891 H.M.T. Holtmaat, “Article 5 CEDAW”, in B. Rudolf, M. A. Freeman, C. M. Chinkin, S. Kroworsch, A. 
Sherrier, S. Wittkopp (eds.), The UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 




5.2.1.3 United Nations Declaration on Social and Legal Principles Relating to the 
Protection and Welfare of Children, with Special Reference to Foster Placement 
and Adoption Nationally and Internationally, 1986 
In 1985 the United Nations Economic and Social Council asked a group of experts on family 
and child welfare to draft a Declaration on foster placement and adoption of children.892 The 
Declaration was adopted in 1986.893 It emphasises the need to bring up children within a 
family environment under the responsibility of parents in an atmosphere of affection and 
security.894 This need defines the purpose of the Declaration: to provide for alternative family 
care, be it kin, foster, adoptive or institutional, when the birth family is unavailable or 
inappropriate for the child.  
From the word go, the Declaration warns of the need to bear in mind that in foster care and 
adoption procedures, the child’s best interests must be the paramount consideration.895 The 
formulation of the principle in this Declaration is precise. It is limited to foster placement and 
adoption procedures which are the subject of the Declaration. However, under Article 5 of the 
Declaration, the scope is further extended to issues not necessarily limited to foster care and 
adoption. It refers generally to alternative care for children who cannot be cared for by their 
birth parents. In all cases, the best interests of the child remain paramount; that is the 
definitive consideration. The Declaration further mentions what interests are paramount in 
this context. Specifically, they include the need for affection, security and continuing care. 
This brings one clear advantage; it leaves no room for wondering which child interests must 
be considered in respect of the matters covered by the Declaration. There is no uncertainty 
regarding which interests the Declaration intends to be the paramount consideration. This 
reduces the principle’s indeterminacy though it could be argued that it does not guarantee the 
flexibility of the UNCRC. 
5.2.1.4 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989 
The United Nations Convention on the Right of the Child (UNCRC) marks the shift from 
regarding children as objects which require care and protection to recognising them as 
 
892 United Nations, “General Assembly Resolution Adopting the Declaration on Social and Legal Principles 
Relating to the Protection and Welfare of Children, with Special Reference to Foster Placement and Adoption”, 
International Legal Materials 26(4) (1987): pp. 1096–102. 
893 Declaration on Social and Legal Principles Relating to the Protection and Welfare of Children, with Special 
Reference to Foster Placement and Adoption (3 December 1986). 
894 Ibid., Preamble. 




independent subjects of rights.896 Since this Convention is almost universal due to its high 
number of ratifications, children around the globe enjoy this new status. The Convention is 
the core child rights instrument that provides comprehensive cover of the child’s welfare. It 
embeds, among other rights, the right to consider the child’s best interests in all actions 
concerning the child.897 Thus, apart from being a right, the principle has acquired the status of 
a general principle of the Convention. It must be considered when interpreting every right 
enshrined in the Convention.898 Moreover, it is a rule of procedure used to justify any decision 
concerning the child during the best interests assessment and determination process.899 
The Convention contains several formulations of the best interests of the child principle. 
Article 3(1) of the Convention contains the most general and internationally distinguished 
formulation. The subject of this provision is ‘children’ used in the plural form as opposed to 
the singular form ‘the/a child’ used in previous instruments. The shift can be interpreted as the 
intention of drafters to subject actions concerning every child individually and all children 
collectively to the best interests test. The Committee on the Rights of the Child has duly 
explained the word as referring to children as an individual, a group or a constituency.900 The 
Convention under Article 1 defines a child as a human person below the age of eighteen 
years.901 
The words ‘in all actions’ give the scope of application of the best interests of the child 
principle under Article 3 (1). In other terms, it means that applying the principle extends to all 
undertakings or interventions relating to the child. Actions may include decisions, proposals, 
 
896 Jean Zermatten, The Best Interests of the Child: Literal Analysis, Function and Implementation (Sion, 2010), 
p. 2. 
897 See Article 3 (1) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, UNCRC (20 November 1989). The principle is 
said to be a substantive right under Para 6(a) of the Committee on the Rights of the Child, “General comment 
No. 14 (2013) on the Right of the Child to Have His or Her Best Interests Taken as a Primary Consideration (art. 
3 para. 1)”. However, Zermatten, J. (2010)., p. 7, argues that the BIC principle is a foundation for a substantive 
right and not a right in itself as it requires the state to lay mechanisms for assessment of best interests during the 
decision-making process. 
898 Cantwell, The Best Interests of the Child in Intercountry Adoption, above footnote 89, p. 1. 
899 Para 6(c) of the Committee on the Rights of the Child, “General comment No. 14 (2013) on the Right of the 
Child to Have His or Her Best Interests Taken as a Primary Consideration (art. 3 para. 1)”, at p. 4. 
900 See Paragraph 13 (a) and (b) of Committee on the Rights of the Child, “General comment No. 7 (2005): 
Implementing Child Rights in Early Childhood”, https://www.refworld.org/docid/460bc5a62.html, 2021-06-21. 
Also see Paragraph 30 of Committee on the Right of the Child, “General comment No. 11 (2009): Indigenous 
children and their rights under the Convention [on the Rights of the Child]”, 
https://www.refworld.org/docid/49f6bd922.html, 2021-06-21T10:20:19.000Z; and Paras 21-24 of the Committee 
on the Rights of the Child, “General comment No. 14 (2013) on the Right of the Child to Have His or Her Best 
Interests Taken as a Primary Consideration (art. 3 para. 1)”, at pp. 7-8 





care, protection, services, procedures and legislation.902 The actions, however, must be those 
“concerning” children. This means that the action must directly or indirectly affect children 
individually, as a group or generally.903 Examples of direct actions include health services, 
care systems and schools, while indirect actions may consist of environment, housing and 
transport.904  
Article 3 (1) brings in an institutional aspect that was missing in the prior formulations. It 
names four categories of authorities that must be bound by the best interests of the child 
principle in their undertakings concerning children. The first category consists of public or 
private social welfare institutions. These include but are not limited to social work 
institutions. They extend to economic, cultural, civil and political institutions concerned with 
children. It certainly includes public and private organisations working for children’s rights 
and freedoms in all spheres of life.905 
The second category comprises courts of law. These involve all bodies conducting either 
judicial, conciliatory, mediatory or arbitral proceedings presided over by professional judges 
or lay persons.906 The third category is administrative authorities. These cover a broad 
spectrum of state agencies administering various services such as care systems, health 
services, protection and security, education, living conditions, environment and many 
others.907 The fourth is legislative bodies. These are all institutions responsible for legislative 
and parliamentary activities such as policy formulation, enactment of laws from national 
down to municipal levels, budgeting, and domestication of bilateral and multilateral 
agreements concerning children.908 
The phrase ‘best interests of the child’ is at the root of the principle. Foremost, in phrasing the 
principle, the superlative ‘best’ is used as opposed to some preceding formulations such as 
those under CEDAW. The researcher interprets the qualifier ‘best’ as referring to those 
interests or rights-based solutions among a cluster of many interests or solutions that best 
 
902 Paras 17-18 of the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC), “General comment No. 14 (2013) on the 
right of the child to have his or her best interests taken as a primary consideration (Art. 3, para. 1)”, at p. 7. 
903 Ibid., paras 19-20.  
904 See Paragraph 13(b) of Committee on the Rights of the Child, “General comment No. 7 (2005): 
Implementing Child Rights in Early Childhood”, above footnote 900. 
905 Para 26 of the Committee on the Rights of the Child, “General comment No. 14 (2013) on the Right of the 
Child to Have His or Her Best Interests Taken as a Primary Consideration (art. 3 para. 1)”, at p. 8. 
906 Ibid., paras 27-29, at pp. 8-9. 
907 Ibid., para 30, at p. 9. 
908 Ibid., para 31. See also Zermatten, The Best Interests of the Child: Literal Analysis, Function and 




serve the child.909 For instance, when determining whether to allow child contact with a 
separated abusive parent, there will be conflicting interests such as the child’s safety and 
psychological health, and the right to maintain personal relations with the parent. In 
consideration of the child’s best interests under the circumstances, a decision-maker may find 
that the safety and health of the child override the right to maintain parent-child relations and 
may proceed to deny contact based on this finding. Hence, the qualifier is a significant 
nuance.  
The status of the principle is that it is ‘a primary consideration’, meaning children’s interests 
must take priority among other considerations in a particular case.910 In other words, the 
children’s interests are not on the same level as other considerations.911 However, they are not 
the determining factor. There is room to consider other relevant aspects such as the rights and 
interests of parents, siblings, family, relatives, other children, or the general public.912 Thus, it 
becomes necessary to balance and compromise between competing interests when 
determining what is best for the child. Under the UNCRC, the approach is different from 
when the principle enjoyed a uniform paramountcy status in the 1959 and 1986 Declarations. 
In that case, it was the ultimate determinant factor concerning the specified actions. However, 
in the UNCRC, the principle is the determinant factor for select matters such as child adoption 
under Article 21 and not in all actions under Article 3 (1). However, this does not mean that 
the authorities concerned can dismiss consideration of the child’s best interests in some 
matters. Article 3(1) uses the word ‘shall’ which imposes a definite obligation and removes 
any room for discretion in considering the child’s best interests.913 
The UNCRC contains other formulations of the best interests of the child principle that apply 
to specific situations. They are divided into three groups depending on the status of the 
principle. In the first group the principle has the status of primacy. This is evident under 
Article 18 (1), which requires parents and legal guardians to have the child’s best interests as 
their ‘basic concern’ while discharging their responsibilities towards the upbringing and 
development of the child. In the second group it has the status of determinant criterion. This 
 
909 Zermatten, The Best Interests of the Child: Literal Analysis, Function and Implementation, above footnote 
896, at p. 11.  Zermatten argues that the use of the qualifier ‘best’ together with the word interests reflects the 
ultimate goal of the Convention which is the well-being of the child. 
910 The drafting history of 'a primary consideration' is available in Cantwell, The Best Interests of the Child in 
Intercountry Adoption, above footnote 89, at p. 16. 
911 See Para 37 of Committee on the Rights of the Child, “General comment No. 14 (2013) on the Right of the 
Child to Have His or Her Best Interests Taken as a Primary Consideration (art. 3 para. 1)”, at p. 10. 
912 Ibid., para 39. 
913 Ibid., para 36. Under section 53 of the Interpretation of Laws Act, Cap 1 [Laws of Tanzania R.E. 2002] it is 




status makes the principle one of the criteria that determines the outcome. This is seen in 
Articles 9 (1) and 20 (1), which provide that separation from parents must be in the child’s 
best interests. Also, Article 9 (3) requires that the child’s best interests be the determinant 
factor in curtailing the right of the child to maintain regular contact and personal relations 
with separated parents. In matters of juvenile justice, Articles 37 (c) and 40 (2) (b) (iii) require 
that detention of a child together with adults and the presence of parents, guardians or legal 
assistants during penal proceedings be in the best interests of the child.914 In the third group it 
has the status of paramountcy. Article 21 requires that the child’s best interests be the 
paramount consideration in every State Party's child adoption system. The Article sets the 
child’s best interests as the absolute determinant.  
The UNCRC revolutionised the concept of the best interests of the child. It promoted the 
concept from a mere decision-making guideline used in the absence of a human rights system 
to the core principle in the child rights system.915 Unfortunately, besides its long, extensive 
use, the principle has remained contentious and often been misapplied. However, the 
Committee on the Rights of the Child has provided guidelines for the interpretation, 
assessment and determination of the child’s best interests.916 Still, there is work to be done: a 
case-by-case assessment and determination in the light of child rights under the Convention 
and other relevant legal instruments. 
5.2.1.5 United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 2006 
This Convention, herein CRPD, is the first international human rights instrument exclusively 
providing for persons with disabilities. Its main agenda is to end all forms of discrimination 
and restrictions against persons with disabilities.917 The intention is to allow these people the 
full enjoyment of human rights. For example, Article 3 (a) and (b) of the Convention 
propagates equality and dignity of treatment as accorded to everyone else without distinction.  
 
914 Zermatten elaborates that Article 37 (c) may apply to a child incarcerated together with one parent for 
instance in the case of a new-born baby. In the case of Article 40 (2) (b) (iii) he suggests that it might be not in 
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Implementation, above footnote 896, pp. 14–15. 
915 Cantwell, The Best Interests of the Child in Intercountry Adoption, above footnote 89, at pp. 6–10. 
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His or Her Best Interests Taken as a Primary Consideration (Art. 3 Para. 1) (2013), CRC/C/GC/14 adopted by 
the Committee on the Rights of the Child at its sixty-second session (14 January - 1 February 2013), 
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that despite clarifications under General comment No. 14 (2013) there still lacks a formal consensus on the 
subject. See ibid., at pp. 5–6  




The convention covers not only adults but also children with disabilities. In furthering the 
promotion and protection of children with disabilities, the Convention enshrines the best 
interests principle. Article 7 (2) contains the first formulation of the best interests of the child 
principle. It has similar wording to Article 3 (1) of the UNCRC with only two main 
differences. One, the subject of the formulation is more specific than under the UNCRC; it 
applies solely to children with disabilities. The scope of application of the principle is 
therefore limited to actions concerning disabled children. Two, the authorities that can take 
action relating to such children are not specified. This can be interpreted as a broader 
formulation. It may mean that it does not matter who takes action. What matters is that such 
action concerns children with disabilities. Under this Article the principle has the status of a 
primary consideration. 
Article 23 (2) embeds another formulation of the principle. It is invoked in the context of the 
rights and responsibilities of persons with disabilities acting as guardians, wards, trustees, 
adopters of children, or similar status. The provision requires that the best interests of the 
child be the paramount consideration in all cases. This Article can be compared to Article 21 
of the UNCRC. It provides for the decision-making process when the child is separated from 
the birth parents and needs alternative care. However, Article 23 (2), in contrast to Article 7 
(2) above, does not limit the principle to children with disabilities. Taking the interpretation of 
the Committee, reference to ‘the child’ under this provision includes children individually, as 
a group or generally.918 Therefore, this formulation extends the application of the principle to 
all children.  
In the past, persons with disabilities were treated akin to children, as objects to be cared for 
and decided for.919 The concept of best interests was applied to them a long time before the 
international recognition of human rights.920 It is this Convention, however, and not the 
universal human rights system that breaks the medical and charity-based approaches to 
persons with disabilities and brings about a rights-based approach.921 In its promotion and 
protection framework, the Convention limits the best interests principle only to children. 
Interestingly, the Convention, though dedicated to persons with disabilities, strives to protect 
all children’s interests irrespective of their condition. 
 
918 See Para 32 of Committee on the Rights of the Child, “General comment No. 14 (2013) on the Right of the 
Child to Have His or Her Best Interests Taken as a Primary Consideration (art. 3 para. 1)”, at p. 9. 
919 Cantwell, The Best Interests of the Child in Intercountry Adoption, above footnote 89, at pp. 6 and 12. 
920 Ibid., at pp. 6-10. 




5.2.2 Hague Conference on Private International Law Instruments 
The Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH) is an intergovernmental 
organisation formed in 1893 with the aim of harmonising the rules of private international 
law.922 It makes and assists in implementing multilateral instruments geared to unifying the 
rules and procedures of private international law. This part looks at three of its instruments on 
child issues that incorporate the best interests of the child principle. 
5.2.2.1 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, 1980 
This multilateral treaty was drafted and concluded before the UNCRC. It strives to protect 
children against the harm of wrongful removal to or retention in another state by laying down 
specific procedures for their immediate return home.923 The Convention seeks to ensure that 
the laws of one state regarding children’s custody and access rights are respected in 
another.924 It applies when an alleged abduction relates to a child below the age of 16 years 
habitually resident in a contracting state immediately before a breach of custody or access 
rights. 
The Convention incorporates the best interests of the child principle in two ways. The first 
way is incorporation as an express formulation. The preamble to the Convention states 
unequivocally that in matters of child custody, the interests of children are without doubt of 
paramount importance. The formulation omits the qualifier ‘best’ and refers only to the 
interests of children. It applies the principle to all children within the limits of custody 
matters. However, the principle is found in the preamble, a seat deemed legally inoperative. 
Its presence, nonetheless, adds to the protective framework of the Convention. 
The second way of incorporation is as an implied formulation. The Convention under Article 
1(1) guarantees any abducted child a prompt return to his or her place of habitual residence. 
However, under Article 13 (b), the Convention departs from its objects by opposing the return 
of an abducted child if there is a grave risk of exposure to physical or psychological harm or 
being placed in an intolerable situation. This implies that the authorities responsible must 
consider the best interests of any child before ordering a return. It has been argued that this 
provision is more concrete than an outright formulation of the best interests of the child 
principle.925 This is because it defines clear criteria for the decision for or against return. It 
 
922 Further details on the HCCH are available at https://www.hcch.net/en/home. 
923 See the Preamble and Article 1 (a) of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, “Hague 
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction”, 
https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3951c.html, 2021-06-21. 
924 Ibid., Article 1(b). 




does not, for instance, merely reiterate the standard formulation that in ordering return, the 
interests of children are of paramount importance. 
This Convention has been described as being widely successful against international child 
abduction. Hans van Loon names it as a significant precedent in creating the 1993 Hague 
Convention on Intercountry Adoption.926 It showed that a multilateral treaty can create a 
robust framework for protecting children at the international level, the best interests of the 
child principle being an unassailable component of such a framework.  
5.2.2.2 Hague Convention on the Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect of 
Intercountry Adoption, 1993 
The spread of intercountry adoption escalated after the Second World War. It was considered 
a humanitarian response and protective measure for orphaned and abandoned children after 
the war. Therefore, many perceived it as desirable for the welfare of the children.927 However, 
with time and for several reasons, children available for adoption in Europe became scarce.928 
Some of the reasons included growing infertility, increased use of contraceptives and adapting 
to single parenthood.929 This reversed the need to find a family for a child, which had been 
associated with intercountry adoption. Motives for adoption increasingly changed from being 
child-centred to being family-centred. Thus, there was a high demand for children to adopt in 
the developed countries, which was answered by a supply of such children from developing 
countries.930 This practice marked the beginning of social controversy relating to intercountry 
adoption.  
In its efforts to regulate intercountry adoption, the HCCH came up with the 1965 Convention 
on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Recognition of Decrees Relating to Adoption.931 Among 
other things, this Convention introduced international legal and procedural regulation as well 
as professionalism in the practice of intercountry adoption. For example, Article 6 of the 
Convention expressly required adherence to the best interests of the child principle, 
introduced best interests assessment (inquiry) by private authorities, and demanded that social 
workers should possess a set of skills and experience in intercountry adoption matters. 
 
926 Loon, J.H.A. van, “Hague Convention of 29 May 1993 on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect 
of Intercountry Adoption”, The International Journal of Children's Rights (3) (1995): pp. 463–68. 
927 Cantwell, The Best Interests of the Child in Intercountry Adoption, above footnote 89, at p. 26. 
928 Mezmur, “From Angelina (To Madonna) to Zoe's Ark: What Are the 'A-Z' Lessons for Intercountry 
Adoptions in Africa?”, above footnote 99, at p. 146. 
929 Ibid., p. 146. 
930 Loon, J.H.A. van, “International Co-operation and Protection of Children with Regard to Intercountry 
Adoption (Volume 244)”, in Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law (Leiden: Brill, 
1993), at p. 230. 




However, the Convention was narrow in scope, making it insufficient to handle the 
dimensions and problems of intercountry adoption, which had expanded since the 1970s.932 
This was because the Convention was drafted to deal with the situation within Europe in the 
1960s. It came into force in 1978 when there were already drastic changes in the realities of 
intercountry adoption. The inapplicability, coupled with the low rate of ratifications, rendered 
the Convention defunct. The inoperativeness of the 1965 Convention paved the way for the 
1993 Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption.933 
The 1993 Convention is designed to establish safeguards and a system of international 
cooperation to ensure intercountry adoptions are in the child’s best interests and respect 
fundamental child rights, thus preventing child abduction, sale, and trafficking. 934  The best 
interests of the child principle is portrayed in three different forms in the Convention. One, as 
a rule of procedure: the Convention endeavours to put in place measures or safeguards to 
ensure that intercountry adoptions ‘are made in’ or ‘take place in’ the best interests of the 
child.935 The wording of the provisions indicates that the best interests of the child principle 
should govern all steps during the due process of intercountry adoption. All individuals and 
authorities concerned must ensure that every aspect of the adoption satisfies the best interests 
test. For example, the eligibility of adopters, adoptability of the child, consent requirements, 
and residence requirements must all conform to the best interests of the child principle. 
Two, as a determinant factor: the Convention makes the principle a determinant factor in 
deciding whether to proceed with the adoption or not. Article 4 of the Convention says that 
intercountry adoption may take place only if it complies with the best interests of the child 
principle. This gives the competent authorities a mandate to conduct a best interests 
determination (BID). Article 16 also requires BID to establish whether a child’s placement is 
compliant with the principle. Under Article 21, the position of the best interests principle as a 
determinant factor is well demonstrated. It says that a child’s adoption in the receiving 
country will not be successful if the central authority responsible determines that it is contrary 
to the child’s best interests. 
Three, as a factor to be taken into account: the Convention requires, for instance, that a 
Contracting State must take the principle into account when refusing to recognise an adoption. 
In this case, as stipulated under Article 24 of the Convention, the determinant factor is the 
 
932 Loon, J.H.A., “International Co-operation and Protection of Children with Regard to Intercountry Adoption 
(Volume 244)”, above footnote 930, at p. 463. 
933 The Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption, 
1993. 
934 Ibid., Preamble para 4 and Article 1. 




public policy of such a State. The best interests of the child are simply a factor to be 
considered when refusing such recognition.  
This Convention does not include the standard formulation of the best interests of the child 
principle. For instance, it does not require it to be either a primary or paramount consideration 
but instead factors it in in all aspects of intercountry adoption. Also, despite the best interests 
of the child principle being at its core, the Convention does not explicitly give any interpretive 
or determinative criteria. The competent and central authorities of individual Contracting 
States are left to their own devices in this respect. They have to rely on the Guide to Good 
Practice and consider the circumstances of each case.936 
5.2.2.3 Hague Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement 
and Co-operation in Respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the 
Protection of Children, 1996 
The 20th century witnessed the commitment of the Hague Conference on Private International 
Law to secure child protection. In succession, the Conference passed three Conventions on the 
subject.937 The last of the three, the 1996 Convention on Protection of Children,938 was more 
extensive and successful than its predecessors.939 The main aim of the 1996 Convention is to 
provide measures for the protection of children by avoiding conflicts over jurisdiction, 
applicable law, recognition and enforcement of judgments.940 It also provides for cooperation 
between state authorities in the discharge of parental responsibilities. Article 1(2) of the 
Convention extends parental responsibility to guardians or other legal representatives 
recognised as parental authorities to protect the person and properties of children. 
The best interests of the child principle is an integral part of the 1996 Convention. In the 
preamble, the State Parties confirm that the child’s best interests are to be a primary 
consideration. This means that the principle has primacy in implementing the entire 
Convention. The words ‘are to be’ reflect an obligation rather than discretion in considering 
 
936 Hague Conference on Private International Law, The implementation and operation of the 1993 Hague 
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Settlement of Guardianship of Minors, 12 June 1902 and Convention Concerning the Powers of Authorities and 
the Law Applicable in Respect of the Protection of Infants, 5 October 1961 as published in the United 
Nations Treaty Series, 1969, pp. 145. 
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939 Peter Nygh, “The Hague Convention on the Protection of Children”, Netherlands International Law Review 
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the child’s best interests. Under this Convention the principle seems to encompass children 
individually, as a group, or generally. 
Apart from the preamble, the Convention embodies some other formulations of the best 
interests of the child principle. These can be divided into two categories. One category 
includes those which recognise the best interests principle as a determinant factor. Article 8 
states the need for the best interests of the child to be assessed by state authorities.941 Article 8 
(4) says that the best interests of the child must be a determinant factor when an authority 
otherwise without jurisdiction accepts jurisdiction over assessment of the child’s best 
interests. This formulation simply requires the child’s best interests to be the foreign 
authority’s basis for assuming jurisdiction. Article 10 (1) (b) also makes the child’s best 
interests a determining factor in deciding whether a state authority has jurisdiction to take 
measures to protect the person and property of the child in the case of the parents’ divorce, 
separation, or marriage annulment. 
The other category includes those formulations that name the child’s best interests as a factor 
to be ‘taken into consideration’ in the decision-making process. Article 22 mentions the need 
for the child’s best interests to be a consideration when refusing application of the law 
designated by provisions of chapter three of the 1996 Convention. The main reason for such 
refusal, however, is a manifest contradiction to public policy. Article 23 (2) (d) has the same 
formulation as Article 22, only that here it relates to the refusal by one state to recognise child 
protective measures taken by another contracting state. Under Article 28, the child’s best 
interests are to be taken into consideration while enforcing measures taken in another state, 
according to the extent of the law of the enforcing state. Article 33, relating to decisions on 
alternative care, subjects the requesting state’s decision for placement or care to the consent of 
the requested state. The provision requires the best interests of the child to be considered in 
making such a decision. 
It can be argued that the 1996 Hague Convention is somewhat obscure with regard to the 
protection of children, especially when compared to the more definitive 1980 Hague 
Convention on Child Abduction and the 1993 Convention on Intercountry Adoption.942 
However, Bainham comments that the three have become sister Conventions forming a solid 
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child protection framework.943 Reinforcing the protection agenda, all three Conventions 
enshrine the best interests of the child principle. 
5.3 African Regional Context 
Africa is the second largest continent in the world both by size and population. It is 
characterised by racial, ethnic, cultural, traditional, religious, legal, economic, and political 
diversity.944 Africa, believed to have been host to the first human life, has progressed albeit 
gradually from living in the state of nature to achieving the African civilisation known today. 
Undoubtedly, the systems of law also advanced with society. This part looks at the 
development of children’s rights in Africa, particularly relating to the best interests of the 
child principle. 
5.3.1 African Union Instruments 
Most African communities in the era before external influence had systems of law based on 
customs and traditions, deriving their authenticity from morality and traditional religion.945 
The continent’s current legal systems, with a mix of common, civil, customary, and religious 
laws, are outcomes of colonial rule. A deep valley separates the pre- and post-colonial legal 
systems. It follows that the definitions of a child and children’s rights and duties vary 
considerably in the old and the current African societies. One African researcher has argued 
that there can never be a universal conception of childhood and children’s rights.946 This is 
because of the dynamic historical, socio-cultural, economic, political, and legal variables at 
play in world societies. Even within the African continent, though it is undebatable that 
children have rights, the concept of the child and children’s rights is not harmonious in the 
fifty-four states.947 This part, however, does not concentrate on the varying concepts of 
childhood, children, and their rights. Instead, it traces the emergence and advancement of the 
best interests of the child principle within African jurisprudence. 
In pre-colonial Africa, human rights were fully enjoyed by members of communities, 
excluding aliens.948 The concept of universal human rights did not exist then, but a person’s 
rights were guaranteed provided he or she belonged to the community and executed his or her 
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duty.949 With the coming of colonialism, African overtures towards promoting and protecting 
human rights were destroyed. It was not until the fight for independence started to bear 
victorious fruits in the 1960s that Africa could hope for respect of human rights and 
restoration of dignity.  
Numerous struggles and efforts led to the formation of the Organisation of African Unity 
(OAU) and the adoption of the OAU Charter in 1963. However, the OAU Charter’s objects 
did not include promoting and protecting human rights but only made general reference to 
them.950 Therefore, to fill the gap, the OAU, with the support of the UN and other African 
organisations, adopted a comprehensive human rights instrument named the Banjul Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights in 1981.951 
In 1979, recognising the need to promote and protect the welfare of the African child, and 
while still deliberating on a draft human rights Charter, the OAU adopted the Declaration on 
the Rights and Welfare of the Child.952 Although the Declaration recalled the 1959 UN 
Declaration on the Rights of the Child, it did not contain a formulation of the best interests of 
the child principle. Nonetheless, it appealed to the Member States to take measures towards 
securing the welfare of the child. The OAU, two years later, adopted the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights.953 The Charter provides for the rights and freedoms of children 
because Article 2 says that it applies to every individual without distinction. Article 18(3) of 
the Charter specifically requires protection of the rights of the child. However, the Charter, 
like the Declaration, contains no formulation of the best interests of the child principle. 
Fortunately, it did not end there for the African child. As foreshadowed by the 1979 
Declaration and as influenced by the drafting activity of the 1989 UNCRC, the OAU set the 
machinery in motion for adopting a binding comprehensive instrument peculiar to the rights 
and welfare of the African child. In 1990 the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the 
Child (ACRWC) was adopted.954 This Charter differs from the UNCRC only in its reflection 
of the socio-cultural and economic setting of the African continent. It considers and confronts 
African values, views and experiences that pertain to and conflict with children’s rights. It 
embeds the principle of the child’s best interests to ensure that the rights under the Charter are 
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respected in all actions concerning the child.955 This Charter is the first regional codification 
of children’s rights and the best interests of the child principle in a treaty.  
In the domestic setting, pre-ACRWC, most national laws enshrined and applied the welfare 
principle for children’s protection. This is because the welfare principle was part of the law 
received from the colonial rulers.956 However, the coming into force of the ACRWC in 1999 
added momentum to the process of enacting and harmonising domestic child laws to mirror 
the provisions of the UNCRC and the Charter. Although this process may still be ongoing, 
considerable progress has been achieved. The ACPF reviewed about nineteen eastern and 
southern African countries in 2007, and most had or were in the process of enacting or 
harmonising their laws to be in line with the UNCRC and ACRWC.957 Therefore, national 
legislation in Africa currently embodies formulations of the best interests of the child 
principle. Others have even gone a step further and provided criteria for the interpretation and 
determination of children’s best interests, which are missing in the international and regional 
instruments relating to the principle.958  
The following part examines and briefly analyses the provisions of the ACRWC concerning 
the best interests of the child principle. 
5.3.2 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, 1990 
A small percentage of African countries represented the continent in the drafting process of 
the UNCRC.959 For this reason, and because of the need to have an instrument true to Africa’s 
unique realities, the OAU adopted the ACRWC to complement the application of the UNCRC 
in Africa. While it retains the spirit and substance of the UNCRC, the African Charter brings 
a distinctive view of child’s rights through the specs of African cultural values and 
experiences. It reflects issues pertinent to Africa, such as child marriage, harmful cultural 
practices like female genital mutilation (FGM), use of children as beggars, recruitment of 
children in armed conflict, rights and obligations of parents, the role of the family in adoption 
and fostering, children’s duty and responsibility to the family and community, and the 
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overarching supremacy of the Charter over all customary, traditional, cultural and religious 
practices.960  
The Charter has several formulations of the best interests of the child principle. Echoing 
Article 3 (1) of the UNCRC, Article 4 (1) of the Charter also provides a general version of the 
principle. However, there are three slight differences in the wording of these two 
formulations. First, as opposed to ‘children’ in Article 3 (1) of the UNCRC, Article 4 (1) of 
the Charter refers to ‘the child’. This could be interpreted as limiting the application of the 
principle to actions concerning individual children only, to the exclusion of children as a 
group or generally. Second, the Charter gives ‘any person or authority’ undertaking actions 
affecting the child the responsibility to consider the child’s best interests. This is a broader 
formulation compared to Article 3 (1), which specifies targeted authorities. The Charter 
eliminates the uncertainty of whether the principle binds individual persons such as parents, 
relatives or members of the community.961 Third, the best interests principle is given the 
status of ‘the’ and not ‘a’ primary consideration. The use of these two articles in formulations 
of the best interests of the child principle has attracted its share of the debate, which will be 
briefly discussed in the following parts.  
In a nutshell, the use of the article ‘the’ suggests that the child’s best interests should be 
considered above the interests of other involved person(s) in all actions concerning the child. 
It implies that the child’s best interests be given utmost priority over other competing interests 
such as those of parents, siblings, other children, the general public, or the state. It is opposed 
to the use of the article ‘a’, which suggests that the child’s best interests are a fundamental 
consideration, but that they do not override other competing interests.962  
The other formulations of the best interests principle under the Charter can be studied on the 
basis of the status accorded to the principle. One, it can be a factor to take into account. Under 
Article 9 (2), parents or legal guardians must take the child’s best interests into account when 
guiding and directing the exercise of a child’s right to freedom of thought, conscience, and 
religion. This formulation is unique to the ACRWC. Two, it can be a determinant factor. 
Article 19 (1) allows parental separation only when a judicial authority, according to 
appropriate law, determines it to be in the child’s best interests. Also, under Article 25 (2) (a), 
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removing a child to alternative family care can be occasioned if it has been determined that it 
is not in the child’s best interests to remain in the environment of the birth family. Three, it 
can be a basic concern. Parents and other people responsible for the upbringing and 
development of the child, under Article 20 (1), must always have the best interests of the child 
as their basic concern. Four, it can be a paramount consideration. Article 24 of the Charter 
gives the child’s best interests the high status of being a paramount consideration in child 
adoption. 
The best interests of the child principle is also a general principle of the ACRWC. Although 
its formulations in the Charter appear similar to those of the UNCRC, they bring a world of 
interpretive differences, since the Charter provides a wide range of rights unique to the 
African child. Therefore, due to the atypical African context, the implications of the general 
and the specified formulations in practice differ considerably from those of the international 
instruments.  
5.4 The Tanzanian Context 
The guarantee of fundamental human rights and freedoms in Tanzania has come a long, 
turbulent way. While it would have been entirely counter-productive to expect such 
guarantees during colonialism, refusal to incorporate a Bill of Rights into the Constitution at 
independence was perhaps more unexpected.963 One would anticipate promotion and 
protection of human rights to be among the priorities of a newly independent state emerging 
from colonialism. However, the new Tanzanian rulers viewed a Bill of Rights as a hindrance 
to development and a tool for the still foreign-constituted judiciary to meddle with 
government affairs.964 Unfortunately, the impacts of the refusal may be traced in Tanzanian 
society from the first government’s rule to the present: undemocratic actions, general 
disregard for the rule of law and failure to respect fundamental human rights and freedoms.965 
The government’s reluctance to address human rights issues in the constitution did not hold 
for long. Initially, the government attempted to resolve the matter by placing the Bill of 
Rights in the preamble to the 1965 interim Constitution. This was ingenious since provisions 
of the preamble do not have any force of law. However, increasing pressure from Tanzanians 
both from Mainland and Zanzibar saw the incorporation of the Bill of Rights in the 1977 URT 
Constitution in 1984. It was incorporated through the Constitutional (Fifth) (Amendment) 
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Act, 1984 (Act No. 15 of 1984).966 It is also possible that Tanzania finally decided to 
incorporate the Bill due to the enormous influence the Banjul Charter had on African human 
rights jurisprudence.967 
The Bill provides for general human rights and specific rights and duties of Tanzanian 
citizens.968 There is no express guarantee of children’s rights in the Bill. Instead, children’s 
rights can be inferred from the general guarantees under the Bill’s framework. Tanzania’s 
approach is in stark contrast to constitutions in other jurisdictions that address children’s 
rights in specific terms. For instance, Section 28 of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa of 1996 contains an exemplary children’s rights constitutional provision. Regarding the 
best interests principle, Section 28 (2) of the South African Constitution says that ‘A child’s 
best interests are of paramount importance in every matter concerning the child.’ 
International and regional child rights instruments incorporated in Tanzanian legislation assist 
in covering the constitutional gap. The Law of the Child Act, 2009 is currently the key 
legislation in promoting and protecting children’s rights as it domesticates the UNCRC and 
ACRWC. 969 The Act is the most comprehensive and unified law on children’s matters that 
the country has ever had. Its enactment was a long-awaited and highly recommended action 
for the Tanzanian child.970  In its protection agenda, the legislation reiterates the best interests 
of the child principle. Regarding the principle, it echoes the UNCRC and ACRWC under 
section 4 (2). The development of the law of the child in Tanzania, particularly as relating to 
the best interests of the child principle, has been a long process. The paragraphs below give a 
brief overview. 
The child in Tanzania has been and is still governed by multiple laws. Customary and 
religious laws were the first legal orders that addressed child matters. With colonialism came 
statutory laws transferred from the metropolis of the colonial power. Statutory laws in 
Tanzania were largely received from or enacted under the British. In the case of the child, 
related laws governed a wide range of matters. These included registration of births and 
deaths,971 child delinquency,972 affiliation,973 child adoption,974 marriage,975 and succession.976 
 
966 Ibid., pp. 11–12. 
967 Ibid. 
968  Articles 12-29 of the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, 1977. 
969 Law of the Child Act, 2009. 
970 See concluding remarks in Rwezaura, Wanitzek, “The Law and Practice Relating to the Adoption of Children 
in Tanzania”, above footnote 22, at p. 161. 
971 The Births and Deaths Registration Ordinance, No. 12 of 1920. 
972 The Children and Young Persons Ordinance, No. 3 of 1937. 
973 The Affiliation Ordinance, 1949: Ordinance No. 42 of 1949 which provided for maintanance of children born 




Tanzania retained some of these laws and they are still applicable to date. However, some of 
the colonial laws held some exceedingly child-unfriendly provisions, such as the filius nullius 
principle in the law of affiliation.977  
Received English law introduced the welfare of the child principle in Tanzania.978 For 
example, the 1937 Children and Young Persons Ordinance contained formulations of the 
welfare principle in its sections 4 and 14.979 Also, the Adoption Ordinance of 1953, under 
section 7 (1) (d), required the court before granting an adoption order to consider whether it 
was in the interests of the welfare of the child to do so.980  
Most of the received laws were retained after independence. With time, demands increased 
for laws that reflected and catered for the realities of Tanzanian society. The law of marriage 
was one of the areas that were reformed. It resulted in the Law of Marriage Act (LMA) 
enacted in 1971.981 The Act attempted to integrate Islamic religious laws, African customary 
laws and received English common law, as well as reforming the status of women in marriage 
and improving the framework for the protection of children.982 
The Law of Marriage Act embarked upon the protection of children’s welfare. Children, 
however, were not the main agenda of the legislation; rather, women’s rights were. Children’s 
welfare surfaces as an issue on the occasion of parental separation or divorce. The Act 
contains varying formulations of the welfare principle and the requirement to consider the 
child’s best interests to protect the child in the aftermath of such occurrences.983Although the 
LMA was a celebrated law at its enactment, it later became apparent that it was still short on 
 
974 The first adoption law in Tanzania (then Tanganyika) was the Adoption of Infants Ordinance, 1942: 
Ordinance No. 5 of 1942. 
975 The Marriage Ordinance, Cap 109 repealed and replaced by the Law of Marriage Act, No. 5 of 1971. 
976 Succession was governed by statutory, religious and customary laws. Received statutory law included the 
Non-Christian Asiatic (Succession) Ordinance, 1923. Religious and customary laws applied under the Judicature 
and Applications of Laws Ordinance, No. 7 of 1920. Customary laws became unified after independence in the 
Declaration of Customary Laws, 1963 as reported in Barthazar A. Rwezaura, Ulrike Wanitzek, “Family Law 
Reform in Tanzania: A Socio-legal Report”, International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 2(1) (1988): 
pp. 1–26. 
977 Section 160(1) of the Law of the Child Act, 2009 repeals the Affiliation Act. 
978 Reception date was 22 July 1920 through the reception clause found under section 2 (3) of the Judicature and 
Applications of Laws Ordinance, 1920 (now Judicature and Applications of Laws Act, Cap 358). 
979 Section 4 is a bail provision for remanding a person under sixteen years of age if doing so will disassociate 
him or her from an undesirable person. Section 14 gives the court a duty to obtain information about a convicted 
child so as to deal with the case in the best interests of that child. 
980 The court gives a good discussion of the welfare principle as provided under the Ordinance in the ruling of 
the adoption petition In the Matter of Master Ayaz and Two Others, LRT 1978, n. 25 as read in Rwezaura, 
Wanitzek, “The Law and Practice Relating to the Adoption of Children in Tanzania”, above footnote 22, at p. 
130. 
981 Law of Marriage Act, 1971. 
982 See Barthazar A. Rwezaura, “Tanzania: Building a New Family Law out of a Plural Legal System”, 
University of Louisville Journal of Family Law 33 (1994-1995): pp. 523–40. 




children’s protection. The inadequacy of the LMA’s framework to protect children was one of 
the reasons for advocacy concerning a comprehensive law of the child. 
It is commendable that Tanzania has enacted a law of the child that reflects the UNCRC and 
ACRWC. Significant to this study is the new children’s rights framework established under 
the law and its operation. The special focus of this study is to consider adoptions with an 
international element, and it uses the best interests of the child principle as a key analytical 
tool in its examination of the law and practice in this field.  
The following part examines the provisions of the best interests of the child principle in the 
relevant Tanzanian laws. Since the child was protected under the welfare principle since 
colonial times, this part looks briefly at the role of this principle in the LMA. It will seek to 
identify the principle’s purpose and scope of application under the Act. This examination sets 
the stage for understanding the transition from the welfare principle to the best interests 
principle. Also, it will clarify the distinction between the welfare and best interests principles 
in terms of their meaning and application under the laws of marriage and the child. 
However, the main aim of this part is to analyse the provisions for formulations of the best 
interests principle in the current legal and policy framework in respect of children. This is 
because the Law of the Child Act applies the best interests principle to all matters concerning 
the child, even those previously only covered under the LMA.  
5.4.1 Law of Marriage Act, 1971 
The children’s issues dealt with in the LMA, 1971 are connected with the aftermaths of 
marriage breakdown. They feature in provisions regarding custody, maintenance, distribution 
of matrimonial property and other matrimonial reliefs. The Act urges the court to be guided 
by the child welfare and best interests principles when determining such matters. The welfare 
principle is provided for under section 125(2) of the Act, which requires ‘the welfare of the 
child’ to be the paramount consideration in determining custody. This provision limits the 
principle to a specific action, makes the court the determining authority, and gives 
paramountcy to the child’s welfare. This section also provides for factors which the court 
must take into account subject to the welfare principle. As provided for under Section 125 (2) 
(a)-(c) of the Act, these include the wishes of the child’s parents, the wishes of the child if 
capable of independent opinion, and the customs of the parties’ community. These factors are 
not the determinant factors. The court needs to take them into account while deciding on the 
child’s welfare. The child’s welfare is the absolute determinant factor in custody 




determination of each child’s welfare in the case of siblings. Also, section 134 emphasises the 
welfare principle by giving power to the court to vary any agreed custody or maintenance 
arrangements if ascertained that it is reasonable and serves the interest of the child’s welfare. 
While the LMA does not incorporate the best interests principle directly, it requires the court 
to safeguard the child’s best interests in post-marriage breakdown arrangements. For instance, 
under section 67, which allows spouses to agree to live apart, the court is empowered to vary 
or set aside certain provisions in the agreements if determined that they are contrary to the 
child’s best interests. Another example is in section 108(c), dealing with separation or divorce 
proceedings. The law states that the court must inquire into arrangements for custody and 
maintenance of children of the broken-down marriage and ensure that these arrangments 
satisfy the best interests of the child test. These provisions specify the subject, purpose and 
scope of the best interests principle but do not formulate it as a general principle as in the 
UNCRC, ACRWC or the Law of the Child Act. The LMA was enacted before the children’s 
rights movement; hence, it could not enshrine the principle as evidence of a change of 
paradigm which revolutionised the child’s status into a rights holder. 
For a long time, Tanzanian laws only applied the welfare principle and required consideration 
of the child’s best interests in certain child-related matters. The LMA, 1971, which has been 
the core source of family law in the country since 1971, could have ensured child protection 
by reiterating Article 3(1) of the UNCRC but did not do so. Instead, it allowed (and still 
allows) practices such as child marriage that are by no means in the child’s best interest. The 
rationale for the Act’s shortcomings seems to be that the Act focused on women’s rights 
rather than those of children. However, even after considerable international and regional 
developments in respect of the rights of women and girls, the Act maintained the status quo. 
This has attracted continued criticisms of the Act.984 Some of the criticism has powered the 
push for child law and policy reform, resulting in the 2008 Child Development Policy and the 
2009 Law of the Child Act. Nonetheless, domestic and international calls for marriage law 
reform still echo in the country.985 
 
984 The Law Reform Commission collected criticisms and complaints against the LMA since 1983 and reported 
them in Law Reform Commission of Tanzania, Report of the Commission on the Law of Marriage Act, 1971 
(Act No. 5 of 1971) Presented to the Minister for Justice and Constitutional Affairs, above footnote 729. Other 
public and private authorities and individuals engaged in family-related work still issue recommendations for 
reform. For instance, one lady challenged sections 13 and 17 of the Law of Marriage Act, 1971 pertaining to 
early marriage and had them recently declared unconstitutional and in need of amendment by the Court of 
Appeal of Tanzania in the case of Court of Appeal of Tanzania, “Attorney General vs Rebeca Z. Gyumi”. 
985 “Magufuli urged to address loopholes in marriage law”, The Citizen (12th December 2015). Further calls for 
change are also heard in Agness Odhiambo, “Victory against Child Marriage in Tanzania: Court of Appeal 





5.4.2 Child Development Policy, 2008 
In 1996, the Tanzanian Government endorsed a new policy having child development as its 
key theme. Being a State Party to the UNCRC motivated Tanzania to formulate the child 
policy. The policy was formed in line with the Convention’s provisions on the rights of the 
child.986 The policy served for about eleven years until 2008 when a revised Child 
Development Policy was adopted to address the existing socio-economic situation and 
hindrances that curtailed the realisation of children’s rights in Tanzania.987 Its main objective 
is to see that children’s rights, welfare and development are promoted and protected in 
Tanzania.988 
Policy issues and statements in the Child Development Policy, 2008 revolve around a child’s 
right to life and survival, development, protection, participation, and non-discrimination. 
Reading chapter five of the policy, which expounds on these rights, one observes that the 
Ministry intended to uphold the best interests of the Tanzanian child.989 Unfortunately, 
however, the Policy does not refer to the best interests of the child principle as a guiding 
standard in the realisation of the rights it recognises. This gap may be filled by the promotion 
and protection of the rights stated in the policy, but it is remarkable because the policy 
statements are based on the other UNCRC’s pillars of children’s rights. In addition, the policy 
lays a foundation for the enactment of a unified law of the child, which incorporates the best 
interests of the child principle. 
5.4.3 Law of the Child Act, 2009  
In 2009 Tanzanian children and child rights actors had two causes for celebration. These were 
the 20th anniversary of the UNCRC, and the brand new Law of the Child Act passed by the 
Tanzanian Parliament in November 2009. The Act qualified for celebration because it marked 
a monumental achievement in unifying children’s laws that for decades had been scattered 
among different statutes, most of which were inherited from the British and thus outdated. It 
also filled some gaps in the existing laws. For instance, the Act repealed the Affiliation Act 
and introduces under sections 34-36 a procedure to determine parantage that includes the use 
of DNA testing, and thus matches the technological advancements of today’s world. Apart 
from reforming and consolidating laws relating to children, the Act also gives effect to 
 
986 Para 20 of the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania, Ministry of Community Development, 
Women Affairs and Children, “Child Development Policy”, 
http://www.tzonline.org/pdf/childdevelopmentpolicy.pdf (Dar es Salaam, October 1996), at p. 12. 
987 Para 4 of the United Republic of Tanzania, Ministry of Community Development, Gender and Children, 
“Child Development Policy”, at pp. 5-6. 
988 See ibid., Paras 35, 40 and 41, at pp. 14–15. 




international and regional conventions on the child’s rights through its dedication to 
promotion, protection and maintenance of the welfare and rights of the child.990 Also, the law 
is the first legal enshrinement of fundamental child rights in Tanzania. Crucial to this chapter 
is that the Law of the Child Act is founded on the best interests of the child principle. 
Numerous provisions under the Act demand consideration of the best interests of the child. 
However, the main question is what constitutes the best interests of the child principle under 
the Act? 
First and foremost, the Law of the Child Act, 2009 takes after the UNCRC and ACRWC in 
incorporating a general formulation of the best interests of the child principle. Section 4 (2) of 
the Act provides for the principle. The subsection reads, 
“The best interest of a child shall be the primary consideration in all actions 
concerning a child whether undertaken by public or private social welfare 
institutions, courts or administrative bodies.” [2009 version] 
“The best interests of a child shall be a primary consideration in all actions 
concerning children whether undertaken by public or private social welfare 
institutions, courts or administrative bodies.” [2019 version] 
While this subsection attempts to domesticate Article 3 (1) of the UNCRC and Article 4 (1) of 
the ACRWC, it shows some considerable differences from them. These differences impact the 
interpretation and application of the principle in the following ways:  
First, the subsection differs in respect of who is protected under the principle. It has already 
been noted above that the African Charter’s formulation departs from the UNCRC’s in using 
‘the child’ instead of ‘children’ as its subject. The 2009 version of the Law of the Child Act 
differed from both instruments as it refered to ‘a child’. This difference raised the question of 
whether the interpretation of section 4(2) can extend to the interests of particular groups of 
children and children generally, or whether it only considers the interests of an individual 
child. However, the revision of the subsection in 2019 widened the application of the 
principle to ‘all actions concerning children’ as under Article 3(1) of the UNCRC. 
Second, while the ACRWC broadened the horizon of those bound to implement the principle, 
the Act limits it. Attempting to mirror the authorities listed under the UNCRC, the Act omits a 
crucial one; legislative bodies. This omission substantively cripples the power of the child’s 
best interests as a general principle of the Act. If the law itself is not in the child’s best 
interests, how can actions implementing the law be? The 2019 revision of the Law of the 
Child Act did not effect changes in this respect. 
 




Third, similar to the ACRWC, section 4 (2) of the previous version of the Act (before the 
2019 revision) gave the principle the status of ‘the primary consideration’. This is a different 
status from ‘a primary consideration’ under the UNCRC, making a child’s best interests the 
first consideration among equals ‘primus inter pares’ or even greater consideration.991 The 
use of the definite article ‘the’ requires the child’s best interests to be the sole fundamental 
consideration, excluding all other contesting interests. While some have argued that this is the 
best position, others have championed the rights of other concerned parties whose interests 
should be considered equally with those of the child.992 While the reason for changing the 
status of the principle during the revision of section 4(2) of the Act in 2019 is not clear to the 
author, it could have been to mirror Article 3(1) of the UNCRC.  
The Act extensively uses the child’s best interests as a guiding standard, as a factor to be 
taken into account, or as a protective measure in connection with an array of actions 
concerning the child. This can be observed in many provisions throughout the Act.993 While 
the great significance attached to the principle in the Act is apparent, it contains no 
established criteria and procedures for interpreting or determining the child’s best interests. 
For example, section 7(3) of the Act requires competent authorities to determine the child’s 
best interests according to applicable laws and procedures, but without specifying these The 
Act could have avoided this gap to ensure the principle is correctly applied to safeguard the 
child’s interests. Section 4 of the Zanzibari Children’s Act is exemplary as it provides an 
extensive list of criteria for best interests determination, 
“In determining the best interests of a child, the following factors 
shall be taken into consideration:- 
(a) the nature of the personal relationship between: 
(i) the child and the parents, or any specific parent; and 
(ii) the child and any other care-giver or person relevant in those 
circumstances; 
(b) the attitude of the parents, or any specific parent, towards: 
(i) the child; and 
(ii) the exercise of parental responsibilities and rights in respect of the child; 
 
991 Para 121 of Detrick, The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, above footnote 403, at p. 137. 
992 See paras 21-28 of the United Kingdom Supreme Court, “ZH (Tanzania) (FC) (Appellant) v Secretary of 
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993 See Sections 7(2) (c), (3), 8(4), 19(8) (a), 23, 26(1) (b), (2), 27(2), 28(2), 29(5), 31(5), 32(4), 37(4), 39(1), 
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(c) the capacity of the parents, or any specific parent, or of any other care-
giver or person, to provide for the needs of the child, including emotional 
and intellectual needs; 
(d) the likely effect on the child of any changes in the child’s circumstances, 
including the likely effect on the child as a result of any separation from: 
(i) both or either of the parents; or 
(ii) any relative, or any other child or any other care-giver or person, with 
whom the child has been living; 
(e) the practical difficulty and expense of a child having contact with the 
parents, or any specific parent, and whether that difficulty or expense will 
substantially affect the child’s right to maintain personal relations and direct 
contact with the parents, or any specific parent, on a regular basis; 
(f) the need for the child:- 
(i) to remain in the care of his parent, family and extended family; 
(ii) to maintain a connection with his family, extended family, culture and 
tradition; 
(iii) not to be removed from his place of residence; 
(g) the child’s age, maturity and stage of development, sex, background and 
any other relevant characteristics of the child; 
(h) the child’s physical and emotional security and his intellectual, 
emotional, social and cultural development; 
(i) any disability that a child may have; 
(j) any chronic illness from which a child may suffer; 
(k) the need for a child to be brought up within a stable family environment 
and, where this is not possible, in an environment resembling as closely as 
possible a caring family environment; 
(l) the need to protect the child from any physical or psychological harm 
that may be caused by: 
(i) subjecting the child to maltreatment, abuse, neglect, exploitation or 
degradation or exposing the child to violence or exploitation or other 
harmful behaviours; 
(ii) exposing the child to maltreatment, abuse, degradation, ill-treatment, 
violence or harmful behaviour towards any other person; or 
(iii) any family violence involving the child or a family member of the 
child; 
(m) the appropriate action or decisions which would avoid or minimise 
further legal or administrative proceedings in relation to the child; and 
(n) any other relevant factor.”994 
 




Section 7(3) of the Law of the Child Act specifies that competent authorities and courts of law 
have a mandate to conduct best interests determination in alternative child care cases. The Act 
does not define competent authorities. However, apart from the court, the only other authority 
the Act charges with determining the child’s best interests is the social welfare department. 
Social welfare officers conduct best interests determination while carrying out a social 
investigation, as provided for under Section 31(5) of the Law of the Child Act. The question 
arises whether the broad range of actions requiring best interests determination can be 
managed by only these authorities. Moreover, the work of the authorities is further 
complicated by the lack of a clear definition of the principle, with criteria and procedures for 
determining the best interests of the child. 
In all its references to the child’s best interests, the Law of the Child Act does not change the 
status of the principle. It remains a primary consideration (section 4(2)) in all actions provided 
for by the Act. Unlike the UNCRC and the ACRWC, the Act does not specify a different 
status for particular actions such as child adoption. However, the Act gives a higher status to 
the principle for another statute. It does so under section 169, which amends the Education 
Act by inserting section 59A, which requires every teacher, artisan, and trainer to ensure that 
the “best interest of a pupil is of paramount consideration”.995 
5.4.4 Subsidiary Legislation 
Section 157 of the Act empowers the Ministers responsible for social welfare and children’s 
affairs to make regulations and rules for a child’s protection, alternative care, and labour. 
Some regulations and rules covering specific subjects are already in place. These include the 
Foster Care Placement Regulations, 2012; the Children’s Homes Regulations, 2012;  the 
Adoption of Children Regulations, 2012; the Retention Homes Rules, 2012; the 
Apprenticeship Regulations, 2012; the Child Employment Regulations, 2012; the Child 
Protection Regulations, 2014; and the Juvenile Court Procedure Rules, 2016. These legal texts 
have been briefly examined in chapter four, when analysing subsidiary legislation. The 
assessment showed that the legislation reflects the spirit of the parent Act in upholding the 
best interests of the child principle. However, except for the Adoption of Children 
Regulations, the subsidiary legislation does not contain criteria for determining the child’s 
best interests. This means they demand adherence to the child’s best interests without actually 
defining such interests in the specific cases to which they apply. Also, all the subsidiary 
legislation under the Act does not provide a best interests determination procedure. As a 
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result, the determination relies on the discretion of the deciding authorities. Without proper 
guidance, the authorities may consider other competing interests and fail to promote the 
child’s rights and welfare. 
Nonetheless, although most of the subsidiary legislation does not specify criteria for best 
interests determination, some of their provisions offer criteria. For instance, regulation 11(1) 
(a) – (j) of the Foster Care Placement Regulations, 2012 providing for responsibilities of 
foster parents, could form part of the criteria for best interests determination. However, it is 
not quite logical that under regulation 11(1) (e), a foster parent is required to promote the 
child’s best interests, while the whole of regulation 11 is actually about promoting the child’s 
best interests. 
The Adoption of Children Regulations, 2012 contain one general formulation of the best 
interests principle under regulation 3:  
“The Court or any public body shall, in making a decision for adoption of a 
child consider the best interest of child and in particular it shall…” 
This formulation is different from the formulation under section 4(2) of the Law of the Child 
Act. The formulation under the Regulations limits the principle’s scope of application to child 
adoption. However, it omits to specify the subject of the principle as ‘the’ or ‘a’ child. Also, it 
does not specify whether consideration of the principle is of primary or paramount 
importance. As already said, the Regulations under GN No. 197 of 2012 have some gaps 
which were not apparent in their earlier drafts. For instance, from the draft Regulations in 
Word format obtained from the Department of Social Welfare during field research, 
regulation 3 reads, 
“In making any decision regarding the adoption of a child, the best interests 
of the child shall be the primary consideration and in particular court or any 
public body shall…” 
This formulation specifies the subject of the principle as ‘the’ child as opposed to ‘a’ child 
under the Law of the Child Act. In addition, it fixes the status of the principle as ‘the’ primary 
consideration, as opposed to ‘a’ primary consideration under the Act. Both formulations, 
however, exclude private institutions as mandated authorities. They also refrain from 
categorising the authorities as administrative or legislative, for social welfare or not. Since the 
draft version is unofficial, the text of regulation 3 under GN No. 197 of 2012 is the one with 
legal effect. However, it is significant to note that the Kiswahili version of the Regulations, 




official English version, GN No. 197 of 2012.996 Nonetheless, according to section 84(5) of 
the Interpretation of Laws Act as revised in 2021, where there is a conflict between the 
original and a translated version of a written law, the language of the enacting version takes 
precedence.997 In the case of the Adoption of Children Regulations, GN No. 197 of 2012, 
takes precedence.  
Regulation 3 of the Adoption of Children Regulations provides a list of criteria to assist the 
authorities in best interests assessment and determination. The language of the criteria under 
GN No. 197 of 2012 also contains slight language errors but is reproduced as follows: 
“(a) ascertained the child’s wishes and feelings; 
  (b) consider the age, maturity and understanding of a child; 
  (c) pay regard to the desirability of continuity in a child upbringing, ethnic, 
religious, and culture; 
  (d) avoid delay in making decision on the child future; and  
  (e) not separate the child from his siblings unless the separation is for the    
best interest of that child.” 
The criteria provide a minimum guidance to the authorities mandated to interpret, determine, 
and apply the best interests principle in child adoption. Although the list of criteria is not as 
extensive as that under section 4 of Zanzibar’s Children’s Act above, it is the only list of 
criteria under the framework of the Law of the Child Act. The application of these criteria in 
child adoption practice is discussed in part 5.8 of this chapter. 
5.5 Components of the Best Interests of the Child Principle 
The principle of the child’s best interests is incorporated in an array of international, regional 
and national legal texts. It is only natural that it is presented in varying formulations. An 
analysis of the different formulations (above) produces different interpretations or 
implications of the principle. Therefore, the following sub-part attempts to briefly state the 
meaning of some components of the best interests of the child principle. 
5.5.1 ‘A’ Child, ‘the’ Child, or ‘Children’? 
The Committee on the Rights of the Child, while discussing the rights of indigenous children, 
proclaimed that the best interests of the child principle is a collective as well as an individual 
right.998 This means that the principle applies to children individually, as a group or 
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generally.999 Zermatten argues that even where the French and Spanish versions of the 
UNCRC use the singular, “l’intérêt supérieur de l’enfant” and “el interés superior del niño”, 
it can be concluded that this is not intended to limit the principle to children individually.1000 
Cantwell also argues that the inclusion of legislative bodies as authorities that must consider 
the child’s best interests without a doubt applies the principle to children who form groups 
and children generally.1001 Freeman agrees that the UNCRC gives the best interests of the 
child principle a broad construction by referring to children, so that it does not relate to 
actions affecting children only individually but also collectively.1002 
Further, section 8(c) of Tanzania’s Interpretation of Laws Act specifies that words in the 
singular also include the plural and vice versa. Therefore, where statutes refer to the best 
interests of ‘a’ or ‘the’ child in the singular, this also includes children in the plural, hence it 
may be interpreted to include childen individually and collectively.  
Conclusively, this study adopts the stance that the best interests of the child principle governs 
all actions concerning children either individually, as a group or generally. This stance is 
maintained even where the African Charter and Tanzanian law mainly refer to ‘the child’ and 
‘a child’, respectively. 
5.5.2 ‘A’ or ‘The’ Primary or Paramount Consideration? 
In the legislative history of the UNCRC, the determinative status of the child’s best interests 
has been a subject of considerable debate.1003 The original text of today’s Article 3(1) evolved 
from the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of the Child, 1959. Principle 2 of the 
Declaration quoted the best interests of the child principle as ‘the paramount consideration’. 
This status gave the best interests of the child principle a determinative quality. In decision-
making where children are concerned, the ultimate determinant of the course of action to take 
would be the children’s best interests. During the deliberations of the 1981 Working Group on 
the UNCRC, the status of the principle was changed into ‘a primary consideration’.1004 The 
previous status was retained only for adoption under Article 21 of the Convention.1005 
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The Committee on the Rights of the Child regards the current status given to the best interests 
of the child principle under Article 3(1) as ‘strong’.1006 Some authors, for example, Parker, 
agree that Article 3 (1) broadens the application of the principle.1007 However, he shows 
discontent with ‘a primary consideration’ and explicitly calls it a ‘weakening’ of the status of 
the principle.1008 Dissenting, Zermatten opines that instead of weakening, the use of ‘a’ puts 
the principle in its ‘rightful place’.1009 Freeman, on the other hand, while theorising on the 
matter, raises an intriguing point: he says that policies relating to children in poorer nations 
may consider the corrupt elite’s interests as being more important than children’s.1010 These 
arguments raise the question of whether giving the principle a stronger status, such as 
paramount importance, would make a difference. This researcher finds that the answer lies in 
a robust legal regulation of best interests assessment and determination in terms of defined 
criteria and procedures. This is because making the best interests of the child a consideration 
of high priority, for instance, does not clarify whether it carries more weight than all other 
competing interests.1011 
The 1989 Working Group of the UNCRC justified adopting ‘a’ as opposed to ‘the’ primary 
consideration with the argument that the latter is more fitting for limited circumstances than 
those of Article 3(1).1012 It is also argued that most actions to be taken by authorities listed 
under Article 3(1) possibly concern children in one way or another.1013 In other words, some 
competing interests that cannot or should not be overridden entirely by children’s interests 
may come into play. Having the child’s best interests as ‘a’ and not ‘the’ primary 
consideration allows for equal or even greater weight to be placed on these other competing 
interests. We may ask whether this formulation does not vitiate the protective value of the 
best interests of the child principle. 
Where the best interests of the child are of paramount importance, this complicates 
consideration of other competing interests. Take the United Kingdom as an example: section 
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1(1) of the Children’s Act 1989 provides for paramountcy of the child’s welfare principle. 
Balancing decisions in cases involving the welfare of more than one child has proved 
incredibly difficult.1014 By contrast, one may assume that the paramountcy principle should 
make the outcome of child welfare cases where the other party is not a child quite obvious. 
Yet, Lowe and Douglas argue that this status does not ease the court’s duty in custody and 
adoption cases.  
Therefore, this researcher understands the status of ‘a’ primary consideration as necessary for 
the broad interpretation and application of the best interests of the child principle under 
Article 3(1) of the UNCRC. The use of ‘the’ primary consideration as found under Article 
4(1) of the ACRWC which is intended to provide the child with strong protection is peculiar 
to the specific intentions and situations of this instrument.1015 In section 4(2) of the Law of the 
Child Act, ‘the’ in the 2009 version has been changed to ‘a’ in the 2019 version. Nevertheless, 
despite these differences, the obligation to consider children’s best interests expressed by the 
word ‘shall’ in all three instruments guarantees some degree of protection. 
5.5.3 Authorities Undertaking Actions Concerning the Child 
Article 3(1) of UNCRC encompasses the governing arms of most states in the world: the 
executive, legislature and judiciary. Moreover, the Article does not limit itself to public 
institutions but also extends to private institutions. The Committee on the Rights of the Child 
provides the broadest possible interpretation of the authorities and institutions mentioned 
under Article 3(1).1016 This interpretation of the principle binds all official entities that 
perform actions affecting children. Zermatten underlines that under Article 3(1), the principle 
is binding for legal, administrative, and legislative authorities, as well as all other actors in the 
children’s sector.1017 However, natural persons such as parents or guardians are left out of the 
principle’s grip. The Committee argues that Article 18(1) of the UNCRC comes to the rescue 
here.1018 But Article 18(1) has been said to weaken the principle as far as the private family is 
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concerned.1019 This is because it does not impose a strict obligation (it uses the word “will” in 
place of “shall”) and makes the best interests of the child only a basic concern.  
The ACRWC under Article 4(1), as opposed to the UNCRC, specifies that the best interests of 
the child principle binds any person or authority taking action concerning the child. This is 
undoubtedly a more extensive formulation of the principle compared to that of the 
UNCRC.1020 It leaves no exceptions for any persons, be it natural or artificial, in any dealings 
concerning children. They must all consider childrens’ best interests in all actions concerning 
them. However, not all national laws on the child in Africa reproduce the same formulation. 
For instance, the spirit of the Charter is evident in the Children’s Act of Ghana of 1998 under 
section 2(2), which reads, “The best interest of the child shall be the primary consideration by 
any court, person, institution or other body in any matter concerned with a child”.1021 
However, this is different in the Children’s Act of Kenya,1022 which mirrors Article 3(1) of the 
UNCRC; and in the Law of the Child Act of Tanzania,1023 which does the same except that it 
omits legislative bodies. The South African Children’s Act provides an altogether different 
formulation of the principle, where the authorities are not stated under Article 9 but must be 
extracted from other provisions of the Act.1024 
All in all, whether one adopts a literal or purposive interpretation of the various formulations 
of the principle, it is clear that every person and entity, whether official or unofficial, must 
consider the best interests of the child when planning measures concerning the child. When 
coupled with appropriate assessment and determination of the child’s interest in practice, this 
principle guarantees robust promotion and protection of children’s rights and welfare. 
5.6 General Interpretation, Determination and Application of the Principle 
This part attempts to establish a general interpretation of the best interests principle and 
examine its determination and application. The body of legal texts discussed above 
contributes to the collective comprehension of the principle. Also, each instrument or statute, 
in its specific way, provides insights into the principle’s determination and application. 
However, this part uses the UNCRC as the core instrument in working out the interpretation, 
determination, and application of the principle. The rationale for reliance on the UNCRC lies 
in it being of the most general nature and having acquired almost a universal status. 
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It is undeniable that the best interests principle has been the subject of extensive scholarly 
debate. The intention here is not to extend or conclude that debate but only to discuss the 
principle in order to build a foundation for understanding its application in child adoption 
practice in Tanzania. Thus, international, and regional instruments, national legislation, court 
decisions, institutional guidelines, and scholarly work interpreting the best interests of the 
child principle are used here only to advance this discussion. 
5.6.1 What are the Best Interests of the Child? 
What the best interests of the child entail is a question whose answer is elusive. The best 
interests of the child is a complex and dynamic concept. Its content changes with time, socio-
cultural attitudes, legal standing, and the context of each case. Relevant international and 
national legal instruments provide no clear definition of the concept. However, the need for 
flexibility and adaptability of the concept provide justification for this. Yet, in practice, 
understanding what the concept means is crucial in the name of clarity and consistency.  
There have been multiple attempts to define the concept of best interests, evidenced by how 
broadly debated it is in the literature. Rwezaura, in one of his writings, identifies two versions 
of the principle.1025 He distinguishes between the child’s best interests as a narrow principle in 
received family law in Africa, and the broader pre-capitalist concept of the principle as 
perceived in African communities and families. While his article focuses on the latter, this 
study concentrates on the former. Rwezaura refers to this version of the principle in the 
following way: 
“…the term ‘best interests of the child’ or ‘welfare of the child’, with its 
various levels of weighting, is to be found in received statutory provisions 
of many African countries. It is not a principle of African law but came to 
Africa via the colonial received law but has now been accepted as part of 
the local law.”1026 
Several scholars have likened the best interests principle to the welfare principle. Diduck and 
Kaganas also regard the two concepts as synonymous.1027 However, in this study they are 
distinguished in the light of the child’s change of status from an object of care to a holder of 
rights, and the scope of application of the two concepts. Nonetheless, for analysis purposes, 
the meaning of the welfare principle is taken into account while seeking to ascertain the 
meaning of the best interests principle. It is thus worth examining the statement on the 
meaning of ‘welfare’ in the New Zealand judicial decision in the case of Walker v. Walker 
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and Harrison, which gives a comprehensive idea of what the welfare principle entails.1028 To 
quote: 
“‘Welfare’ is an all-encompassing word. It includes material welfare, both 
in the sense of an adequacy of resources to provide a pleasant home and a 
comfortable standard of living and in the sense of an adequacy of care to 
ensure that good health and due personal pride are maintained. However, 
while material considerations have their place, they are secondary matters. 
More important are the stability and the security, the loving and 
understanding care and guidance, the warm and compassionate relationships 
that are essential for the full development of the child’s own character, 
personality and talents.”1029 
This statement is compared to Rwezaura’s conclusion after considering sub-Saharan Africa’s 
socio-economic conditions and their effects on interpreting the best interests of the child 
principle. He says, 
“The contemporary economic realities, at least for the majority of Africans, 
require that the principle of the best interests of the child be construed rather 
narrowly to mean the satisfaction of material needs of the child.”1030 
From these two statements, it is apparent that both the best interests and the welfare principle 
seek to secure the child’s needs. Thus, they can both be used to assess what the best interests 
of the child entail. The statement from Walker v. Walker and Harrison does not list all the 
needs but introduces a significant feature, i.e. their categorisation. The Judge argues here that 
a child’s material and emotional needs should be considered separately. He provides pointers 
to aid in identifying a child’s interests under each category. Unfortunately, his terminology is 
subjective. Perceptions of a pleasant home and a comfortable standard of living vary 
significantly from one continent to another, let alone from one family to another. Stability and 
security are also relative concepts that may be perceived very differently, for instance, in a 
peaceful country and in a war-torn country. Very thought-provoking is his argument that 
emotional needs are more important than material needs. For example, in a third world 
country, the availability of stable and secure housing, food, clothes, and health services may 
be regarded as having precedence over warm and compassionate relationships—
circumstances which bring Rwezaura’s statement to the fore. 
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5.6.2 Assessment and Determination of Interests 
The analysis above shows clearly that it is impossible to fashion a one-fits-all definition of the 
child’s best interests. Instead, it is important to understand the core elements of the standard. 
From the statements quoted above, it can be deduced that the child’s best interests are, in 
reality, the essential needs of any child. The division into material and emotional, or physical 
and metaphysical, does not change the fact that children need both. Whether the needs are 
current or future-oriented, experiential, or developmental, they are crucial. Therefore, the 
importance attached to these different needs in various societies is immaterial. The fact is that 
children have needs, needs that must be met. And every need corresponds to the responsibility 
to meet such a need. This responsibility can be parental, social, institutional, judicial, or 
legislative. Thus, when the responsible parties satisfy the needs of a child or children, they act 
in the child’s or children’s best interests. 
Keeping this argument in mind, it is obvious that not all children have the same needs. 
Defining the best interests of a child or children in a specific situation or context requires 
ascertaining the needs of that child or children. The Committee on the Rights of the Child 
resolutely maintains that the child’s best interests must be understood on a case-by-case basis 
depending on the child’s circumstances (needs, situation, and context).1031 Such an 
understanding demands assessment and determination of the best interests of the child.  
States Parties to the Convention have the duty to provide the requisite machinery for such 
assessment and determination.1032 During the assessment and determination process, it is 
important to take into account that children, parents, legal practitioners, and judicial and 
social welfare officers will probably perceive the child’s best interests differently. For 
instance, parents may define their children’s needs in terms of their ability and willingness to 
satisfy them. On the other hand, children may have views and feelings that are contrary to 
their best interests in a particular situation (such as medical treatment). Therefore, there must 
be legal procedures, criteria and trained personnel to assess and determine what is in the 
child’s best interests. 
Unfortunately, the UNCRC does not provide criteria to act as a checklist for the required 
assessment and determination. There is a debate on the reasonability and practicality of 
including such criteria in an international instrument. However, Freeman argues that the 
availability of a checklist would assist decision-makers in ascertaining the child’s best 
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interests.1033 In response to this debate, the Committee on the Rights of the Child, in a non-
binding instrument, provides elements to be considered and procedural safeguards in 
assessing and determining the child’s best interests.1034 Also, some domestic legal systems 
have established factors to be considered in the determination. The Children’s Acts of 
Tanzania Zanzibar and the Republic of South Africa contain good examples of factors to be 
considered in the implementation of the best interests of the child principle.1035 The remaining 
concern is that the lack of internationally accepted minimum criteria eliminates any 
expectations of a common judgment concerning the child’s best interests in an international 
setting such as intercountry adoption. 
Another way of interpreting and determining the child’s best interests is by taking into 
consideration the other three general guiding principles and rights established under the 
UNCRC. This is because these principles and rights concretise the best interests of the child. 
For example, the right to participation under Article 12 of the Convention is a significant 
consideration in establishing a child’s best interests. Also, the subsidiarity principle 
established under Article 21 (b) of the Convention holds substantial sway in determining 
whether intercountry adoption is in the child’s best interests. However, a difficulty may arise 
in determining whether the implementation of a particular right is in itself in the child’s best 
interests. For instance, is it appropriate to leave a child in his home country when he or she 
refuses to be transnationally adopted even though this has been determined as the most 
suitable measure of alternative care by the mandated authorities? In the famous “Zulu Boy” 
case, the child’s views were (erroneously?) entirely disregarded by the court, which believed 
it was deciding in the boy’s best interests.1036 
5.6.3 Application of the Principle 
In the light of the theories upon which this study is founded, observing the interplay between 
the best interests principle as an international cultural norm and customary law or local 
practice is imperative to its interpretation. In a community that recognises customary and 
religious laws as a formal source of law, there is a need to reconcile local cultural norms with 
the child’s best interests.1037 This may prove quite a challenge as even the definition of 
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childhood varies considerably from one culture to another.1038 Very often a sieve must be 
employed when attempting reconciliation because while some cultural norms may be 
reconcilable, others may not.1039 Some examples are practices such as FGM, early and forced 
child marriages, or the sale of children.  
Other cultural practices are in a grey area where no one can rule beyond doubt whether they 
are in the child’s best interests or not. For instance, child circulation within kinship care 
arrangements may be deemed to be in the child’s best interests, especially where the child 
stands to benefit, such as getting a better education and better nutrition. However, it can be 
detrimental to a child’s development, especially where a child is obliged to constantly move 
from one relative to another or is overburdened with household chores (not uncommon in 
kinship care). Thus, achieving common judgments regarding the child’s best interests across 
different cultures or communities is a challenge. This level of subjectivity may render 
interpretation of the principle arbitrary.  
While commenting on country reports, the Committee on the Rights of the Child has depicted 
how cultural and religious considerations hinder the implementation of the best interests of 
the child principle.1040 The Committee wields the principle to criticise laws, policies, and 
practices in State Parties that in their view do not uphold the principle.1041 Freeman, while 
discussing culture, childhood and rights from the perspective of the tension between Articles 
24(3) and 30 of the UNCRC, shows how difficult it may be to determine whether cultural and 
religious practices affecting children in different communities are guided by the standard of 
the child’s best interests or not.1042 The challenge, he argues, lies in the lack of a common 
judgement on children’s best interests across different communities.1043 How then can 
reconciliation be achieved under such circumstances? For instance, adoption of a Tanzanian 
child by a non-resident Tanzanian is supported by the Tanzanian Law of the Child Act, but 
this is not perceived as intercountry adoption and can be affected by customary law under 
section 68 of the Act. In such a scenario, the host country’s laws must also come into play, 
especially in connection with entry, residence, and implementation of the best interests of the 
child principle. How then can the differing cultural norms and national laws of the two 
communities be reconciled, especially regarding the child’s best interests? Freeman argues 
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that this can be achieved by spreading universal visions of children’s rights, and by creating 
links and engaging in dialogue between communities, in order to enlarge shared views and 
increase the chances of achieving judgments with universal validity.1044 This may be another 
way of interpreting and determining the child’s best interests, albeit in a collective manner.  
Summing up, interests may not necessarily be rights. Yet, the best interests of the child 
principle fills the role of a substantive right. Article 3(1) of the UNCRC establishes a child’s 
right to have his or her best interests assessed and taken as a primary consideration.1045 It also 
places a corresponding obligation on the State Parties and all their public and private 
authorities to consider the best interests of the child principle in all actions concerning 
children. This principle is, however, not only a right but also a primary interpretative legal 
tool through which all rights under the Convention are understood. It is also a rule of 
procedure, through which any action taken in furtherance of the UNCRC may be supported, 
negated, justified, or clarified.1046 In addition, it is used as an evaluating tool for State Parties’ 
laws, policies and practices relating to children. In view of these multiple roles, there is a 
great need for the principle to be accurately understood and implemented in order to give 
children the best chances in reality.  
The principle of the child’s best interests can only be effective in practice when appropriately 
interpreted, determined, and applied. Although this part has attempted to shed some light on 
what these three aspects imply in practice, it remains the duty of every state to ensure proper 
processes and safeguards in their law that guarantee the child’s interests in every case. 
The next part looks at concretisations of the principle unique to adoptions with an 
international element. It lays a foundation for understanding the application of the best 
interests principle in child adoptions with an international element as practised in Tanzania. 
5.7 The Principle in Adoptions with an International Element 
Various legal instruments providing for child adoption contain specific provisions on 
intercountry adoption. Such inclusions have one feature in common: the need for intercountry 
adoption to be in the child’s best interests. In this study, adoptions that have some features of 
intercountry adoption are analysed. However, Tanzania’s law regards them as domestic 
adoptions. Therefore, a middle ground has been selected by calling them adoptions with an 
international element, and the analysis involves examination of how provisions on 
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intercountry adoption also apply to them. In this part, some of the legal provisions in 
international, regional, and national legal texts on adoptions with an international element are 
studied. These include the UNCRC, the ACRWC, the 1993 Hague Convention on 
Intercountry Adoption and the Tanzanian Law of the Child Act, 2009. The main aim is to 
observe the status accorded to the best interests of the child principle and the application of 
other related protective standards in the regulation of adoption. In addition, this part also 
assesses the implications of the specific provisions on adoptions with an international 
element. 
Article 21(b) of the UNCRC and Article 24(b) of the ACRWC recognise intercountry 
adoption as an alternative child care measure. The 1993 Hague Convention on Intercountry 
Adoption also recognises that intercountry adoption has the advantage of providing a child in 
need with a permanent family even if this is outside his or her country of origin.1047 In 
Tanzania, sections 62 and 74 of the Law of the Child Act recognise adoptions with an 
international element as an alternative care measure. These include adoption by resident non-
Tanzanians and non-resident Tanzanians. All these legal provisions specify that adoptions 
with an international element must be in the child’s best interests.  
5.7.1 Status of the Best Interests of the Child Principle 
Article 21 of the UNCRC and Article 24 of the ACRWC require that the child’s best interests 
be the paramount consideration in child adoption. This applies to all types of child adoption 
under both Conventions. Thus, the child’s best interests are an absolute determinant in child 
adoptions with an international element. The main objective of the 1993 Hague Convention 
on Intercountry Adoption, as stated in Article 1(b), is to ensure that intercountry adoptions are 
concluded only when in the child’s best interests. However, despite the Convention’s 
dedication to the principle of the child’s best interests, it does not specify the status of the 
principle. This sets the best interests standard as an absolute requirement without weighing its 
significance in comparison to the interests of other concerned persons.1048   
As already seen above, the Law of the Child Act, 2009 names the best interests principle as an 
overarching principle under section 4 (2). This provision requires that the best interests of the 
child be ‘a’ primary consideration. The Adoption of Children’s Regulations do not set a 
specific status for the principle in connection with adoptions. Thus, the  status under the Act 
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applies to adoptions with an international element which are provided for in sections 62 and 
74. For Tanzania, the best interests of the child are not the absolute determinant in adoptions 
with an international element but are a fundamental consideration to be given priority over 
other people’s interests. 
5.7.2 Other Standards that Regulate Adoptions with an International Element 
The standard of the best interests of the child is concretised in most instances by other 
standards that go hand in hand with it. In the specific provisions on intercountry adoption, 
other standards are named apart from the best interests of the child principle. The aim of this 
part is to observe whether the same or similar standards bind adoptions with an international 
element under the Law of the Child Act, 2009. These standards are as follows: 
5.7.2.1 Subsidiarity Principle 
Intercountry adoption, according to Article 21(b) of the UNCRC and Article 24(b) of the 
ACRWC, is required to be a measure of last resort. This means that intercountry adoption 
becomes an option only when all suitable local means of alternative care have been exhausted. 
Under section 74(1) (a), the Law of the Child Act permits resident non-Tanzanians to adopt 
only where a child cannot be suitably cared for within Tanzania. The Act does not apply the 
subsidiarity principle to adoptions by non-resident Tanzanians. This standard is incorporated 
to promote suitable local alternative care measures, which open up avenues for continuity in a 
child’s upbringing, preserving a child’s cultural identity and guaranteeing possible family 
reunification. However, the subsidiarity principle itself is subsidiary to the best interest of the 
child principle.1049 Therefore, after reasonable consideration of available suitable domestic 
alternative care measures, a decision-maker may find intercountry adoption more in the 
child’s best interest than the available local measures. 
Although the 1993 Hague Convention recognises the subsidiarity principle, it does not require 
intercountry adoption to be the last option available to a child.1050 Instead, the Convention 
prioritises intercountry adoption as a means to procure a permanent family environment for a 
child over temporary domestic foster or institutional care.1051 
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5.7.2.2 Equivalent Standards for Adoption 
Article 21(c) of the UNCRC and Article 24 (c) of the ACRWC require that a child adopted 
internationally should enjoy safeguards and standards equivalent to those of a child adopted 
nationally. Equivalency may extend to legal, procedural, and institutional safeguards. It 
applies to adoptability, subsidiarity, consent, and residence requirements, as well as 
monitoring conducted by mandated authorities for intercountry adoption. The 1993 Hague 
Convention expounds on this standard. Article 1(a) stipulates that the main objective of the 
Convention is to ensure that there are established safeguards to warrant intercountry adoptions 
are in the best interests of the child. Thus, the Hague Convention concentrates on the 
availability of central, competent, and accredited authorities to regulate the entire intercountry 
adoption process in the countries of origin and destination, as provided in Articles 6-11, 14-21 
and 33. The essence of the equivalency standard is to uphold the child’s best interests and 
prevent illicit activities in intercountry adoption. 
Tanzania is not a party to the 1993 Hague Convention on intercountry adoption. Therefore, 
the equivalent standards stipulated under the Convention only apply if incorporated in the 
Law of the Child Act. The Act includes no comprehensive provisions on these standards for 
adoptions with an international element. However, the Adoption of Children Regulations, 
under regulations 25 and 27, emphasise that the legal and procedural safeguards applicable to 
adoptions by resident Tanzanians also apply to adoptions with an international element. 
Further, considering that a child in an adoption with an international element may reside 
abroad, the Regulations demand further assessment and monitoring, pre- and post-adoption, 
under regulations 16(5), 26, and 28. 
5.7.2.3 Prohibition of Illicit Activities 
Illicit activities in intercountry adoption may include, but are not limited to, the selling and 
buying of children, child abduction, trafficking in children and improper financial gain. The 
UNCRC under Article 21 (d) requires the State Parties to have safeguards to ensure that 
intercountry adoption does not result in improper financial gain. Article 24 (d) of the ACRWC 
goes further and requires that intercountry adoption must not result in improper financial gain 
or involve trafficking in children. The 1993 Hague Convention is geared towards preventing 
illegal activities in intercountry adoption, including the sale, abduction and trafficking of 
children as well as improper financial and other gains.1052 This is a standard that requires 
 
1052 See the preamble, Article 1(b) and Articles 8 and 32 of the The Hague Convention on Protection of Children 




legislative and institutional structures to be in place in both sending and receiving countries to 
ensure that intercountry adoption is entirely in the best interests of the child and not for the 
illegal advantage of any person involved. 
The Law of the Child Act, under section 72, prohibits payment or rewards in respect of an 
adoption. It does not explicitly prohibit the other illicit activities that can affect a child in 
adoptions with an international element. However, an investigation of the prospective 
adopter’s criminal background is required under section 74(1) (d) of the Act and regulations 
26(ii) and 28((d) of the Adoption of Children Regulations. 
5.7.2.4 Post-adoption Monitoring 
The most deplored aspect of intercountry adoption in countries of origin is the loss of post-
adoption follow-up opportunities once the child leaves the country.1053 The ACRWC under 
Article 24(f) requires the State Parties to establish a monitory machinery to follow up the 
well-being of the adopted child. The UNCRC does not have an echoing provision. Instead, it 
contains the standard requirement relating to the conclusion of bilateral and multilateral 
arrangements or agreements to ensure that a competent authority is responsible for a child’s 
placement in the receiving state.1054 These agreements may facilitate post-adoption 
monitoring by competent adoption authorities both in the country of origin and in the country 
of placement. The 1993 Hague Convention provides a cooperation platform for Convention 
Countries involved in intercountry adoption. According to Article 9 of the Convention, the 
institutional framework established under the Convention ensures post-adoption follow-up. 
Co-operation agreements, among others, may also assist in preventing illicit activities and 
promoting the child’s best interests in intercountry adoption. 
Post-adoption monitoring for adoptions with an international element in Tanzania is provided 
under regulation 16(5) of the Adoption of Children Regulations. The Regulations do not call 
for any cooperation agreements or frameworks to facilitate monitoring. Instead, they say that 
the Commissioner must consult with the International Social Service (ISS) to ensure the child 
is protected post-adoption.  
 
1053 African Child Policy Forum (ACPF), Africa: The New Frontier for Intercountry Adoption, above footnote 
646, at p. 9. 




5.8 The Principle in Tanzania’s Child Adoption Practice 
This part looks at the interpretation, determination and application of the best interests 
principle in the practice of adoptions with an international element in Tanzania. The analysis 
is based on data gathered during the three phases of field research. 
5.8.1 Practical Interpretation of the Best Interests Principle 
The legislation does not define the concept of the child’s best interests. Its interpretation is left 
open to the authorities applying the principle in practice. As seen above, the law mainly 
mandates social welfare officers and the court to implement the principle in child adoption 
practice. Therefore, the researcher investigated how these two authorities interpret the 
principle through interviews and analysis of social investigation reports and court rulings on 
child adoption.  
To begin with, the language largely used in practice is Kiswahili, Tanzania’s national 
language. The concept of the child’s best interests in Kiswahili is translated as ‘maslahi bora 
ya mtoto’. Most social welfare officers explained their understanding of the concept in 
Kiswahili. However, judges and magistrates used English in their explanations, since they use 
English in their work. All responses were translated into English and are reported in English 
in this part.  
For this study, 20 social welfare officers were interviewed. About half that number explained 
in detail what they took the principle to mean. A quarter of them described all their 
responsibilities towards children as constituting the principle. By contrast, another quarter 
limited the child’s best interests to their physiological needs. Some of the officers did not give 
any clear statement in response to this question. The table below shows what they understand 





Table 5-1: Social Welfare Officers’ Understanding of the Best Interests Principle 
Meaning of best interests of the child principle1055 Number of 
those who 
ascribed1056 
“It means that the child’s development and future must be the main consideration in 
our decisions. So, we consider the child’s rights and see how our decision will 
favour the child. Of course, the decision should also be more permanent than 
temporary and always timely.”1057 
2 
“In anything that you do, you must look first at the impacts it will have on the child. 
For instance, while refusing marital separation, mothers usually say, we remain only 
for our children. Their children’s best interests bind these mothers. That is what it 
means.”1058 
3 
“Everything we social welfare officers do is for the child’s best interest. Our 
decisions benefit children.”1059 
5 
“It means the child’s interests first! We check whether the placement will give the 
child all her or his material needs, whether the child will be happy and have some 
fun!”1060 
1 
“Ah, possibly we cannot tell what it exactly means. However, we follow the 
determination criteria under regulation 3 of the Adoption of Children Regulations 
and then put the child’s interests first. To know a child’s best interests, you must 
have good interviewing skills. They normally exhibit an ‘I want-I do not want 
attitude’. Therefore, you should really focus on their facial expressions to get what 
they truly want. Best interests are not only needs. People’s religious beliefs, 
customs and traditions and life circumstances make them much more than just 
needs.”1061 
1 
“It means children should have all their basic needs. They need to eat, sleep, dress, 
play, go to school and get medical care. That is what we always look at first.”1062 
5 
No clear statement 3 
 
The author also interviewed four judges of the High Court, two magistrates of Resident 
Magistrate’s Courts, and two of the Juvenile Court. Their understanding of the best interests 
of the child principle, like that of the social welfare officers, varied. Here, two statements are 
presented as examples. The first was made by a high-ranking judge of the High Court of 
Tanzania, and the other by a magistrate of the Juvenile Court at Kisutu, Dar es Salaam. The 
judge said, 
“The best interests of the child are very central that no court can grant an 
adoption order without ascertaining all the requirements have been adhered 
to. When the petition comes to court, the first thing is the appointment of a 
 
1055 This column quotes statements by individual social welfare officers who were interviewed during field 
reseach.  
1056 ‘Those who ascribed’ refers to the number of social welfare officers who gave a similar meaning of the best 
interest principle in interviews during field research.  
1057 Interview with social welfare officer at the adoption desk, MoHCDGEC headquarter offices in Dodoma, on 
22. 03. 2018. 
1058 Interview with social welfare officer, Temeke District, Dar es Salaam, on 04.02.2019. 
1059 Interview with social welfare officer, Ilala Municipal Council, Dar es Salaam, on 07.02.2019. 
1060 Interview with social welfare officer, Bunju Ward, Kinondoni District, Dar es Salaam, on 16.01.2019. 
1061 Interview with social welfare officer 1, DSW, MoHCDGEC headquarter offices in Dodoma, on 05.03.2019. 




guardian ad litem, who carries out a social enquiry to establish whether the 
adoption is in the child’s best interest. The court nearly always accepts the 
enquiry’s report and relies on it.”1063 
The magistrate said, 
“In civil proceedings, we always measure what is more suitable for the child 
and not the mother or father. Social welfare officers conduct a social 
investigation that paints the family’s actual circumstances or the 
environment in which the child lives. We also listen to the child, but usually 
their thoughts may not influence an immediate decision. Well, every case 
has its own peculiarities, so the court relies on the social investigation report 
to understand them and decide in the best interest of the child.”1064 
These statements have two things in common. First, the judicial officers do not attempt to 
describe what constitutes the best interests of the child. Instead, they signify how important it 
is to adhere to the principle. The Magistrate goes a little further in explaining that the 
principle requires the court to determine what is suitable for the child in the presence of 
competing interests. Also, she provides the child’s role in defining his or her interests through 
participating in decision-making. Second, both statements portray the court’s reliance on 
social welfare officers in determining the child’s best interests. Since the court cannot 
investigate, the social investigation report remains the only way to understand the child’s 
circumstances. Thus, the understanding and will of social welfare officers largely influence 
the court’s decision on the child’s best interests. However, the Judge in his explanations, also 
said, 
“There are very few social welfare officers who are conversant with issues 
of child adoption. Maybe about only two.”1065 
In addition, during field research, the author interviewed a social welfare officer whom the 
Department of Social Welfare and the court had recommended as the most seasoned officer at 
the child adoption desk. With regard to understanding the best interests principle, she said, 
“Between social welfare officers, this principle is understood differently. 
Poverty is treated as a reason for child adoption, and it is perceived in the 
child’s best interest to remove them from a poor family.”1066 
Here, the issue of context resurfaces. The officer’s understanding of the child’s interests may 
be influenced by socio-economic and political perceptions prevailing in the society, and may 
not necessarily lead to a correct assessment and determination of interests. Therefore, the 
 
1063 Interview with a high-ranking Judge, High Court of Tanzania, at Dar es Salaam, on 01.03.2019. 
1064 Interview with Resident Magistrate 2, Juvenile Court, at Kisutu, Dar es Salaam, on 21.02.2019. 
1065 Interview with a high-ranking Judge, High Court of Tanzania, at Dar es Salaam, on 01.03.2019. 




court’s reliance on social welfare officers in determining the child’s best interests, though 
required by law, may compromise the child’s interests. 
The question of what the child’s best interests are was put to all respondents. Only those who 
had a legal background or worked with children could provide varying degrees of articulate 
responses. However, a deputy regional health officer for Dar es Salaam who had neither of 
these qualifications made a very interesting statement of what constitutes the child’s best 
interests. He said,  
“In Eden, Adam and Eve could get everything they wanted. Eden was like 
having parents, a mother and a father. In life, having parents is like Eden; 
you cry out and say what you want, and you get it. When a child gets the 
opportunity to tell someone ‘I want’, their best interests have been 
considered. Food, clothes, and shelter are automatic rights but getting a 
person who listens to the child’s needs makes an actual consideration of his 
or her interests. Listening to a child is two-fold, verbal and non-verbal, by 
observation. When a child has the freedom to give their opinion, they are 
comforted. Of course, there should be a balance in listening, administering 
discipline and upholding the child’s interests.” 1067 
The health officer’s statement emphasises the psychological needs of a child over 
physiological needs. He claimed that determining the child’s best interests is nearly 
impossible without listening to the child’s own views. In his opinion, even babies have views 
that can be taken into consideration, hence the need for non-verbal communication through 
observation. This statement makes the child’s right to freedom of opinion and participation in 
decision-making central to understanding what the child’s best interests are.  
5.8.2 Assessing and Determining Interests 
The Adoption of Children Regulations provide a list of criteria to consider when determining 
the child’s best interests. Although the Regulations do not provide a specific procedure for 
best interests assessment and determination, the procedures for child protection, foster care 
placement and adoption are geared towards safeguarding the child’s best interests. These 
procedures are, however, extensive, and not very specific. Hence, a child could benefit more 
from a separate procedure exclusively for best interests determination in child adoption. 
During field research, aided by an excerpt from the Tanzania Mainland Child Protection 
Training Manual in a PowerPoint document,1068 a social welfare officer explained how they 
 
1067 Interview with a regional health officer, Regional Commissioner's Offices, Dar es Salaam, on 07.02.2019. 
1068 Tanzania Mainland Child Protection Training Manual: Module 8, Assessing Children's Needs. UNICEF 
Tanzania, through their child protection specialist the study interviewed, promised to provide the complete 




assess and determine the child’s best interests.1069  The training manual grounds the 
requirement for a needs assessment on section 94(7) of the Law of the Child Act which 
requires social investigation after receiving child protection referrals. In child adoption, 
regulation 11 of the Adoption of Children Regulations details what such an investigation 
entails. The manual sets the best interests determination criteria under regulation 3(a)-(e) as 
the golden rule for each needs assessment. It also categorises needs assessments into three. 
First, initial assessment (also initial investigation) is done immediately after receiving a child 
protection referral. Second, full or comprehensive assessment is done over an extended period 
to determine a proper care plan for the child. And third, risk assessment is a continuing 
process forming part of other investigations meant to determine dangers to which a child is or 
could be exposed. The manual aims to facilitate social welfare officers in the assessment and 
determination of the child’s interests on a case-by-case basis. It provides an assessment 
triangle to guide the process. The triangle is reproduced below for ease of reference: 
Figure 5-1: Child’s Needs/Interests Assessment Triangle1070 
 
 
1069 Interview with social welfare officer at the adoption desk, MoHCDGEC headquarter offices in Dodoma, on 
22.03.2018. The officer shared the document via email on 28.03.2018. 
1070 Reproduced from the Ministry of Health, Community Development, Gender, Elderly and Children, Tanzania 
Mainland Child Protection Training Manual, above footnote 1068. 
                                      





Although the Adoption of Children Regulations provide a checklist for best interests 
determination in child adoption, only seven of the twenty interviewed respondents could 
mention at least three of the criteria during interviews. Among the seven, only four mentioned 
the legal source of the criteria. This gap suggests that most social welfare officers lack the 
legal knowledge necessary for carrying out their responsibilities, especially as far as child 
adoption is concerned. However, this position was challenged by the existence of the training 
manual, which, according to the interviewed UNICEF Tanzania child specialist, is sufficient 
to prepare social welfare officers to carry out all their child protection responsibilities 
effectively and efficiently.1071 The responses of the social welfare officers concerning the 
extent of their training on child adoption law and procedure resolve this enigma. More than 
half of the interviewed officers complained of having received little or no training in child 
adoption. One of them said, 
“I have never been trained on child adoption. I have manned the foster care 
and child adoption desk since 2012. I personally worked hard to understand 
what adoption means and how to apply the law governing it. Well, I am 
trained in social work, but the curriculum did not include child 
adoption.”1072 
The statement above is typical of what the social welfare officers responsible for child 
adoption said when asked about their training in implementing child adoption law and policy. 
This means that best interests assessment and determination may be challenged by the lack of 
sufficient knowledge and skill in its execution. During field research, the author observed that 
social welfare officers relied primarily on experience rather than on training. However, 
experience may not always lead to correct assessments. An interview with a child protection 
specialist at UNICEF Tanzania revealed that the organisation is working with the 
MoHCDGEC to overhaul the social work curriculums of tertiary education institutions to 
provide training that will equip social welfare officers with adequate skills to handle their 
responsibilities.1073 This initiative, if well implemented, will play a significant role in 
eliminating the lack of training issues at the Department of Social Welfare. 
5.8.3 Application of the Principle 
Social welfare officers and the courts apply the best interests principle in deciding whether 
child adoption is the most suitable option for the child. Therefore, before granting an adoption 
order, the court considers the child’s best interests presented in a social investigation report 
 
1071 Interview with child protection specialist, UNICEF Tanzania, Dar es Salaam offices, on 21.02.2019. 
1072 Interview with social welfare officer, Ilala Municipal Council, Dar es Salaam, on 07.02.2019. 




submitted by the child’s appointed guardian ad litem. Sections 59(1) (b), 59(3) and 74(2)-(4) 
of the Law of the Child Act require the court to make an adoption order after receiving a 
social investigation report if the court is satisfied that the adoption is in the best interests of 
the child. Specifically, section 59(1) (b), which binds the courts generally, provides, 
“The court shall make an adoption order if it is satisfied that- 
[(a) …] 
(b) it is in the best interest of the child and that the wishes of the child have 
been considered if the child is capable of forming an opinion;”1074 
[emphasis added] 
Section 74(4), which applies specifically to adoptions by resident non-Tanzanians, provides 
that, 
“The court may, in respect of the application for adoption by a foreigner, 
make an additional order- 
(a) requiring a social welfare officer to represent the best interest of the 
child; 
(b) requiring a social welfare officer to prepare a social investigation report 
to assist the court to determine whether the adoption order is in the best 
interest of the child or not; and 
(c) for any other matter as the court may determine.” 
These two sets of provisions confirm what has already been argued above. While the court 
has the final responsibility to apply the best interests principle in deciding for or against the 
adoption, the law requires considerable reliance on a social investigation report. Thus, the 
duty to interpret, determine and apply the best interest principle lies squarely on the shoulders 
of social welfare officers. This is so because, although the social investigation report is meant 
to assist the court in making a decision, the court has no room to perform further 
investigations apart from observations made in chambers. Therefore, it can only depart from 
the report’s conclusions if other contrary facts become manifest during the adoption 
proceedings. During a follow-up interview, a Judge of the High Court of Tanzania, when 
responding concerning these provisions, said, 
“The way the adoption law and procedure are structured, the court has no 
choice but to always rely on what a social investigation report provides. A 
judge cannot learn of the child’s circumstances otherwise. Yes, the judge 
can interview the prospective adoptive child in camera, but these children 
are too young to form a reliable opinion in most cases. I find that the law 
provides an opportunity for the social welfare officers to collude with the 
 




applicants or their advocates to make sure the report supports the 
adoption.”1075 
The author closely scrutinised seven social investigation reports accessed during perusal of 
court files as part of the field research. She observed three things. First, only two out of the 
seven strictly followed the social investigation report template scheduled under the Adoption 
of Children Regulations. Second, three reports presented information reflecting serious 
investigation while the other four seemed only to respond to the formal requirements. Third, 
three of the reports came from the same social welfare officer and are all similar. They use the 
same format, provide the same arguments, and arrive at the same conclusion for three 
different cases. It shows that the officer was using one of her previous reports as a template 
for future ones. While the three reports in the second category above presented concrete 
information that appears quite helpful to the court, the other four seemed to fulfil a formality.  
The information required in the social investigation report template emphasises the financial 
ability of the adopter to care for an adoptive child. This puts emphasis on the child’s 
physiological needs, such as the physical environment of the adopter’s home, rather than 
psychological. The seven reports reflected the same emphasis. However, they also considered 
the adoptive family’s capacity to satisfy the child’s psychological needs such as love, 
affection, and discipline. They reflected a varying degree of emphasis on these needs. The 
child’s feelings and wishes were not featured in any of the seven reports. The reason behind 
this could be that the children lacked sufficient maturity to make an opinion. However, one of 
the reports covered the adoption of two teenage girls and did not include their opinion on the 
adoption. 
Since the author was able to access some adoption rulings during field research, she analysed 
the courts’ considerations of the child’s best interests recorded in them. The analysis was 
based on 50 court rulings in adoptions with an international element between 2007 and 2018. 
It was found that the court relied on the social investigation report in 48 out of the 50 
decisions. In one of the decisions that departed from the report’s recommendations, the judge 
refused the adoption, arguing that the applicants did not fulfil the requirements for adoptions 
by foreigners under section 74(1) of the Act.1076 In the other ruling, the judge considered the 
report but arrived at the decision to grant the adoption on the basis of considerations that were 
 
1075 Interview with a Judge of the High Court of Tanzania, at Dar es Salaam, through phone conversation on 
27.06.2020. 
1076 High Court of Tanzania, At Dar es Salaam, “In the Matter of the Law of the Child Act, 2009 and In the 





not entirely reflected in the report.1077 These two decisions presented more extensive 
arguments than the others and considered other adoption precedents, binding and persuasive, 
in different matters, including the best interest of the child principle. One of the judges 
emphasised that this principle should not be applied to the exclusion of other provisions of the 
law. He said,  
“I am live in my mind of the important legal principle that in adoption 
petitions the main purpose is to safeguard and promote the welfare of the 
child at issue throughout his/her childhood (better than the existing 
arrangement); see the holding in the case of Re M (An Infant) [2004] TLR. 
247 and In the Matter of Master Ayaz and two others [1978] LRT. N. 25. 
The supreme court of Uganda also subscribed to this stance of the law; see 
Re M (An Infant), [1995-1998] 2 EA 174. However, this valuable principle 
did not mean that courts should deliberately overlook important and express 
provisions of the law like S. 74 (1) (a) – (f) of the Act. It is for this ground 
that S. 74 (2) of the same Act provides that the court may grant an adoption 
order if it is in the best interest of the child, subject to S. 74 (1) of the 
Act.”1078 
The position of the judge supports the guidance of the UN CRC under Comment 14 that the 
principle considers other rights in the UNCRC and can be used for their analysis.1079 Thus, 
applying the best interests principle means analysing the provisions of the law that safeguard 
the child’s welfare and applying them.  
The court’s reliance on social investigation reports in determining and applying the child’s 
best interests principle has led to minimal analysis of issues regarding the principle in the 
rulings. Most of the adoption rulings reiterate the contents of the reports and provide no 
further argument. The role of the court in interpreting the law is thus minimised in this 
instance. This practice has rendered the court a passive player in application of the child’s 
best interests principle. The resercher concludes that the law and practice in respect of 
interpreting, determining, and applying the principle can detract from the protection 
guaranteed by the principle. 
5.9 Conclusion 
Prior to the human rights movement, children as objects of care were protected under the 
welfare principle. Although numerous child rights professionals and scholars use the welfare 
 
1077 High Court of Tanzania, At Dar es Salaam, “In the Matter of the Law of the Child Act, 2009 and In the 
Matter of Application for an Adoption Order by JNH and EMV and In the Matter of GC, the Adoptive Child” 
(10.11.2015). 
1078 High Court of Tanzania, At Dar es Salaam, “In the Matter of the Law of the Child Act, 2009 and In the 
Matter of A (Infant) and In the Matter of an Application for an Adoption Order by JVPB and EG of Dar es 
Salaam”, at p. 11. 
1079 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC), “General comment No. 14 (2013) on the right of the child 




and best interests principles synonymously, they are different. The development and 
application of the welfare principle in the Commonwealth countries, including Tanzania, 
assists understanding of the differences. 
Although the UNCRC was neither the first nor the last international instrument incorporating 
the best interests principle, it exalted its significance by making it a cardinal principle 
extensively applicable due to the Convention’s near universal status. The principle’s broad 
coverage in numerous conventions and statutes gives it an extensive variation of subject, 
scope, purpose, and status of application. In child adoption, the principle is allotted the high 
status of paramountcy, which means that it is the absolute determinant in the adoption 
decision.  
However, child-centred conventions, such as the UNCRC and the ACRWC, and other general 
conventions enshrining the principle do not define it or provide criteria for its determination. 
The main purpose of leaving the principle indeterminate is to allow for flexibility considering 
the diverse circumstances and cultures in which the principle may be applied. Though 
deliberate, and for a good cause, the principle’s indeterminacy can compromise compliance 
with it to the detriment of the child. This is due to the principle’s own attribute of subjectivity 
which may lead to arbitrariness in practice.  
The child’s best interests, therefore, may not always be harmoniously determined across 
different cases, cultures, nations, or regions. This is a fact that must always be reckoned with. 
The significant point to note is that the individual will, agenda or manipulations of the 
determining authority should not taint the determination procedure. The final decision in 
every action concerning the child should and must be seen to be in the child’s best interests. 
Consideration of elements in the formulation of the best interests principle under a particular 
legal instrument should not ever defeat the requirement for any action to be in the child’s best 
interests. Debates on elements such as primacy or paramountcy of the child’s best interests 
should be subjected instead to the ultimate obligation to consider the child’s best interests. 
Other standards provided in the legal instruments embedding the principle concretise it. These 
standards form part and parcel of the best interests of the child’s determinative criteria. For 
instance, under the UNCRC, these are the other three cardinal principles,1080 the desirability 
for continuity of a child’s upbringing, ethnic, religious, cultural and linguistic background,1081 
 
1080 Right to life, survival and development of the child under Article 6, right against discrimination under 
Article 2, and the right to respect the views of the child under Article 12 of the UNCRC. 




the right of a child to preserve his or her identity1082 and other provisions of the Convention. 
In adoptions with an international element, the other standard requirements, such as observing 
the subsidiarity principle, prohibition of illicit activities and conclusion of cooperation 
agreements between states, further concretise the best interests principle and add up to criteria 
for determination. 
Also, there are efforts by the UN CRC, UNHCR, professionals, scholars and other institutions 
working with children to provide guidance in interpreting, determining, and applying the 
principle. However, although they are very helpful, they are non-conclusive. The introduction 
of determination criteria in national children’s statutes provides more specific guidance in the 
light of the nation’s own culture and prevailing circumstances. However, the responsibility to 
rely on the criteria and use them correctly to determine and apply the principle lies with the 
mandated authorities. Again, subjectivity dominates where the authorities could be influenced 
by their socio-cultural and economic situation which may cloud their perception of the child’s 
best interests. For instance, considering that the principle originates from international law 
and is domesticated by the Law of the Child Act in Tanzania, the traditional understanding of 
the child’s best interests may clash with the international perception, a case of legal pluralism. 
Also, the workplace environment of the mandated authorities, which is characterised by 
pressures emanating from the shortage of time, training, and resources, affects how these 
authorities consider the best interests principle in their decision-making, a case of street-level 
bureaucracy.  
Tanzania’s child adoption practice is strongly affected by legal pluralism and street-level 
bureaucracy. The Law of the Child Act places on the social welfare officers and the court the 
responsibility to apply the best interests principle in child adoption practice. The law and 
practice have created a reliance on the social welfare officers to interpret, determine and apply 
the principle. The officers, however, lack sufficient training to adequately discharge this 
responsibility. Also, they are significantly influenced by socio-cultural perceptions of what 
the child’s best interests entail and workplace pressures, which can compromise their ability 
to apply the principle. In cases of child adoption, the court primarily relies on the social 
welfare officers’ reports or representation of the child’s best interests, which compromises 
their ability to safeguard the child’s best interests. As a result, there is no guarantee that these 
interests will be protected. 
 





Finally, it is impossible to ascertain beyond reasonable doubt what is in the best interests of 
the child, because an actor charged with best interests determination will be influenced by his 
or her own personal beliefs and inclinations. Also, due to social-cultural diversities, which are 
ever-changing, a definitive interpretation and determination of the child’s best interests in the 
legal texts would be unreasonable. What is important is for every country to have proper 
interventions and qualified human resources to determine the child’s best interests. In 
adoptions with an international element, this is critical as the subsidiarity principle requires a 
foolproof best interests determination. 
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Chapter 6:  The Practice of Child Adoptions with an International Element 
in Tanzania 
“My settled view is that, even if it is taken as true that the 
petitioners complied with the conditions set under S. 74 (1) (b) 
and (c) of the Act, that alone would not warrant this court to 
overlook the rest of the conditions set under the same section 
for, as I observed before, the conditions have to be fulfilled 
cumulatively and not alternatively.”1083 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents, analyses, and discusses the findings of this study on child adoption 
practice in Tanzania. It concentrates mainly on data collected during the three phases of field 
research. While all the previous chapters collectively work towards providing answers to the 
research questions, this chapter addresses all the questions.  
The chapter provides a statistical analysis of registered adoptions from 2007-2018, the period 
under study. Also, it complements the statistics gathered for this study with those from a 
previous study by Rwezaura and Wanitzek covering the period 1944-2006. Together, they 
reveal trends in child adoption from 1944-2018. The motives for child adoption are then 
analysed and discussed based on a selected number of adoption rulings. The trends and 
motives provide a background to understanding the practice of child adoptions with a foreign 
element in Tanzania.  
Child adoption practice, in this chapter, is discussed in a way that exposes the strengths and 
weaknesses of the legal and institutional frameworks in regulating child adoptions with an 
international element. The discussion considers whether these frameworks can adequately 
manage the practice while ensuring that the adoptions are in the child’s best interests. Also, it 
examines the impact of legal pluralism on the law and practice and looks at how a Tanzanian 
child is protected in adoptions with an international element. Lastly, the chapter considers the 
role of child adoption in addressing the problem of children in need of care and protection in 
Tanzania. 
 
1083 Utamwa, J. in High Court of Tanzania, At Dar es Salaam, “In the Matter of the Law of the Child Act, 2009 
and In the Matter of A (Infant) and In the Matter of an Application for an Adoption Order by JVPB and EG of 




6.2 Child Adoption Trend  
This part presents the general development of child adoption practice since its inception in 
Tanzania in the year 1944.1084 It traces the history of child adoption in terms of the number 
and nature of adoptions, adopters and adopted children. The quantitative data collected during 
field research are presented and discussed, with explanatory qualitative information where 
required.  
The study builds on the foundation of research on child adoption law and practice in Tanzania 
by Bart A. Rwezaura and Ulrike Wanitzek conducted in the 1980s and later extending up to 
2006. The previous study provided statistical data that the present study uses to observe 
changes in child adoption practice.1085 Part of the research findings of the previous study, 
especially from the years 1986-2006, are unpublished but were accessible to the 
researcher.1086  
Research for the present study focused on child adoptions that took place within the twelve 
years from 2007 to 2018. The envisaged sources of quantitative data during preparation for 
field research were the Tanzania National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), the Department of 
Social Welfare (DSW), the High Court of Tanzania, the Resident Magistrate’s and District 
Courts in Dar es Salaam and Arusha, and the Registration, Insolvency and Trusteeship 
Agency (RITA). Except for NBS, the others were envisioned sources for qualitative data as 
well.  
The author had expected research at the NBS to be mainly online since it has an official 
website providing approved statistical data to the general public.1087 However, no specific 
data relating to child adoption were found on the website. The author attributed the absence of 
data to the confidential nature of child adoption and therefore established contact with the 
Bureau’s personnel to obtain the desired information through interviews. Regrettably, the 
Bureau reported the non-existence of any unpublished data on child adoption from which the 
study could benefit. 
The DSW is the core player in child adoption practice in Tanzania. Thus, it was expected that 
this would be the leading source of information. However, during field research it was found 
that the Department had no centralised data recording system that could provide country-wide 
 
1084 The Adoption of Infants Ordinance, 1942 came into operation in 1944, as mentioned in Rwezaura, Wanitzek, 
“The Law and Practice Relating to the Adoption of Children in Tanzania”, above footnote 22, at p. 124. 
1085 Rwezaura, Wanitzek, “The Law and Practice Relating to the Adoption of Children in Tanzania”, above 
footnote 22. 
1086 Rwezaura, Barthazar A., Wanitzek, Ulrike, “The Adoption Practice in Tanzania Mainland 1986-2006, 
Statistical Evaluation recorded by Wanitzek, Ulrike” (University of Bayreuth, 13.01.2007, unpublished). 




statistical data on child adoptions executed during the twelve-year period. The same problem 
was encountered at the social welfare offices visited at the local government level in selected 
districts of Dar es Salaam and Arusha. The offices could not present consolidated data on 
child adoptions even for complete one-year periods only. Hence, it was impossible to amass 
reliable quantitative data for the targeted twelve-year period from either the Department of 
Social Welfare or the social welfare offices at the local government level.  
The situation was different in the Judiciary. All courts with the mandate to adjudicate on child 
adoption maintained registers of adoption petitions. However, at each court visited (High 
Court Registries and Resident Magistrate’s Courts in Dar es Salaam and Arusha), child 
adoption petitions were registered in Miscellaneous Civil Causes Registers, which included 
various other civil causes. This type of recording presented several challenges. There was a 
need to access and go through multiple voluminous register books in busier courts. Some 
register books contained barely any information on child adoption. In some court registries, 
only parts of the registers from earlier years could be retrieved from storage, as in the case of 
the High Court Dar es Salaam Registry. In the High Court, Arusha Registry, the author was 
given to access a Miscellaneous Civil Causes Register with records only from 2014 to March 
2019. These circumstances made it difficult for the author to collect from the court registers 
reliable and unified statistical data covering the entire twelve years.  
The Adopted Children Register maintained by the Registrar-General, at the Registration, 
Insolvency and Trusteeship Agency (RITA), was the only other option.1088 This Register 
records child adoptions based on a valid court order. Registration of the adoption, like 
registration of birth, forms the basis for an adoption certificate issued by RITA, which legally 
proves the existence of a parent-child relationship. The author was able to obtain consistent 
and reliable statistical data for the twelve years from this register. The data, however, is 
limited to only registered adoptions. Unregistered adoption orders remain unaccounted for.  
Below is a presentation of numerical data on country-wide child adoptions from 2007 to 2018 
originating from the Adopted Children Register maintained at RITA headquarter offices in 
Dar es Salaam.1089 Two methods of presentation are used: the first is based on the year of 
entry in the Adopted Children’s Register and the second is based on the year of the adoption 
order as recorded in the Register. The number of adoptions entered in the Register in a 
particular year is not necessarily the same as the number of adoption orders issued by the 
 
1088 Register maintained according to section 69(1) of the Law of the Child Act, 2009. 
1089 Perusal of the Adopted Children Register at the Office of the Registrar General, RITA HQ Dar es Salaam, 




court in that year. This is because in practice, adoptive parents rather than the registrar of the 
respective court initiate the registration of the adoption orders, which goes against the 
requirements of section 69(2) of the Law of the Child Act. The sub-section requires the 
registration to be done by the court’s registrar within 30 days from when the adoption order is 
issued. But since the court registrars do not adhere to this provision in practice, it is left to the 
parents to register the order at their own convenience. Adoptive parents tend to register the 
order depending on the forces of urgency driving them. If there is no urgency, they may 
register the adoption even ten years after the date of the adoption order. For instance, in the 
Adopted Children Register, entry 496, the adoption order was issued in 2000 but registration 
was done in 2011; the same applies to entry 502, adoption order issued in 1998 but 
registration done in 2011; entry 648, adoption order issued in 2007 but registration done in 
2015; and entry 707, adoption order issued in 2011 but registration done in 2015. 
However, the data collected from the Adopted Children Register are considered in this study 
as being generally representative of the child adoption trend in Tanzania from 2007-2018. 
Both quantitative and qualitative data from the Register and the other sources named above 
are used to reveal the current pattern of child adoption practice in Tanzania. Statistical data 
from 1944 to 2006 collected and evaluated by Rwezaura and Wanitzek is also used to paint a 
clear picture of the developing trend of child adoption practice from its inception to 2018.  
6.2.1 Number of Registered Adoptions 
During field research, the author visited the RITA offices in March 2019. Access to the 
Adopted Children Register was possible up to the 27th of March 2019. The researcher 
examined child adoption entries from January 2007 to 25th March 2019 in the Register. 
During this time, there was a total of 514 registered child adoptions, starting from Register 
entry number 349 up to number 862. Among the 514 registered adoptions, six were of 
adoption orders granted in the 1990s or otherwise earlier than 2007 which were only 
registered in or after 2007. Also, by 25th March 2019, all adoptions registered in 2019 were of 
adoption orders issued in 2018. Therefore, excluding the six, there were 508 adoption orders 
issued from 2007 to 2018 entered in the Adopted Children Register by 25th March 2019. 
Again, it is essential to note that the aggregate number of registered child adoptions may not 
represent the actual number of adoption orders granted from 2007 to 2018 as some may 
remain yet to be registered. However, for discussion purposes in this study, it will be treated 




According to the year of entry in the Register, the number of adoptions registered in the 
twelve years from 2007 to 2018 is 499, recorded under entries 349 to 847. This is because the 
15 entries from 848 to 862 were recorded between 1st January and 25th March 2019, and are 
thus excluded from the number of Register entries from 2007 to 2018.  
Therefore, based on the number of registered adoption orders issued in 2007-2018 recorded 
up to March 2019 which is 508, an average of 42 child adoption orders were issued per year 
(see Chart 6-1 below). The line graph (Graph 6-1) depicts the number of registered child 
adoptions in 2007-2018. It presents them using two lines: first, according to the year of entry 
in the Register from 2007 to 2018 and second, according to the year of adoption orders issued 
in 2007 to 2018 as registered up to 25th March 2019.  
 
Graph 6-1: Number of Registered Child Adoptions 2007-2018 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
No. of Registrations per Year 30 34 44 38 31 23 49 43 70 58 47 32











No. of Registrations per Year No. of Adoption Orders per Year
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Chart  6-1: Average of Child Adoptions per Year 
 
Under the Adoption of Infants Ordinance 1942, later repealed and re-enacted as the Adoption 
of Children Ordinance 1953, the operation of which began in 1944, 130 child adoptions were 
recorded up to 1961 when Tanganyika obtained its independence.1090 In the eighteen years 
between 1944 and 1961, there was an average of 7 adoptions orders per year. From 1962 to 
1985, 406 adoption orders were registered in the twenty-four-year period, recording an 
upsurge in the average number of adoptions per year to 17.1091 Over the next twenty-one years 
(1986-2006), a total of 333 adoption orders were registered, averaging at 16 adoptions per 
year.1092 This shows that the rate of adoptions during the colonial period was significantly 
lower than after independence, while there was no significant difference between the periods 
1962-1985 and 1986-2006. However, registered adoption orders from 1962 to 2006 totalled 
739, which over the 45 years signifies an average of 16 adoptions per year. This increase is 
more than double the average adoptions registered during the colonial period.  
The statistics of the current study show a considerable increase in the average number of 
adoptions per year over the twelve-year period compared to 1944-2006. In the 63 years (1944-
2006), a total of 869 adoptions were registered, giving an average of 14 adoptions per year. 
However, in the twelve years from 2007-2018, 499 adoptions were registered, giving an 
average of 42 adoptions per year. While the total number of adoptions over the twelve years 
was more than half of the adoptions registered in the earlier 63 years, the average number of 
 
1090 Rwezaura, Wanitzek, “The Law and Practice Relating to the Adoption of Children in Tanzania”, above 
footnote 22, at p. 124. 
1091 Ibid., at p. 124-125. 
1092 Rwezaura, Wanitzek, “The Adoption Practice in Tanzania Mainland 1986-2006, Statistical Evaluation 
recorded by Wanitzek, Ulrike”, above footnote 1086. The statistical data was collected and evaluated in a second 
phase of field research by Professors Rwezaura and Wanitzek after they had published their article “The Law 
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children adopted per year has tripled. Although the length of the periods compared to each 
other differs considerably, this is still a significant change that further discussion in this 
chapter shall attempt to explain. 
The line graph above depicts an interesting trend in the number of adoptions registered and 
adoption orders issued each year. Both lines depict a similarity in the increase and decrease 
pattern in the number of adoptions in the twelve respective years. The mandated institutions 
did not provide official explanations of the resultant pattern during field research. Therefore, 
the researcher, on the basis of the field research findings, gives possible grounds for the 
statistical pattern. 
First, it is significant that, for a country with over 50 million people and a considerable 
problem of children without parental care, the registered number of adoptions is generally on 
the low side. This fact can assist in understanding the analysis of adoption numbers over the 
years under study. In the years 2007 to 2009, when the Adoption of Children Act 1953 was 
still applicable, the graph shows a low but steady increase in the number of registered 
adoptions and adoption orders issued. Such an increase could be an extension of a pattern 
from earlier years or could be explained by other factors. However, looking at the years 2010-
2012, there is a gradual decrease in the adoption numbers. This was after the Law of the Child 
Act, enacted and assented to in November 2009 and published in the government gazette on 
25th December 2009, had come into force on 1st April 2010. Although the change in the 
statistics is slight, anticipation of a new law could be the reasoning behind it. In 2009, when 
the Act was enacted, the Register recorded the highest numbers by a difference of tens in the 
three years from 2007-2009. This could be because the judges and the parties concerned 
thought it best to conclude pending adoption petitions and register them before the new law 
became applicable. 
The second half of the twelve years under study, from 2013-2018, evidences a general 
increase in the number of adoptions compared to 2007-2012. Although the increase is not 
ground-breaking, it is significant. A simple explanation for it could be the passing of several 
Law of the Child Act Regulations, including regulations for child adoption, foster care 
placement, and children’s homes, in 2012. The guidance provided by the Regulations on child 
adoption requirements and procedures based on the new law could have improved child 
adoption practice, hence the increase.  
2015 witnessed the highest number of child adoption registration and court orders compared 
to any other year under study. Such a spike in the numbers could have been caused by the 




adoption practice. However, considering the implementation challenges of these Regulations 
in conjunction with those passed in 2012, their influence on the 2015 statistics is uncertain. 
Hence, it seems likely that there was a socio-political rather than a legal reason for the 
increase in adoption numbers in 2015. During election years in many African countries, 
including Tanzania, there is a risk of political unrest. Therefore, many people attempt to put 
their affairs in order in case of such an occurrence. 2015 was an election year in Tanzania.  
The year 2016 had the next highest numbers in the twelve-year period, which could also be 
connected to a political regime change following an election year. A strong decrease in the 
registered adoptions follows in the years 2017 and 2018. However, by 25th March 2019, the 
Adopted Children Register had 15 more adoptions whose court orders were issued in 2018 but 
were registered in 2019. Such an addition brings the number of adoption orders issued in 2018 
from 22 to 37, but the number remains low. Field research showed that a rise in socio-
economic difficulties coupled with issues relating to governance could be responsible for this 
decrease. For instance, a respondent attributed the decrease in resident non-Tanzanian 
adopters to limitation of fundamental rights and freedoms in the economic arena during the 
fifth phase government regime.1093 Chart 6-2 below on the background of adopters depicts the 
decrease between 2015 and 2018.  
Nevertheless, it is significant to consider that many factors are at play in adoption practice; 
hence the socio-political explanation may not be conclusive. For instance, the year 2010 was 
also an election year, but no increase similar to that of 2015 is recorded during that time, 
probably due to the different factors at play then. The elections were for a second term for the 
incumbent president, and the effects of such elections are usually mild compared to when a 
change in political regime is expected.  
Some respondents’ comments suggest that there may be a socio-political explanation for the 
rising number of adoptions in 2015 and 2016, followed by a gradual decrease in 2017 and 
2018. An advocate specialising in child adoption practice reported a decrease in resident non-
Tanzanians who wanted to adopt children in Tanzania. She attributed the decrease to changes 
engineered by the new political regime. They included a review of policy and practice relating 
to residence and work permits for non-citizens based on the new Non-Citizens (Employment 
Regulation) Act of 2015 and other reforms (such as tax) affecting foreign investors. The 
respondent shared her adoption practice statistics for 2017 and 2018, which as in the 
 
1093 Interview with an advocate specialised in child adoption practice and a resident non-Tanzanian adopter, Dar 




presented statistics, evidenced a considerable drop in the number of resident non-Tanzanians 
adopting. She said,  
“The foreign clientele has dropped by 70%. There are no more foreigners 
living in Tanzania! Procuring a work permit is a problem.” 1094 
Due to the policy changes, foreign investors and expatriates working in Tanzania had to leave 
the country and those who remained felt that their positions were challenged.1095 
6.2.2 Background of Adopters and Adopted Children 
The Adopted Children Register contains information on adopters and adopted children, which 
may assist in determining their background. For this study, the cultural background of the 
adopters is interesting, the question being to which cultural group do they belong? However, 
the aim is not to identify a specific cultural group for each adopter, but to establish whether 
the adopter is a Tanzanian (and thus belongs to the plural cultural background that is 
Tanzanian) or is a non-Tanzanian (and thus belongs to a foreign cultural background). This 
means a division into people of any descent (such as African, Arab, Asian, and European, 
including mixed descent) who are Tanzanians, and people of any descent (such as African, 
Arab, Asian, European, and mixed descent) who are not Tanzanians. The place of residence 
of the adopters is also a significant factor which leads to their categorisation as resident 
Tanzanians, resident non-Tanzanians or non-resident Tanzanians. 
The Adopted Children Register records the adopter’s name, profession, address, place of 
residence and the court that issued the adoption order. This information is not sufficient to 
conclusively ascertain the cultural background of all adopters. Court records available in some 
cases provide more information that shows the adopters’ cultural backgrounds beyond doubt 
and in more detail. However, as discussed above, court records could not be retrieved for all 
adoption petitions lodged during the period under study. Therefore, the background 
information presented here gives only the place of residence and nationality of the adopters, 
which is only sufficient to show whether they are Tanzanian or not. The findings of the 
previous study by Rwezaura and Wanitzek provide an example of statistical evaluation based 
 
1094 Interview with an advocate specialised in child adoption practice and a resident non-Tanzanian adopter, Dar 
es salaam, on 15.01.2019. 
1095 For further information see, for instance, Katherine Houreld, “Exclusive: Foreign firms hit by tax demands 
rethink Tanzanian expansion”, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-tanzania-economy-idUSKBN13O0HO; and 
Tom Collins, “Five more years? Business prepares for Magufuli’s second term: Have Tanzania's president's 






on adopters’ cultural groups.1096 Their analysis can assist in producing and understanding a 
similar presentation and discussion in the current study. 
With regard to the adopted children, the Register records their date and place of birth and their 
gender. This information is relevant because it shows the age and gender preferences of the 
adopters, and ascertains the place of residence and nationality (albeit inconclusively) of the 
adopted child. Where possible, the information recorded in the Register was confirmed by 
looking at the child adoption court rulings and orders submitted during registration. 
The charts below present an analysis of the backgrounds of the adopters and the adopted 
children. The first chart (Chart 6-2) shows the adopters’ background in terms of residence and 
nationality against the number of children they adopted in the years 2007, 2011, 2015 and 
2018. Nationality is shown only as Tanzanian or non-Tanzanian, and residence is limited only 
to resident or non-resident in Tanzania without naming the foreign countries of residence. The 
numbers represent the total number of children adopted; the same person or couple may have 
adopted more than one child. Chart 6-2 is followed by Graphic 6-1, which shows common 
occupations of resident Tanzanian, non-resident Tanzanian and resident non-Tanzanian 
adopters. 
The second (Chart 6-3) and third (Chart 6-4) charts depict the background of adopted children 
with reference to their gender and age. Chart 6-3 presents distribution by gender of adopted 
children in the selected four years. And Chart 6-4 shows the age of the children at the time of 
the adoption order as recorded in the Adopted Children Register. In the four selected years, 
based on information about the place of birth, the Register records all adopted children as 
residents and nationals of Tanzania. 
 
1096 Rwezaura, Wanitzek, “The Law and Practice Relating to the Adoption of Children in Tanzania”, above 
footnote 22, at pp. 124 and 125. Some additional statistical categorization is made in the unpublished findings of 
their second phase field research covering years 1986-2006. 
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Chart  6-2: Background of Adopters Based on Residence/Nationality  
 
For the colonial period, from 1944 to 1961, Rwezaura and Wanitzek report that Europeans 
formed two-thirds and Asians one-third of the total number of adopters.1097 The number of 
African adopters was inconsequential. After independence, from 1962 to 1985, this situation 
was reversed, with the number of Asian adopters increasing to about two-thirds and 
Europeans dwindling to one-third. The number of Africans applying for adoption after 
independence increased but remained at less than 10%. 
In their unpublished research findings, Rwezaura and Wanitzek report a considerable change 
in the number of adopters by cultural group between 1986 and 2006.1098 They show that the 
total number of adopters was made up of 38.7% Africans, 27.7% Europeans, 21% Asians and 
12.6% mixed couples1099. Thus, the number of African adopters increased considerably in the 
years 1986-2006. However, since the study categorised mixed couples as part of the European 
cultural group, this remained the dominant group at 40.3% of the total number of adopters. 
Unlike this previous study, the current study, covering the period from 2007 to 2018, does not 
present the number of adopters in terms of cultural group. Instead, it focuses on categorisation 
according to residence and citizenship. This is because the study specifically focuses on 
 
1097 Ibid., at pp. 124 and 125; see fn. 5 at p. 124 for explanations on the categorisation of the cultural groups. 
1098 Rwezaura, Wanitzek, “The Adoption Practice in Tanzania Mainland 1986-2006, Statistical Evaluation 
recorded by Wanitzek, Ulrike”, above footnote 1086. 
1099 See Rwezaura, Wanitzek, “The Law and Practice Relating to the Adoption of Children in Tanzania”, above 
footnote 22, at p. 124, fn. 5. As explained in that footnote, so it is in this study that the term ‘mixed couple’ 
refers to a bi-cultural couple mostly consisting of a person of European descent (including Americans) married 
to a person of African or Asian descent. 
2007 2011 2015 2018
Resident Tanzanians 4 6 33 13
Non-Resident Tanzanians 3 5 11 10
Resident Non-Tanzanians 16 16 23 7

























The columns represent the number of children adopted by each group of adopters 
per year




adoption by non-resident Tanzanians and resident non-Tanzanians. In the light of this 
categorisation, the statistics show that on average, 34.8% resident Tanzanians, 18% non-
resident Tanzanians, 38.5% resident non-Tanzanians and 8.7% mixed couples adopted 
children in Tanzania from 2007-2018.  
Thus, irrespective of residence in the country or not, Tanzanians account for 52.8% of the 
total number of adoptions in the studied period. The remaining 47.2% are adoptions by 
resident non-Tanzanians and mixed couples. The term mixed couples is used to refer to a 
European or an American married to a spouse of African descent, primarily Tanzanian. In 
such a union, child adoption is sought mainly by the European or American spouse. Thus, on 
the one hand, it could be counted as adoption by a resident non-Tanzanian. On the other hand, 
however, it may be different, especially where the adopted child was born out of wedlock to a 
male Tanzanian spouse who undertakes the adoption with the consent of his non-Tanzanian 
wife. In such a case, adoption is used to affiliate a child and make him or her as if biologically 
born to the mixed couple in lawful marriage. Following this procedure, the said adoption is 
sought by the Tanzanian rather than by the non-Tanzanian spouse. Nevertheless, there is an 
international element because the adoptive parents are a mixed couple. Considering both 
scenarios, adopters with an international element dominate in child adoption practice in 
Tanzania. They consist of non-resident Tanzanians, resident non-Tanzanians, and mixed 
couples, and together constitute 65.2% of all registered adoptions in the studied period.  
Looking at the adopters’ backgrounds helps to understand who in the Tanzanian population is 
ready to use, and uses, the formal adoption law. The population census of 1967, which was 
the last to inquire about and record people’s ethnic origins, reported that Africans constituted 
97.5% of the total population,1100 while the latest population census of 2012 reported that 
Tanzanians form 98.5% of the population.1101 Considering the adoption statistics given above, 
for instance, from 1944 to 1985, when barely 10% of adopters were Africans, it is clear that 
the largest percentage of the population was not ready to and did not use the formal law of 
adoption. From 1986 to 2006 and later from 2007-2018, considerable changes are seen where 
African adopters form 38.7% and 52.8% of the total number of adopters, respectively.1102 
Such an increase means that there are factors that made Africans, and in this study, 
 
1100 Rwezaura, Wanitzek, “The Law and Practice Relating to the Adoption of Children in Tanzania”, above 
footnote 22, at p. 125, see fn. 6. 
1101 National Bureau of Statistics, United Republic of Tanzania, Basic Demographic and Socio-Economic 
Profile: Key Findings 2012 Population and Housing Census (Dar es Salaam, 2014) at p. 3 There was a total of 
656,223 non-Tanzanians forming 1.5% of the population in Tanzania.  
1102 It is significant to note that ‘African adopters’ in the previous study may not have been limited to Tanzanian 




Tanzanians in particular, be ready to use the formal law of adoption. The reasons are 
elucidated below while discussing motives for adoption. 
Graphic 6-1: Adopters’ Occupation 
 
The analysis of adopters’ occupations generated qualitative rather than quantitative data. This 
is because it was necessary to understand the adopters’ social, economic, and educational 
status. Therefore, above is a list of the most common occupations among three groups of 
adopters, namely resident Tanzanians, non-resident Tanzanians and resident non-Tanzanians.  
Except for housewives and non-professionals, the listed occupations require a certain level of 
education. Also, they come with an elevated socio-economic status in society. Thus, most 
adopters came from the elite portion of the population. Wives of resident non-Tanzanians who 
were described as housewives and who petitioned for adoption with the consent of their 
husbands are not necessarily women of low social, economic or educational status. They may 
have been staying at home just because they were yet to get a work permit or a job. 
Alternatively, they may have chosen to support their husbands’ work in a foreign country by 
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Chart  6-3: Background of Adopted Children Based on Gender 
 
Chart 6-3 above shows that overall more girls than boys were adopted in the four selected 
years. There was an average of 55.3% adopted girls compared to 44.7% boys. The 
percentages are derived from the total number of adopted children in the four years presented 
in the chart, which is 72 boys and 89 girls respectively. Social welfare officers, children’s 
homes managers and advocates specialising in child adoption affirmed in their responses that 
most resident Tanzanian adopters preferred girls to boys. However, they also pointed out that 
preferences could not always be met depending on available children suitable for adoption.  
Responding to why girls may be preferable over boys, some social welfare officers claimed 
that it is easier to bring up girls than boys; and, furthermore, that girls tend to take care of 
their parents in old age while posing no inheritance challenges compared to boys. A family 
law expert put it in this form “…there is a preference of girls for adoption and a dislike for 
boys who demand land.”1103 
An advocate specialised in child adoption practice commented that resident non-Tanzanian 
applicants do not have such a gender preference, as compared to resident Tanzanians.1104 If a 
child of the gender they prefer is unavailable, they adopt an available child of the other 
gender. Nonetheless, according to interviewed social welfare officers, more boys are 
ultimately left to grow up in children’s homes than girls. 
 
1103 Interview with a professor of law and family law expert, Mbezi Chini, Dar es Salaam, on 15.02.2019. 
1104 Interview with an advocate specialised in child adoption practice and resident non-Tanzanian adoptive 
parent, Dar es Salaam on 28.02.2018. 
2007 2011 2015 2018
Male 9 13 37 13














Chart  6-4: Background of Adopted Children Based on Age 
 
Chart 6-4 shows that children of a tender age, especially 0-3 years, are generally preferred for 
adoption.1105 In Dar es Salaam, two children’s homes, Msimbazi and Mburahati, which take 
care of children of this age group only, were more frequented by prospective adopters than 
other homes. One social welfare officer commented that if a child in this age group is 
unavailable at the two homes in Dar es Salaam, adoption applicants may be permitted to find 
a child in the age group from a home in other regions,1106 for instance, from Forever Angels in 
Mwanza, where children of the same age group are cared for and may be available for 
adoption. The age group 4-7 years is the next from which most children are adopted. The two 
age groups make up about 60.2% of the total number of children adopted in the four selected 
years.  
Respondents confirmed that younger children are preferred because it is easier to instil values 
in a child during the formative years, and because at that age, the feeling of belonging to an 
adoptive family can be developed with less difficulty. It becomes increasingly challenging to 
guide children who are beyond the formative years and make them feel part of the family. The 
social welfare officers who were interviewed reported that some resident Tanzanian adopters 
preferred newborn babies because they wanted to pass them off as biologically theirs and not 
 
1105 The chart presents a total of 156 instead of 161 children adopted in the four selected years because two 
adoptions were of persons beyond 18 years and three entries had errors in the age of the child.  
1106 Interview with social welfare officer 1-Kinondoni District, Dar es Salaam, on 23.01.2019. 
2007 2011 2015 2018
Age 0 - 3 10 12 21 9
Age 4 - 7 6 7 21 8
Age 8 - 11 5 5 14 6
Age 12 - 15 4 6 7 5











adopted. Two officers relayed stories of adoptive parents who moved to other areas just so no 
one could find out that their children were adopted.1107 
While going through some of the child adoption rulings and orders, it became apparent that 
most older children adopted were either relatives of the adopters or had been in the care of the 
adopters for many years before applying for adoption. For instance, there were two extreme 
cases in which persons aged (nearly) 19 and 29 were adopted by their relatives although they 
were not minors and therefore not adoptable under the Law of the Child Act. The first person 
was 18 years and 11 months old at the time of the adoption order and was adopted by a 
relative who was a non-resident Tanzanian. The second was 29 years old when the adoption 
petition was lodged and at the time of the order. She was adopted in 2018 by a relative who 
was a resident Tanzanian.1108  
6.3 Motives for Adoption 
The legal effects of an adoption order reflect the legislative rationale of Tanzanian adoption 
law. Mainly, it is to govern the transfer of parental rights and responsibilities from the birth to 
the adoptive parents. Although this may be the ultimate goal of adoptive parents, it does not 
explain their reasons for embarking on the adoption route in the first place. The Law of the 
Child Act and Regulations made under it pertaining to child adoption do not make it a legal 
requirement for prospective adopters to state their motivation to adopt. However, considering 
this study’s focus on the categorisation of adopters in Tanzania, understanding the reasons 
pushing them to utilise the law of adoption becomes most pertinent.  
Seventy child adoption court cases were selected as samples to analyse the motives of the 
adopters. The main criteria for the selection were based on the need to identify adoptions with 
an international element and the extent of available information on the adoption petitions and 
orders. The cases were selected from the child adoption orders from 2007 to 2018, collected 
from the Dar es Salaam and Arusha Registries of the High Court and RITA offices in Dar es 
Salaam. Fifty of the selected cases are child adoptions with an international element (non-
resident Tanzanians, resident non-Tanzanians, and mixed couples), while the remaining 20 
are by resident Tanzanians. Studying the motives of resident Tanzanian adopters will shed 
light on their current increasing readiness to use the law of adoption, and show how their 
grounds for adoption differ from those of adopters with an international element. 
 
1107 Interview with social welfare officer 1 and 2-Kinondoni District, Dar es Salaam, on 23.01.2019. 
1108 The District Court of Kinondoni, at Kinondoni, “In the Matter of the Law of the Child Act 2009 and In the 
Matter of RCM of Kinondoni-Dar es Salaam and In the Matter of Application for an Adoption Order by ECK of 




Ascertaining motives for adoption in the 70 cases has been a challenging feat because of the 
lack of a binding requirement to state the motive in the adoption application. Even where an 
attempt to provide the reasons for adoption is made in the petition, there is no guarantee that 
there are not others that remain unstated. Also, the reasons for adoption are not always clear 
cut; they could arise from multiple considerations connected with the particular circumstances 
in the birth and the adoptive families. In the 70 cases considered, the researcher found clearly 
stated motives in some cases, but in most cases had to deduce them from facts stated in the 
adoption petitions and rulings.  
Peter Selman, in a book chapter entitled “Adoption: A Cure for (Too) Many Ills?”, discusses a 
wide range of reasons for child adoption.1109 This study, however, focuses on three main 
categories of motives for adoption found in the 70 selected cases. Based on a structure 
developed by Rwezaura and Wanitzek, the motives are divided into three categories: child-
centred, family-centred and strengthening of filial ties.1110 The analysis of the cases showed 
an overlap in almost all cases (66 of 70) as far as child- and family-centred motives were 
concerned. Only in 4 cases, in which the motive for adoption was a distinct strengthening of 
filial ties, such an overlap was absent. It was clear that other pulls towards child adoption may 
go beyond the above three categories in some cases. One such pull is to legalise a parent-child 
relationship that already existed pre-adoption. This motive was strongly detected in 5 of the 
cases. Additionally, reasons that are not easily categorisable were apparent in some cases. 
Some of these reasons are discussed below in part 6.3.5, ‘complex motives’, with illustrations 
from relevant cases. 
6.3.1 Child-centred Motives 
Adoption is child-centred when its paramount consideration is to cater for the adopted child’s 
needs and interests rather than those of the birth or adoptive parents or any other involved 
parties. In such adoption, the central goal is to provide a substitute stable, caring family for a 
child who has no family or is in a family that is unable or unwilling to provide proper care. 
This means that adoptions exclusively meant as a remedy for illegitimacy, childlessness, or 
lack of a male heir are not necessarily child-centred. However, there may be no clear 
demarcation between these reasons in most adoption cases. For instance, in the 70 selected 
adoption cases, about 41 adoptive parents without biological children of their own adopted 
children who were abandoned, orphaned, or came from dysfunctional families. This means 
 
1109 Selman Peter, “Adoption: a cure for (too) many ills?”, in F. Bowie (ed.), Cross-cultural approaches to 
adoption (London: Routledge, 2004). 
1110 See Rwezaura, Wanitzek, “The Law and Practice Relating to the Adoption of Children in Tanzania”, above 




that, although childlessness was the primary motive, a home was also given to a child without 
a stable, caring family. 
As shown in Chart 6-5 below, in the 70 cases, 41 children were abandoned and had no known 
family, while 17 were from incomplete families with single, separated, or divorced parents, or 
unknown fathers, or had been left with relatives who could not care for them. Eight adopted 
children were orphaned by one or both parents and had no relatives who could care for them, 
while the remaining 4 were adopted to strengthen ties with step-parents in their biological 
parents’ new marriages. It is evident from these numbers that the dominant motive underlying 
adoption in the select cases was to provide care in a family setting for children who lack such 
care. In the studied cases, there were only 3 children who came from a complete family, living 
with both of their parents. The main reason to grant such adoptions was the inability of the 
parents to provide sufficiently for their children. These children account for only 4.3% of the 
70 adopted children. This means increased challenges to family and social life in Tanzania, 
leading particularly to children being abandoned, accounted for the largest percentage of 
children adopted. 
The study found that from the 70 adopted children, 66 were adopted for child-centred 
motives. Nevertheless, in the 66 cases, there are overlaps with other motives, some readily 
discernable and others too complex to decipher clearly. Overlapping family-centred motives 
were detected in 26 cases. In 5 cases, there was a compelling need to formalise an already 
existing social parent-child relationship in order to better cater to the child’s needs and 
interests. This leaves 35 out of the 66 cases in which the child’s interests may be the sole 
motive, although this cannot be confirmed beyond doubt since others hint at reasons that are 





Chart  6-5: Categories of Adopted Children 
 
As shown in Chart 6-6 below, in 29 out of the 70 cases, the adoptive parents had biological 
children of their own. Child-centred motives could be stronger in these 29 cases than in the 
remaining 41 cases in which the adoptive parents were childless. However, this cannot be 
conclusively said because usually there are other motives involved. For instance, considering 
the data in Chart 6-5 above, which shows that 59% of the children had been abandoned, the 
adoptive parents, regardless of whether with or without their own biological children, adopted 
them to provide a caring family, among other things. Of the 8 orphaned children constituting 
11% of the 70 cases, 5 children were adopted by parents with biological children of their own 
while 3 were adopted by parents without children of their own. Also, in the 24% of children 
adopted from incomplete families (17 children), 5 were adopted by parents without biological 
children of their own, while the remaining 12 parents had their own children. This means that 
17 out of the 29 parents with their own biological children adopted children who were 
orphaned or from incomplete families. This may or may not support the contention that their 
motives were strongly child-centred. The remaining 6% of adopted children are the 4 adopted 
jointly by a biological parent and a spouse to strengthen filial ties in a subsequent marriage. 
This accounts for 21 out of 29 parents with their own biological children, leaving 8 parents 
who adopted abandoned children. If it were clearly stated in the records that these 8 parents 
adopted the children not to sustain their own needs, such as finding a male heir, the study 
could confidently declare their adoptions to have been strongly child-centred. Unfortunately, 















Chart  6-6: Categories of Adoptive Parents 
 
The motives of parents adopting children who were orphaned or from incomplete families 
were further analysed to evaluate the strength of their child-centredness. Among the 8 
orphaned children, 3 were adopted by their relatives. Only one couple, who adopted 2 of the 3 
children, had no biological children of their own. The couple, a non-resident Tanzanian 
husband who was the children’s uncle and his non-Tanzanian wife, were named responsible 
for the children in a clan meeting according to local customary law.1111 However, they 
adopted the children because they were resident in Ireland and spent more time there than in 
Tanzania. They had sought formal adoption in order to fulfil the immigration requirements of 
the foreign state and let the children benefit as would their own biological children in the 
event they move them to Ireland.  
The researcher also considered the 17 children adopted from incomplete families and found 
that 14 out of the 17 were adopted by relatives. Among the 14 adopting relatives, 3 had no 
biological children of their own. Apart from providing better care for the children, these 
adoptive parents also wanted to have a child to care for as their own, hence a family-centred 
motive. In the other 11 cases, the relatives were already indirectly caring for the children 
before adopting them. They met the children’s basic needs such as food, clothing, health, and 
education while the children stayed with a single parent, a grandparent or another relative. 
 
1111 High Court of the United Republic of Tanzania, In the District Registry of Arusha, At Arusha, “In the Matter 
of the Law of the Child Act, 2009 and In the Matter of MERM and CERM of Olasiti, Arusha and In the Matter 
of the Application for an Adoption Order by JRMS and DDD” (Misc. Civil Cause No. 19 of 2018, ordered on 
14.03.2019). 
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They could already care for the children without resorting to formal adoption, so why did they 
do it? Eight out of the 11 adoptive parents were Tanzanians resident abroad or about to 
emigrate abroad. It was evident that, apart from desiring to provide better care and prospects 
for their relatives’ children abroad, they were compelled to use the formal law of adoption in 
order to fulfil the immigration requirements of the host foreign countries. This was an 
additional reason that overlapped with child-centred motives.  
In the remaining 3 cases, the adopters were relatives with their own children and resident in 
Tanzania. They also had other motives for resorting to adoption, which largely remained 
unexpressed. For instance, in one of the cases, a maternal grandmother applied to adopt her 
one-year-old granddaughter with the mother’s consent, who also lived with the grandmother 
and her child.1112 The mother was not married to the child’s father, who was declared to have 
gone AWOL. The grandmother had been taking care of her granddaughter for the past one 
year; thus, the question arises of why she should seek to adopt the child. Since the grandfather 
consented to the adoption, providing two stable parents for the child could be the motive for 
adoption. However, another possible motive is to erase the daughter’s shame of having a child 
out of wedlock and at her parents’ home. Also, it cannot be ruled out that the grandmother 
needed to be a legal parent to enable the child’s entitlement to some benefits such as health 
insurance.1113  
To sum up, in Tanzania, child-centred motives for adoption are not restricted to the provision 
of an alternative family to a child who lacks one or whose parents or relatives are unable or 
unwilling to care for him or her. There are other underlying motives, such as compliance with 
the laws of other nations or organisations. The circumstances that compel people to use the 
formal law of adoption may, at times, compromise the intended legal effects of child 
adoption. The permanent change in familial relations may not be a practical reality in some 
cases. The scenario of the grandmother adopting her granddaughter while living with the 
mother of the child in the same household is a good example.  
6.3.2 Family-centred Motives 
The history of child adoption and its motives has passed through several phases. One motive, 
reflected in the adoption laws of the Western world, was adoption to serve the interests of the 
 
1112 High Court of the United Republic of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam District Registry, At Dar es Salaam, “In the 
Matter of the Law of the Child Act, No. 21 of 2009 and In the Matter of GSG-the Infant and In the Matter of 
Petition for Adoption Order by DHN” (Misc. Civil Application No. 90 of 2011). 
1113 Interviews with social welfare officers provided accounts of adoption applicants whose motive for adoption 





adoptive family.1114 This is known as family-centred adoption: adoption whose primary goal 
is to cure an ill in the adoptive family.1115 The problem could be childlessness or lack of a 
male heir. Due to changes in social awareness and attitudes towards children, propagated by, 
among other things, the recognition of children as subjects of rights rather than objects of 
care, child adoption has become increasingly child-centred rather than family-centred across 
the globe. However, it does not mean family-centred adoptions are not practised anymore. On 
the contrary, adoptions for the purpose of creating families for involuntarily childless couples 
still occur in most countries globally. The good thing is that the adopted child in family-
centred adoptions benefits rather than suffers from the adoption. In cases where voluntarily 
childless couples seek to adopt children, this is usually with the intention of providing a 
family for children who are in need. 
In 41 of the 70 selected cases, the adoptive parents had no biological children of their own. It 
is nevertheless only distinctly stated in 26 cases that adoption was sought to cure 
childlessness. About 4 adoptive parents out of the remaining 15 cases stated that they were 
voluntarily childless, and it was their life mission to adopt orphaned or abandoned children 
instead of having biological children of their own. Among these 4 adoptive parents, one 
adopted 5 children from Tanzania, accounting for 8 cases among the 15.1116 In the remaining 
7 cases, there was no clear statement of motives, and the researcher could not, without doubt, 
presume them to be family-centred adoptions. In these 7 cases, 4 adoptive parents were 
married while 3 were not. The duration of marriage of the married adoptive parents could 
unfortunately not be ascertained as such information was not available in the rulings. Duration 
of marriage where a couple remains childless helps determine their motive for adoption, 
especially in Tanzania, where couples seek to bear children within the first 5 years of 
marriage.1117 Of the 3 single adoptive parents, one was a Tanzanian uncle resident abroad, and 
two were resident Tanzanian women, one of African and the other of Indian descent whose 
primary interest seemed to be to offer a better life to their relatives’ children, since they were 
still within the productive age.  
 
1114 Keating provides a detailed account of historical and legal developments relating to child adoption in 
England in her book, Keating, A child for keeps, above footnote 306. 
1115 Interestingly, Selman refers to it as adoption for the best interests of the parents in Selman Peter, “Adoption: 
a cure for (too) many ills?”, above footnote 1109, at p. 260. 
1116 Interview with a non-Tanzanian adopter and founder of a children's home in Mwanza, currently living in the 
UK, interview through email, submitted on 16.02.2019. 
1117 Rwezaura, Wanitzek, “The Law and Practice Relating to the Adoption of Children in Tanzania”, above 




Childlessness has gradually become a strong motive for adoption among Tanzanian 
couples.1118 Out of the 41 cases of parents without biological children, 18 were Tanzanians, 
while 23 were non-Tanzanians and mixed couples. However, fewer Tanzanians, resident and 
non-resident, declared their childlessness as a motive for adopting compared to the two other 
groups. Tanzanian parents who adopted their relatives’ children to satisfy their need of having 
children were only 3. Others adopted orphaned or abandoned children. The main reason 
against Tanzanians adopting their relatives’ children as a cure for childlessness is the limited 
applicability of the permanent change of child-parent relations in their circumstances. The 
birth parents or extended family would probably still regard the adopted child as belonging to 
the birth parents. Most significantly, the child might still regard the adoptive parent as an 
aunt, uncle, sister, brother, or grandparent. Also, the need for secrecy is a factor where a 
couple without a child of their own would like the community to regard the adopted child as 
biological rather than adopted. A relative’s child would not fit this bill. 
In a nutshell, all family-centred adoptions among the 70 studied adoptions were also child-
centred. This is because most of the adopted children were abandoned or orphaned; hence 
adoption provided them with a substitute family. Among the children with incomplete 
families who were adopted for family-centred motives, the adoptive parents wanted to provide 
them with better standards of life, and these cases were thus also child-centred. As indicated 
in the discussion on child-centred adoptions, other motives were also present in the family-
centred adoptions. 
6.3.3 Adopting to Strengthen Filial Ties 
Filiation or filiality can be understood as the state of being a son or a daughter.1119 In some 
instances, existing legal or social filial ties may require strengthening. Child adoption can be 
used as one of the means to strengthen filial ties. This may happen where an applicant or one 
of the applicants is the biological parent of the child. In this case, the child may be an issue of 
one spouse’s previous marriage or an extra-marital affair. It is also possible for a single 
applicant to adopt his or her illegitimate child. If married, the applicant must get the consent 
of the step-parent. A couple may adopt their pre-marital child as well if they so wish. 
However, section 34 of the Law of the Child Act makes recourse to adoption unnecessary for 
 
1118 Ibid., at p. 137. This is a departure from the earlier trend where Africans did not generally view adoption as a 
solution to childlessness. 
1119 Bryan A. Garner (editor-in-chief), Black's Law Dictionary, Deluxe 9th ed. (St. Paul, MN: West Publishing 




a parent whose only motive is to legitimise the child. The parent may apply to the court to 
confirm the parentage of the child.1120 
The common law principle making an illegitimate child filius nullius (child of nobody)1121 is 
the basis for requiring the strengthening of filial ties. The principle’s legal effect is to estrange 
an illegitimate child even from his/her biological parents and extended family. For instance, 
an illegitimate child could not inherit from the estate of a parent or relative who died intestate 
or did not specifically mention him or her in their will. Since Tanzanian law borrows from 
English common law, the effects of the principle also affected illegitimate children in the 
country. For a long time, despite the Affiliation Act, the legitimation of children was 
governed by rules of Islamic or customary law. This is because the Act focused on issues of 
custody and maintenance instead of legitimation.1122 However, the Law of the Child Act 
covers this gap through provisions on parentage under Part V. In child-step-parent relations, 
however, child adoption remains the viable route to create a legal child-parent bond. 
Among the 70 selected cases, 4 were dedicated to strengthening filial ties. All 4 cases 
involved a step-parent applying to adopt a child of their spouse. They involved two resident 
mixed couples, a non-resident Tanzanian and non-Tanzanian couple, and a resident Tanzanian 
couple. Among the four principal applicants, three were male, and one was female. In two 
cases, stepfathers petitioned for adoption jointly with their wives, who were the children’s 
birth mothers. In one case, a stepfather applied alone with the consent of the child’s mother 
(whom he was cohabiting with but not yet married). And in the last case, a resident non-
Tanzanian wife jointly applied with her Tanzanian husband to adopt his extra-marital child 
born during the subsistence of their marriage. Apart from the latter, in the other three cases, 
the adopted children resulted from the mothers’ prior relationships before their subsequent 
marriages. 
There were no cases of unmarried parents seeking to adopt their illegitimate children. The 
only exception is in the case mentioned above, where adoption was granted to a resident non-
Tanzanian male who is part of a mixed couple cohabiting without any proof of marriage.1123 
In all four cases, the adoptive parents cared for the children for some time before they decided 
to adopt them. In two cases, the children were adopted within the first five years of marriage. 
 
1120 Law of the Child Act, 2009, under section 160, repeals and replaces the Affiliation Act which harboured 
cumbersome procedures for legitimising a child that made adoption seem a more practical route to take. 
1121 Garner, Black's Law Dictionary, Deluxe 9th ed., above footnote 1119, at p. 705. 
1122 See The Affiliation Act, 1949 [Cap 278 R.E. 2002]. 
1123 High Court of the United Republic of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam District Registry, At Dar es Salaam, “In the 
Matter of Application for Adoption of TGB, a Male Child and In the Matter of Application for Adoption of TGB 




In the remaining two cases, the duration of marriage was immaterial or inapplicable. The 
child resulting from an extra-marital alliance during the subsistence of marriage was adopted 
within two years of being born, while in the other case, adoption was sought after four years 
of cohabitation.  
Although these adoptions are meant to strengthen family relations between the child and a 
step-parent and possibly siblings of the subsequent marriage, there usually are other 
underlying reasons compelling parents to resort to adoption. The need to expunge the child’s 
illegitimate status, exclude the other natural parent from sharing parental rights and 
responsibilities, or seek to meet requirements imposed by states or organisations may be other 
common reasons. For instance, in the four studied cases, there was a need to adopt to meet 
immigration law requirements in the case of travel abroad for the mixed couples and the non-
resident Tanzanian and non-Tanzanian couple. In the case where the child was a result of 
extra-marital relations, alienating the birth mother’s parental rights to preserve the marriage 
may have been one of the driving motives for adoption. In the case of the resident Tanzanians, 
there may have been a need to entitle the child to the adopting stepfather’s estate because he 
was already 70 years old at the time of the application.1124 In short, there are usually other 
pushing factors to adoption than what meets the eye, and they are not always discernable.  
6.3.4 Legalisation of de facto Parent-Child Relations 
De facto is a Latin term that means existing in fact but not in a formal or legal sense.1125 Some 
parent-child relations may exist socially but are not formally or legally recognised. Child 
adoption may be used to legalise such relationships. Multiple factors may necessitate such 
formalisation, based on circumstances within or outside the family. All in all, the 
formalisation of de facto parent-child relations is not on its own a category of motives for 
adoption, but it helps when trying to understand why some parents decide to use the formal 
law of adoption. 
In the 70 selected cases, a considerable number of adoptions concerned children who had 
already been cared for by the adoptive parents for quite some time. However, not in all cases 
had the parent-child status developed. This was strong in 5 cases where one could say there 
was an existing informal (de facto) adoption. In these cases, the adoptive parents lived with 
and took care of the children for periods ranging from 5 to 15 years before applying for 
formal adoption. The common reason for adoption in these 5 cases was the need to meet the 
 
1124 Resident Magistrate Court in Dar es Salaam, at Kisutu, “In the Matter of Application for Adoption under the 
Law of the Child Act, 2009 and In the Matter of IGM of Dar es Salaam between GFM and AML”, (Misc. Civil 
Application Case No. 124 of 2018, ordered on 21.03.2019). 




immigration requirements of foreign countries when travelling abroad. All five cases involved 
uncles and aunts adopting children of their relatives whom they took care of within Tanzania. 
Adoption was done due to the emergent need to travel abroad, for instance for a new job. In 
one of the cases, the adoptive parents, who were a mixed couple, had cared for the children 
after the death of their birth parents. The care arrangements fulfilled their obligations under 
customary law; however, they had to formalise the de facto adoption to enable them to travel 
abroad, among other things.1126 
Many other reasons could push a de facto parent to adopt a child. These may relate to 
entitlement to benefits such as health insurance, inheriting the parent’s estate, or adopting a 
child just before he or she attains the age of majority. In one case, which was clearly intended 
to legalise a de facto adoption, the court granted an adoption order for a 29-year-old woman 
who had been under the care of the adoptive parent for most of her life.1127 This case is not 
counted among the 5 because, although the court used the Law of the Child Act as the 
enabling law, the adopted person was not a child. Other motives compelling the adoptive 
parent to adopt an adult and the court to sanction it were not stated in the ruling.1128 Again, 
motives for adoption are not always clearly determinable.  
6.3.5 Complex Motives  
Some motives for adoption are not easily categorisable. There were some motives among the 
70 studied cases that did not fall under any of the categories above. It could not be determined 
without a doubt whether the adoption served the interests of the adopted child, the interests of 
the adoptive parents, or the interests of the birth parents or family. It has already been shown 
that it is not always possible to understand reasons for adoption. In some cases, the motives 
are understandable, but their categorisation is complicated. These motives are referred to here 
as complex. 
A sample of 10 cases was further studied to give an example of complex motives. While this 
part will not cover all 10 cases, some will be used to represent sets of similar motives that 
proved difficult to categorise. These motives include adopting a child because the birth 
 
1126 High Court of the United Republic of Tanzania, In the District Registry of Arusha, At Arusha, “In the Matter 
of the Law of the Child Act, 2009 and In the Matter of MERM and CERM of Olasiti, Arusha and In the Matter 
of the Application for an Adoption Order by JRMS and DDD”, Misc. Civil Cause No. 19 of 2018, Ordered on 
14.03.2019. 
1127 The District Court of Kinondoni, at Kinondoni, “In the Matter of the Law of the Child Act 2009 and In the 
Matter of RCM of Kinondoni-Dar es Salaam and In the Matter of Application for an Adoption Order by ECK of 
Mbezi Beach, Kinondoni-Dar es Salaam”, Misc. Civil Case No. 24 of 2018, Ordered on 25.05.2018. 
1128 For an example of reasons for adult adoption, see High Court of the United Republic of Tanzania (Dar es 
Salaam District Registry), At Dar es Salaam, “Matayo K. Kihwelo vs. Gabriele Brandolini”, Misc. Civil Cause 




mother has remarried, adopting a child from a complete family to assist financially while such 
support was already being given, and adopting for religious reasons. 
Adoption because the birth mother has remarried: In one of the cases, a maternal uncle and his 
wife adopted their teenage niece because her mother had remarried. The new husband was not 
willing to take care of his stepdaughter. Since the death of the birth father six years before the 
remarriage, the mother had taken care of her daughter without any assistance from the 
paternal side. She said that after remarriage, living with her daughter caused 
misunderstandings in her marriage. Therefore, from the year she was remarried, she let her 
brother and sister-in-law take care of her daughter. After four years of living with her, the 
uncle and his wife applied for child adoption. They had no child of their own, and at the time 
of the application, the uncle was resident in the USA for studies. Thus, there are other motives 
at play here. Nonetheless, when granting the adoption, the judge said that it was to safeguard 
the welfare of the child, the birth mother, and her marriage.1129 In this case, is the motive for 
adoption child-centred, family-centred or both? One can argue that both categories apply. 
However, it is the opinion of the researcher that the adoption order was granted out of 
consideration for the birth mother and her marriage rather than for the child’s best interests. 
Issues such as continuity in the child’s upbringing or effects of an adoption order on parental 
rights were not considered or discussed in the ruling. Although referring to a different 
scenario, Selman, in his chapter, introduces child adoption as a cure for birth mothers’ ills.1130 
Probably the motive for adoption, in this case, could be categorised as birth mother centred.  
Adoption for financial support: In a group of ‘open adoption’ cases, non-resident Tanzanians 
adopted their relatives’ children to continue to support their upkeep. This means providing for 
food, clothes, shelter, medical care, and education. Three similar cases can serve as examples 
in this sub-category. The cases concern three girls, one 15 years old1131, another 13 years 
old1132 , and the last one 4 years old1133. The main reason stated for adoption in these cases is 
to provide care for the adopted children because their parents cannot afford to do so. The non-
 
1129 High Court of Tanzania, At Dar es Salaam, “In the Matter of LKIM, a Child of Usa River, Arusha and In the 
Matter of Application for Adoption by RET and JEY of Usa River, Arusha” (Misc. Civil Application No. 103 of 
2009, Ordered on 30.03.2010). 
1130 Selman Peter, “Adoption: a cure for (too) many ills?”, above footnote 1109, at p. 261. 
1131 District Court of Kinondoni, At Kinondoni, “In the Matter of the Law of the Child Act, No. 21 of 2009 and 
In the Matter of the Law of the Child EMJS and In the Matter of Application for an Adoption Order by RMM 
and PVM” (Misc. Civil Case No. 134 of 2018, Ordered on 19.07.2018). 
1132 District Court of Kinondoni, At Kinondoni, “In the Matter of the Law of the Child Act, No. 21 of 2009 and 
In the Matter of the Child RJM of Mbezi Beach, Dar es Salaam and In the Matter of an Application for an Open 
Adoption by CFK and IMK of London, UK” (Misc. Civil Case No. 165 of 2008, Ordered on 24.08.2018). 
1133 District Court of Kinondoni, At Kinondoni, “In the Matter of the Law of the Child Act, No. 21 of 2009 and 
In the Matter of DWDM and In the Matter of an Application for an Adoption Order by GAK and HK of Jersey, 




resident relatives say that they were already giving the parents financial assistance. Since the 
parents were alive and well and were already receiving assistance, this motive for adoption 
seems questionable.1134 Evidently, the adopters chose to adopt in order to enable the children 
to travel to the country where they resided. Being able to travel abroad is important because 
what the adoptive parents are seeking to achieve is a better life for their relatives’ children. In 
such cases, the motive is difficult to categorise because it is difficult to establish whether it is 
in the children’s best interest to separate them from their birth parents for the chance of ‘a 
better life’ abroad. Since one cannot guarantee that they will have a ‘better life’, the adoption 
is not conclusively child-centred. 
Adoption pursuant to religious beliefs: Some adoptive parents cited their religious beliefs as 
the motive for adoption in several cases. This was more common among adoption petitions 
from foreign missionaries working in different parts of Tanzania. In one adoption petition 
heard in Moshi, a Christian American missionary couple stated that according to their 
religious convictions, they had decided not to have biological children of their own but to 
adopt orphans.1135  However, not only Christians claim religious beliefs as a motive for 
adoption. In one adoption case ordered in Dar es Salaam, a Muslim couple with four children 
of their own adopted a three-year-old abandoned girl stating their religious belief as the only 
reason for adoption.1136 Although the Judge, in this case, did not raise any objection, the 
researcher knows that child adoption is not in compliance with the Islamic faith, where only 
kafala is recognised. Since the Law of the Child Act, 2009 does not provide for kafala, 
Muslims in Tanzania Mainland can adopt children, though the same cannot happen in 
Tanzania Zanzibar.1137  
It was interesting to observe that not only adoptive parents were moved by their religious 
beliefs, but also judges/magistrates in their reasons for granting adoptions. In one case, a 
judge, while granting an adoption to a resident non-Tanzanian couple, said,  
 
1134 In a case decided in Moshi: Resident Magistrate Court of Moshi, At Moshi, “AAM, Petitioner vs. JAM and 
IAM, Infants” (Adoption Case No. 02 of 2017, Ordered on 02.03.2017), a similar conclusion can be reached as a 
resident Tanzanian woman adopted two of her younger siblings, a brother of 16 years and a sister of 15 years, 
despite having both parents alive and well, and despite the fact that they were already receiving financial support 
from their sister. Terming the adoption child-centred, as the Magistrate did, may not fit the true meaning of the 
category. 
1135 High Court of Tanzania, At Moshi, “In the Matter of the Adoption of Children Act, Cap 335 and In the 
Matter of BSM, Infant and In the Matter of an application for an Adoption Order by DLH and MWH, Petitioner” 
(Misc. Civil Application No. 10 of 2010). 
1136 High Court of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam District Registry, At Dar es Salaam, “In the Matter of the Law of the 
Child Act, No. 21 of 2009 and In the Matter of Application for Adoption of AM, infant and In the Matter of an 
Application for an Adoption Order by MOM and AM of Kinondoni, Dar es Salaam” (Misc. Civil Application 
No. 583 of 2018, Ordered on 08.11.2018). 




“I wish to take this opportunity to express my thanks to the petitioners who 
have offered to adopt this infant. May the Almighty God pour a lot of 
blessings on them for being good hearted. First of all, this infant is an 
orphan…he was just abandoned in the church premises by one of his 
relatives who was not in a position to take care for him. Thereafter, he was 
taken to the orphanage where the petitioners who are good Samaritans 
volunteered to care for him. That is great of them.” 1138 
Religion, therefore, is a motivation for adoption. However, it does not fit the other categories 
of motives discussed above, and is hence included under complex motives.  
During field research in Tanzania, several social welfare officers explained other motives for 
child adoption that were difficult to categorise. These motives were primarily beneficial to the 
adoptive parents rather than the children. Here, the study mentions only two dominant 
motives among those advanced. A motive common to both resident non-Tanzanian and non-
resident Tanzanian adopters was adopting in order to receive child benefits in the country of 
origin or the country of residence. In some Western countries, the state provides child benefits 
for residents. For instance, in Germany, the state provides ‘kindergeld’ monthly to every 
lawfully resident parent. The more the children, the higher the amount. The social welfare 
officers named a second motive that applies mainly to non-resident Tanzanians: adopting a 
relative’s child in order to have household help abroad. The officers said that in their life 
abroad these adopters miss the support which they are used to finding within the extended 
family at home, and try to replace it by adopting their relatives’ children. “There are no 
housegirls in Europe; these non-resident Tanzanian adopters sometimes seek to adopt their 
relatives’ children to obtain house help”, said one social welfare officer.1139 The study could 
not confirm these motives in the court records because they are very personal, and no adopter 
would ever state them. Also, they are neither child- nor family-centred and do not fit the 
profiles of the other motives discussed above, hence they are referred to here as complex. 
6.4 Adherence to and Sufficiency of Child Adoption Requirements and Procedures 
The legal requirements and procedures for child adoption in Tanzania, and their strengths and 
weaknesses, have been discussed in the earlier chapters. This part looks at how the authorities 
mandated to oversee child adoption interpret and apply them in practice, and how street-level 
bureaucrats navigate areas with unclear legal regulation. In addition, the sufficiency of the 
legal requirements and procedures to accomplish the envisaged effective child adoption 
practice is discussed. The headings under which practice is examined have been chosen to 
 
1138 High Court of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam District Registry, At Dar es Salaam, “In the Matter of the Adoption 
of Children Act, Cap 335 and In the Matter of CPO, Infant and In the Matter of an Application for an Adoption 
Order by KLT and SECT” (Misc. Civil Cause No. 131 of 2009, Ordered on 02.02.2010). 




expose the most crucial matters in the discussion. Issues of legal pluralism and their effects 
are addressed where applicable under the sub-parts. Child protection issues in adoption are 
also described and discussed under each heading.  
6.4.1 Identifying a Child for Adoption 
“…they are simply ‘chosen’ by the family (who come to the Baby Home 
and actually select the child they like best!).”1140 
Admittedly, the process of identifying a child for adoption raised several issues among 
persons responding to questions posed by the researcher. The legal position of a child suitable 
for foster care pending adoption may contribute to the issues. Because, in all types of 
adoptions, the Law of the Child Act requires a prospective adoptee to be in the continuous 
care of the adopter for a period of not less than three or six months before petitioning for 
adoption, the process of identifying a child to be fostered prior to adoption is regulated by the 
Foster Care Placement Regulations, 2012. The children, for the most part, are to be found in 
residential children’s homes or institutions.1141 The Adoption of Children Regulations, 2012, 
therefore, have no provisions on child identification. However, since there is no distinction 
under the Foster Care Placement Regulations between children to be fostered pending 
adoption and children to remain in foster care, a problem arises. This is because not all 
children suitable for foster care are necessarily suitable for adoption as well. 
The Child Protection Regulations, 2014 attempt to remedy this situation. They provide that 
children suitable for adoption are those whom the Juvenile Court has declared free for 
adoption during care order proceedings where the care plan is for adoption.1142 However, 
since the Child Protection Regulations came two years after the Foster Care Placement 
Regulations, what they provide is not always reflected in practice. The established practice is 
to select children to foster for purposes of adoption from children’s homes or institutions 
irrespective of whether they have been declared free for adoption or not. Two Magistrates of 
the Juvenile Court at Kisutu, Dar es Salaam, who were interviewed during field research, 
asserted that not all children placed in homes or institutions are subjects of supervision or care 
 
1140 Interview with a non-Tanzanian adoptive parent and founder of a children's home in Tanzania, currently 
living in the UK; interview response submitted online on 16.02.2019. The adoptive parent of five Tanzanian 
children and an active non-state actor in the field of child adoption in Tanzania, said the quoted words while 
responding to a question relating to determination of the best interests of the child. 
1141 Regulation 8(1) of the Foster Care Placement Regulations, 2012 read together with sections 32(1) and 53 (1) 
and (7) of the Law of the Child Act, 2009. 
1142 Sections 49 and 50 of the Child Protection Regulations,2014 read together with section 99 of the Law of the 




orders.1143 Social welfare officers place a considerable number of children in homes or 
institutions as an emergency response pending further action, but they generally remain there 
for longer than the anticipated period. Ultimately, the children may be declared abandoned 
without known parents or relatives and so they remain in the homes or institutions without 
any court process. Also, any person may place a child in a home or institution. In such an 
occurrence, the law requires the home or institution to notify the social welfare office 
responsible. Unfortunately, in all district social welfare offices visited during field research, 
the officers said that usually, the managers or patrons of the homes or institutions neglect this 
duty. As a result, children identified for fostering pending adoption from the homes or 
institutions may not always be suitable for adoption in the sense of the Child Protection 
Regulations, 2014.  
The freedom of prospective adopters to select children for adoption from children’s homes or 
institutions is another issue. This is because, once the Commissioner for Social Welfare 
approves an application to foster a child pending child adoption, he or she also allows the 
applicant(s) to visit a children’s home or institution to identify a child. Ordinarily, the 
Commissioner’s approval letter specifies a home or institution on the basis of the 
characteristics of the prospective adoptee specified by the applicant.1144 Unfortunately, the 
law and the letter of approval set no guiding rules for the identification process.1145 Thus, 
prospective adopters are free to assess all the children in the home or institution available for 
adoption and choose the one they are most pleased with. And if none of the children seems to 
satisfy the needs of the prospective adopters, they are, subject to permission from the social 
welfare office responsible for their application, free to search for a child in another home or 
institution. A social welfare officer at Kinondoni District, while describing the process, said, 
“When the Commissioner approves the application, he writes to the council 
director allowing the applicant to go identify a child in a children’s home. 
He also copies the letter to the manager of the home, the social welfare 
officer in charge and the applicant. When the applicant cannot identify a 
child from the home designated by the Commissioner, the officer in charge 
requests the Commissioner to allow the applicant to identify a child from 
 
1143 Interview with Resident Magistrates 1 and 2, Juvenile Court at Kisutu, Dar es Salaam, on 19.02.2018 and 
21.02.2019, respectively. 
1144 During field research the researcher found that children’s homes are specified according to the category of 
children they receive. This categorisation may be in terms of age, gender, religion and status of the child with 
regard to having surviving parents, relatives or guardians. Thus, a prospective adopter in search of a child aged 
between 0 and 3 years would be directed to a home caring for such young children. 
1145 The researcher analysed the contents of the approval letters found during the perusal of child adoption files at 




other children’s homes. Since most applicants want small babies, they could 
even be allowed to go to other regions.”1146 
 Some respondents described the process with the words ‘as if selecting common commodities 
in the market’.1147 This freedom is against the tenets of child-centred adoption. 
Apart from the above challenges, the identification process presents other problems. One such 
problem is the lack of a rigorous child-parent matching process based on a needs assessment 
of an adoptable child and the prospective adopter’s ability to meet these needs. The social 
investigation procedure provides for the assessment of prospective adopters with regard to a 
child already specified or identified. However, in practice, if a child in a home has no known 
parents or relatives, he or she is available for adoption. Once the prospective adopter chooses 
such a child, it is settled; there is no matching process of any kind. The arguments of the 
guardian ad litem as reported in adoption rulings, focus mainly on the adopter’s financial 
ability, home safety and criminal status. The researcher has not come across any court case 
that considered or questioned an adopter’s psycho-social, medical, or emotional condition. As 
a result, adoptive parents may select children to adopt while mentally or emotionally unable 
or unprepared to parent them. One of the non-Tanzanian adopters who responded to this study 
had to re-adopt a previously adopted child because the original adoptive parents were unable 
to handle the child and returned the child to the children’s home.1148 It would be important to 
consider how the best interest of the child can be safeguarded in such practice. 
Another problem of this freedom is the resulting inherent discrimination of children living 
with a disability, HIV/AIDs or other similar conditions. Very few prospective adopters 
willingly select such children for adoption. However, there are persons who, for child-centred 
reasons, would adopt these children if assessement shows that they are well matched. Thus, 
with a proper needs assessment and matching process, children with such conditions would 
not remain in the homes for a longer time than is necessary, a situation that is currently 
inevitable.1149  
The primary rationale behind the freedom to choose a child, apart from the lack of a strict law 
to the contrary, is the presence of a large number of children available for adoption against a 
 
1146 Interview with social welfare officer 1-Kinondoni District, Dar es Salaam, on 23.01.2019. 
1147 Interview with two non-Tanzanian adopters living in Dar es Salaam and the UK, on 15.01.2019 and 
16.02.2019, respectively. 
1148 Interview with a non-Tanzanian adoptive parent and founder of a children's home in Tanzania, living in the 
UK, interview response submitted online on 16.02.2019. 
1149 The study observed two mentally disabled young adults who have remained at the Kurasini Children’s home 





limited number of adoption applicants. If adopters were lining up waiting for children to 
adopt, this freedom would be non-existent. One respondent said that,  
“…. there are so many more children needing families than there are 
families wanting to adopt. So, there is no ‘competition’ where Tanzanians 
would get priority over a foreigner. Like I said – we have only ever done 
adoptions with children who have been abandoned and have no known 
relatives – and we often had 30-40 children at any time who would be 
available for adoption. Once a couple was approved – they would come to 
us with a letter from Social Welfare and choose their baby. They pretty 
much always got the baby they chose as there was no one else in the 
process.”1150 
The need of prospective adopters to pass off adopted children as their own biological children 
is another reason for allowing freedom to choose. This practice is common among resident 
and non-resident Tanzanians. Respondent social welfare officers reported cases where 
prospective adopters chose children from homes in other regions so that they could keep the 
adoption secret and later claim the children were their biological children. 
In a few cases, adopters do not go through the child identification process. They already have 
specific children they want to adopt before lodging the adoption application. This does not, 
however, mean that the problems stated above are avoided in these cases. Since the child is 
specified, an assigned social welfare officer conducts a social investigation to ascertain the 
suitability and eligibility of the child and the prospective adopters. The investigation does not 
go beyond the requirements of the social investigation form. Hence, again, no psycho-social 
or emotional assessment is made. When it is a relative’s child, the assessment is even laxer. 
This is because, in most cases, the child has been in the prospective adopter’s care for some 
time before the adoption application. So, adoption is seen as only an extension of that care 
within new legal bounds. In such cases, there is no meticulous determination of whether 
adoption is in the specified child’s best interest.  
In a nutshell, improving the law is the first solution for issues relating to the identification of 
children for adoption. Establishing a clear, integrated approach, from the Law of the Child 
Act to the Regulations on child adoption made under it, would go a long way to solving the 
problem. Also, social welfare officers should be trained in how to implement current laws or 
regulations, especially where there are changes. In addition, the enactment of stricter rules on 
child identification is imperative. For instance, there is no such free rein in choosing children 
 
1150 Interview with a non-Tanzanian adoptive parent and founder of a children's home in Tanzania, living in the 




in the UK, from where Tanzania’s adoption law originated.1151 Instead, social workers match 
the prospective adopters with the available children. Such a practice would require training of 
social welfare officers in Tanzania in respect of the rigorous needs assessment and matching 
procedures. Next, there must be a campaign to raise awareness in the Tanzanian community 
on the meaning and significance of child adoption as an alternative care measure for children 
in need of family care. Such a campaign might increase the number of adopters who want to 
help the available adoptable children and not only adopt for motives beneficial to themselves.  
6.4.2 Consent: Understanding Formal Child Adoption 
One of the most fundamental requirements and procedures in child adoption practice is 
procuring consent from the persons charged with the child’s care and from the child 
concerned. Consent should be free and informed.1152 For it to be so, those giving consent must 
fully understand the meaning and effects of formal child adoption. In practice, this goal has 
proved not always attainable. While all the respondent social welfare officers and 
commissioners for oaths interviewed during field research insisted that they explain the 
meaning and effects of child adoption to their clients, they agreed that not all understand it as 
they should. The main challenge is understanding the permanent and complete transfer of 
rights and responsibilities from the birth family to the adoptive family. Child care in 
traditional African systems does not usually entail such an effect. Even where child adoption 
is practised in such systems, its requirements and effects differ from those of formal child 
adoption under state laws derived from the West.1153 
In the 70 selected adoption cases, three scenarios were observed in which consent to adoption 
does not necessarily mean that the people consenting understand or assent to the permanent 
change in familial relations. The first scenario is when relatives adopt. As discussed above, in 
these adoptions, the primary motive may be to provide a better standard of living for a 
relative’s child rather than an alternative family. The legal effect of permanently and 
completely depriving the relative of his or her child may be undesired and hence not 
representative of the social reality after the adoption. For instance, in the case where a 
 
1151  The process of assessment and approval of adopters before they are given a child is explained in Alper, 
Joanne and Howe, David (eds.), Assessing adoptive parents, foster carers and kinship carers: Improving 
analysis and understanding of parenting capacity (London, Philadelphia: Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 2017). 
1152 Parental informed consent is required under section 59(1) of the Law of the Child Act, 2009 and regulation 
5(5) of the Adoption of Children Regulations, 2014. For children, it is required under regulation 11(7) of the 
Adoption of Children Regulations, 2014. 
1153 Rwezaura, Wanitzek, in “The Law and Practice Relating to the Adoption of Children in Tanzania”, above 
footnote 22 at pp. 153-155, explain child adoption under traditional laws of different African societies. The 
authors argue that such societies practise child adoption for reasons different from those envisaged in formal 
child adoption, and that the nature and effects of such traditional African law adoptions differ considerably from 




grandmother adopted her daughter’s child, it is doubtful whether anyone in the family would 
really consider the grandparents as the child’s parents.1154 Also, in the case decided in Moshi 
where the court granted a sister an adoption order for her two teenage siblings, it is 
implausible that they would regard her as their parent rather than their natural parents who 
were still alive.1155 Similarly, in cases where non-resident Tanzanians adopt their relatives’ 
children to facilitate travel abroad with them, the relatives’ consent to the adoption does not 
necessarily mean that the change in familial relations is strictly socially applicable. 
The second scenario is cases where consent to adoption is given purely in order to alleviate 
financial difficulties in respect of raising the child and not otherwise. In these cases, the 
permanent change in familial relations may be not only undesired but also inconceivable. 
Undeniably, in many of the studied cases, the financial status of the birth families plays a vital 
role in their agreeing to consent to the adoption. Not in all such cases, but in a considerable 
number, the birth parents or relatives may harbour a belief that their financially astute children 
will come back to assist them in the future. Several social welfare officers, advocates and a 
founder of a children’s home reported that some clients consent to child adoption because 
they consider it a form of social security, trusting that their adopted children will return and 
care for them, especially in their old age.1156 They reported that the practice was common in 
Arusha, where numerous non-Tanzanians come as tourists or to work in the region. Some of 
them take pity on children living in hazardous environments and decide to adopt them. In 
such adoptions, the natural parents or relatives are mostly convinced that their children will 
receive a better education overseas and will eventually return to care for them. 
 Cases in which people seek to adopt children only to fulfil eligibility criteria for benefits 
from certain organisations also fit into the scenario above. There is no permanent change in 
familial relations intended in such adoptions. For instance, there is a current tendency where 
applicants have adopted or attempted to adopt children, their relatives’ or not, in order to be 
able to fill them in their National Health Insurance Fund (NHIF) slots.1157 This is because 
 
1154 High Court of the United Republic of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam District Registry, At Dar es Salaam, “In the 
Matter of the Law of the Child Act, No. 21 of 2009 and In the Matter of GSG-the Infant and In the Matter of 
Petition for Adoption Order by DHN”. 
1155 Resident Magistrate Court of Moshi, At Moshi, “AAM, Petitioner vs. JAM and IAM, Infants”. 
1156 Interview with social welfare officers 1 and 2-Kinondoni Municipal, Dar es Salaam 23.01.2019; social 
welfare officers 1 and 2-Arusha Regional and Municipal offices 19.03.2019; an advocate and resident non-
Tanzanian adoptive parent, Dar es Salaam, 15.01.2019; and a non-Tanzanian adoptive parent and founder of a 
children's home in Tanzania, living in the UK, online response submitted on 16.02.2019. 
1157 Interview with social welfare officers in Dar es Salaam and Arusha indicated a growing trend of resident 
Tanzanians applying to adopt children so they can benefit from their health insurance schemes. They admitted 
that some may have successfully adopted for this reason although they did not state it as their motive for 




every public servant in Tanzania must be a member of NHIF, where 3% of the salary is 
deducted as a membership contribution. Apart from a spouse, the health fund gives four slots 
for legal dependants who can be parents or children of the insured. The children must be born 
to the insured or adopted. In cases where the insured has to pay for health care of a relative’s 
child, and has some empty slots, they may apply for adoption only so that the child can 
benefit from their NHIF account. 
The third scenario comprises situations where consent to adoption is mistaken. There were a 
few cases in which birth parents or relatives gave their consent for guardianship, but the 
procedure in court changed to child adoption. This means that they never really consented to 
the effects of child adoption, including permanent changes in familial relations. In two such 
cases used as examples here, the court rulings mention application for full custody or 
guardianship as the original intent of the applicants. Then, in due course of arguing, the 
application was changed to child adoption, which the court eventually granted. In one of the 
two cases, the researcher was able to access an affidavit by the child’s natural father 
consenting to an application for full custody, yet the court granted child adoption.1158 It is an 
odd case because the applicants are resident non-Tanzanians who are not related to the child 
and the court awarding the adoption order is a district court. In the other case, a non-resident 
Tanzanian maternal uncle, according to the court ruling, applied for full and sole legal 
custody for his nephew at the same district court but was instead granted an adoption order at 
the end.1159 It was not possible to access any affidavit or letter of consent from the natural 
mother whom the ruling mentions as having consented to the adoption. These two cases, 
among others, show the court’s lack of sufficient understanding of child adoption legal 
requirements and procedure. 
Since consent is a core legal requirement in adoption, applicants usually submit to the court a 
duly signed consent letter from the natural parents or relatives, together with the petition. 
Unfortunately, it is impossible to determine whether the signatory fully comprehended the 
effects of child adoption before signing the document. In the case of applications to adopt 
children without known parents, relatives or guardians, the Commissioner for Social Welfare 
provides consent for adoption. Such consent is not discussed here because it can be assumed 
that it is sufficiently free and informed.  
 
1158 District Court of Kinondoni, At Kinondoni, “In the Matter of the Law of the Child Act, 2009 and In the 
Matter of an Application for Custody of MJM by JW and AW” (Misc. Civil Cause No. 358 of 2016, Ordered on 
23.06.2017). 
1159 District Court of Kinondoni, At Kinondoni, “In the Matter of the Law of the Child Act, 2009 and In the 
Matter of an Application for Adoption Order of FAHA by AHA of Jersey City” (Misc. Civil Case No. 163 of 




6.4.3 Pre-Adoption Care Supervision 
The Law of the Child Act, under sections 56(3) (b), 59(5) and 74(1) (c), requires children who 
are subjects of adoption applications to remain in the continuous care of the applicants for 
periods not below six months for resident and non-resident Tanzanians, and three months for 
resident non-Tanzanians, before petitions for their adoption can be lodged in court. The 
continuous period of care is known as pre-adoption care or foster care. This time is meant for 
the prospective adopter(s) to bond with the child and for the authorities to ascertain whether 
the care arrangement is suitable for both parties. The Foster Care Placement Regulations, 
under regulation 16, designate home visits as the method to assess the welfare and progress of 
the child while under the care of the prospective adopter(s). Thus, these pre-adoption 
supervision visits form part and parcel of the child protection process. 
Commencement of home visits depends on the age of the child. Where the child is less than 
two years old, then the first visit should be within the first two weeks after placement, and for 
children above two years old, within the first month after placement. Subsequent visits should 
follow every two months for the duration of the foster care placement before the court grants 
child adoption. Other visits may be immediate or urgently scheduled depending on incoming 
information, for instance reports of child abuse. According to regulation 16(7) of the Foster 
Care Placement Regulations, the Commissioner should develop rules and forms to guide the 
supervision visits and facilitate reporting. However, the researcher was not able to access such 
rules or forms during field research. Therefore, the only guidance on home visits considered 
here is that provided under regulation 16.  
The field research findings show that although the law is clear and seemed well understood by 
the social welfare officers, home visits were not conducted according to the set requirements. 
Interviews with two non-Tanzanian adopters, one American and the other British, brought up 
the fact that after the initial home visit following placement, the assigned social welfare 
officer did not visit again.1160 These two women with their husbands had adopted a total of 
nine children from Tanzania; hence they had sufficient experience of the adoption procedure. 
They reported that to get the social welfare officers to come for subsequent visits, a 
prospective adopter must seek them out and facilitate their visit. They observed that since the 
social welfare department provides no transport infrastructure or financial support to enable 
 
1160 Interview with a non-Tanzanian adoptive parent and founder of a children's home in Tanzania currently 
living in the UK, response submitted online on 16.02.2019 and interview with a non-Tanzanian adoptive parent, 




the visits, it is difficult for the officers to make visits as officially required. Another resident 
American adopter said, 
“No, they do not do visits. They do the first visit but then disappear, and 
you have to beg for them to come for the final visit at the end of the six 
months. It creates avenues for corruption.”1161 
 When questioned about this matter, the social welfare officers cited a shortage of time, 
finances, human resources, and travel infrastructure as curtailing their efforts to discharge this 
particular duty. For instance, one officer with a locomotor disability, while explaining similar 
challenges, described how such shortages create pressures on their work.1162 Giving his own 
example and considering his situation, he let the researcher consider how these deficiencies 
further complicate his work. In accordance with the street-level bureaucracy theory, the social 
welfare officers attempt to manage their working conditions by creating practicable patterns. 
Thus, they find other ways to assess a child’s placement, such as meeting outside the 
home.1163 However, some of these coping mechanisms may defeat the purpose of the law in 
ordering home visits. Most of the interviewed social welfare officers said that in their efforts 
to discharge this responsibility, they tend to go for a first visit to satisfy themselves that the 
child is well and adequately cared for. Also, they figure out that an adopter cannot lodge an 
adoption petition without a final supervision visit; hence, they must reach out to them and 
arrange the meeting when the time comes. They cannot achieve more than these crucial visits 
in most cases. The researcher is of the opinion that this practice is not in the child’s best 
interests, especially where there is abuse or other parent-child matching complications. 
Another problem discovered is the social welfare officers’ lack of training on what to be done 
during the supervision visits. A British adopter, who has much experience with Tanzanian 
adoption practice as she established a children’s home in Tanzania, shared some information 
on this problem.1164 She reported that different social welfare officers would have different 
ways of conducting supervision visits. Some would want to see and speak to the child, while 
others would only talk to the parents. Regarding the depth of the supervision, she said, “the 
social workers themselves have no idea about adoption or attachment or positive parenting – 
so how can they evaluate someone else?” Training on child adoption that is uniform, 
consistent, up-to-date and frequent is a scarce commodity among social welfare officers at 
 
1161 Interview with an advocate and resident non-Tanzanian adopter, Dar es Salaam, on 15.01.2019. 
1162 Interview with social welfare officer, Bunju Ward, Kinondoni Dar es Salaam, on 16.01.2019. 
1163 Interview with social welfare officer, Temeke Dar es Salaam, on 04.02.2019. She said that at times it is 
difficult to visit prospective adopters’ homes, hence a supervision meeting may be arranged out of the home at 
an agreed place. 
1164 Interview with a non-Tanzanian adoptive parent and founder of a children's home in Tanzania, currently 




national and local levels.1165 As a result, the quality of social welfare officers’ work is 
compromised, which challenges conformity to the dictates of the best interests of the child 
principle.  
A respondent social welfare officer who has worked at the adoption desk, national 
departmental level, in Dar es Salaam for about ten years reported that home visits and social 
investigation are also done in the home of an applicant non-resident Tanzanian abroad.1166 
She said that the Tanzanian social welfare officers liaise with social welfare officers in the 
applicant’s country of residence to obtain a report on their suitability to adopt based on their 
home environment abroad. The law does not reflect the practice of direct liaising with foreign 
social welfare offices, not only for non-resident Tanzanians but also for resident non-
Tanzanians. For non-resident Tanzanian applicants, the law stipulates that home visits and 
social investigation will be done in their Tanzanian homes while they foster prospective 
adoptive children for six months.1167 However, there seemed to be discrepancies in practice, 
with social welfare officers reporting that some non-resident Tanzanians failed to fulfil the 
foster requirement and could still adopt. During one of the interviews, a social welfare officer 
shared some real examples of adoption applications by non-resident Tanzanians, citing two 
diplomats who could adopt children without fulfilling the six-month foster requirement.1168 
Other respondent social welfare officers agreed that the requirement is not ordinarily strictly 
adhered to, especially where a relative’s child is being adopted. A respondent advocate said 
that the foster care requirement is an obstacle to adoption by non-resident Tanzanians because 
many have employment abroad and cannot spend six months fostering a child in Tanzania 
before adopting.1169 She recommended that the law should consider a pre-adoption care period 
abroad. Although regulation 60(5) of the Child Protection Regulations stipulates that the court 
can give a care order for a child to live outside the United Republic, it is not common in 
practice. Both at the social welfare offices and the Juvenile Court, the respondents were not 
aware of this type of care order. However, the provision means a non-resident Tanzanian 
adopter can foster such a child abroad pending adoption. 
 
1165 Lack of sufficient training amongst social welfare officers was a consistent finding during field research, 
complained of by adoptive parents, lawyers and judges, and also confirmed by the Commissioner of Social 
Welfare and the social welfare officers interviewed from the DSW HQ offices in Dodoma and those in districts 
of Dar es Salaam and Arusha. 
1166 Interview with a social welfare officer in charge of the adoption desk in Dar es Salaam 2008-2018, DSW Dar 
es Salaam Offices, on 06.04.2018. 
1167 Regulation 4(7) of the Adoption of Children Regulations, above footnote 568. 
1168 Interview with social welfare officer, Bunju Ward, Kinondoni Dar es Salaam, on 04,01.2019 and 16.01.2019. 




Interviews with other social welfare officers at the local government level showed that they 
were only aware of the work of the International Social Service (ISS) in obtaining information 
about suitability to adopt from the country of origin of a non-Tanzanian applicant. They 
claimed that liaising with ISS is not within their mandate but that of the Commissioner or 
assigned social welfare officer at the national level. The Adoption of Children Regulations do 
not specify the practice of involving the international agency for pre-adoption supervision but 
only for post-adoption monitoring. During field research, reports of the ISS were declared top 
secret and could not be accessed. Such reports are also not submitted during the adoption 
petition and hearing, and hence are not part of court filed records. Evidence that the 
Department of Social Welfare uses ISS as an agency to provide the required information was 
presented by a respondent advocate during field research in Dar es Salaam.1170 However, the 
study cannot confirm that pre-adoption home visits or social investigation in the non-resident 
Tanzanians and resident non-Tanzanians’ countries of residence or origin are conducted in all 
cases. 
The challenges of supervision in pre-adoption care reflect challenges concerning child 
protection in adoption. Lack of a consistent, uniform practice according to the dictates of the 
law may compromise a child’s best interests. 
6.4.4 The Adoption Order and its Effects 
The Law of the Child Act and other laws such as the Law of Marriage Act 1971 specify the 
legal effects of an adoption order. Section 64 of the Law of the Child Act empowers an 
adoption order to transfer all rights and responsibilities for the child of any nature, including 
under customary law, from the child’s natural parents or any other person connected to the 
child to the adoptive parent. The adoptive parent takes on such rights and responsibilities as if 
the child was born naturally to him or her in lawful wedlock and had never been a child of any 
other person. This part considers the legal and social impacts of section 64 on other provisions 
of the law relating to child adoption and on the social realities of natural and adoptive 
families. 
6.4.4.1 Effects of an Adoption Order in ‘Open Adoption’ 
In ‘open adoption’, defined and practised as adoption by relatives according to the Law of the 
Child Act, the legal effects of adoption articulated under section 64 are a challenge in 
 





implementation. Regulation 22 of the Adoption of Children Regulations names two 
exceptions to section 64 of the Act. These exceptions allow for maintaining contact between 
the natural family and the adoptive family and prohibiting changes to a child’s family name 
unless agreed upon between the child, the natural family and the adoptive family. Regulation 
24 further provides for access and communication between the adopted child and his or her 
natural family. One may ask whether this does away with the idea that adoption makes the 
child belong to the adoptive parent as if the child was born to him or her in lawful wedlock 
and has never been a child of any other person. The research would answer no to this 
question. Because legally, the child no longer belongs to the natural family even if he still 
bears the same name and has contact. The adopted child does not hold a birth certificate 
anymore but an adoption certificate. Thus the law recognises that the adoptive parents have all 
rights and responsibilities concerning the child and not the natural parents. In cases of 
adoption by relatives, however, such a complete clean-cut change of familial relations is not 
viable in practice. 
Complications associated with the social effects of the adoption order in an open adoption are 
observable at different levels. Two of these will be considered here. First, the child’s natural 
parents and relatives continue to be his or her relatives after adoption by virtue of being 
relatives of the adoptive parent. Second, the natural and adoptive parents, the whole extended 
family, and in some cases, the child, know for a fact that the child was born to the natural 
parents. A child with sufficient maturity to understand and who knows about the adoption 
pursuant to regulation 24 of the Adoption of Children Regulations will still regard the natural 
parents as his or her ‘real parents’. The natural parents will maintain their social name and 
status as father and mother, and the adoptive parent will continue to be grandmother, 
grandfather, aunt, uncle, sister or brother as before the adoption. Thus, the change in familial 
relations is a legal reality but has no force in everyday social life. To drive this point home, 
the social realities may be considered in the cases cited above where a grandmother adopted 
her daughter’s one-year-old child while residing with them both; a sister adopted two of her 
teenage siblings while their parents were still alive; and an uncle together with his wife 
adopted his niece because the natural mother re-married. In these adoptions, it is improbable 
that the participants would live the legal effects of the adoption order in their social reality. 
While discussing these effects with a family law expert who participated in the drafting 
process of the Law of the Child Act, he had the following to say, 
“We had proposed inclusion of adoption by relatives and open adoption as 




family makes adoption not a necessity. There is no expectation of an uncle 
or aunt to adopt the child of his or her sister or brother to be able to take 
care of the child. We insisted on adoption by relatives because traditional 
care is quickly breaking down. As resources are becoming scarce, the care 
system is challenged—we begin to find who owns what? The relative child 
would remain with nothing. The idea of adoption by relatives was intended 
to protect children cared for by relatives by ensuring that they have equal 
rights and care as biological children.”1171 
“Understanding the law of adoption has not been used by Tanzanians; we 
wanted to bring it down to the people. To allow this, we wanted it to be less 
expensive and most accessible at the magistrate’s court. Thus, open 
adoption was intended to make adoption much more usable to Tanzanians 
considering African views on the family. The adoptive parent gets the legal 
responsibility for the child because there must be somebody liable when 
enforcing the responsibility. In the permanent change in familial relations, 
the test is the best interests of the child.” 1172 
The fact that the Law of the Child Act combines adoption by relatives and open adoption into 
one makes an analysis of the effects of such an adoption much more complicated. 
6.4.4.2 Effects of an Adoption Order on Prohibited Relationships 
Section 14(4) of the Law of Marriage Act specifies a legal effect of an adoption order that the 
Law of the Child Act leaves undetermined. It declares that the adoptive parent and the child 
are within the prohibited degrees of consanguinity, which means that they cannot marry or 
have sexual relations. Section 14 of the Law of Marriage Act lists prohibited relationships 
based on consanguinity and affinity. Sections 158, 160, and 161 of the Penal Code, 1945 
criminalise such relationships by pronouncing them incestuous and forbidden. Section 64 of 
the Law of the Child Act raises some questions in this regard. First, if the adopted child 
belongs to the adoptive parent as if a natural child born within lawful wedlock, do all adoptive 
relatives become as if blood-related to the adopted child by force of law? If yes, by the same 
implication, do natural relatives, related by blood to the child, cease to be blood relatives? The 
Law of Marriage Act and the Law of the Child Act are silent on these questions.  
Section 65(1) of the Law of the Child Act, on the effects of an adoption order, states that upon 
intestacy, an adopted child will inherit from the estate of a deceased adoptive parent as if a 
natural child of the deceased. Section 66(1)(d) declares that in the testamentary disposition of 
the deceased’s property, “any reference to a person related to the adoptive parent shall, unless 
the contrary intention appears, be construed as a reference to the person as if he were the 
relative of the child who is adopted.” It is, therefore, without a doubt that an adoption order 
 





creates relatedness between relatives of the adoptive parent and the adopted child. However, 
the phrase ‘as if’, repeated in sections 64(1) (b) and (2), 65(1), and 66(1) (d) of the Act, hints 
at an artificial relationship created by court order, similar but not the same as that of the 
natural family. Therefore, the adopted child has a biological-like legal relationship with the 
adoptive relatives rather than a real biological relationship. Prohibited relationships between 
the adopted child and adoptive relatives can thus not be founded on consanguinity. Since laws 
on prohibited relationships derive their significance from blood relationships, adoptive 
relationships do not fall squarely in their realm.1173 This means that forbidden relationships 
between adoptive relatives are based on religious or social considerations. One author argues 
that civil and criminal laws on prohibited relationships are meant to preserve family peace by 
eliminating clashes while vying for sexual relations in the home.1174 Thus, by social rather 
than legal standards, adoptive siblings or relatives in other degrees are not allowed to have 
sexual relations or marry. However, a clear position in the law would be in the best interest of 
the adopted child. 
Wadlington argued that enactment could not execute biological separation; hence an adopted 
child remains in the purview of prohibited relationships with his natural family due to 
consanguinity.1175 He contended that prohibited relationships apply even to illegitimate and 
half-blood relatives; thus, it should still apply to the adopted child—a position supported by 
Tanzania’s Law of Marriage Act.1176 The researcher was not able to trace any judicial 
interpretation on this question from Tanzanian courts. However, while considering reports on 
cases with persuasive status, it became apparent that courts have not always thought like the 
author above. In a 1986 case, the court in Indiana, USA, stated that adoption completely 
severed biological relations and acquitted a biological father who had had incestuous relations 
with his daughter, who had been adopted at age four. Nevertheless, soon after, in 1989, the 
Indiana Supreme Court, in another case, overturned the previous court’s stand by ruling that 
adoption law, which establishes legal parenthood, cannot abolish the link of consanguinity.1177 
Although Tanzania’s law is not as clear, in practice, it seems that an adoption order 
 
1173 The Adoption and Children Act (2002) of UK expressly states under section 74 that the status conveyed by 
an adoption order as provided in section 67 of the Act shall not apply to prohibited degrees of kindred and 
affinity under the Law of Marriage of 1949 and Civil Partnership Act of 2004. 
1174 Walter J. Wadlington, “The Adopted Child and Intra-Family Marriage Prohibitions”, Virginia Law Review 
49(3) (1963): p. 478 at p. 483. 
1175 Ibid., at p. 484. 
1176 The Law of Marriage Act, 1971, under section 14(5), extends the prohibitions to half-blood and illegitimate 
children. 
1177 In State v. Bohall, 546 N.E. 2d 1214, 1215 (Ind. 1989) cited by Naomi Cahn, “Law, Adoption, and Family 




supplanting natural with legal familial relations lacks the power to obliterate blood relations. 
Hence, an adopted child is within the prohibited relationships with his or her natural family, 
whether he or she knows them or not.1178 
6.4.4.3 Effects of an Adoption Order when a Natural Parent Adopts 
In adoptions motived by the desire to strengthen filial ties lies another question that the law 
does not clarify. In these adoptions, a natural parent, alone or with a spouse, adopts his or her 
natural child with the intention of legitimating their relationship or incorporating the child into 
a new family. The effects of an adoption order granted to such a parent do not differ from 
those named in section 64 of the Act. In this instance, however, the order erases the natural 
familial relationship and replaces it with a legal adoptive relationship with the same natural 
parent. In a way, it creates an absurdity. The law declares a natural child to be ‘as if a natural 
child’. Although declaring an illegitimate child to be ‘as if a natural child born in lawful 
wedlock’ may secure for the child some legal benefits such as property rights, it does not 
reflect the social reality. What has changed in the eyes of the law has not changed in the eyes 
of society. This is because a person’s natural child, whether legitimate or not, remains as such 
in social relations despite an adoption order. The law should have a more subjective provision 
for this type of adoption in the child’s best interests. Two points are discussed below which 
further support this argument. 
 Section 70 of the Law of the Child Act requires registration of an adoption order for it to be 
complete and effective. In practice, although not specified in the law, upon registration, the 
adoptive parent must surrender the adopted child’s birth certificate to the Registrar-General 
and in place receive an adoption certificate. This is the practice even where a natural parent 
has adopted his or her own natural child. Adoptive parents, social welfare officers and officers 
at the registration agency (RITA) have expressed significant concerns regarding this practice. 
Their most common concerns were connected with the confidential nature of adoption and 
what happens in educational facilities. For school registration, a birth certificate is one of the 
required documents. For adopted children, because they have no birth certificates, adoption 
certificates are submitted. This practice discloses the adoptive status to the school 
administration, and to teachers who have access to the child’s file. The information finally 
reaches fellow students if the matter is not handled with the required confidentiality. Fellow 
students may start pestering the adopted child with questions, jests and discriminatory 
 
1178 Interviews with respondents on this issue showed they were averse to the notion of an adopted Tanzanian 




behaviour. A social welfare officer who has worked at the adoption desk in Dar es Salaam for 
a long time reported this situation to be worse for Tanzanian children adopted by Europeans 
because of the racial differences.1179 The children end up being laughed at for believing that 
they have ‘white’ or ‘mzungu’ parents.  
Section 61 of the Law of the Child Act specifies that adoptive parents should tell their 
adopted children that they are adopted only if it is in the child’s best interest and the child has 
attained fourteen years of age. So, in some cases, the children may not have been aware of 
their adoptive status. When they hear it from their fellow students and in an unkind manner, 
this is likely to occasion psycho-social problems for them. Although section 61 (2) and (3) 
prohibits and makes it an offence for any person other than an adoptive parent to disclose the 
adoption to an adopted child, no record of any such offence was found during field research. 
An interview with a high-ranking officer at RITA raised an interesting question.1180 She said 
that if the child becomes ‘as if a natural child’ of the adoptive parent, should he or she not be 
entitled to a birth certificate to avoid the problems presented by having only an adoption 
certificate? She declared that her office would propose legal reforms in this area. On another 
note, section 61 is contrary to all the provisions on obtaining a child’s consent to an adoption 
and the child’s right to participation in decision-making. Thus, it already stands on shaky 
ground.  
6.4.4.4 Effects of an Adoption Order and Legal Pluralism 
The effects of the adoption order in conjunction with section 68 of the Law of the Child Act 
may also cause complications in practice. The effects of an adoption order under section 64 
are based on the Western law of adoption inherited from the British. However, section 68 of 
the Act applies customary law to an adopted child, provided the adoptive parents are subject 
to customary law. Thus, the application of the effects of an adoption order in this situation 
requires particular understanding. Adoption is understood differently under statutory law and 
under local customary law. It has been indicated above that the effects of formal adoption 
may not be plausible in the social reality of Tanzanians, whether resident or non-resident, due 
to the influence of their traditions and customs. 
For instance, there is the case where a non-resident Tanzanian paternal uncle, together with 
his non-resident non-Tanzanian spouse, adopted two teenage girls who were under their care 
 
1179 Interview with social welfare officer in charge of the adoption desk in Dar es Salaam 2008-2018, on 
06.04.2018. 




subject to a clan decision passed after the death of the girls’ parents.1181 The first care 
arrangement the orphaned girls were subject to was traditional according to their local 
customary law; placement under the care of relatives. It means that the uncle was subject to 
customary law upon accepting its application. Later, the uncle together with his spouse 
decided to formalise the adoption to comply with foreign immigration laws when travelling to 
their usual place of abode, Ireland. Taking section 68 into account, the girls continue to be 
subject to customary law after the adoption, because their adoptive parent is subject to it. 
Hence, the cessation of rights and responsibilities under customary law as provided for in 
section 64 of the Act is reversed by section 68. With regard to property rights on succession, 
sections 65 and 66 of the Act would still apply, as well as the local customary law. Here a 
conflict of laws may arise. For instance, section 65(2), which declares that an adopted child 
shall not be entitled to inherit from the estate of the biological parent upon intestacy, may not 
hold for the two girls if the customary rules of inheritance are applied. The court, in this case, 
did not address the issue of multiple applicable laws.  
Respondent family law experts, judges, magistrates, and social welfare officers could not 
explain the rationale of section 68 during field research.1182 There is a need to find clarity for 
the law to safeguard the child’s best interests in adoption. In the case above, if the family 
moved to Ireland, Irish family laws would also play a role in determining various adoption or 
family life issues. This would add to and possibly further complicate the interaction of 
different legal orders governing the same family relations.  
A social welfare officer shared an actual case scenario that raises pertinent questions on the 
contextualisation of section 68.1183 She told a story of an adoptive couple, a Tanzanian man 
married to a non-Tanzanian woman. They had adopted two children because they could not 
beget children naturally. Unfortunately, the husband died intestate a few years after the 
adoption. After the funeral, the husband’s relatives instructed the wife to return the adopted 
children to the social welfare office since they were not of their bloodline. They said, 
according to their customary laws, the two children could not inherit from the deceased’s 
estate because he was not their father. Section 65(1) of the Act could not protect these 
children since section 68 subjected them to customary law which bound their adoptive father. 
 
1181 High Court of the United Republic of Tanzania, In the District Registry of Arusha, At Arusha, “In the Matter 
of the Law of the Child Act, 2009 and In the Matter of MERM and CERM of Olasiti, Arusha and In the Matter 
of the Application for an Adoption Order by JRMS and DDD”. 
1182 A professor of law and family law expert at Kinondoni, Dar es Salaam, in an interview conducted on 
15.02.2019, affirmed that it is challenging to ascertain the intention of the drafters of the Law of the Child Act 
for section 68. 




Here, there was a clash between statutory and customary laws that was against the best 
interests of the adopted children. 
In adoptions by Muslim parents there are further complications. One author showed that 
Muslims bound by Islamic laws live by those laws wherever they are, irrespective of the host 
state’s laws.1184 The Law of the Child Act permits Muslims to adopt in Tanzania Mainland 
contrary to Islamic laws, which do not recognise formal child adoption. Islamic law governs 
the affairs of Muslims who live according to the tenets of their faith. When Muslim adopters 
declare religious beliefs as their motive for adoption, this implies that they are religious. 1185 
Thus, the very law that does not recognise child adoption may be used to govern rights and 
responsibilities between the adopted child and the adoptive family post-adoption. The 
question arises of what the effects of child adoption under section 64 will signify in the 
adoptive family’s social life. For instance, will the extended family regard the child ‘as if 
naturally born to the adopters in lawful wedlock’? Analogously, if the adoptive family 
continues to be subject to customary law under section 68, a Muslim family will continue to 
be subject to Islamic law after the adoption. Therefore, issues that may be governed by 
Islamic law in Tanzania, such as marriage, guardianship, and inheritance, will fall within the 
ambit of that law.1186 Similar to the case of customary law above, the inheritance rights of an 
adopted child who is subject to Islamic law will be complicated in the intestate devolution of 
property. This is because Islamic law does not recognise formal child adoption; hence the 
adopted child may not be considered eligible to inherit under the estate of the adoptive parents 
subject to Islamic law. 
The constellation of different legal orders that govern relations pre- and post-adoption may 
result in conflicts affecting the adopted child’s best interests. To ensure that an adopted child 
has adequate protection post-adoption, the Law of the Child Act and Regulations should limit 
other laws that govern rights, responsibilities, and relations in adoption. It is true that since the 
adopted child becomes ‘as if naturally born’ to the adopters, such regulation may be perceived 
as invading family privacy. However, strict regulation is warranted in view of the different 
perceptions of child adoption in different legal orders. 
 
1184 Judith Stacey, “Uncoupling Marriage and Parenting”, in L. C. McClain, D. Cere (eds.), What is parenthood?: 
Contemporary debates about the family (New York: New York University Press, 2013), at p. 78. When 
discussing the practice of Muslim polygamous marriage, the author explains that Muslims living in states such as 
Canada where such marriages are illegal still practice them following their religious laws. 
1185 High Court of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam District Registry, At Dar es Salaam, “In the Matter of the Law of the 
Child Act, No. 21 of 2009 and In the Matter of Application for Adoption of AM, infant and In the Matter of an 
Application for an Adoption Order by MOM and AM of Kinondoni, Dar es Salaam”. 




In a nutshell, non-Tanzanian adopters, by virtue of growing up in a legal culture or society 
that has practised and understood child adoption with effects akin to section 64 of the Act, do 
not encounter problems similar to those experienced by their Tanzanian counterparts. 
However, the dekinning of a child in adoption is not a matter easily perceptible or acceptable 
to any parent, Tanzanian or otherwise. The case of I.S. v. Germany, providing a detailed 
argument on whether a birth parent loses kinship with an adopted child once the adoption is 
final, shows that dekinning is also challenging to Europeans.1187 Kinning of children after the 
adoption is equally challenging. A respondent social welfare officer gave an example of a 
married resident Tanzanian woman who adopted a child because she could not have children 
biologically.1188 Shortly after the adoption was complete, she became pregnant and safely 
delivered her own natural child. Thereafter, the woman sought to return the adopted child to 
the social welfare office. This signals a complete misunderstanding of the effects of an 
adoption order. The Law of the Child Act has no provisions for returning adopted children, 
although it does specify that an adoption order can be appealed.1189 Because an adopted child 
becomes ‘as if naturally born’ to the adopter, returning him or her would be regarded as child 
abandonment or relinquishment. To better protect a Tanzanian child’s interests in adoption, 
the law should take more account of adopters’ social realities. Even more important, the 
ministry responsible should organise legal and social public awareness campaigns on child 
adoption and its effects.  
6.4.5 Child Adoption Record Keeping and Management 
The Law of the Child Act and the Regulations made under it insist on record-keeping for 
applications and actions concerning the adoptive child. On the side of the social welfare 
office, these include, but are not limited to, registers of most vulnerable children, people 
unsuitable to work with children, and foster carers; records of child protection referrals; and 
records of applications, investigation reports, administrative decisions and court orders 
affecting children. Regulation 13 of the Child Protection Regulations, 2014 lists opening a file 
as the initial procedure upon receiving a child protection referral. Regulation 13(3) specifies 
that the file should be in hard copy and opened in the child’s name. In addition, regulation 
13(4) provides for a filing system in electronic form using an established case management 
system. Giving this regulation due emphasis means that every child who has been referred to 
the social welfare office for whatever reason should be in their files. The status of the file, 
 
1187 European Court of Human Rights, “I.S. v. Germany” (13.10.2014). 
1188 Interview with social welfare officer 2-Kinondoni Municipal, on 23.01.2019. 




whether open or closed, depends on the status of the child. All children in care should 
therefore have files in the social welfare offices of their respective areas. 
During field research, it became apparent that most adopted children were obtained from 
children’s homes except for cases involving relatives’ children. This means that their data 
from the time of referral to placement into care should be available at the social welfare 
offices of their respective areas. However, this was not the case. It was a challenge to obtain 
any of the records required by law in the social welfare offices both at local and national 
levels. During a visit to the social welfare office at Kinondoni District, Dar es Salaam, the 
researcher observed that there was one big file where an assortment of matters concerning 
children were filed. The matters ranged from applications for maintenance and custody to 
applications for foster care and adoption. There was no data management system to speak of, 
either in physical or electronic form. When asked about a database, the Commissioner 
answered that it is something his management is working on. He said that because of 
decentralisation by devolution, data is received directly by the district or municipal councils, 
where directors have to analyse it and send it to the national level. However, due to a heavy 
workload and the fact that data is recorded manually, the directors rarely send the required 
information to the Commissioner’s office. He agreed that this is why, for instance, there is no 
centralised register of foster carers as required by regulation 7 of the Foster Care Placement 
Regulations. 
Social welfare officers and other respondents who work with the Department, such as 
advocates and adoptive parents, agreed that data management is a big challenge. A respondent 
non-Tanzanian adoptive parent and founder of a children’s home in Tanzania, while replying 
to a question concerning data management at social welfare offices, said,  
“Nothing is computerized – the offices deal with bits of paper and files and 
it is an unorganized mess to be honest.  I don’t think in 12 years, I ever 
managed to re-find a piece of paper/report in Social Welfare ever! They get 
lost within the filing and this is a child protection issue in itself.”1190 
An acting director and youth care worker at SOS Village in Dar es Salaam, while sharing their 
working experience with the social welfare authorities at national and local levels, also said,  
“Record keeping is not a strong suit with the Department. Formalities are 
not well followed, for instance, in documenting the children they bring to 
us. There are usually incomplete documents.”1191 
 
1190 Interview with a non-Tanzanian adoptive parent and founder of a children's home in Tanzania, currently 
living in the UK, response submitted by email on 16.02.2019. 





The researcher had an opportunity to interview a child protection specialist working with 
UNICEF Tanzania in alternative child care and capacity building for social welfare 
officers.1192 He revealed that the organisation had been working together with the Social 
Welfare Department to develop an electronic system that would facilitate the creation of a 
database. At the time, an online system for registration and monitoring institutions was 
already in the preparatory stage. He reported that UNICEF Tanzania had assisted the 
Department in establishing a District Case Management System that was already functional in 
about fifty (50) or more district councils. The system analyses information from case 
management forms that social welfare officers must fill in and then feed into the system. The 
specialist spoke about the challenges associated with this requirement. Social welfare officers 
are used to recording information in ‘counter books’, and find it difficult to fill in about 
twelve forms for each case and enter the information in the electronic system. Although it is 
already progress to have and use case management forms, while many officers could not even 
draft a care plan, to succeed, there must be a proper case management process, he said. A 
proper process would need consistency, which is yet to be achieved. In line with the theory of 
street-level bureaucracy, pressures resulting from heavy workloads coupled with shortage of 
time, human resources, training and facilitative infrastructure hinder effective use of the 
system.  
The study did not encounter the problem of record-keeping and management only at social 
welfare offices. Although courts and RITA had data management systems of some sort in 
place, they were not in satisfactory order. Data was stored mainly in hard copy, which meant 
it was not always possible to access court records from earlier years because, due to the 
bulkiness of documents, the court is forced to put them in external storage where they often 
get misplaced. During field research at the High Court of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam Registry, 
the researcher observed efforts to digitalise record-keeping through uploading judgements on 
an electronic data storage system. However, at the stage reached, the system could not be of 
any assistance to this study. At RITA offices, the adopted children register is only available in 
hard copy, which is not the best method of data management. There were better data 
management conditions in the children’s residential homes and institutions that were visited. 
However, the conditions varied depending on available infrastructure, human resources, and 
technological know-how. For instance, data management in organisations or homes such as 
 




SOS Village and Save the Children Tanzania is not comparable with homes such as Kurasini 
and Umra, where information is mainly stored in hard copy files. 
The lack of a uniform and functioning data recording and management system in social 
welfare offices at the national and local levels compromises the effectiveness and efficiency 
of the services. For instance, the Commissioner and several respondent social welfare officers 
spoke of adoption applicants who had been given children to foster pending adoption but had 
not returned to complete the procedure for years. The Department desires to urge the 
applicants to finish the process but cannot do so as it lacks reliable information concerning 
their whereabouts. This also means that consistent monitoring and evaluation of placement is 
a challenge due to the lack of a database. This shortcoming compromises compliance with the 
best interests of the child principle. 
6.4.6 Corrupt Practice in Child Adoption  
Section 72 of the Law of the Child Act prohibits any form of personal financial gain in respect 
of child adoption. Any payment or reward must be authorised by the court. Sub-section 3 of 
the section makes giving or receiving any unauthorised payments or rewards in the adoption 
process an offence punishable by fine or imprisonment not exceeding two million shillings or 
two years, or both. Such a prohibition is a condition to be observed before giving an adoption 
order stipulated under section 59(1) (d) of the Act. Despite these explicit provisions, the 
researcher found that there have been instances of corrupt or fraudulent behaviour in child 
adoption practice. Below is a brief account of respondents’ experience with this issue.  
During field research, a high-ranking officer of the Department of Social Welfare, who had 
been in office for about 15 months, spoke of his struggle to eliminate corrupt practice in the 
Department. Specific to child adoption, he said he had received reports that Arusha was a hub 
for “bought adoptions”.1193 A regional social welfare officer in Arusha confirmed the 
allegations, saying that he was transferred to the office in 2018 to combat the practice.1194 The 
social welfare officer working the adoption desk at the municipality,1195 a non-Tanzanian 
adopter and founder of a children’s home1196 and an advocate specialising in adoption 
practice1197 also confirmed the existence of corruption in Arusha and shared their experiences 
 
1193 Interview with a high-ranking officer of the DSW, in Dar es Salaam, on 20.02.2019. 
1194 Interview with social welfare officer 1-Arusha, Regional Social Welfare Offices, Arusha, on 19.03.2019. 
1195 Interview with social welfare officer 2-Arusha Municipal, on 19.03.2019. 
1196 Interview with non-Tanzanian adoptive parent and founder of a children's home in Tanzania, currently living 
in the UK, response submitted online on 16.02.2019. 
1197 Interview with an advocate specialised in child adoption practice and resident non-Tanzanian adoptive 
parent, Dar es Salaam, on 15.01.2019 The advocate cited names of social welfare officers who demanded illegal 




of it. These sources reported different perpetrators of corrupt acts in child adoption, including 
social welfare officers, advocates, and judges. The average amount extorted is around $5,000, 
they said. The Commissioner, who was mortified, said corrupt social welfare officers tell 
clients that about $3,000 of the amount must be paid to his office. 
“Usually, the advocate and the judge collude in the corruption and later pull the social welfare 
officer into the game as guardian ad litem”, said a respondent social welfare officer.1198 She 
describes the collusion as follows: A prospective adopter, desirous of adopting a specific child 
they have met but ignorant of the child adoption legal process, approaches an advocate for 
legal counsel. The advocate misdirects the client by drawing up documents for the adoption 
petition and submitting it to the court instead of applying for adoption at the social welfare 
office in the area. Of course, the client is billed an enormous sum of money for the service. 
Once the petition has been assigned to a judge or magistrate, the advocate brings them up to 
speed about the whole issue. When the judge or magistrate is on board, the first step of the 
hearing process is to appoint a guardian ad litem. This is a social welfare officer who is 
required to tender a social investigation report to vet the adoption ‘in the best interest of the 
child’. It does not matter whether the investigation is actually carried out or not. A good 
amount is paid for the report. An adoption order is then issued without following the due 
process of law. This corrupt practice presents an opportunity to adopt a child without all the 
challenging legal requirements. It is, however, akin to sale of the child. 
A respondent social welfare officer shared a personal story where he was wrongfully 
implicated in a corruption saga. He reports,  
“… you know, in the Monduli District there are no children’s homes, this is 
because of the Maasai traditional child care arrangements or their way of 
life. As a social welfare officer in the District, I once had to find a home for 
two boys of mentally challenged parents. I found it in the Cradle of Love, a 
home in Arusha Town. A couple from Trinidad and Tobago adopted the 
children from the home without following the requisite legal procedures. I 
got blamed for it. But you should know, a social welfare officer from Meru 
did the social investigation in Monduli without my knowledge and played in 
the deal to give away the children. I am telling you this because you may 
find the case in court records.”1199 
The respondent at the municipal social welfare office in Arusha Town lamented that many 
judges and magistrates do not yet understand the law of adoption. This makes them open to 
manipulation by advocates who persuade them to participate in corrupt practices. She spoke 
 
1198 Interview with social welfare officer 2-Arusha Municipal, on 19.03.2019. 
1199 Interview with social welfare officer 1-Arusha, Regional Social Welfare Offices, on 19.03.2019. The author 




of the tension between advocates and social welfare officers where an advocate has already 
instituted an adoption petition in court and has received payment for it, so that he or she wants 
it to succeed by all means. Because the court is not involved in the initial adoption application 
process, judges or magistrates usually do not concern themselves with that process. They look 
at the petition at hand. As a result, a social welfare officer appointed as guardian ad litem is 
put in a difficult situation. The researcher noted a problem in these proceedings: lack of 
involvement of the Commissioner for Social Welfare as required by law. The court proceeds 
without submission of the Commissioner’s approval of the adoption and can obtain a guardian 
ad litem without this person being appointed by the Commissioner. The officer explained in 
respect of the first issue that the court proceeds without the Commissioner’s approval being 
attached to the petition due to insufficient knowledge of the adoption procedure or at the 
instance of a corrupt advocate. With regard to the second issue, she said that social welfare 
officers who go to court for adoption cases are already established in their offices and are 
known by the court; hence they may receive a court summons to act as guardian ad litem.1200 
Corrupt practices in child adoption and the giving or receiving of illicit payments for personal 
gain are not restricted to Arusha. The Commissioner shared his knowledge of widespread 
corrupt and fraudulent malpractice in social welfare offices at local levels. He said that a 
current campaign propagated by the Regional Commissioner for Dar es Salaam had unveiled 
the ‘rottenness of the system’.1201 Also, during field research, corrupt allegations facing a 
seasoned social welfare officer at the national adoption desk were explained to the researcher 
by the officer herself and a colleague.1202 The alleged corrupt practice was not limited to 
receiving money for personal gain but included unnecessary delays in the adoption process, 
loss of documents, breach of privacy and poor customer care in general.1203 At the time of the 
interview, the Department was investigating these allegations to find a proper recourse.  
 
1200 Regulation 4(5) of the Adoption of Children Regulations requires the Commissioner to appoint a guardian ad 
litem and inform the court of the appointment. However, the researcher found that in practice there are social 
welfare officers at the national or local levels who are generally asked to appear as guardian ad litem in adoption 
cases. As a result, the court usually sends an order for their appointment to the social welfare office concerned, 
and the Commissioner does not have to make such an appointment in every child adoption case. 
1201 Muhidin Issa Michuzi, “Mamia ya Wanawake Waliotelekezwa na Waume Zao Wafurika kwa Makonda”, 
https://issamichuzi.blogspot.com/2018/04/mamia-ya-wanawake-waliotelekezwa-na.html. Also observable in a 
video showing multitudes of women claiming to have been abandoned by their male partners who failed to 
receive assistance from the social welfare authorities; Mamia ya Wanawake Waliotelekezewa Watoto Wafurika 
kwa Makonda (Youtube, 09.04.2018). 
1202 Interview with two social welfare officers who worked at the adoption desk, MoHCDGEC offices in 
Dodoma and Dar es Salaam, on 21.03.2018 and 06.04.2018, respectively. 






The theory of street-level bureaucracy could provide explanations for some of these 
malpractices. Extorting payments from clients could be due to the financial and infrastructural 
constraints experienced by social welfare officers in their daily work. These include low 
income, lack of office equipment such as photocopiers or printers, lack of vehicles for travel, 
and insufficient financial allowances to facilitate their work, for example for communication 
with clients. Delays, loss of documents and lack of privacy may be due to having a massive 
workload with time pressures, lack of proper data management systems in the office, and lack 
of office space for private consultations. The theory only explains the practice but does not 
condone it. A respondent with experience in the Mwanza region, responding to a question 
relating to corruption complaints, said, 
“In Mwanza, I have never known any. In 101 adoptions, we have never 
been asked for money. We have been asked to buy phone credit or 
photocopy adoption forms etc., as the office had no money to do so – but 
this was helping out their poor systems, and no money was being used for 
personal gain. In other places, definitely Arusha, lawyers and Social 
Workers have received thousands of dollars to complete adoptions.”1204 
Section 72(3) of the Law of the Child Act imposes punishment on any person who gives or 
receives any payment or reward not approved by the court to procure an adoption order. 
While investigating the repercussions of social welfare officers and officers of the court 
engaging in corrupt practices in the adoption process, the researcher did not find any evidence 
of convictions under this subsection. However, the Department of Social Welfare has reacted 
by either dismissing, suspending, or changing the work posts or responsibilities of officers 
who have been shown to be corrupt. A follow-up on officers named as being corrupt by 
respondents during field research showed that one or more of the above-mentioned actions 
were implemented in their cases. 
6.5 Post-Adoption Protective Measures 
To ensure the protection of adopted children beyond the adoption, the Adoption of Children 
Regulations, 2012, under regulation 16, require post-adoption monitoring. The Regulations 
require monitoring to be done by way of home visits after the first three months following the 
adoption order. For children adopted by parents residing in Tanzania, the monitoring duty 
falls upon social welfare officers. In the case of adopted children whose parents reside abroad, 
the Commissioner of Social Welfare, in consultation with the International Social Service, is 
 
1204 Interview with a non-Tanzanian adoptive parent and founder of a children's home in Tanzania, currently 




the designated authority to make the follow-up. If monitoring unveils any protection issues, 
the law requires that they are dealt with according to the Law of the Child Act.  
6.5.1 Post-Adoption Monitoring Practice 
Post-adoption monitoring is not standard in Tanzanian child adoption practice. None of the 
social welfare officers and adoptive parents interviewed had ever done or experienced any 
post-adoption monitoring. A resident non-Tanzanian adoptive parent who also practises child 
adoption law in Tanzania reported that she had not witnessed any monitoring since she 
adopted her child in Tanzania 13 years ago.1205 She added that she has been legal counsel for 
numerous adoption petitions but has never heard about post-adoption monitoring in respect of 
any of her clients. Commenting further on post-adoption monitoring, she asked whether every 
parent in Tanzania is monitored on how they raise their natural children. Her argument was, 
once a child is adopted, he or she belongs to the adoptive parents as if naturally born to them 
in a lawful marriage; so if she is not monitored in respect of her natural children, she does not 
see why she should be monitored for her adopted ones. Some of the social welfare officers 
interviewed shared the same viewpoint.1206 However, when asked about post-adoption 
monitoring, others said that an adopted child is one less in their extensive workload of 
children whose fate is still undetermined. They argue that once the court has ruled that 
adoption is in the child’s best interest and granted an adoption order, it can be assumed that 
the child is safe in a stable family, and resources can be concentrated on others who are still in 
need of care. This argument reflects what street-level bureaucracy theory says about the effect 
work pressures have on social workers – rationing services as a coping mechanism.1207  
The rationale for post-adoption monitoring or services is that the adoptive family must 
understand and respond to the adopted child’s history, specific needs and behaviour, which 
may be due to earlier bad experiences or the child’s current adoptive status. The child may be 
struggling with feelings of loss, confusion over origins and the need to form a dual 
identity.1208 An adoptive parent may require professional assistance if the adopted child is 
 
1205 Interview with an advocate specialised in child adoption practice and resident non-Tanzanian adoptive 
parent, Dar es Salaam, on 15.01.2019. 
1206 Interview with social welfare officer, Ilala Dar es Salaam, on 07.02.2019. 
1207 Smith, Donovan, “Child Welfare Practice in Organizational and Institutional Context”, above footnote 117, 
at pp. 543-544. As a coping mechanism in the face of resource limitations, time pressures and conflicting goals 
at the work place, social workers may end up rationing services that they are responsible for providing to their 
clients. 
1208 Kay Challand, “Calling for Post-Adoption Monitoring and Support: A Personal Statement”, Adoption & 
Fostering 24(4) (2000): pp. 29–31. The author provides a personal account of the struggles she went through as 
an adoptive child in two different adoptive families and makes a plea for strengthening post-adoption 
monitoring. Michael Tarren-Sweeney, Mental health screening and monitoring for children in care: A short 




experiencing any of these challenges. Also, there are child protection issues involved in 
adoption that warrant post-adoption monitoring. These include the possibility of child abuse, 
abduction, sale and trafficking. This is the reason behind the insistence on safeguards and 
post-adoption services under the 1993 Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption.1209  
6.5.2 Tanzania’s Position on the 1993 Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption 
Tanzania is not a party to the 1993 Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption. Therefore, 
the safeguards, including central and competent institutions formulated under the Convention 
that could conduct post-adoption monitoring, are not available to an adopted Tanzanian child 
living abroad. Protection of children adopted by non-resident Tanzanians, and by resident 
non-Tanzanians with the possibility of residence outside Tanzania, is in the hands of the 
Commissioner with the help of ISS. However, the researcher could not find any evidence that 
this type of monitoring is performed. 
In its report to the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child 
(ACERWC) in 2015, Tanzania indicated that it was consulting with stakeholders to form a 
consensus regarding ratifying the Convention.1210 In paragraph 102 of the report, Tanzania 
indicates that it practises international adoption where non-citizen adopters must be residents 
in the country during the adoption. The study followed up both statements during field 
research. A high-ranking officer of the Department of Social Welfare indicated that there was 
not sufficient progress at the consultation stage to merit ratifying the Convention. He said, 
“We have no good systems to do an assessment before an international 
adoption and also monitoring after the adoption. While speaking about 
international adoption in the Parliament, the Members of Parliament asked 
me, are you aware of how many of our children live abroad? Do you know 
what traditions Madonna is teaching them?” 1211 
In response to the second statement above, the Department of Social Welfare maintained that 
Tanzania only practises domestic adoption. Social welfare officers exhibited meagre 
knowledge of what international adoption means. Among the 20 interviewed officers, only 
four were aware of the 1993 Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption. Of these four 
officers, two were holders of a bachelor’s degree in sociology and social work who had 
 
author discusses the mental health and psycho-social effects that a child in care, including adopted children, may 
experience because of his or her status. This can be addressed only where post-adoption monitoring is conducted 
and support is offered. 
1209 Under Articles 1 and 9(c) of the Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of 
Intercountry Adoption (Concluded 29 May 1993), reflecting the spirit of Artcle 21 (c) of the; United Nations, 
Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
1210 See Paras 104 and 233 of the United Republic of Tanzania, Consolidated 2nd, 3rd and 4th Reports on the 
Implementation of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child by the Government of the United 
Republic of Tanzania, above footnote 395, at pp. 30 and 64. 




worked at the adoption desk at the national level for an extended period; one had a master’s 
degree in development studies and was working on general social welfare issues at the district 
level; and one had a bachelor’s degree in sociology and was working at the ward level. One of 
the social welfare officers who demonstrated an understanding of what the Convention entails 
said, 
“The Convention makes the adoption process easier and provides an avenue 
for children to get a better life abroad. However, it is not fully equipped to 
guard against the trafficking and selling of children. Our legal framework is 
still not well structured to carry the safeguards established under the 
Convention. Selling and trafficking in children would be easier.”1212 
The officer was further questioned on whether a Tanzanian child in adoptions with an 
international element would not be better protected under the framework of the Convention 
than without it. He was asked to take into account that even if these adoptions are considered 
domestic in Tanzania, they have an international aspect, and that, by not being a party to the 
Convention, Tanzania may be compromising the level of protection they could be guaranteed. 
He responded, 
“There are some effects of Tanzania not being a party to the Convention, 
but instead of experiencing the dangers of being a party now, it is better to 
improve our adoption laws, perceptions and institutions first so that we can 
profit from it.” 1213 
In the light of these responses, the researcher cannot conclusively say whether, or when, 
Tanzania will ratify the 1993 Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption. During field 
research in 2018 and 2019, there were no indications that the consultations were still ongoing, 
or whether the undertaking has been abandoned. 
In conclusion, Tanzania’s law and practice on post-adoption monitoring are not 
comprehensive enough to guarantee the protection of the adopted child in accordance with the 
best interest of the child principle. A regional social welfare officer in Arusha shared a story 
regarding a non-Tanzanian adopter whose intentions regarding the adoption were doubted by 
the assigned social welfare officer.1214 In the social investigation report, the officer expressed 
his doubts. In court, the officer agreed with the decision to grant the adoption but wanted to 
ensure that there would be post-adoption monitoring while the child was abroad. Because he 
was bothered by the case, the assigned social welfare officer established contact with the 
social welfare office in the host country and received quarterly reports on the adopted child’s 
 
1212 Interview with social welfare officer at the adoption desk, MoHCDGEC headquarter offices in Dodoma, on 
22.03.2018. 
1213 Ibid. 




development. This story shows that post-adoption monitoring is possible and can be done 
across borders with the cooperation of the social welfare offices in the receiving country. 
Such cooperation could be secured by way of bi- or multilateral agreements between Tanzania 
and common receiving countries. The law and the administration of the Department of Social 
Welfare need to effect reforms to ensure better protection of adopted children to safeguard 
their best interests. 
6.6 The Role of Child Adoption in Helping to Alleviate the Problem of Children Without 
Parental Care in Tanzania 
This part considers the role of child adoption as a whole, not only by resident non-Tanzanians 
and non-resident Tanzanians. It pays particular attention to the position of Tanzanians 
generally in child adoption practice. The statistics and trends of child adoption in Tanzania 
from 1944 to 2018 show that it is still practised at a very low level. The NBS estimated the 
country’s population at 55.9 million in 2019.1215 The researcher found that up to March 2019, 
there were 1,377 registered adoptions. These include 869 adoptions in the period 1944-2006 
as reported in the previous study by Rwezaura and Wanitzek, and 508 adoptions in the period 
2007-2018 as reported in this study. Considering the size of the country’s population and the 
number of years over which adoption law has been implemented in Tanzania, the adoption 
rate is negligible. These numbers are inexplicable, especially when considering the high 
numbers of children in need of care and protection in Tanzania, as discussed in part 3.3.  
Several respondents attempted to explain why child adoption practice is minimal in Tanzania. 
The leading reason was the cultural legitimacy of formal child adoption in Tanzanian society. 
A social welfare officer said, 
“The biggest drawback is culture. It is not in our culture as Tanzanians and 
Africans to take children that are not related to us and make them ours. It is 
in the Europeans’ culture to assist unrelated children; hence they understand 
alternative care or adoption better than Africans.”1216 
Rwezaura and Wanitzek, in the 1980s, also gave “cultural background” as an explanation for 
people of African descent showing low engagement in formal child adoption.1217 They found 
that there was a preference for traditional alternative care arrangements such as kinship foster 
care and adoption practices.1218 However, they also found a gradual increase in adoptions by 
 
1215 United Republic of Tanzania, National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), “Tanzania in Figures 2019”, above 
footnote 530, at p. 18. 
1216 Interview with social welfare officer, Bunju Ward, Kinondoni District, Dar es salaam, on 16.01.2019. 
1217 Rwezaura, Wanitzek, “The Law and Practice Relating to the Adoption of Children in Tanzania”, above 
footnote 22, at p. 125. 




Tanzanians of African descent. A significant number of these were, of course, among 
professional groups and non-residents. This study, like the previous one, confirms that non-
resident Tanzanian adopters use the formal law of adoption, partly because they understand 
adoption better due to their exposure to European culture, and partly because they are forced 
to adopt by foreign immigration laws. In the research for this study, a developing trend of 
increased adoptions by resident Tanzanians has been observed. However, such adoptions are 
still low compared to the numbers of children in need. 
Rwezaura and Wanitzek predicted that features of a modern state, such as bureaucratic 
requirements and social restraints compelling a precise definition of social relations between a 
person and his or her dependents, might influence the use of formal adoption. The motives for 
adoption discussed above do indeed show that Tanzanians adopt because the legal 
requirements of a modern state, whether Tanzania or a foreign state, force them to define their 
relationships with their dependents. This obligation arises in issues of emigration, inheritance 
and succession, national registration, services such as health insurance, and the like that 
require definitive parentage.  
The mandatory requirements of a modern state apply, and the Law of the Child Act contains 
comprehensive provisions for child adoption which creates clear parent-child relations; so 
why do Tanzanians still not use the formal adoption law? The study confirms that traditional 
care arrangements in Tanzania have undergone substantial weakening, leaving many children 
in need of care and protection; so why do Tanzanians still not use formal child adoption to 
cater for these children? The respondents provided several reasons based on the socio-legal 
and economic situation in Tanzania. Two major reasons stand out: lack of legal awareness, 
and financial inability to care for additional children. These issues have been extensively 
discussed in part 3.3. However, while explaining the reasons, two respondents gave 
distinctive opinions. One social welfare officer said, 
“Many Tanzanians are not aware of child adoption. Those who are aware do 
not know what it really means. They want child adoption mostly to access 
services such as health insurance, education, better standard of living or 
travelling abroad and not to provide care for those in need.”1219 
A health officer also said, 
 




“Economy is the biggest hindrance to caring for relatives’ children. 
Electricity or water bill expenses will marginally increase. But what about 
food and health care? People avoid taking on this burden.”1220 
Apart from these reasons, respondents attempting to explain Tanzanians’ reluctance to adopt 
also mentioned the legal and institutional challenges. The researcher made some observations 
during field research regarding these challenges. They include the mandated authorities’ lack 
of sufficient knowledge, training and experience in handling child adoption practice, the 
courts’ financial and procedural inaccessibility, and lack of institutional commitment in 
facilitating child adoption practice.  
Social welfare officers, magistrates and judges exhibited an insufficient understanding of the 
law and procedure of child adoption as provided under the Law of the Child Act. During field 
research in 2018 and 2019, about ten years after the Act was enacted, they still referred to it as 
“the new law”. Social welfare officers were honest about this shortcoming and attributed it to 
the lack of training, as already explained above. On the side of the court, several respondent 
judicial officers declared a lack of experience in child adoption matters. An adoptive parent 
and seasoned child adoption legal practitioner said, “…judges and magistrates do not actually 
know the law and procedure on child adoption…”.1221 In analysing adoption cases, the 
researcher came across substantive and procedural irregularities that proved this contention. 
There were irregularities in matters of court jurisdiction, adherence to child adoption 
requirements, and child adoption procedures. For instance, open adoption requirements and 
procedures were a stumbling block for several magistrates and judges. Some magistrates ruled 
on closed adoption petitions as if they were open,1222 and some judges deliberated on open 
adoption petitions as if closed.1223 The researcher also came across an adoption order granted 
in the Juvenile Court at Kisutu, which has no jurisdiction for adoption matters.1224 Adherence 
 
1220 Interview with a deputy regional health officer, Regional Commissioner's Offices, Dar es Salaam, on 
07.02.2019. 
1221 Interview with an advocate specialised in child adoption practice and resident non-Tanzanian adoptive 
parent, Dar es Salaam, on 28.02.2018. 
1222 For instance, in the Resident Magistrate's Court of Kinondoni, At Kinondoni, “In the Matter of the Law of 
the Child Act, 2009, In the Matter of A (Infant) and In the Matter of Application for Adoption by CXM and LSL 
of Dar es Salaam” (04.08.2017); and District Court of Kinondoni, At Kinondoni, “In the Matter of the Law of 
the Child Act, 2009 and In the Matter of an Application for Custody of MJM by JW and AW”. 
1223 For instance, an adoption by the child's grandmother concluded in the High Court, see High Court of the 
United Republic of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam District Registry, At Dar es Salaam, “In the Matter of the Law of 
the Child Act, No. 21 of 2009 and In the Matter of GSG-the Infant and In the Matter of Petition for Adoption 
Order by DHN”. 
1224 Juvenile Court of Dar es Salaam, at Kisutu, “In the Matter of the Law of the Child Act, No. 21 of 2009, In 
the Matter of an Application for an Open Adoption Order by HAB alias HAH and In the Matter of Open 




to requirements pertaining to age,1225 residence,1226 marital status,1227 pre-adoption foster 
care,1228 and best interests determination and application was also not always strictly 
observed. If the institutions implementing child adoption law do not understand it, it is even 
more challenging for the general public to understand and apply it. 
Regarding the court’s inaccessibility in child adoption matters, social welfare officers 
attributed this to the length of adoption proceedings, financial costs of adoption and 
complicated procedures that challenge a common Tanzanian’s understanding. One social 
welfare officer, while speaking about these difficulties, said, 
“Many applicants become stuck at the fostering stage because advocates are 
very expensive; they cost 1.5 to 3 million Tanzanian shillings for an 
adoption, they say. They become reluctant to file adoption petitions. And 
the high court is not easily accessible to ordinary people without legal 
representation. Also, adoption proceedings take too long; and they are 
postponed for years as if they are similar to criminal! This is because judges 
are always reshuffled. I have an adoption proceeding at the High Court that 
has gone on for two years now with a change of four judges already. Last 
time the case was postponed for six months just because the applicant had 
gone out for five minutes to find a snack for the child while the case got 
called.” 1229 
Although open adoption, as conceived during the Act’s drafting, would have assisted in 
reducing the procedural inaccessibility of the court, it now applies only to adoptions by 
relatives. District and resident magistrate’s courts are generally more approachable than the 
High Court of Tanzania. For instance, for a long time Kiswahili was used as the language of 
proceedings in the lower courts, while at the High Court, English was used. Since only a small 
number of Tanzanians are conversant with the English language, this acted as a barrier. 
However, there has been a recent change under Act 1 of 2021 which amends the 
Interpretation of Laws Act by adding section 84A which makes Kiswahili the official 
language of all courts.1230 This change may improve court accessibility, particularly in 
 
1225 A child adoption order was granted for a 29-year-old woman in The District Court of Kinondoni, at 
Kinondoni, “In the Matter of the Law of the Child Act 2009 and In the Matter of RCM of Kinondoni-Dar es 
Salaam and In the Matter of Application for an Adoption Order by ECK of Mbezi Beach, Kinondoni-Dar es 
Salaam”. 
1226 The adopted child and adoptive parents were already resident in the USA at the time of the adoption order in 
the case of High Court of Tanzania, At Dar es Salaam, “In the Matter of the Law of the Child Act, 2009, In the 
Matter of Adoption of M (the Child) by PLK and PMK (Petitioners) of Texas, USA” (2014). 
1227 The applicant stepfather was not yet married to the adopted child's mother in High Court of the United 
Republic of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam District Registry, At Dar es Salaam, “In the Matter of Application for 
Adoption of TGB, a Male Child and In the Matter of Application for Adoption of TGB by RB”. 
1228 In an open adoption by a relative there was no compliance with the pre-adoption foster care requirement in 
District Court of Kinondoni, At Kinondoni, “In the Matter of the Law of the Child Act, 2009 and In the Matter 
of an Application for an Open Adoption of PJK by MPM” (16.06.2017). 
1229 Interview with social welfare officer, Ilala Municipal Council, Dar es Salaam, on 07.02.2019. 




adoption matters. Other issues, such as postponement of proceedings, are administrative 
issues that the court administration can resolve. 
The court’s role in interpreting the law is not sufficiently reflected in child adoption practice. 
Rather, the court suffers from misconceptions in the law, as in the case of the 
misconceptualisation of open adoption. The court could have established the correct 
interpretation and application of the concept which would have cured several problems 
connected with open adoption, as explained in this thesis. Also, the court has refrained from 
clearing up contradictory provisions, such as section 61 of the Act, which derogates from the 
child’s right to an opinion and participation in decision-making. This section also counteracts 
the provisions in the Act and the Regulations requiring a child’s consent to an adoption 
provided the child is of sufficient maturity and understanding to give such consent. The 
researcher observed that advocates and officers of the court with the responsibility to assist it 
to arrive at just and correct decisions show a lack of aptitude and commitment to do so in the 
practice of child adoption.1231 Instead, they mislead the court by colluding1232 with clients and 
bending the law to suit their clients’ demands.1233 
There is very little institutional commitment to facilitating child adoption. This is common to 
both public and private institutions involved in the child adoption process. The Department of 
Social Welfare has not emphasised the practice which can ensure a permanent family-based 
solution for children in need of parental care; instead, it still relies on institutional care. Social 
welfare officers, during interviews, declared that child adoption, especially with an 
international element, is procedurally difficult; hence they tend to avoid it.1234 Children’s 
rights stakeholders such as UNICEF Tanzania support formal child adoption but have not 
included it in their priority areas. During field research, a UNICEF officer in charge of 
alternative child care said that the organisation’s primary focus was on deinstitutionalising 
child care.1235 The researcher is of the opinion that coupling the deinstitutionalisation agenda 
with raising awareness on child adoption could go hand in hand in ensuring that children 
leaving or not placed in institutional care find permanent homes.  
 
1231 See discussion on a similar finding in Rwezaura, Wanitzek, “The Law and Practice Relating to the Adoption 
of Children in Tanzania”, above footnote 22, at pp. 147-151. 
1232 See the discussion on corrupt practices in child adoption in part 6.4.6.  
1233 For instance, the advocate in High Court of Tanzania, At Dar es Salaam, “In the Matter of the Law of the 
Child Act, In the Matter of RKSM (Infant) and In the Matter of an Application for Adoption by LBM of London, 
UK” (07.08.2014) instituted an open adoption petition at the High Court. The adoption proceedings reached the 
hearing stage before the advocate realised he was misleading the court and applied to withdraw the petition. An 
advocate who knows the law should not make such an obvious mistake. 
1234 Interview with social welfare officer 2-Kinondoni District, Dar es Salaam, 23.01.2019. 





The practice of child adoption in Tanzania plays a minimal role in reducing the problem of 
children without parental care. However, the adoption of even one child is significant as long 
as it serves the child’s best interests. For child adoption to significantly reduce the problem, a 
host of challenges must be eliminated first. This is because the socio-legal challenges 
explained in this part and throughout the thesis limit the practice of child adoption. The 
following chapter provides recommendations to address the challenges and provide a way 
forward. 
6.7 Conclusion 
The child adoption trend in Tanzania shows that the dominance of certain cultural groups in 
child adoption has gradually shifted since 1944. Currently, there is an increase in adoptions by 
African Tanzanians, both resident and non-resident. However, despite the increase, adoptions 
with an international element still dominate the practice. This means adoptions by non-
resident Tanzanians, resident non-Tanzanians, and mixed couples.  
The number of registered adoptions shows that child adoption practice in Tanzania is still 
very low. The general Tanzanian resident population consists of almost 60 million people. 
However, the leading adopters are those with a foreign element, whose number is limited. 
According to the information from registered adoptions, most adopters come from 
professional groups. This means that ordinary Tanzanians generally do not use the formal law 
of adoption. Cultural background and lack of understanding of formal child adoption are the 
main reasons for their non-engagement in child adoption.  
The registered adoptions show that adopters prefer girls to boys. They also show that the 
child’s age matters, with a preference for younger children over older ones. Children in the 
age groups 0-3 and 4-7 made up over half of the total number of adopted children in the years 
under study. In addition, over half of the total number of adopted children in these years had 
been abandoned. This finding indicates that child abandonment significantly contributes to the 
problem of children without parental care, and further, that adoption plays a role in solving 
this problem by providing a permanent family for those children. Moreover, it confirms that 
abandonment is one of the main factors leading to an increase in the number of children in 
need of care and protection, as discussed in part 3.3.  
The motives for adoption analysed in this chapter reveal the type of children adopted in 
Tanzania. Most of the studied cases involved an overlap between child- and family-centred 
motives. Although there were other motives which the researcher found difficult to categorise, 




were child-centred. This means that a considerable percentage of the adoptions helped to 
solve the problem of children in need of care and protection. 
The child adoption legal framework provides requirements and procedures geared towards 
safeguarding the child’s best interests. However, due to several shortcomings and gaps in the 
framework, this goal may not always be realisable. For instance, there is an urgent need to 
harmonise the provisions and practice of the Law of the Child Act and the Regulations made 
under it on child adoption issues. The problems associated with identifying a child for 
adoption could, for example, be addressed by the ‘freeing for adoption procedure’ under the 
Child Protection Regulations, 2014. However, since the Child Protection Regulations came 
later than the other Regulations, child adoption practice does not always adhere to its 
provisions.  
The institutions responsible for administering adoption law suffer from structural, 
administrative, resource and professional challenges that can compromise the child’s best 
interests. The institutional shortcomings affect the ability of the mandated authorities to 
interpret and apply adoption law. For instance, this study has shown how lack of sufficient 
knowledge, skill, and experience affects the way child adoption practice is managed by social 
welfare officers and judicial personnel. Also, it has shown how the shortage of time, human, 
financial and infrastructural resources create workplace pressures leading the responsible 
officers to resort to coping mechanisms that can detract from compliance with the child’s best 
interests principle.  
Tanzania is a country in which child adoption practices are impacted by legal pluralism. The 
presence and operation of other legal orders alongside state law have a two-fold effect on 
child adoption practices. First, the influence of customary and religious laws on child care 
traditions affects Tanzanians’ understanding of child adoption. They fail to comprehend the 
effects of an adoption order, especially regarding the permanent change of familial relations 
and its associated consequences. Second, it makes those Tanzanians who engage in formal 
child adoption do so for other compelling reasons that make child-centred motives secondary. 
For instance, the researcher found that in the case of non-resident Tanzanian adopters, 
children are adopted mainly in order to comply with the immigration laws of their host states. 
It was also found that in some adoptions the interplay of different legal constellations may 
compromise the child’s best interests. For example, the application of customary or religious 





The legal and institutional shortcomings discussed in this chapter and throughout the thesis 
are evidence of an inadequate child protection framework, especially in adoptions with an 
international element. For instance, the law does not sufficiently provide for post-adoption 
monitoring and support initiatives. In addition, there was no evidence of compliance with the 
minimum measures that the law provides for adopted children living abroad. Furthermore, 
Tanzania maintains that all adoptions with an international element are domestic adoptions, 
and that the country does not practise international adoption. Tanzania is not a party to the 
1993 Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption, and the researcher could not find a clear 
policy on the country’s position regarding joining the Convention. 
Lastly, while it is true that child adoption still plays a minimal role in addressing the problem 
of children in need of parental care in Tanzania, it has the potential to do more and the 
number of adoptions by resident Tanzanians is in fact increasing. Considering that traditional 
arrangements for child care are weakening, and that there is a move towards 
deinstitutionalisation, formal child adoption could be a good solution in future for children in 
need of permanent family-based care. Bearing in mind the low use of other alternative care 
measures such as foster care and placement with fit persons, the area of formal alternative 
child care in Tanzania needs keener attention. Thus, the following chapter provides 
recommendations for improving child adoption practice in Tanzania. 
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Chapter 7:  A Response to ‘in the Best Interest of the Child?’ – A Summary 
of Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
7.1 Recapitulation of Research Questions and Findings 
Journalistic, scholarly, and social reports on the increasing number of children living in 
endangered environments (‘most vulnerable children’) in Tanzania roused the researcher’s 
interest in child welfare law and practice. Her attempts to understand the root causes of child 
vulnerability unveiled an intricate social problem that could be examined from numerous 
angles. Being trained in legal studies, the researcher elected to pursue legal research on the 
care and protection of children who lack parental care. This led to the study of alternative 
child care, and in particular child adoption. 
A preliminary investigation into Tanzania’s law and practice on child adoption gave rise to 
questions about how the relatively newly enacted Law of the Child Act, 2009 of Mainland 
Tanzania addressed adoptions, especially those with an international element.1236 These are 
adoptions by Tanzanians living abroad (non-resident Tanzanians) and non-Tanzanians living 
in Tanzania (resident non-Tanzanians). These questions shaped the current study into a socio-
legal inquiry on Tanzania’s law and practice on child adoptions with a special focus on 
adoptions with an international element. At the centre of the study is an interrogation of: 
1. whether the existing legal, policy, and institutional frameworks have the capacity to 
adequately manage child adoptions with an international element; 
2. whether the legal process for child adoptions by non-resident Tanzanians and resident 
non-Tanzanians is in the best interest of the child;  
3. whether the law and practice on child adoption guarantee sufficient protection to the 
child in the adoption process; and 
4. the extent to which child adoption, especially by non-resident Tanzanians and resident 
non-Tanzanians, could help to alleviate the problem of children deprived of parental 
care in Tanzania. 
The main objective of asking these questions was four-fold: to analyse, to inform, to suggest 
solutions, and to motivate reforms. The researcher aimed at providing a critical analysis of the 
law, policy and institutional frameworks relating to child adoption in general, and to 
adoptions with an international element in particular. The analysis was meant to show 
 
1236 Detailed justifications for research on child adoptions with an international element are given in part 1.2 of 




whether the frameworks can sufficiently manage child adoption practice in a way that 
guarantees the child’s best interests. In the case of shortcomings, it was intended to 
recommend solutions that would motivate reforms and bring about a legal and practical 
transformation in the field of child adoption in Tanzania. 
The researcher used field and desk research methods to generate data that could address the 
research questions and meet the research objectives. The thesis presents, analyses, and 
discusses these data which were collected using interviews, documentary analysis and a 
quantitative survey, in combination with other methods. The empirical data were collected 
from selected districts and municipalities in Tanzania. They cover a period of twelve years 
from 2007 to 2018 and are in some aspects complemented by other authors’ previous studies. 
7.2 Research Findings 
This part provides a summary of the main research findings. They are arranged under 
headings that reflect the research questions.  
7.2.1 The Capacity of the Legal, Policy, and Institutional Frameworks to Manage 
Child Adoption 
7.2.1.1 Legal Framework  
The framework that regulates child adoption in Tanzania is mainly provided in the Law of the 
Child Act together with the Regulations made under it. In principle, the framework provides 
for how child adoptions should take place in Tanzania with the intention of protecting 
children’s best interests. The study’s overall findings indicate that the framework provides 
minimum guidance for adoptions generally, and specifically for those with an international 
element. A critical examination of the entire framework revealed a number of inadequacies, as 
summarised in this part.  
It was discovered that child adoption in Tanzania is regulated by multiple legal orders that 
create a relatively broad and complex legal framework. These legal orders interplay in 
practice and may be invoked alternatively depending on the nature of a specific case. For 
instance, customary or religious laws may apply in pre- or post-adoption decision-making 
where the involved parties are subject to such laws. The reality of this plurality of laws is that 
it creates challenges for the new familial relations and rights and duties created by adoption 
under state law. It also affects law enforcers, such as non-lawyer social welfare officers, who 
are required to take into account the constellation of legal orders involved in child adoption. 




The present analysis of the law on child adoption reveals a lack of harmony between the Act 
and the Regulations that creates difficulties in implementation. This legal disharmony results 
from haphazard drafting and enactment of the Regulations without proper sequence and 
sufficient consideration and consultation of the already existing provisions. For instance, the 
Child Protection Regulations, 2014, which should have been drafted first, came later than the 
Regulations on children’s homes, foster care, and adoption. The requirements and procedures 
under the Child Protection Regulations cover all alternative care measures and are certainly 
beneficial for children deprived of parental care. However, they are not always complied with 
in the child adoption process because the earlier provisions set out in the specific Regulations 
for each measure have already taken root.  
On procedural aspects, the researcher found a lack of clarity and uniformity in the child 
adoption requirements and procedures laid down in the Regulations. This is because the 
requirements and procedures for different formal care measures affect child adoption. During 
the child adoption process, it is necessary to consider the rules and procedures set out in the 
Regulations for child protection, children’s homes, foster care placement and adoption of 
children. Where an international element is involved, as in adoptions by non-resident 
Tanzanians and resident non-Tanzanians, matters are further complicated. For instance, the 
Child Protection Regulations, 2014 provide a procedure to free children for adoption, which is 
not reflected in the other Regulations and hence is not always adhered to. This has caused the 
enforcers to apply the law selectively and sometimes erroneously, based on long-term 
established practices and procedures that do not necessarily reflect the spirit and intent of the 
current legal framework.  
In the course of analysing the legal framework, it became apparent that the relevant legal texts 
on child adoption, especially the Law of the Child Act, 2009 and the Regulations made under 
it, contain multiple misconceptions, contradictions, ambiguities and omissions, as well as 
errors in language, typing, numbering, and cross-referencing. Despite the recent law review in 
2019 that edited some parts of the Law of the Child Act, many errors still subsist. These 
shortcomings affect the substance of the law and impact attempts to interpret and apply the 
relevant provisions correctly. In some instances, these shortfalls make it difficult to reconcile 
provisions of the Act and different Regulations that address a similar issue. As a result, the 
shortcomings affect the law’s implementation, especially when those responsible for 
implementation are not trained in law. 
In connection with the above finding, it was observed that some Regulations have been 




information available to the researcher, the weaknesses in the Regulations were not raised as a 
problem during the process of translation. However, in the case of the Adoption of Children 
Regulations, GN. No. 197 of 2012, some considerable changes are included in the translated 
version, GN. No. 164 of 2016. Nonetheless, while section 4 of Act No. 1 of 2021 amending 
section 84 of the Interpretation of Laws Act requires all laws to be translated into Kiswahili, it 
maintains that the language of the enacting version takes precedence in case of any conflict 
with the translated version. Therefore, the translations of the Adoption of Children 
Regulations and the other Regulations do not address the shortcomings in the original 
documents. That is not the task of a translation anyway, since it must follow the original 
version exactly. Thus, the Kiswahili translation of the Regulations might facilitate enforcers’ 
understanding of the law but it does not help to clear up the confusion created by the observed 
shortcomings. The researcher found that without first amending and harmonising all relevant 
legal documents, such translation risks creating parallel versions that further complicate the 
problem. 
In addition to these findings, the relevant laws fail to properly define critical terms related to 
adoption, or they provide definitions that are either misconceived or inconsistent with 
accepted international standards and practice. For example, open adoption is defined by the 
Act as adoption by relatives, different from the common understanding of this notion, 
according to which open adoption allows for varying degrees of communication, contact, and 
access between the birth and adoptive families. The effect of this misconception is an 
uncertain framework with novel legal rules that apply only in Tanzania. This presents a 
challenge from an interpretation perspective, especially when viewed in the context of 
international laws on child adoption. From an implementation perspective, this misconception 
limits the scope of open adoption and misconstrues adoption by relatives. Furthermore, the 
Act and the Regulations do not provide comprehensive legal requirements and procedures that 
apply exclusively to this type of child adoption. In practice, this results in contradictions such 
as regarding whether a relative prospective adopter needs to foster a child for six months or 
not. Social welfare officers expressed contradictory views regarding this question. 
Adoptions by non-resident Tanzanians face similar challenges because there are no sufficient 
provisions on the precise requirements and procedures for this type of child adoption. It was 
observed that the question of pre-adoption care for non-resident Tanzanian adopters attracted 
the most conflicting responses. There was no agreement on the terms of the requirement and 
its duration, especially where the adopters were relatives of the child. Social welfare officers 




In conformity with the alternative care principle of suitability, the Law of the Child Act 
provides a range of formal alternative care measures. However, there is a gap between what is 
provided in the laws and what is found in practice. For example, it was discovered that even 
though the Law of the Child Act introduced placement with ‘fit persons’ as a measure of 
alternative care in 2009, it is not yet practised throughout the country. Also, regulations 
concerning the requirements and procedures for fit person placements are yet to be published. 
Another example is foster care, which in practice is hardly used as an independent alternative 
care measure as conceived under the law, but mainly as a precondition for child adoption. 
These shortfalls, which result from the inconsistencies of the legal framework and weak 
institutional structures (as will be seen in the next section), force children to unnecessarily 
remain in institutional care against their best interests.  
The researcher found that the law does not adequately address kinship care as an alternative 
care measure. Despite its recognition in the Law of the Child Act, its regulation remains a 
challenge. For instance, even though the law provides for monitoring and support in formal 
placements with relatives, practice shows that social welfare officers hardly do so. The 
situation was found to be even more unsatisfactory in informal kinship care, where the Act 
merely recognises it without setting any further standards and safeguards to monitor it. The 
impact of this omission is enormous as it means the law does not adequately address the form 
of care that is most commonly practised by Tanzanian families and communities under their 
different customary and religious laws. This means that a significant number of children 
placed in informal kinship care do not enjoy the full protection of the law. While state 
intervention in traditional child care remains debatable, issues regarding children’s exposure 
to significant harm in kinship care cannot be disregarded. A balance must be struck to 
guarantee the child’s best interests.  
Despite the challenges discussed in this thesis, some components of the legal framework are 
very good. For instance, the Child Protection Regulations, 2014 establish a robust, 
comprehensive child protection procedure, which, if reviewed to correct the errors and if well 
implemented, can guarantee adherence to the child’s best interests. However, effective 
implementation of the Regulations goes hand in hand with enhancing the understanding and 
work conditions of the enforcers (mostly the social welfare officers). For example, the 
researcher discovered that implementation of the Regulations is compromised by workplace 
pressures arising from the shortage of resources such as time, qualified human resources, 




7.2.1.2 Policy Framework 
The researcher found that there is a multiplicity of policies that influence child adoption law 
and practice in Tanzania. Such policies include the Child Development Policy of 2008 and 
many others relating to children’s education, health, labour, and other relevant social aspects. 
Overall, it was found that these policies aim at protecting the child. However, their analysis 
also revealed some weaknesses that undermine effective implementation of the policies and 
laws on child adoption.  
Since different public offices developed these policies at different times and for different 
purposes, they remain unharmonised and potentially confusing in practice. It was observed 
that over time, their implementation has become inconsistent and counterproductive. It must 
be noted that in practice, ‘street-level bureaucrats’ adhere to the contents of policies more than 
to the relevant laws and regulations. This means that a confusing policy framework directly 
impacts implementation of the law.  
Also informing policy and adding to its framework are national plans of action, strategies, and 
guidelines covering or impacting child welfare in Tanzania. Similar to policies, these texts are 
also multiple and unharmonised. There is also no smooth succession from one national plan of 
action or strategy to the next. In practice, when the time for implementation of a plan has 
lapsed, it is succeeded by another without any further follow-up. The new plans rarely build 
on the work of the previous plans due to the lack of a rigorous review process that identifies 
their successes and failures in order to better address the needs in the field. Thus, the multiple 
policies and policy-like documents on child welfare are disconnected in a way that affects 
their implementation and defeats their purpose.  
Multiple policy documents provide a wealth of plans and strategies for effective child care 
and protection in Tanzania. However, since they are not well coordinated and implemented in 
practice, they fail to achieve their objective. 
7.2.1.3 Institutional Framework 
The relevant laws have established the Department of Social Welfare with officers at the 
national and local government levels as an institution responsible for overseeing children’s 
affairs, including adoption matters. The Department has an extensive mandate on children 
such that no institutions involved in the child adoption process can function without its 
cooperation. This centralisation in the institutional arrangement is potentially good as it 
ensures uniformity in addressing children’s issues across the country. However, the following 




The Department suffers from challenges in respect of coordination of its operations and 
officers between central and local government levels. This is because the decentralisation by 
devolution reform has made the position and work of social welfare officers at the local 
government level unclear. Their responsibilities and accountability fall under the Ministry of 
Health, Community Development, Gender, Elderly and Children (MoHCDGEC) and the 
President’s Office – Regional Administration and Local Government (PO-RALG), which are 
two different Ministries. This breaks the smooth chain of command that is implied in the Act, 
a situation which complicates child adoption management. 
Institutional administration of child adoption law is impeded by structural, administrative, 
resource, and professional challenges that compromise adherence to the best interests of the 
child principle. Apart from the lack of good institutional coordination as mentioned above, 
these challenges are evident in the lack of sufficient human, financial, and infrastructural 
resources, which mostly affect social welfare and judicial officers, the key administrators of 
child adoption law. Among other things, the effects are seen in their lack of adequate 
knowledge, skill, and experience required for the proper implementation of adoption law. 
These shortcomings create workplace pressures that push the officers to create coping 
mechanisms with the potential to undermine compliance with the child’s best interests 
principle.  
The researcher found that the institutions responsible for child adoption, specifically courts of 
law and social welfare offices, do not have reliable modern systems for data storage and 
management. To a considerable extent, the institutions still use paper-based systems that are 
disorganised and make tracking information extremely tedious. For example, although the 
courts have made considerable strides in developing electronic data systems, they are still 
lagging behind with case registers and court decisions. In the course of the study, it was 
challenging and time-consuming to retrieve data on registered adoption petitions and adoption 
orders. This situation forced the researcher to work personally and manually in the court 
registry for several weeks to obtain the records of the cases used in this study. Similar 
instances of poor data management were observed in social welfare offices where records of 
their transactions were almost non-existent.  
The research findings reveal that the judiciary has not been adequately executing its role in 
adoption proceedings. For example, significant delays in adoption cases were recorded, 
affecting the whole adoption process, which is already a sensitive matter. Further, it was noted 
that some judicial officers are not well versed in child adoption law. Instead, they rely on the 




provisions of the law. Thus, there can be no independent verification by the judicial officers 
who may approve adoptions that do not uphold the child’s best interests.  
It was further noted that shortcomings in the legal and policy framework contribute to 
weaknesses in the institutional management of child adoption. For instance, the Law of the 
Child Act and the Regulations overemphasise the duty of social welfare officers to interpret, 
determine and apply the best interests principle. This means that the court is forced to rely 
almost entirely on the decisions of the officers regarding the best interests of a child in 
adoption proceedings. This practice obliterates the court’s chances to consider the best 
interests of the prospective adoptive child objectively. Since the court is supposed to be the 
independent umpire in the proceedings, relying on social welfare officers who may be 
influenced by the adopters jeopardises best interests determination by the court. 
7.2.2 Adherence to the Best Interests of the Child Principle 
Chapter five of this thesis contains an extensive discussion of the best interests of the child 
principle. This principle is one of the UNCRC’s four cardinal principles, and is widely 
applicable in children’s matters. The Convention’s near-universal status has given the 
principle broad coverage. This has led to the principle being included in multiple conventions 
and statutes with varying scope, purpose, and status of application. However, in most such 
instruments, the principle remains deliberately devoid of a definition or criteria for 
determination. The primary purpose for leaving the principle indeterminate is to allow for 
flexibility considering the diverse circumstances and cultures in which the principle may be 
applied.  
Thus, what constitutes the child’s best interests, cannot be harmoniously determined across 
different cases, cultures, nations, or regions. Nonetheless, the authority determining and 
applying the best interests principle must ensure that the decision made or action taken is in 
the child’s best interests. This study of the relevant laws and practice in Tanzania reveals 
mixed findings regarding adherence to the best interests of the child principle.  
The relevant Law of the Child Act does not define or provide criteria for determining the 
child’s best interests. However, the Adoption of Children Regulations provide a brief list of 
criteria applicable to child adoption. Compared to the criteria under Zanzibar’s Children’s 
Act, this list is very limited.  
Although the requirement that all administrative and judicial actions must adhere to the best 
interests of the child principle is uniform across the Act and the Regulations, other principles 




instance, the Act does not include a list of alternative care principles that concretise the best 
interests principle. These are found under the Regulations. The Foster Care Placement 
Regulations contain the least provisions for these principles, while the Children’s Homes 
Regulations include the most comprehensive list. Thus, adherence to these principles in child 
protection practice is inconsistent, which lays the basis for discriminatory practice that may 
impinge on the best interests of some children.  
The Law of the Child Act requires social welfare officers and the court to apply the best 
interests principle in child adoption. In practice, however, there is an over-reliance on social 
welfare officers to interpret, determine, and apply the principle. However, the officers lack 
sufficient training to understand the legal aspects of best interests determination and 
application of this principle in child adoption. Also, the officers’ socio-cultural and economic 
environment significantly influence their perceptions of what constitutes the child’s best 
interests. It was found that the workplace pressures emanating from a shortage of time, 
training, and resources force the officers to devise coping mechanisms that affect their ability 
to apply the principle. Since in cases of child adoption the court primarily relies on the reports 
and representation of the child’s best interests submitted by a social welfare officer as 
guardian ad litem, it cannot be guaranteed that the child’s best interests are always 
safeguarded in adoption.  
7.2.3 Adherence to the Law and to Child Protection Requirements in Child Adoption 
The Law of the Child Act and the Regulations provide child adoption requirements and 
procedures meant to safeguard the child’s best interests. However, the framework they create 
is plagued with the following shortcomings and gaps that defeat their goal in practice.  
The existence of non-harmonised provisions in the Act and the Regulations challenges 
adherence to the law in practice. For example, several different procedures can be used to 
identify a child for adoption. The problems associated with child identification could, among 
other possibilities, be solved by referring to the ‘freeing for adoption procedure’ under the 
Child Protection Regulations, 2014. Unfortunately, since the Child Protection Regulations 
came later than the other Regulations, child adoption practice does not always adhere to their 
provisions. Departure from the Child Protection Regulations potentially leads to protection 
issues, especially where children are identified for adoption, who have parents and relatives 
who are capable and willing to care for them. 
The impact of legal pluralism on child adoption is evident in the way in which the formal law 




child adoption alongside state law affect formal child adoption practice in two main ways. 
One, Tanzanians’ understanding of child adoption is influenced by customary and religious 
laws in respect of child care. As a result, birth families and, in a few observed cases, 
mandated officers, fail to fully comprehend the effects of an adoption order, especially 
regarding the permanent severance of familial relations and its associated consequences. This 
is one of the grounds for low use of the formal law of adoption. Two, the influence of other 
legal orders makes Tanzanians who engage in formal child adoption do so for other 
compelling reasons that are not always child-centred. For instance, non-resident Tanzanian 
adopters, for the most part, adopt children to comply with the immigration laws of their host 
states rather than to safeguard the child’s best interests. Also, the interplay between different 
legal orders in some adoptions may compromise the child’s best interests. For example, 
applying customary laws post-adoption pursuant to section 68 of the Act may affect adopted 
children’s inheritance rights in intestate devolution of property.  
The legal and institutional shortcomings in the practice of child adoption result in an 
inadequate child protection framework, especially in adoptions with an international element. 
For instance, the Law of the Child Act and the Regulations insufficiently provide for post-
adoption monitoring and support to ensure that the child’s best interests continue to be 
safeguarded. Tanzania maintains that all adoptions with an international element are domestic 
adoptions regardless of the fact that the adopted children may reside abroad with their non-
resident Tanzanian or non-Tanzanian adoptive parents. Since the country is not a party to the 
1993 Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption, adopted children living abroad have 
minimal protection under the Adoption of Children Regulations. In the course of the study, 
the researcher could not find evidence in practice of post-adoption monitoring for adopted 
Tanzanian children living abroad as envisaged in the law. 
The existing laws for the protection of children are yet to have a substantial impact in 
practice. It was noted in the course of this study that a considerable number of Tanzanian 
children live in an environment that exposes them to risks of significant harm. For example, 
the number of children living and working on the street is constantly increasing. Also, there is 
an increase in reported practices that affect children’s welfare, such as child abandonment, 
abuse, and violence, especially physical and sexual. Unfortunately, the majority of the victims 
are those children without proper family care. And where children are placed in informal care, 
instances of abuse by relatives and neighbours are increasing. This indicates a significant 




7.2.4 Potential of Child Adoption as a Solution to the Problem of Children without 
Parental Care 
The child adoption trend in Tanzania shows a current increase in adoptions by African 
Tanzanians, both resident and non-resident. However, adoptions with an international element 
still dominate the practice of formal child adoption in Tanzania. These include adoptions by 
non-resident Tanzanians, resident non-Tanzanians, and mixed couples. On the potential of 
child adoption as a measure to help alleviate the problem of children without parental care in 
Tanzania, the study revealed the following major findings. 
Considering the number of registered adoptions, the general child adoption practice in 
Tanzania is still very low. Taking into account the average number of registered adoption 
orders per year, which is 42 (including adoptions by non-Tanzanians), the number of 
Tanzanians adopting per year is negligible in comparison to the 2019 NBS estimation of a 
population of almost 60 million. While the number of resident Tanzanians eligible to adopt, 
for instance who meet the age requirement of 25-50 years, is higher than the number of 
eligible resident non-Tanzanians and non-resident Tanzanians, the highest numbers of 
adoptions in Tanzania are those with an international element. Thus, only a slight number of 
resident Tanzanians use the formal law of child adoption.  
An analysis of the registered adoptions shows that most adopters come from professional 
groups. This means that Tanzanians who do not engage in any formal profession hardly use 
the formal adoption law. It can be assumed that the cultural background of the Tanzanian 
majority inhibits understanding of and desire to use formal child adoption.  
On the other hand, because certain social benefits institutions, such as health insurance, rely 
on formalised relationships, there has been a gradual increase in the number of adoptions by 
resident Tanzanians. Although this is not sufficient ground for establishing adoptive relations, 
it serves to show that resident Tanzanians can use the formal law of adoption when prompted 
to do so. 
These factors, considered in the light of the weakened traditional child care system, the high 
practice of institutional alternative care and the move to deinstitutionalise, and the still low 
practice of foster care and fit person placements, show the significance of child adoption as an 
important solution for children in need of alternative care. 
7.3 Conclusions 





The current legal, policy and institutional frameworks on child adoption do not have the 
capacity to adequately manage child adoptions with an international element. Although the 
new Act and Regulations create a broader framework that provides more explicitly for 
adoptions by non-resident Tanzanians and resident non-Tanzanians than the preceding 
legislation, they have shortcomings that render them incapable of handling these two types of 
adoptions effectively.  
The Law of the Child Act and the Regulations consistently provide that child adoption must 
be in the child’s best interests. However, legal and institutional deficiencies coupled with a 
lack of strict compliance in practice jeopardise adherence to the child’s best interests in the 
adoption process. The increased legal and procedural requirements in adoptions with an 
international element further complicate the process and leave more room for non-compliance 
with the dictates of the best interests principle. Thus, in child adoptions by non-resident 
Tanzanians and resident non-Tanzanians, the best interests of children are not always 
sufficiently examined before taking a decision. 
The Law of the Child Act and the Child Protection Regulations attempt to provide a 
comprehensive procedure meant to guarantee child protection in all alternative care processes. 
Other Regulations that provide specifically for given alternative care placements contribute 
further to the protection framework. The laws, together with the institutional framework they 
create, build the child protection system in Tanzania. However, the Child Protection 
Regulations are not reliably implemented in practice. Thus, specific measures meant to 
safeguard the child in the adoption process under the Regulations, such as the ‘freeing the 
child for adoption procedure’, are not adhered to in every case. Also, there was no evidence in 
practice suggesting that post-adoption protection measures established under the Adoption of 
Children Regulations are usually complied with, especially for adopted children living abroad. 
Non-harmonisation of the law that establishes the child protection framework and non-
compliance with the law in practice result in a weak legal and institutional capacity to protect 
children in the adoption process. Thus, the law and practice of child adoption with an 
international element do not guarantee sufficient protection for the children concerned. 
In terms of numbers of registered adoptions, the statistical findings of this study in 
combination with previous studies, covering the period from 1944 to 2018, indicate a low 
child adoption rate. Compared to the size of the Tanzanian population and the extent of the 
problem of children in need of parental care in the country, child adoption as currently 





The research findings show deficiencies in the legal, policy, and institutional frameworks that 
challenge the management of child adoptions with an international element. Also, the analysis 
of child protection practice has revealed some problems that must be addressed to ensure that 
children without parental care are guaranteed sufficient alternative care and protection, both in 
temporary family-based measures and, where suitable, in adoption. This part suggests 
strategies to cure the shortcomings in the law and practice, especially of adoptions with an 
international element. 
7.4.1 Legal Reforms 
It is recommended that the mandated authorities in legal drafting, enactment, and 
implementation work on legal reforms in the following ways: 
The authorities should review and amend the Law of the Child Act and the Regulations made 
under it to correct all the formal errors in the black letter of the law in respect of language, 
typing, numbering, and cross-referencing.  
Also, the Law of the Child Act and the Regulations made under it should be reviewed and 
amended to correct and clarify inconsistencies, misconceptions, omissions, and ambiguities in 
the content of the laws. The requirements and procedures under the legal framework should 
be harmonised so that they will apply uniformly and avoid confusion in practice.  
The responsible authorities should review the law and ensure it not only recognises the 
influence of other legal orders, such as customary and religious laws, on the alternative care 
of children, especially in child adoption, but explicitly provide for their interaction with state 
law and how to manage the resulting effects of such interaction. This is imperative to ensure 
that the rights of children in alternative care are protected. 
The Adoption of Children Regulations should provide for the entire adoption process in terms 
of requirements and procedures for every type of adoption. Therefore, the Regulations should 
be amended to make them a one-stop centre for all adoption requirements and procedures. 
This will eliminate the need to consider provisions scattered in several legal texts, which 
complicates the management of adoption cases for the mandated authorities and legal 
practitioners. Also, the amendment should address specific procedural gaps in open adoption 
and adoption by non-resident Tanzanians.  
Further, the authorities need to review the law and practice in respect of the existing 
alternative care placement measures to ensure that they are practical in view of Tanzania’s 




legal guidance regarding the formal requirements and procedures for these measures. In this 
regard, placement with fit persons should not be operationalised without gazetted regulations 
that ensure consistency in practice.  
The authorities should review and amend the law to make recognition of formal and informal 
kinship care go hand in hand with appropriate regulation to ensure sufficient protection of 
children in this type of care. The Law of the Child Act recognises children in the care of their 
relatives as having parental care, and in accordance with the doctrine of family privacy, the 
state may be hesitant to interfere. However, due to the reported risks of significant harm 
children in kinship care are exposed to, some state interference is warranted to protect the 
child’s best interests.  
Law makers should adopt comprehensive criteria for determining the best interests of the 
child under the Law of the Child Act, 2009. The criteria will give uniform guidance for 
interpretation, determination, and application of the principle in all matters provided for under 
the Act. The criteria listed in Zanzibar’s Children’s Act, 2011 should be used to draw lessons.  
The legislature should establish in the law rigorous procedural guidance and training for 
social welfare officers and judicial personnel involved in best interests determination. This is 
essential since definitive guidelines on the child’s best interests determination in the legal 
texts may be unrealisable, and there are socio-cultural diversities, which are ever-changing, 
that further complicate the determination process. Therefore, qualified human resources are a 
mandatory requirement for the robust implementation of the child’s best interests principle. 
The responsible authorities should establish under the Law of the Child Act, 2009 recourse to 
the court for social welfare officers and other mandated authorities to seek interpretation of 
the law. The Act oversees sensitive matters, such as child adoption, that potentially changes 
the lives of children and their entire families. Therefore, legal clarity is required in its 
implementation. Since social welfare officers are non-lawyers, legal interpretation may not be 
their strong suit. Regarding those provisions that lack a consistent understanding and 
application, the officers or other interested parties should be able to move the court to provide 
an interpretation. Having a provision to this effect in the Act should prove beneficial in 
safeguarding the child’s best interests through effective legal implementation. 
The Legislature in consultation with the Judiciary should improve court accessibility in 
matters of child adoption. The Law of the Child Act, 2009 gave the Resident Magistrates’ and 
District Courts a mandate to rule in open adoptions in order to enhance accessibility of the 
court. However, since open adoptions are limited to relatives of the child, this provides only a 




related children still have to petition the High Court. Since it is a higher court, they require 
legal representation, which can be unaffordable. The law should be revised to see how access 
to the lower courts can be extended to other adoption applicants, especially resident 
Tanzanians.  
The authorities should review the law in order to strengthen the child protection framework in 
child adoptions with an international element. Post-adoption monitoring and support 
initiatives for adopted children whose parents are residents or citizens of other countries need 
more definitive procedural provisions. The intimated involvement of the Commissioner of 
Social Welfare and ISS in the Adoption of Children Regulations is not a sufficient protection 
mechanism, as social welfare officers lack any knowledge of the process abroad. Established 
procedures such as periodical reporting requirements for the adoptive parents, home visits by 
ISS personnel, and a collaborative child protection referral sytem between the Department of 
Social Welfare and social welfare institutions in the receving countries could be some of the 
ways to monitor and support the progress of the adopted child. In the case an adopted child is 
suffering or at risk of suffering significant harm, then the collaborative child protection 
referral system can be used to ensure appropriate measures are taken by the host social 
welfare institutions to safeguard the child’s best interests. These collaborative measures can 
be secured by way of signing bi- or multilateral agreements between Tanzania and common 
receiving countries.  
7.4.2 Policy Reforms 
Policy-makers should harmonise and coordinate policies and policy documents concerning 
child welfare. Since these policy texts are multiple and sometimes contradictory, there is a 
need to unify them and have only few solid documents whose implementation can be 
coordinated and guaranteed.  
Also, the policy-makers should ensure that policies adopted in the field of child welfare align 
with Tanzania’s socio-cultural, economic, and political environment. Policies that reflect 
these realities have more potential in implementation than otherwise. 
The Tanzanian Government should develop a political will to ensure that children’s rights and 
welfare are guaranteed. Despite the existence of multiple laws, policies, and institutions to 
safeguard the child’s best interests, the lack of a political will to provide requisite resources 




7.4.3 Institutional Improvements 
The Government of Tanzania and other specified institutions should take measures to improve 
institutional management of child adoption in Tanzania. To achieve this, the following 
measures need to be taken. 
There should be a central body (in the form of a specialised agency) for children’s matters 
independent of the Ministries that work with children. Children’s issues do not get the right 
attention under the MoHCDGEC because of the Ministry’s broad mandate. Also, several 
other Ministries handle children’s matters without any special means to ensure the child’s best 
interests are always upheld in their endeavours. Thus, a central body charged with 
coordinating all children’s matters in the sense of care and protection, health, education, 
labour, and others, will go a long way to ensuring that children’s rights and welfare are 
safeguarded. In child adoption, the central body would oversee the work of the Department of 
Social Welfare which is the accredited body that manages the child adoption process. The 
body will ensure that the law is effectively implemented and that children are protected pre- 
and post-adoption. 
The Department of Social Welfare needs to be restructured so that officers and responsibilities 
falling under the Department both at national and local levels remain wholly within its 
mandate. Making social welfare officers responsible under two different government 
ministries presents structural and administrative challenges that can only be addressed by 
reorganising the Department of Social Welfare. For instance, the Department under the 
MoHCDGEC can be extended to the local level by ensuring the sub-departments in the local 
government authorities are directly answerable to the Department and not to the authorities’ 
councillors. This measure will also address the confusion on where the social welfare 
departments at the local government level belong and avoid the constant reshuffles, such as 
being placed formerly under the community development departments and currently under the 
health departments, which affects the allocation of resources to these social welfare 
departments. 
The Government should allocate sufficient resources for the work of social welfare officers at 
the national and local levels. These include human, financial, and infrastructural resources. 
There is still a considerable shortage of social welfare officers, who should be in every ward 
of every district in the country. Also, there is a lack of adequate funds, office space, office 
equipment, and fieldwork equipment required for effective social welfare services. To ensure 




in order to reduce the workplace pressures resulting from their shortages. These lead to coping 
mechanisms that occasion mismanagement of the adoption process. 
Provision of legal training for officers who implement the Law of the Child Act, 2009 is an 
imperative demand. The Act and the Regulations made under it are not well understood by the 
officers who apply them in their daily work. A legal awareness-raising campaign with a series 
of seminars and workshops based on the Law of the Child Act would help to provide the 
required training for officers already trained in the law, such as judges, magistrates, lawyers, 
and other judicial personnel. However, for non-lawyers, such as social welfare officers, the 
Government and higher learning institutions must ensure legal training is incorporated in their 
curricula. This will assist in imparting skills for legal interpretation and application. Also, 
more specifically, the MoHCDGEC should organise periodical refresher courses for its 
officers in areas where they need training. Child adoption is one particular area that needs 
these courses, especially in light of the changes that came with the Law of the Child Act in 
2009 and the subsequent Regulations made under it. 
Courts should treat child adoption petitions with the reasonable care and urgency that they 
require. Adoption proceedings should not be postponed for long periods because of 
administrative issues such as reshuffling of judges. Since adoption procedures have set 
timelines under the Act and the Regulations, the court should also set an internal realisable 
timeline for child adoption proceedings depending on the definite court procedures.  
In connection with the preceding recommendation, the Judiciary should establish a specialised 
High Court Division to handle children’s matters and other family-related legal issues. This 
will improve accessibility to the High Court in adoption practice and reduce the duration of 
adoption proceedings. Also, it will allow for judges who have specified knowledge and 
experience of child law to handle child adoption matters. At the lower court level, the Juvenile 
Court already addresses all children’s issues, except for child adoption. Appeals from this 
court should be able to go to a specialised higher court that can handle them with the required 
legal sensitivity.  
Further, to ensure that the reforms bring about the required effect in the execution of legal 
functions ascribed to judicial personnel, the Judiciary must ensure strict compliance with the 
law. In this regard, court registrars should arrange for the registration of adoption orders 
themselves, within the time limit set by the law. The present practice of alloting this 
responsibility to the adoptive parents results in sporadic registrations and a lack of reliable 




All institutions should work on their data recording and keeping systems. Poor data 
management at the Department of Social Welfare is among the challenges encountered during 
field research for this study. Although there was talk of data systems in preparation and data 
retention tools were said to be already at the pilot stage, the Department could not comment 
on their progress. There is an urgent need to computerise data recording and keeping at the 
social welfare offices to ensure that files are well managed and stored. This will reduce 
complaints about data loss at these offices. Also, although the court has already made 
progress in this, more efforts are still required, especially in establishing an electronic case 
registry data system. RITA also needs to computerise the Adopted Children Register to avoid 
risks connected to paper trails. 
7.4.4 Social Remedies 
The Government of Tanzania and civil actors can play significant roles in addressing social 
circumstances that have an effect on alternative child care and child adoption in particular. 
Working in association, they could do the following: 
The Government together with the civil society can organise campaigns dedicated to raising 
public awareness on formal child adoption. The public education should ensure that society 
understands what formal child adoption means, its reasons, and its legal requirements and 
procedures. This awareness will assist those who have a genuine wish to adopt for child-
centred motives to do so, one way to speed up finding solutions for children in need of 
parental care and protection. It will also assist in reducing the number of applicants who want 
to adopt children only to access services such as health insurance or better education, since 
such type of adoptions are not necessarily in the best interest of the child. 
Also, complex social problems resulting primarily from poverty and globalisation need to be 
addressed. A lack of financial resources compromises the ability of parents to care for their 
children appropriately, leading to children without parental care and protection. Poverty and 
globalisation also add to the weakening of the traditional care system as relatives and 
community members cannot care for the children of others, and prefer to keep only a small 
nuclear family.  
Further, there should be initiatives to tackle child abandonment as a unique social problem 
that contributes to children being without parental care in Tanzania. The societal environment 
that forces women to abandon their children is the first item to work on. There must be 
adequate age-appropriate sexual and birth control education in schools and religious 




children in the first place. Also, sexual violence must be eliminated so that women do not 
conceive after being raped. Most significantly, how a girl or woman with an unwanted child is 
treated in society determines what happens to that child. The government and society should 
provide support rather than shun these women. In the instance that a girl or woman who has 
abandoned a child is caught, they should not be treated as criminals but should be given 
psycho-social education and support that will enable them to take back their children and rear 
them themselves. 
7.5 Cases for Further Research  
In the course of the study, the researcher identified the following socio-legal issues as areas 
for further research: 
1. A situational analysis of informal kinship care in Tanzania. 
2. The status of institutional child care and the move to deinstitutionalise in Tanzania. 
3. The care and protection of children in conflict with the law in Tanzania. 
4. Jurisdiction and practice of Tanzania’s Juvenile Court.  
5. A comparative analysis of child adoption law and practice by non-resident citizens in 
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